Détente

  • The growing danger of nuclear war and the Berlin and Cuba crises helped push the USA and the USSR into a more relaxed period known as détente. 

  • It was also made possible by the fact that now the USSR had reached nuclear parity with the USA and so could negotiate from a position of equality.  In addition each power had its own reasons for wanting a relaxation of tensions and there was also pressure from Europe for wanting a relaxation of tensions. 

  • The USSR needed relaxation of tensions in order to take the pressure off its economy and improve the standard of living for Soviet citizens. It also hoped to import new technologies from the West. In addition, its relationship with China was deteriorating and it was now crucial for the USSR to keep China isolated from the West by seeking for itself an improved relationship with the West. 

  • The USA needed a way of ending the Vietnam War, and Henry Kissinger, Nixon's National Security Advisor, was keen for the US to follow a more realistic foreign policy which would take account of the changing international situation. This was known as 'realpolitik'; Kissinger argued that the Kennedy's and Johnson's administrations had focused too much on victory in one isolated area - Vietnam - at the expense of the global balance of power. Thus Nixon hoped to use détente to get the USSR and China to put pressure on North Vietnam to end the war, and at the same time to retain and 'deepen' the US' global role through negotiation rather than confrontation. 

  • There was also pressure for détente from Europe. Events in 1968 - the invasion of Czechoslovakia and student riots and strikes in France - had shown political instability in both Eastern and Western Europe. The new chancellor of West Germany, Willy Brandt, took the initiative to improve relations between the two Germanys. His policy of encouraging greater dialogue and reduction of tension became known as Ostpolitik. From the Soviet side there was also impetus for improved relations in Europe; the Soviets wanted to win Western acceptance of the division of Germany and formalize the existing territorial situation in Eastern Europe. 

End of Détente

  • Many in the US felt that the arms agreements were benefiting the Soviets as the USSR was continuing to build up ICBMS 

  • The Soviet Union was continuing to support left-wing revolutionary groups in Africa such as the MPLA in Angola 

  • The Soviets and Cubans were also involved in supporting Ethiopia against Somalia in 1977. To the Americans it seems as though the Soviets were involved in a grand scheme of global expansion (though this was in fact not the case) 

  • There was also disillusionment with the Soviet Union's attitude towards the Helsinki Agreement. The Soviets had believed that Basket 3 of the agreement was meaningless as the US could not enforce human rights within the USSR. However, increasingly the US under Jimmy Carter tried to link economic  deals to improved human rights; for example for allowing new trading agreements only if the Soviet Union would allow Soviet Jews to emigrate. Such 'linkage' was deeply resented by the USSR. 

  • On the Soviet side, there was a realization that the US still believed that it could do as it pleased on the world stage despite détente. This was clear when the Israelis ignored a ceasefire in the 1973 Yom Kippur War that had been agreed at the UN and the USA did nothing to get the Israelis to obey the ceasefire. 

  • The Soviets were concerned that the US was still supporting anti-Communist governments in the 'Third World' such as the Chilean government 

  • The economic benefits that the US had originally sought from détente no longer seemed relevant as it's economy started to recover in the late 1970s; the USSR however was still struggling and with the economic position of each superpower so different and with the imbalance benefiting the US, Americans had less incentive to pursue a policy of détente 

  • The final collapse of detente came when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979; the US saw this as a serious threat to world peace and Carter refused to approve SALT II, stopped all electronic exports to the US and forbade US athletes to participate in the Olympic Games. The Carter Doctrine committed the US to intervene if the Soviets threatened Western interests in the Persian Gulf. 

Détente impacts

  • Historians have disagreed as to whether détente can be considered a success or a failure: 

    • Writers in the mid 1970s, and of course the biographies of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, stress the positive achievements of détente in reducing tension and the threat of nuclear war. 

    • Post-revisionist historians such as Mike Bowker and Phil Williams in Superpower Détente: A Reappraisal support this positive view arguing that détente allowed competition to be managed in a such a way as to prevent war 

    • John Lewis Gaddis argues that to call détente a failure is to misunderstand what détente was about in the first place; it was not intended to end the arms race or to reform the Soviet Union or prevent US-Soviet rivalry in the developing world but that it was intended to turn 'a dangerous situation into a predictable system'. 

    • Right-wing historians see détente as a weak policy that allowed the Soviet union to continue to strengthen itself and gain access to Western technology at the expense of American interests. 

Détente: A Comprehensive Overview

The growing danger of nuclear war and escalating crises, specifically the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, catalyzed a shift in relations between the USA and the USSR, leading to a period of reduced tensions known as détente. This era was made feasible in part because the USSR achieved nuclear parity with the USA, allowing both superpowers to negotiate from a position of relative equality. However, each nation sought détente for distinct reasons and was influenced by pressures from Europe.

Soviet Motivations for Détente

  1. Economic Pressure: The USSR faced significant economic difficulties and sought to alleviate these through a reduction in tensions. A more stable international environment would help improve the standard of living for Soviet citizens.

