CON LAW 1

 Federalism


McCulloch v. Maryland (1819)

  • Constitutionality of a federal bank—Necessary and Proper Clause

  • Specific to federalism unit: Maryland cannot regulate a national bank (10th Amendment and Supremacy Clause) as states cannot impede Congress’s means for executing its powers

  • Whole on a part vs. part on a whole

Scott v. Sandford (1857)

  • Court says Black people are not citizens (because they weren’t considered citizens when the Constitution was written), so they cannot sue in a federal court

  • Constitution does not give Congress the power to legislate over territories, so the Missouri Compromise is unconstitutional

  • Later overturned by 14th Amendment

Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918)

  • Struck down law banning child labor for violating 10th Amendment

  • Health/safety/well being of citizens is in the enclave of states rights

  • More relevant in Commerce Clause unit

New York v. U.S. (1992)

  • Radioactivity recycling of states 

  • Take title clause struck down for forcing compliance instead of incentivizing—they had no real choice not to comply

  • Carrot & the stick - motivation rather than compulsion - Monetary and access incentives permissible but the take-title provision was not because it was coercive

  • Congress can directly regulate commerce or provide a regulatory scheme that allows them to choose to comply on their own

  • New doctrine: Congress can encourage/incentivise states to regulate in certain ways:

    • Can put conditions on receiving federal funds if relevant to the spending’s purpose

    • When Congress can regulate private actions under Commerce Clause, can give states the choice between regulating those activities to federal standards or just having the federal law preempt state law

Printz v. U.S. (1997)

  • The Brady bill was a federal law requiring law enforcement to conduct background checks on guns

  • Requiring them to comply with this is unconstitutional because it forces compliance instead of just incentivizing (treats doctrine from New York v. U.S. as controlling)

State of Missouri v. Holland (1920)

  • Dealt with treaty on migratory birds—Missouri said it infringed on state rights

  • Laws to enforce treaties are a separate class of legislation, are also supreme law, and are not prohibited by federalism

Medellin v. Texas (2008)

  • Foreign national who committed murder → right to contact embassy

  • Self enacting treaty - Congress doesn’t have to pass separate legislation to enact it

  • States still have to comply

Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council (2000)

  • State law can be preempted by federal law even if the state acts first

  • A way to know if a field is occupied is if a private party cannot comply with federal and state law

American Insurance Association v. Garamendi (2003)

  • State law wanted to allow Holocaust survivors to sue and recover assets from Germany

  • Struck down because interferes with nationwide foreign policy

Arizona v. U.S. (2012) 

  • Federal law trumps state immigration laws

  • Field can be occupied by federal legislation even if Congress has not legislated, but intends field to be unlegislated (e.g. Congress deliberately chose not to criminalize employees, just employers, so the state legislation can’t criminalize this too)

  • When states can’t act:

    • If Congress explicitly preempts state law

    • If the state law is intended to displace federal law in an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction

    • If state law conflicts with federal law in a way that means they cannot be enforced. 

  • Section 3, Section 5(c) and Section 6 provisions were preempted by federal law; Section 2B isn’t at this point because state courts haven’t interpreted it yet so isn’t clear if it conflicts with federal law



Commerce Clause

Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)

  • Establishes what is considered commerce—commercial intercourse between states; saying anything internal in states cannot be regulated through commerce clause

  • Dealt with who could regulate New York and New Jersey waterways permits

    • Because of the supremacy clause, federal authorization was superior

Kidd v. Pearson (1888)

  • State made is illegal to manufacture alcohol

  • Court said manufacturing is not a part of interstate commerce since manufacturing occurs in one state, so there is no field to be occupied by Congress

US v. EC Knight Co (1895)

  • Dealt with Antitrust Act attempting to regulate to bust monopolies

  • Can regulate products coming in from across state lines but can’t regulate factories themselves

  • Manufacturing is not commerce as of this decision

Swift & Co v. US (1905)

  • Defines stream of commerce that begins with raw product then moves to processing facility then to hands of consumer

