Elite-Citizen Gap

Study Notes

What the paper investigates

• Whether there is a legitimacy gap between elites (leaders in business, civil society, media, academia/research, political parties, bureaucracy) and ordinary citizens regarding international organizations (IOs). (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)

• If such a gap exists, what drives it — focusing on individual‑level characteristics rather than organizational or structural explanations. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)

Data & scope

• Surveys in five countries: Brazil, Germany, Philippines, Russia, United States. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)

• Six IOs studied: ICC, IMF, UN, World Bank, WHO, WTO. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)

• Two coordinated surveys: World Values Survey for citizens; LegGov Elite Survey for elites. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)

Key findings

1. Elite–Citizen Gap Exists

   • Elite respondents consistently have higher confidence in IOs than citizens do. This holds across all six IOs, four of the five countries, and for all six types of elites. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)

   • For example, the average confidence (on scale from 0 to 3) of citizens across all IOs is ~1.4 vs. elites ~1.8 (difference ~0.4). (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)

2. Variation in the Size of the Gap

   • The magnitude of the gap differs by country, IO, elite type. For example:
     • Brazil shows a relatively large gap (~0.6); the Philippines shows a small or even negative gap in some cases. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)
     • Among elites, bureaucratic elites show larger gaps relative to citizens; civil society elites show smaller gaps. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)

3. Drivers of the Gap (Individual‑Level Characteristics)
   The authors test four main hypotheses about what individual differences (between elites and citizens) explain the gap:

   Driver	What it is / how it works	Empirical results summary
   Socioeconomic Status (education, financial satisfaction)	Elites tend to have higher education and better economic position; such status correlates with greater legitimacy belief in IOs	Strong in US; mixed elsewhere. Less explanatory in Russia. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)
   Political Values (ideology, GAL‑TAN spectrum)	Values more supportive of global cooperation/less nationalist → more legitimacy toward IOs	Strong effect in US; mixed or weaker in some other contexts. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)
   Geographical Identification (global vs national attachment)	Greater global identity → more favorable views of IOs	Significant in US, Russia; less so in Brazil, Germany, Philippines. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)
   Domestic Institutional Trust (trust in national government, satisfaction with political system)	Those who trust their domestic institutions more tend also to trust IOs more; elites tend to have higher domestic institutional trust on average than citizens	This is one of the more universally strong predictors across IOs & countries. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)

4. Context Matters

• The strength of each driver varies by IO (some IOs with more economic mandates vs others) and by country. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)

• Also, other factors (controls) like social trust, political knowledge, age/gender are included; but the four primary factors explain much of the gap. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)

Implications / What it suggests

• The gap could undercut democratic legitimacy of IOs: when elites who make or implement global policy trust IOs more than citizens, there may be disconnects in policy and lack of accountability. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)

• Challenges for international cooperation: citizens’ skepticism may reduce support for treaties, IOs’ actions, compliance, legitimacy in domestic politics. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)

• Populist movements can exploit this gap: they can rally citizens by emphasizing IOs as symbols of elite disconnect or global over national control. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)

Limitations / Caveats

• Cross‑sectional snapshot: the data is from 2017‑2019. Causality over time not established. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)

• Limited number of countries & IOs; generalizability beyond these readings remains to be shown. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)

• The individual‑level model leaves out some organizational or structural explanations (e.g. how IOs act, specific performance, legitimacy cues). (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)