Sanity and Responsibility Notes

Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility

Introduction

Philosophers studying free will and responsibility often find their work relevant to practical concerns.
Questions of responsibility arise frequently in everyday life (e.g., in courts, families).
In everyday contexts, people generally assume they know the conditions of responsibility, focusing on whether an individual meets those conditions (maturity, sanity, etc.).
Philosophers, however, question the general conditions of responsibility and whether anyone is ever truly responsible.
The author aims to show that the mundane condition of sanity is crucial to the metaphysical problems of responsibility.
Fully appreciating sanity's significance may dissolve some seemingly insurmountable metaphysical issues.
The strategy involves examining a recent trend in philosophical discussions of responsibility that ultimately fails due to metaphysical problems.
The condition of sanity is presented as a means to resolve these problems.

Frankfurt, Watson, and Taylor: The Deep-Self View

The trend is exemplified by the writings of Harry Frankfurt, Gary Watson, and Charles Taylor.
The deep-self view posits that an agent's actions must align with their "deep self" in order to be considered responsible.

Harry Frankfurt

Distinguishes between freedom of action (doing what one wills) and freedom of the will (controlling one's desires).
A person with freedom of action may not be responsible if their desires are not subject to their control (e.g., posthypnotic suggestion).
Freedom of the will is analogous to freedom of action: it's the freedom to will whatever one wants to will.
First-order desires: desires to do or have things.
Second-order desires: desires about what desires to have or make effective.
An agent must govern actions by first-order desires and first-order desires by second-order desires to have both freedoms.

Gary Watson

Similar to Frankfurt, but distinguishes between "mere" desires and those reflecting values.
Free action arises from desires that are values, reflecting judgments that the desired objects are good.
Some desires are just appetites, while others express judgments of value.
Responsible actions are governed by one's value system.

Charles Taylor

Focuses on the ability to reflect on, criticize, and revise oneself.
Freedom and responsibility depend on this ability to evaluate and change our selves.
If our characters were simply implanted, we would be mere vehicles, not responsible agents.
Human beings can step back and decide whether they are the selves they want to be.

Synthesis: The Deep-Self View

All three philosophers agree that responsible agency involves more than intentional agency.
Actions must stem from characters that originate from, are acknowledged, and affirmed by the agent.
Frankfurt: wills ruled by second-order desires.
Watson: wills governable by a system of values.
Taylor: wills issue from selves subject to self-assessment and redefinition.
Key to responsibility: wills must be within the control of the agent's deeper self.

Virtues and Drawbacks of the Deep-Self View

Deep-self view explains intuitions about responsibility.
Explains why kleptomaniacs, brainwashed individuals, etc., are not responsible because their wills are disconnected from their deep selves.
Explains why adults are responsible while animals, infants, and machines are not: they lack a deep self.
Addresses the fear of determinism by distinguishing desires determined by external forces from those determined by one's "real" self.
Even if determinism is true, actions can still be determined by one's deeper self.
However, the question remains: Who or what is responsible for the deeper self?
The problem is pushed further back, even with endless levels of reflection.
There's a psychological limit to levels of reflection; it's impossible to conceive of high-order desires.
No matter how many levels are posited, there's always a last level raising the question of what governs it.
If determinism is true, the deepest self is governed by something external.
Even if determinism is false, the deepest self is not determined by the individual.
The individual isn't responsible for their existence or deepest self, whether due to controlled forces or random mutations.
The deep-self view identifies a necessary but insufficient condition for responsibility.
The fear of determinism connects to the idea that we are intermediate links in a causal chain, not self-initiating sources.
Responsibility seems to require being a prime mover, whose deepest self is self-determined or self-created.
Proponents of the deep-self view question the legitimacy of this fear and whether self-creation is necessary.
From an internal standpoint, having a deep self effective in governing actions is a sufficient distinction.
We can reflect on and change ourselves; revision is enough even if we don't create ourselves from nothing.
Harry Frankfurt: A person free to do and want what they want has all possible freedom.
Even with the freedom to control actions and desires, a further kind of freedom may be needed.