  • The whole stream is regulable, stockyards included

Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918)

  • Keating-Owen Child Labor Act

  • Even when Congress is otherwise able to legislate, if it is too intrusive, it will be struck down

  • Even if Congress is using the Commerce Clause, if that can be taken as regulating wellbeing (enclave of states’ rights), it is left to the states (people can’t be regulated, products can)

  • Later overturned by US. v. Darby

Stafford v. Wallace (1922)

  • State police powers in regard to anti-trust provisions (monopolies)

  • Stockyards are in the stream of interstate commerce and therefore regulated

    • Precedent derived from Swift & Co. v. US 

Panama Refining v. Ryan (1935)

  • Same law as Schecter (NIRA)

  • Gave executive the power to regulate and prohibit the interstate shipment of oil.

  • Delegation of power to the president struck down

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry v. U.S. (1935)

  • National Industry Recovery Act- Trade associations pass codes on wages, hours, trade practices, etc. president approves codes

  • Court strikes down delegation to the president as an unconstitutional delegation because gives no standards

  • Doctrine: Congress can regulate what has a direct effect on interstate commerce, not indirect effect

  • Wages, hours, trade practices in the case of Schechter have an indirect effect on interstate commerce, so law is struck down.

Carter v. Carter Coal (1936)

  • Carves out coal mining as not part of interstate commerce; cannot be regulated by Congress

  • Commerce is distinct from production

    • Employing workers, wages, hours, and mining coal are a part of production, so they cannot be regulated by Congress

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937)

  • NLRB created, which established union guidelines. NLRB is upheld due to the commerce clause. 

  • Upheld because NLRA contains jurisdictional element so it only applies to industries affecting interstate commerce 

US v. Darby (1941)

  • Congress can regulate employment (wages/hours)

  • Has authority to regulate working conditions that might affect public health

  • 10th Amendment is just a truism but doesn’t prevent Congress from using all means to exercise its constitutional authority

  • Overturns Hammer v Dagenhart (1918); says it’s based on an abandoned principle

Wickard v. Filburn (1942)

  • Market regulations on wheat production and personal consumption 

  • Substantial (aggregate) effect replaces direct vs. indirect effect—even if it’s just one farmer, in the aggregate, it could have an impact

  • Most expansive commerce clause power at this point

Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S. (1964)

  • Congress can regulate issues of morality if there is another constitutional authority allowing it—Civil Rights Act

  • Court exercises rational basis review

U.S. v. Lopez (1995)

  1. Types of Commerce to be regulated by Congress:

    1. Channels: roads, rivers, railways

    2. Instrumentalities: persons or things in commerce

    3. Activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce

      1. Is the activity economic?

      2. Is there a jurisdictional element? - way within act to determine if falls under interstate commerce

      3. Is there a legislative history demonstrating a link between issue and commerce?

  2. In this case, struck down Gun-Free School Zones Act for exceeding Congress’s Commerce Clause power

    1. Based on the three questions to consider for substantial relation, there wasn’t a substantial relation to interstate commerce

U.S. v. Morrison (2000) 

  • Virginia Tech gender violence—Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)

  • Did not apply rational basis - Although Congress proves valid effort to engage in connection, Court needs to believe

    • Unlike in Lopez, Congress presented an extensive legislative history of evidence of the substantial relation, but instead of just accepting Congress’s belief, the Court unpacked this belief and said it wasn’t significant

  • Does not adopt a blanket rule that non-economic aggregate behavior could become economic. 

