Notes on Ayer's Symposium: Can There Be a Private Language? (Wittgenstein vs Ayer)
Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument
Central claim: There cannot exist a necessarily-private language whose terms refer to what only the speaker can know (private sensations). A private language would lack an objective criterion to distinguish correct use from incorrect use, making meaningful communication and rule-following impossible.
Core definition (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, section 95):
"The words of this language [a necessarily-private language] are to refer to what only the speaker can know – to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language".
Public vs private: According to Wittgenstein, meaning is grounded in typical language practice within a community; following rules privately erases the very notion of rule-following and undermines meaning.
Rule-following and meaning hinge on consequence: For a rule to have meaning, there must be a determinate, public way to judge whether an action conforms to the rule. If every action can be made to conform to the rule, the rule loses its force and meaning (the paradox Wittgenstein highlights).
Key sections cited in the discussion: 258, 265, 268, 293, 198, 201, 88, 99, 106, 107, 101.
A.J. Ayer's Symposium: Can There Be a Private Language?
Ayer’s empiricist stance: Private language exists and is necessary for understanding language; his essay is a hard-nosed empiricist challenge to Wittgenstein’s private language argument.
Ayer’s thesis (summary):
Verifications of linguistic signs in the public domain are no better, in principle, than verification in the private domain.
There is no publicly observable object; observation occurs in the mind, a private Cartesian space; hence private language could be possible.
To salvage realism, Ayer seeks a way to reconstruct an external world while allowing for private language.
Two false assumptions (as identified by Ayer and the essay’s commentator):
Assumption 1: It is impossible to understand a sign without observing the object it signifies or something naturally associated with it.
Assumption 2: For a person to attach meaning to a sign, other people should be capable of understanding it too.
Order of presentation in the critique: The commentary addresses Assumption 2 first, then Assumption 1, following Ayer’s own order.
Private Language: A Working Definition (Ayer’s View)
Ayer’s example: Robinson Crusoe on an island learns a private language. Crusoe can potentially develop a language, and there must be a method of verification for signs even if there is no public domain for verification.
Verification via memory: Crusoe uses memory to verify which sign corresponds to which sensation or meaning; this illustrates a private method of verification that does not require a public domain.
Implications: If Crusoe can verify his signs by memory alone, does that undercut Wittgenstein’s insistence on the necessity of a public framework (custom) for rule-following?
The Crusoe Thought Experiment and Verification via Memory
Crusoe’s island as a test case to show privacy does not necessarily block language use.
Ayer’s claim: Memory can serve as a verification mechanism for signs referring to private sensations; there is no requirement that a public domain is necessary for meaning.
Implications: If memory suffices for a single isolated speaker, then private language might be possible in a Cartesian sense, challenging Wittgenstein’s broader claim.
The discussion frames Crusoe as a representative of how a private language might function in the absence of an external public domain.
Critiques and Alternatives to Ayer's Crusoe Case
Peter Asaro’s Case for Private Language (Asaro, 1994): Memory alone is not sufficient for Crusoe to justify that he uses signs consistently.
Thought experiment: Crusoe marks a tree as edible after tasting fruit; later returns and discovers the mark was misinterpreted, leading to sickness.
Crucial question: How does Crusoe determine which mistake he made? He would have to rely on memories of the intended meaning, which may not be reliable.
Asaro’s conclusion: A purely isolated individual cannot determine whether a sign is used consistently; this seems to be a paradox for private language.
The critique notes two problems with Asaro’s argument:
Writing systems and iterative development could create a linguistic community through practice and agreement, undermining the isolation assumption.
Even without a public community, memory is still a causal enabler of language use; a truly private language is still undermined by the need for shared criteria to verify meaning.
The commentator’s assessment: Asaro’s argument fails to defeat the broader claim that private language is logically problematic, but it raises important issues about memory and verification within a framework of potential community practices.
Temkin's Perspective: A Private Language Argument
Jack Temkin’s critique (A Private Language Argument, 1986): The argument does not hinge on a verification standard or doubts about memory reliability.
Temkin’s stance: The Wittgensteinian argument depends on the impossibility of a rule-following framework in isolation, not merely on verification concerns.
The commentator notes that Temkin rejects the idea that Ayer’s verification-centric reading captures Wittgenstein’s point.
Wittgenstein on Rule-Following and the Role of Custom
Core idea: Rules require an established usage, a custom; a signpost is meaningful only insofar as there is training and community use.
Key lines and ideas:
A rule stands like a signpost; there must be an established usage, a custom (Wittgenstein 44, 86).
Following a rule privately is impossible; there would be no objective criterion to determine whether one is following the rule (Wittgenstein 88).
Meaning arises from consequences in practice; a rule must delimit a course of action and reject others (Wittgenstein section 198, 86, 87–88).
The signpost metaphor: even with a worn sign, there is room for doubt; there is no single definitive course of action determined by the sign itself (the forest-path example) (Wittgenstein 44).
The argument culminates in the claim that language relies on a framework of custom; memory alone cannot ground the meaning of signs without such a framework.
The Commentary’s synthesis: Wittgenstein’s private language argument is not primarily about memory reliability or verification but about the impossibility of a private framework of rules without a public, shared basis.
The Public Domain, Solipsism, and Reality
Ayer’s radical empiricism risks solipsism if all that can be known are private sense-experiences in the mind.
The commentary argues Ayer does not convincingly address the implications for knowledge of an external world or for other minds.
The essay suggests Wittgenstein’s point is not that memory cannot verify signs, but that private language cannot have the framework (rules, customs) necessary for language to function at all.