The Condition of Sanity

The deep-self view fails as a complete account of responsibility.
Consider JoJo, son of an evil dictator, who internalizes his father's values and acts accordingly.
JoJo acts according to his desires and wants to be that kind of person; his actions align with his deepest self.
It's dubious whether JoJo should be considered responsible due to his upbringing.
The deep-self view cannot differentiate JoJo from normal selves because his self is what he wants it to be.
The judgment that JoJo isn't responsible can only be made externally.
Like JoJo, our deepest selves aren't "up to us" in the last analysis.
Literal self-creation is logically impossible, so if JoJo isn't responsible, neither are we.
The appearance that self-creation is needed for responsibility is mistaken.
Freedom and responsibility require distinctive types of control: actions under control of selves, superficial selves under control of deep selves.
Not all requirements for freedom and responsibility must be types of control, such as the condition of sanity.
It's not ordinarily in our power to determine whether we are sane.
Being sane doesn't necessarily mean having a certain type of power or control.
Some insane people may have complete control of their actions.
The desire to be sane is the desire for one's self to be connected to the world in a certain way.
Criteria for sanity in legal questions: M'Naughten Rule:
- Knows what he is doing.
- Knows that what he is doing is right or wrong, as the case may be.
Sanity involves living in the real world and being controlled by accurate perceptions and sound reasoning.
Similarly, one's values should be controlled by processes that afford an accurate conception of the world.
Sanity is the minimally sufficient ability cognitively and normatively to recognize and appreciate the world for what it is.
This definition may not be perfect, but it highlights the interest sanity has in connection to responsibility.

The Sane Deep-Self View

The sane deep-self view supplements the deep-self view with the condition of sanity.
A satisfying conception of responsibility requires governing actions by desires, desires by deep self, and a sane deep self.
The sane deep-self view deals with JoJo and deprived childhood victims better than the plain deep-self view.
It explains why JoJo is not responsible because his deep self is insane.
It explains why we give less responsibility to people acting badly due to societal encouragement (e.g., slaveowners, Nazis) because they have false beliefs derived from social circumstances.
If agents could not help but be mistaken about their values, we don't blame them for actions inspired by those values.
Avoidability and mistakenness are not unequivocally distinct.
Avoidability can be construed metaphysically based on the tightness of causal connections.
Our deep selves may seem as unavoidable as JoJo's, given the influence of parents, culture, etc.
However, JoJo cannot avoid mistaken features of his character because he lacks the ability to know right from wrong.
We unavoidably have sane deep selves with the ability to know right from wrong, providing resources for self-correction.
Although we may not control our deepest selves, we have the resources on which to base self-correction.
The absence of control at the deepest level shouldn't upset us, as we are not responsible for being sane.
We have the ability to revise our selves in terms of values held by our deep selves.
If we have both the ability and a sane deep self, we can change irrational or objectionable aspects of our characters.
We may not be metaphysically responsible for ourselves, but we are morally responsible because we can understand right and wrong and change our characters accordingly.

Self-Creation, Self-Revision, and Self-Correction

The sane deep-self view can be put into perspective by comparing it to other views.
Free and responsible agents can control actions in accordance with desires and desires in accordance with deep selves.
We need to be able to regulate ourselves: remove some desires and traits and perhaps replace them with others based on our deeper desires or value.
Self-revision alone might not be enough to assure us of responsibility.
The ability to create ourselves doesn't seem necessary either and should not be disappointing.
We want something more than the ability to revise ourselves but less than the ability to create ourselves.
Implicit in the sane deep-self view: the ability to correct or improve ourselves.
Responsible for our actions = responsible for our selves, analyzed as:
- Ability to evaluate our selves sensibly and accurately.
- Ability to transform ourselves insofar as our evaluation tells us to do so.
We take responsibility for the selves that we are but did not ultimately create.
The condition of sanity is connected to the first ability; the condition of governing superficial selves is connected to the second.
The difference between the plain and sane deep-self views is the difference between the capacity for self-revision and self-correction.
Only sane selves will properly be accorded responsibility.

Two Objections Considered

How can we be sure that "we" are any saner than the non-responsible individuals discussed?
Justification: widespread intersubjective agreement and success in navigating the world and satisfying needs.
These grounds are not sufficient for smug assumption, and time will reveal blind spots in our outlook.
Judgments of responsibility can only be made from here, based on the understandings and values we can develop.
Does the view too closely connect sanity with being right about the world, implying that anyone who acts wrongly is insane?
The sane deep-self view embraces a normative conception of sanity.
Sanity is a normative concept, and severely deviant behavior constitutes evidence of a psychological defect.
Horrendous crimes could be committed only by an insane person.
Any wrong action or false belief counts as evidence of the absence of sanity because sanity is the ability to understand and appreciate the world for what it is.
It is appropriate to look for an explanation of why someone acted in a way that is not in accordance with acceptable standards.
The hypothesis that the person was unable to understand and appreciate that an action fell outside acceptable bounds will always be a possible explanation.
Having the ability is one thing, and exercising it is another.
At this point, metaphysical concerns may voice themselves again.
The sane deep-self view highlights some of the practical and empirical problems connected to responsibility.
However, it may resolve some of the philosophical and metaphysical problems and reveal how intimate are the connections between the remaining philosophical problems and the practical ones.