  • Application of Lopez; Not a or b, c3 distinguished

Gonzalez v. Raich (2005)

  • Can the federal government regulate all marijuana use without an exception

    • Dealt with California giving exceptions for medical use

  • Court ignores Morrison/Lopez and applies rational basis review, upholds federal law under the Commerce Clause

    • Returns to citing aggregate effects from Wickard

NFIB v. Sebelius (2012) 

  • ACA upheld as a tax (under the Necessary and Proper Clause), rather than use of Commerce Clause powers 

  • Returns to citing Lopez/Morrison—looking at whether there’s a substantial effect on interstate commerce

  • Congress cannot compel individuals to purchase health insurance because Congress cannot create a market where one does not exist—power to regulate commerce assumes the commerce already exists



Economic Substantive Due Process

The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873)

  • Louisiana forces all butchers to join statewide butcher company, butchers sue saying violates 13th and 14th amendments

  • Court says that 14th amendment will only likely apply to discrimination on the basis of race

  • State interest in common good: Ensuring Mississippi River isn’t polluted—in this interest, Louisiana puts regulations on slaughterhouses, limiting butchers’ individual freedom

  •  Court says this matters falls under the enclave of states rights not the 14th Amendment—says the plaintiffs claim their rights “in error” as these rights come from states, not national citizenships

  • Bradley’s dissent says this is a right to liberty under the 14th Amendment—provides frame for future cases

Munn v. Illinois (1877)

  • States reserve the right to regulate an individual's property if the property will be ingrained in the public good. 

  • Due process in grain rights!

Mugler v. Kansas (1887)

  • Kansas banned alcohol in the interest of public safety

  • Court upheld the ban, creating the “reasonableness test.” The Court looks at regulations and asks if there is a “reasonable relationship” to health and public safety. 

Chicago Railway v. Minnesota (1890)

  • Minnesota set fair price regulations on railroads.

  • Court declares that Minnesota law does not pass the reasonableness test. The Courts must determine reasonableness, not the legislature. (Not yet using rational basis review)

Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897)

  • Court talks about economic liberty for the first time—injects “substance” into the word liberty in the 14th Amendment's due process clause

  • Louisiana law prevented companies located in Louisiana from purchasing insurance from other states because no other state regulated insurance fraud. 

    • Court struck down this law, upheld economic liberty to buy insurance wherever an individual chooses. 

Holden v. Hardy (1898)

  • Utah law limits hours miners can work. 

  • Court upholds this law. Right to contract is an economic liberty but can be overcome by reasonableness test (Mugler v. Kansas)

  • Balances reasonableness test again right to economic liberty—can only be infringed if reasonableness test met. In this case, the circumstances were related to public safety

Lochner v. New York (1905)

  • New York law liming hours baker’s can work

  • Court will intervene if reason isn’t apparent/disagree - Permits unhealthy conditions due to lack of severity

  • Court said this infringed on business owner’s liberty because regulating work hours isn’t related to regulating for public safety/common good

  • Shifts power balance to individual liberty, including liberty to contract

Muller v. Oregon (1908)

  • Oregon placed hourly restrictions for women working in laundry facilities - harsh chemicals could affect child birth. 

    • This law was upheld by the Court.

Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923)

  • DC minimum wage law for women

  • Court strikes down because violates right to contract

Nebbia v. New York (1934)

  • New York state regulates milk prices (sets minimum price)

  • Court upholds the regulations in the public interest of controlling the market

  • Establishes doctrine on what’s in the public interest:

    • Due process is met if the laws are reasonably related to a proper legislative purpose (the public good) and aren’t arbitrary/discriminatory

    • This is not formal rational basis review, but one step toward it

Morehead v. New York (1936) 

  • Struck down minimum wage for women - states cannot interfere with the right to contract between employers and employees as it is a liberty protected by the due process clause

West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937) 

  • Overturns Adkins

  • Permits female min wage under state powers

  • “The switch in time that saved nine”

Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. (1955)

  • State law dealing with who can fit eyeglass lenses

  • Most extreme example of rational basis review—Court says the law might not make sense but still defers to legislature’s judgment

Caperton v. Massey Coal Co. Inc. (2009)

  • Right to an unbiased judge from 14th amendment due process clause

  • Court says you need to judge whether the interest poses such a risk of actual bias

  • Court specifies this is an exceptional case

Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar (2015)

  • Florida law prohibited judges from soliciting campaign funds

  • Supreme Court upholds it in the public interest of unbiased judges



Takings Clause 

Loretto v. Manhattan CATV (1982)

  • Partial physical invasion still requires just compensation. 

