Notes on Trusting Moral Intuitions by John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, and Russ Shafer-Landau

Trusting Moral Intuitions

Moral intuitionism is defended as a theory asserting that moral intuitions can be epistemically trustworthy.
The Trustworthiness Criterion serves as a central principle, emphasizing the social dimensions of cognitive states.
Argument moves away from individualistic claims (e.g., moral intuitions as regress-stoppers or innocent until proven guilty).

Moral intuitions are understood as conscious non-sensory mental events where individuals perceive things morally.
Examples: Instinctively believing that recreationally slaughtering persons is wrong or that aiding a friend is admirable.
They can be the bases of moral beliefs, but not all beliefs derive from intuitions.

For an agent to trust a cognitive state (ϕ), they must [ "cognitively rely" ] on it to improve or expand their understanding.
Trustworthiness relates to the warrants for cognitive reliance, which encompasses:
- Favored: The state is beneficial for the agent.
- Permitted: Reliance on the state is acceptable.
- Blameless: No blame should arise from reliance on the state.
- Appropriate/Reasonable/Good: Reliance on the state is sensible and beneficial.
- Defeasible: Trustworthiness could be undermined under uncertain conditions.

The criterion posits that if a cognitive practice (P) is in good working order, its outputs are trustworthy for participants in P.
The practice must:
1. Be socially established (broad participation over time).
2. Be deeply entrenched (essential aspect of participants' lives).
3. Include sophisticated methods for critically evaluating outputs.
4. Encourage achievements like accurate predictions and understanding.
5. Exhibit internal harmony (outputs cohere without systemic inconsistencies).
6. Exhibit external harmony (outputs cohere with other practices in good order).

Satisfies the Trustworthiness Criterion by being in good working order; it has reliably consistent outputs.

Fails the criterion due to lack of reliable outputs; predictions are inconsistent and lack evaluative frameworks.

Indicates nuanced success; while there is disagreement about tastes (open to cultural interpretation), it may yield trustworthy outputs regarding pleasantness in some contexts.

Produces outputs that face significant internal inconsistency; lacks universal agreement even among serious practitioners.

Demonstrated through examples where conditions (i-VI) influence the reliability of outputs significantly.
The moral intuition practice is examined against the Trustworthiness Criterion's standards:
1. Socially Established: It has historical roots; participation is ubiquitous in human experience.
2. Deeply Entrenched: It’s fundamental to human social practice.
3. Critically Evaluated: Several methods (e.g., ensuring coherence, consulting others, comparison with moral exemplars) going beyond individual belief assessment.
4. Substantive Projects: Ethical inquiries and navigation of complex moral situations benefit from moral intuitions.
5. Internal Harmony: Numerous intuitions align with moral platitudes and common moral beliefs, suggesting less systemic conflict than theorized.
6. External Harmony: Moral intuitions cohere reasonably with outputs from established cognitive practices.

When grounded in trustworthy moral intuitions, moral beliefs derived from them are also deemed reliable, validating the intuitionist perspective.
This extends the argument beyond mere acceptance of moral intuitions to framing how they connect to broader moral inquiry and conceptions of epistemic merit.