High-level guidance on how to build a secure house, including best practices and regulations.
Building code that sets standards for home safety requiring fire exits and proper insulation
Model
Definition: A theoretical concept of how security should be implemented to achieve specific security objectives, such as confidentiality, integrity, or availability.
Example: Bell-LaPadula Model, Biba Integrity Model, Zero Trust Model
Analogy: General House
A house built with minimalist modern design or traditional colonial style.
Blueprint
Definition: A specific, detailed plan for implementing security controls in an organization, based on a chosen framework and model.
Example: Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) – A security blueprint for secure software development. ISO 27001 might create a custom blueprint detailing specific encryption protocols, access control systems, and incident response procedures.
Analogy: Detailed House Plan
Specifies what materials to use (e.g., brick, wood, concrete).
Specifies where to place doors, windows, and rooms.
Specifies the exact security system (locks, cameras, access control).
Usable Security Blueprint
Most organizations draw on established security frameworks, models, and practices to generate a usable security blueprint.
Some of these frameworks, models, and practices are:
Proprietary (only available for a significant fee).
Relatively inexpensive (such as ISO and ISACA standards).
Free (available from NIST and a variety of other sources).
The chosen mode/framework/practices must be flexible, scalable, robust, and sufficiently detailed.
ISO 27000 Series
ISO/IEC 27002
Information Technology—Code of Practice for Information Security Management
One of the most widely referenced and often discussed security models/frameworks
Purpose: Offers guidance for the management of InfoSec to individuals responsible for their organization’s security programs.
Focused on a broad overview of the various areas of security, providing information on 127 controls over 10 areas.
ISO/IEC 27001
Provides information on how to implement ISO/IEC 27002
How to set up an information security management system (ISMS).
NIST Security Publications
NIST has published several special publications.
Advantages:
They are publicly available at no charge.
They have been available for some time.
They have been broadly reviewed (and updated) by government and industry professionals.
SP 800-12, Rev. 1: Computer Security Handbook
SP 800-14: Generally Accepted Security Principles and Practices
SP 800-18, Rev. 1: Guide for Developing Security Plans for Federal IS
SP 800-30, Rev. 1: Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments
SP 800-34, Rev. 1: Contingency Planning Guide for Federal IS
SP 800-37, Rev. 1: Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal IS
SP 800-39: Managing InfoSec Risk: Organization, Mission, and IS View
SP 800-53, Rev. 4: Security and Privacy Controls for Federal IS and Orgs
SP 800-53A, Rev. 4: Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations: Building Effective Assessment Plans
SP 800-55. Rev. 1: Performance Measurement Guide for InfoSec
Example: Login authentication, IDPS (Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems), encryption.
Access Control Categories by Authority Type
Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
Enforces strict classification levels on data and users.
Users have no control over access permissions.
Example: Government Top Secret, Secret, Confidential classifications.
Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
Data owners control who can access resources.
Users can share or restrict access at their discretion.
Example: A user granting access to a shared network drive.
Nondiscretionary Access Control (NDAC)
Controlled by a central authority, not individual users.
Two main types:
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) – Access tied to job roles.
Example: HR employees can access payroll records, but not IT system logs.
Task-Based Access Control (TBAC) – Access tied to specific tasks or projects.
Example: A contractor gets access only for the duration of a project.
Bell-LaPadula Confidentiality Model
The Bell-LaPadula (BLP) confidentiality model is a state machine reference model that helps ensure the confidentiality of an information system by means of mandatory access controls (MACs), data classification, and security clearances.
A system that serves as a reference monitor compares the level of classification of the data with the clearance of the entity requesting access; it allows access only if the clearance is equal to or higher than the classification
BLP security rules prevent information from being moved from a level of higher security level to a level of lower security
Access modes can be one of two types: simple security and the * (star) property
Simple security (also called the read property) prohibits a subject of lower clearance from reading an object of higher classification, but allows a subject with a higher clearance level to read an object at a lower level (read down)
The * property (the write property) prohibits a high-level subject from sending messages to a lower-level object
In short, the principle is “no read up, no write down”
Biba Integrity Model
The Biba integrity model is similar to BLP
The intent is to provide access controls to ensure that objects or subjects cannot have less integrity as a result of read/write operations
The Biba model ensures that no information from a subject can be passed on to an object in a higher security level
This prevents contaminating data of higher integrity with data of lower integrity
The Biba Model assigns integrity levels to subjects and objects using two properties: the simple integrity (read) property or the integrity * property (write)
The simple integrity property permits a subject to have read access to an object only if the security level of the subject is either lower or equal to the level of the object
The integrity * property permits a subject to have write access to an object only if the security level of the subject is equal to or higher than that of the object
In short “no write up, no read down”
Clark-Wilson Integrity Model
The Clark-Wilson integrity model, which is built upon principles of change control rather than integrity levels, was designed for the commercial environment
The change control principles upon which it operates are:
No changes by unauthorized subjects
No unauthorized changes by authorized subjects
The maintenance of internal and external consistency
These controls are part of the CWI model:
Subject authentication and identification
Access to objects by means of well-formed transactions
Execution by subjects on a restricted set of programs
The elements of the Clark-Wilson model are:
Constrained data item (CDI)—Data item with protected integrity
Unconstrained data item—Data not controlled by Clark-Wilson; nonvalidated input or any output
Integrity verification procedure (IVP)—Procedure that scans data and confirms its integrity
Transformation procedure (TP)—Procedure that only allows changes to a constrained data item
Graham-Denning Access Control Model
The Graham-Denning access control model has three parts: a set of objects, a set of subjects, and a set of rights; subjects are composed of two things: a process and a domain
The eight primitive protection rights are:
Create object
Create subject
Delete object
Delete subject
Read access right
Grant access right
Delete access right
Transfer access right
Brewer-Nash (Chinese Wall)
The Brewer-Nash model—commonly known as a Chinese Wall—is designed to prevent a conflict of interest between two parties
The Brewer-Nash model requires users to select one of two conflicting sets of data, after which they cannot access the conflicting data