The Psychology of Decision Making

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Rationality:

  • Your preferences are consistent and your choices follow clear principles.

  • John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern formalized how a rational person should choose under risk.

  • Their work became the foundation of expected utility theory in economics and decisions.

Expected Utility Theory:

  • By Neumann & Morgenstern.

  • Expected utility theory is presented as a normative theory.

  • A classical theory that does not intend to explain how people actually behave, but how people should behave if they follow the will to make certain rational decisions.

  • It's not mainly describing real behavior, but setting a standard for how people should decide if they want to be rational.

  • More like rules of ideal decision-making.

  • Goal: The goal of the theory is to establish a set of assumptions that underlie rational decision making.

  • These assumptions are the logic behind rational choice.

Order of alternatives:

  • A rational decision maker should be able to compare any 2 options.

    • You either prefer A to B, prefer B to A.

    • You're indifferent, no confusion

    • "I can't choose” if the options are clear.

  • Preferred ranking: Decision makers should be able to compare any 2 alternatives.

  • They should either prefer 1 alternative to the other, or they should be indifferent to them.

Dominance:

  • Do not choose a strategy that will give better results to the opponent.

  • Rational actors should never adopt strategies that are “dominated” by other strategies (adopting a strategy is equivalent to making a decision).

Cancellation:

  • A choice between 2 alternatives should depend only on those outcomes that differ, not on outcomes that are the same for both alternatives.

  • If 2 options share the same outcomes in some parts, those shared parts shouldn't affect the choice.

  • The decision should depend only on what differs, because the common factors " cancel out.”

Transivity:

  • If a rational decision maker prefers Outcome A to Outcome B, and Outcome B to Outcome C, than that person should prefer Outcome A to Outcome C.

  • a>b and b>c → a>c

  • This keeps preferences logically consistent and prevents circular choices.

Continuity:

  • For any set of outcomes, a decision maker should always prefer a gamble between the best and worst outcome to a sure intermediate outcome if the odds of the best outcome are good enough.

  • Peferences shift smoothly with probabilities, not abruptly.

Invariance:

  • A decision maker should not be affected by the way the alternatives are presented.

  • Framing shouldnt matter.

  • Framing: "90% success” and “10% complication” can describe the same situation, but people often react differently.

  • It hints that real decisions are sensitive to wording and emotion.

Expected utility theory:

  • Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue that utility theory is not an adequate descriptive model and propose an alternative account of choice under risk.

  • Prospect Theory

Prospect theory:

  • Different from utility theory.

  • Replacing 'utility' (net income) with 'value' (profit and loss, ie deviations from a reference point).

  • Prospect theory predicts that selection depends on how the problem is perceived.

  • If a 'reference point' is defined where the result is seen as profit, then the function value is concave and the decision maker is 'risk averse'.

  • If the 'reference point' is termed where the result is seen as a loss, then the function value is convex and the decision maker is 'risk seeking'.

  • The shape explains why we avoid risk when winning, but may chase risk when trying to avoid losses.

  • The graph shows that losses are steeper than gains.

  • Hypothetical Decision Weights according to Prospect Theory.

  • Decision weights tend to overweigh small probabilities and underweight moderate and high probabilities.

  • Prospect theory argues people don't treat probabilities objectively.

  • This helps explain lottery play and avoidance in low-probability risks.

Thinking fast and slow:

  • This introduces the idea that we have fast, intuitive thinking and slower, analytical thinking.

  • It sets up why biases happen:

    • Often fast thinking drives the first response.

    • Slow thinking may or may not correct it.

  • The 2 systems work together.

  • We need them both but kahneman suggests that we need to be careful.