Study Notes on The Nuclear Taboo: The U.S. and Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use

The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use

Introduction

  • The fiftieth anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki marks a significant event, as these represent the only instances of nuclear weapon use in warfare.
  • The phenomenon of nuclear non-use since 1945 is central to the discourse on international relations, yet the origins and maintenance of this tradition are not fully understood.
  • Common explanations cite deterrence as the primary reason for non-use, but this article contends that it is insufficient.
  • A normative element, which has arisen globally, plays a crucial role in the stigma surrounding nuclear weapons, categorizing them as unacceptable for use in warfare.
  • The article specifically investigates the U.S. nuclear experience to highlight anomalies in conventional deterrence explanations.

Empirical Anomalies of Conventional Deterrence

  1. Non-use by the United States in contexts without fear of nuclear retaliation:
    • Early years of U.S. nuclear monopoly (1945-1949) and later in the Vietnam War despite extensive bombing.
    • Example: The U.S. did not use nuclear weapons in Vietnam, despite dropping conventional bombs equivalent to many Hiroshima bombs (including the Gulf War scenario).
    • Britain did not use nuclear weapons in the Falklands, nor did the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.
  2. The failure of nuclear weapons to deter attacks from non-nuclear states:
    • Instances of attacks by China during the Korean War and North Vietnam during the Vietnam War demonstrate this.
  3. The situation of small non-nuclear states remaining less threatened by a nuclear security dilemma, challenging realist assumptions.
  4. The reluctance of several states to pursue nuclear arsenals despite capability, contradicting claims that U.S. security guarantees alone motivate this.

The Normative Prohibition Against Nuclear Weapons

  • The article posits a normative prohibition against nuclear weapons, essential for understanding non-use.
  • The nuclear taboo has developed, delegitimizing nuclear weapons as balanced with conventional warfare and stabilizing self-help dynamics in international relations.
  • The taboo's impact extends beyond mere deterrence explanations to influence behavior, shaping the identity of what it means to be a "civilized state."

The Taboo versus Materialist Explanations

  1. Normative Effects:
    • Norms exert regulative effects (constraining actions) and constitutive effects (defining identity and behavior).
    • The primary regulative effect is the prohibition against first use, showing that nuclear use is not just a strategic choice but framed within moral and ethical considerations.
  2. Historical Shift:
    • In the aftermath of Hiroshima, decision-making reflected minimal stigma attached to nuclear use, evolving through the Korean War era to an entrenched taboo by the Gulf War.
    • A deeper understanding is achieved by analyzing four historical cases: 1945 Japan, Korean War, Vietnam War, and Persian Gulf War.

Case Studies of Nuclear Decision-Making

1. Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Early Use
  • Decisions by U.S. leaders in 1945 had minimal moral objections to atomic bomb usage, largely justified under existing military norms.
  • Public and military opinion largely supported the use of atomic bombs to end World War II, showing no stigma against such actions at that time.
2. The Korean War: Emerging Norms
  • In the Korean War, leaders, including Truman and later Eisenhower, displayed hesitation in considering nuclear options despite discussions, indicating early normative and political constraints emerging around nuclear use.
  • Concerns arose about world opinion and moral implications of using nuclear weapons in Asia, highlighting the growing taboo.
3. The Vietnam War: Stronger Normative Influences
  • U.S. leaders, despite the ongoing war, did not consider nuclear options despite several military pressures. Presidential advisers publicly opposed the idea, recognizing the prevailing moral and political climate against nuclear use.
  • The notion of "nuclear weapons against non-nuclear adversaries", such as Vietnam, raised significant political obstacles related to moral perceptions of warfare and destruction.
4. The Gulf War: Taboo Solidified
  • In the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. leaders ruled out nuclear weapons entirely and considered nuclear use to be unacceptable, a significant departure from prior military doctrines where such ideas were broached.
  • The taboo had developed to the point where even discussions of nuclear options were seen as excessive; officials clearly articulated that using nuclear arms would jeopardize their moral standing and unify global condemnation.

Conclusions on Normative Effects

  • The nuclear taboo's development has implications extending across history, inhibiting nuclear use and promoting broader issues of international norms concerning warfare.
  • It illustrates that despite the principles of deterrence, the role of norms and taboos substantially influences international relations and security dynamics.
  • Recommendations for policymakers suggest a future consideration of how evolving norms could influence strategies and defense policies globally, especially concerning nuclear disarmament and military ethics.