  2. Technological Imports: The Soviet regime aimed to import advanced technologies from the West to bolster its economy, particularly in agriculture and industry.

  3. China's Relationship: The USSR's relationship with China had been deteriorating, leading to significant geopolitical concerns. Strengthening ties with the West was seen as a strategy to counterbalance China's influence and avoid having a two-front confrontation.

American Motivations for Détente

  1. Ending the Vietnam War: The Vietnam War had stretched US resources and morale. Henry Kissinger, National Security Advisor under Nixon, advocated for a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy, coining the term 'realpolitik' to emphasize the importance of a broader global perspective over isolated victories.

  2. Shifting International Dynamics: Nixon perceived détente as a means to engage both the USSR and China, encouraging them to exert pressure on North Vietnam to bring the conflict to a close.

  3. Retaining Global Role: The US aimed to sustain and deepen its international influence through negotiation rather than military confrontation.

European Pressure for Détente

The European landscape was increasingly unstable, with events like the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and widespread protests in France indicating political turmoil. Willy Brandt, the new chancellor of West Germany, pioneered a diplomatic initiative called Ostpolitik, aimed at improving relations between East and West Germany. The USSR also sought acceptance of the divided status of Germany and wanted to formalize territorial realities in Eastern Europe.

Decline of Détente

As the 1970s progressed, perceptions shifted regarding the benefits of détente:

  1. Arms Agreements Viewed as Favors: Many in the US criticized arms control agreements, arguing they disproportionately benefited the Soviets while they continued to expand their Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capabilities.

  2. Soviet Activities Abroad: The Soviet Union's support for leftist movements in Africa (e.g., MPLA in Angola) and involvement in the Ethiopian-Somali conflict raised alarms among American policymakers, who interpreted these actions as attempts at global expansion.

  3. Helsinki Agreement Disillusionment: The US under Jimmy Carter began to link economic benefits to improvements in human rights within the USSR, a stance that was deeply resented by Soviet leadership, complicating relations further.

  4. US Actions in the Middle East: The Soviet concern over the US's apparent indifference to international violations, such as Israel's actions during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, signaled to the USSR that the US believed it could operate unilaterally on the global stage.

  5. Economic Disparities: By the late 1970s, the US economy began to recover, reducing American incentives to pursue détente, while the USSR continued to struggle economically, creating a stark imbalance.

  6. Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979: The final collapse of détente occurred following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, perceived by the US as a direct threat to global stability. Consequently, President Carter halted SALT II negotiations, restricted electronic exports to the USSR, and boycotted the Olympic Games, setting the stage for renewed tensions.

Impacts and Historical Views on Détente

Historians remain divided on the assessment of détente:

  • Positive Achievements: Some scholars from the mid-1970s, including those writing biographies of Nixon and Kissinger, emphasize the success of détente in reducing nuclear war threats.

  • Post-Revisionist Perspectives: Historians like Mike Bowker and Phil Williams argue that détente managed competition effectively to prevent direct conflict between superpowers.

  • John Lewis Gaddis's Interpretation: Gaddis contends that viewing détente merely as a failure misinterprets its goals; it was never intended to eliminate the arms race or the US-Soviet rivalry, but rather to create a predictable international system.

  • Critical Perspectives: Right-wing historians criticize détente as a weak policy that allowed the USSR to consolidate power and access Western technology at America's expense.

Key Impacts of Détente on US-USSR Relations up to the End of 1979

  1. Reduction of Nuclear Tensions: Détente allowed for significant arms control agreements, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) in 1972, which aimed to curb the arms race and reduce the threat of nuclear confrontation between the two superpowers.

  2. Economic Interactions: Détente fostered greater economic engagement, with both the US and USSR seeking trade agreements. The USSR hoped to import advanced technologies from the West to bolster its struggling economy.

  3. Geopolitical Maneuvering: Each superpower utilized détente for its own geopolitical advantages. The US aimed to engage both the USSR and China to help end the Vietnam War, while the USSR sought to isolate China by improving relations with the West.

  4. European Stability Efforts: Détente contributed to initiatives aimed at easing tensions in Europe, such as the Helsinki Accords that sought to improve East-West relations and address issues like human rights, though implementation varied.

  5. Emergence of Dissent: Despite the apparent cooperation, détente also exacerbated feelings of disillusionment. The US criticized Soviet actions abroad, such as support for leftist movements in Africa and the invasion of Afghanistan, leading to growing tensions.

  6. Collapse of Détente: The invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 marked the end of détente, as it was perceived by the US as a threat to global stability. Consequently, the US adopted a more confrontational stance, halting SALT II negotiations and increasing military preparedness.

List of them historians

  • Mike Bowker

  • David S. Painter

  • John Lewis Gaddis

  • Mark G. Kramer

  • Robert E. Smith

  • Natalia Roudakova

  • Richard Dean Burns

  • Gregory Mitrovich

  • Robert S. McNamara

  • Phil Williams (post revisionist)