The Beetle in the Box: A Crucial Wittgenstein Thought Experiment
The beetle in the box (section 293): If everyone has a box with something they call a “beetle,” no one can look inside another’s box; the beetle may be private and change over time.
Implications for naming private sensations: Naming the private sensation cannot carry informative content about the sensation itself because the content is private to each person and may vary or be inscrutable to others.
The point: Attempting to model private sensations with public-name structures fails; the private nature of the object undermines its capacity to function as a public sign.
The critique: Ayer’s attempt to designate private sensations with public-like names fails to capture the inseparability of sensation and its natural expressions in Wittgenstein’s view.
The Diary Keeper Thought Experiment and Its Limits
a) Wittgenstein’s diary thought experiment (section 258):
The idea is to keep a diary recording when a specific sensation recurs, using a sign “S.”
Wittgenstein argues that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated; hence, there is no stable way to track the occurrences of S.
Implication: You cannot define or fix the sign’s meaning through such private tracking, undermining private language feasibility.
b) Ayer’s interpretation:
He reads the diary experiment as attempting to show there is no valid method of verification for a sensation.
He suggests memory or physiological indicators could verify recurrence of the sensation, giving a private method of verification.
c) The critique’s response:
Wittgenstein’s point is not about a simple memory check; it is about the inability to ground a private rule without a shared framework of meaning and consequences.
The diary example is better read as illustrating the necessity of external criteria for rule-following, not as a simple memory failure.
The Memory Problem and False Memories (Ayer vs Wittgenstein)
Ayer introduces the idea of false memories: someone might remember an identical experience to another, enabling mutual understanding of a sign for that sensation (Ayer, p. 74–75).
The critique contends this fails: identical subjective experiences are unlikely; even if phenomenology were identical, the events generating the sensation differ, challenging the idea that they are truly the same experience.
Wittgenstein’s holism: sensations are inseparable from their natural expressions and events that produce them; private signs cannot detach from their ecological and social contexts.
Descartes, Solipsism, and the External World
The essay situates Ayer’s view against classical solipsism, drawing on Descartes’ Meditations:
Descartes argues that sense experiences can deceive us; skeptical hypotheses (the possibility of a dreaming state or a deceiving god) undermine certainty about the external world.
The famous conclusion: “I think, therefore I am” gives certainty about the existence of the thinking self, but not necessarily about other minds or an external world.
The evaluation notes Ayer’s position risks reintroducing solipsism and idealism, since the only certain knowledge would be private sense data; yet Ayer does not address this fully.
Connections to Foundations, Ethics, and Real-World Relevance
Foundational issue: Is language inherently social (public) or can it function within a private cognitive space?
Ethical and practical implications: If private language were possible, would it undermine shared norms, shared truth-conditions, and communication across minds?
Real-world relevance: The argument speaks to the reliability of memory, the nature of evidence, and the social dimension of language learning and meaning.
The debate connects to Cartesian skepticism, the role of memory as a cognitive tool, and the necessity of an external world for intersubjective knowledge.
Summary of Key Points and Implications
Wittgenstein argues: There is no private language; the essence of language is grounded in public rule-following and the social framework of meaning.
Ayer argues: Private language is possible and even necessary to understand human language; memory can serve as a verification mechanism, potentially circumventing the need for external public criteria.
The two positions rest on opposing interpretations of verification, memory, and the role of custom in language.
The debate highlights crucial tensions between empiricist tendencies (Ayer) and holistic, social-linguistic theories (Wittgenstein).
The final assessment in the transcript: Ayer’s view fails to address the core of Wittgenstein’s argument; memory cannot substitute for the framework of custom, and private language remains ontologically and logically problematic.
Important Quotes and References (Key Passages)
Wittgenstein (Private Language):
"The words of this language [a necessarily-private language] are to refer to what only the speaker can know – to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language" (Wittgenstein, 95).
Ayer on verification:
Ayer emphasizes that “verification in the public domain is no better than verification in the private domain” (Ayer, 67).
Diary thought experiment: Wittgenstein’s diary example is used to challenge the possibility of defining a sign S and tracking its occurrences (Wittgenstein, 98).
Right hand / left hand money thought experiment: Section 268 demonstrates the idea that practical consequences are essential for following a rule.
Beetle in the box: Wittgenstein’s beetle thought experiment (section 293) shows the private nature of sensations cannot be publicly named or shared in a meaningful way.
Asaro’s challenge: Crusoe’s language and the memory problem; the critique argues that writing and community practices could circumvent pure isolation (Asaro, 1994).
Temkin: A Private Language Argument (1986) – Temkin argues the argument depends on more than verifiability or memory reliability; it requires a broader reading of rule-following and social practice.
Conclusion
The essay concludes that Ayer’sSymposium does not successfully refute Wittgenstein’s private language arguments; it rests on a verificationist misreading of Wittgenstein and overlooks the essential role of the conceptual framework of custom and rule-following in language use.
The analysis emphasizes the importance of social, communal criteria for meaning and rules, and argues that memory, while important, cannot substitute for the external, normative framework that makes language possible.
The broader philosophical takeaway is that private language is not merely a question of memory or verification but a deep issue about the nature of meaning, understanding, and the social conditions that make language intelligible.
{ ext{Private language: }L{ ext{priv}} ext{ vs. Public language: }L{ ext{pub}}}
{ ext{Rule-following requires a shared custom: }R, C ext{ such that } orall ext{actions } a, ext{ a follows }R ext{ iff } a ext{ aligns with }C.}