  • New York law, landlords must allow tenants to install cable tvs. 

    • Constitutes a partial physical taking, must compensate. 

U.S. v. Causby (1946)

  • Dealt with the Causby’s chicken farm which was significantly negatively affected by military planes flying over their land

  • Established that while the airways are generally a public space, property owners have ownership of any parts of the air that directly interferes with their use or enjoyment of their land

  • Physical invasion can be a taking

Penn Coal v. Mahon (1922)

  • Penn Coal believed there was coal under Mahon’s property, and purchased the right to mine. So Penn Coal was there first.

  • After this purchase, Pennsylvania passed a law prohibiting mining beneath existing structures and the Court said this law went too far.

  • If regulation goes “too far” it is a taking. Just laws include: laws that outlaw noxious dangerous use, zoning laws, incidental infringement, but Court is vague about what laws go too far

Penn CTC v. City of New York (1978)

  • Penn CTC wants to build apartment building on top of Penn station, but prohibited because of historical preservation law

  • Court says not a taking because it doesn’t interfere with the building’s primary use

  • Main factor is economic impact of regulation on the expected use—and the expected use was to function as a train station, which it can still do without building above

First Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of L.A. (1987)

  • Church built in a former flood plain, taken out by flooding. LA denied permits to rebuild temporarily. 

  • Church sued claiming a taking; court ruled in favor.

    • Temporary takings are still a taking. 

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987)

  • Beachfront property permit required a public access condition for approval

  • State claimed it was to reduce the public’s psychological barrier to using beach

  • Court has historically said regulations aren’t takings if they “substantially advance” a “legitimate state interest” but that isn’t the case here as the access condition is unrelated to the state’s supposed goal of reducing the psychological barrier 

  • Access condition is a taking without just compensation

Lucas vs. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992)

  • Lucas buys land with intention to build; after he purchased it building was prohibited because of land conservation law

  • Court rules it is a taking because the land is rendered economically useless

Horne v. Dept. of Agriculture (2015)

  • Law mandated raisin and other ag. farmer products mandated to be set aside for government

  • Unconstitutional: interference with property rights as personal property is included, even if the original owner has some remaining interest based on the property value

  • Can’t require someone to relinquish property to participate in commerce (distinguishes from a case about dangerous chemicals)

  • Doesn’t remand to court of appeals to determine compensation b/c gov’t already calculated the value of the raisins when fining Horne

US Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch (1946)

  • Tennessee Valley Authority tried to use eminent domain to create a dam on a river to produce hydroelectric power, but it would also flood the area

  • Court said this is for a public use (so accacceptable taking) because it’s a public utility, even if the public utility itself is privately owned

Berman v. Parker (1954)

  • D.C redevelopment plan - Berman department store outside of blighted area

  • Two questions: is this public use at all, and if so, is it OK to also take property that wasn’t specifically part of the “urban blight”?

  • Taking of private property must be for public purpose—this was so it doesn’t violate Takings Clause

  • Says Court should not question the limits of a specific project; Congress determined the area boundaries they thought were necessary and that includes Berman’s store


Hawaii Housing v. Midkiff (1984)

  • Hawaii’s statute to redistribute land was rationally related to a conceivable public purpose. 

  • Private land being redistributed via eminent domain to private owners does not condemn the law to having solely a private purpose. 

Kelo v. City of New London (2005)

  • Private property in New London could be taken for Pfizer, as it is in the economic interest of the city. 

  • Serves public interest; public use is not a literal requirement for use by the public

  • Public benefit exists because it would create jobs and economic progress through increased tax revenue.

  • Public use standard has changed over time—shift from public use to public purpose to public interest

  • Rational basis review—Court doesn’t need to question City’s determination of what’s necessary to economically revitalize the City