The Future of Peacekeeping & Enforcement in Somalia and the Horn of Africa

Course & Assignment Context

  • Course: Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies – Course Code: IRL 30153015
  • Lecturer: Dr. Fatuma Ali
  • Group Assignment (Group 11) – Members: Peris Awiti 670243670243, Resian Marima 669948669948, Wendy Aboudha 669434669434, Senio Musanhu 670481670481, Kimani Alvin 671234671234, Sonia Joy Achieng 668345668345, Glen Washington 666723666723, Elijah Mutuku 669934669934, Ashley Zawadi 671043671043

Somalia: Introduction – A Crucible of Conflict & Intervention

  • State collapse after Siad Barre regime in 19911991 triggered:
    • Transition from conventional civil war → clan‐based warlordism → globalized jihadist insurgency (Al-Shabaab).
  • Somalia as a “laboratory” for evolving UN/AU intervention: traditional peacekeeping → robust peace enforcement.
  • Central paradox: coercive external military action ≠ coherent political strategy + local legitimacy.
  • “Intervention Trap”:
    • Continuous foreign troop presence stops total collapse & Al-Shabaab expansion.
    • Yet entrenches Somali National Army (SNA) dependency, weak institutions, and political complacency among elites.
  • Proxy theatre for Turkey, UAE, Qatar, Kenya, Ethiopia, etc. – intervention as part of conflict system; premature exit ⇒ Al-Shabaab surge, continued stay ⇒ sovereignty stalled.

Historical Roots of Conflict

Pre-Colonial Era

  • Multi-sultanate landscape: Ajuran (13th13^{th}17th17^{th} c.), Adal (14th14^{th}16th16^{th} c.), Ifat (precursor of Adal), Geleedi (18th18^{th}19th19^{th} c.), Majeerteen & Hobyo (19th19^{th} c.).
Clan Rivalry & Resource Competition
  • Patrilineal clans as political–military units:
    • Grazing & water (e.g., Darod vs Hawiye).
    • Territorial disputes (Isaaq vs Dir).
    • Livestock raiding → revenge cycles.
Sultanate Expansion Wars
  • Adal–Abyssinian Wars (early 15001500s): Imam Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi’s jihad → halted by Abyssinian-Portuguese coalition.
  • Geleedi & others fought over Jubba/Shabelle riverine trade–farmland corridors.

Colonial Partition (1884188419601960)

  • Scramble for Africa → 55 Somali regions: British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland (Djibouti), Ogaden (Ethiopia), Northern Frontier District (Kenya).
  • British rule (indirect): Dervish Resistance (1899189919201920) – Sayyid Mohamed Abdullah Hassan “Mad Mullah.”
  • Italian rule (direct): infrastructure + harsh repression; Fascist period 19301930s-19411941 intensified exploitation.

Post-Independence to State Collapse

  • Siad Barre (1969196919911991): Cold-War patronage, clan favoritism, oppression.
  • Ogaden War 1977197719781978 pivoted Somalia from USSR → USA.
  • Barre ousted Jan 19911991 by USC, SNM, SPM; vacuum → civil war.
Civil War Dynamics
  • USC split (Aidid vs Ali Mahdi) – Mogadishu battle zone.
  • Warlordism: mini-state fiefdoms, trade & taxation monopoly, lawlessness.
  • Humanitarian catastrophe → early UN/US peacekeeping attempts (1992199219951995) failed (Battle of Mogadishu 19931993).

Trajectory of International Intervention

MissionYearsChapterCore MandateKey Outcomes
UNOSOM I1992199219931993VICease-fire monitoring & aid corridorsConsent absent → mission creep → insecurity
UNITAF1992199219931993VII“All necessary means” to secure reliefShort-term military success; no political roots addressed
UNOSOM II1993199319951995VIINation-building, disarmamentBecame belligerent vs Aidid; 1818 US deaths → “Somalia syndrome”
AMISOM2007200720222022VII (AU/UN hybrid)Protect TFG, fight Al-ShabaabDrove militants from Mogadishu 20112011; high casualties, dependency, funding gaps
ATMIS → AUSSOM20222022–presentVIIGradual security hand-over to SNASNA unready, drawdown delays, severe funding crisis

Peacekeeping vs Peace Enforcement – Doctrinal & Ethical Issues

  • Traditional Peacekeeping (Ch VI): consent + impartiality + minimal force (self-defence).
  • Peace Enforcement (Ch VII): no consent, proactive force, impose peace.
  • Somalia: Ch VI model failed; necessity pushed AU to enforcement – raises:
    • Loss of neutrality → AU seen as combatant.
    • Civilian harm from heavy weapons → legitimacy erosion, Al-Shabaab propaganda.
    • Regime-protection dilemma supporting perceived corrupt FGS.

Current Conflict Drivers & Internal Dynamics

Al-Shabaab’s Enduring Pillars

  • Financial empire ≈ 100100 million +/year via taxation, ports, charcoal.
  • Governance gap exploitation → sharia courts, swift justice → perceived efficiency.
  • Tactical adaptability: rural guerrilla, IEDs, suicide bombings (e.g., El-Adde 20162016).

Clan Politics & Fragmented Security Sector

  • Federal structure magnifies Hawiye, Darod, Dir, Isaaq competition.
  • Tension FGS vs Federal Member States (FMS).
  • SNA = mosaic of clan militias; ghost soldiers, regional loyalty, cohesion deficit.

ATMIS/AUSSOM – Operational Realities

  • Funding precarity: arrears on stipends; UNSC 27192719 framework (UN 75%75\% funding) still contested (US scepticism).
  • Transition timeline misaligned with SNA capability → drawdown pauses.
  • Static Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) – defensive dispersion; supply routes under IED threat; reliance on UNSOS airlift.
  • Protection-of-Civilians (PoC) dilemma: communities desire security yet resent collateral damage.

Regional Actors & Interests

Ethiopia

  • Major TCC since 20142014; combats Al-Shabaab.
  • Tigray war pulled troops; 20242024 MoU with Somaliland (Berbera port access) → Mogadishu sovereignty dispute; potential naval base.

Kenya

  • KDF entered 20112011 (Operation Linda Nchi); mentors Jubaland forces; secures supply routes.
  • Economic agenda: trade at $124.5\$124.5 million (20222022) exports; EAC integration.

Djibouti

  • Hosts US, France, Japan, Italy, China bases; gateway at Bab-el-Mandeb; revenue vs dependency; US-China rivalry risk.

Geopolitical Chessboard – Patronage Marketplace

  • External patrons (Turkey, UAE, Qatar, US, EU, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti).
  • Turkey trains Gorgor & Haram’ad for FGS; UAE arms Puntland, etc.
  • US backs elite Danab brigade.
  • Fragmented security architecture: multiple externally funded units → undermines unified state.

Re-Imagining Future Approaches

Hybrid AU-UN Financing & Command

  • Institutionalize predictable funding per UNSC 27192719; overcome ad-hoc logistics.

Locally-Led Security Governance

  • Leverage Macawisley clan militias – integrate via “Community-Based Security Governance” to avoid new warlordism.

“Smart” Counter-Terrorism

  • Target Al-Shabaab finances: financial intelligence sharing, sanctions, empower Somali FRC.

Tech-Enabled Peace Enforcement

  • ISR drones, satellite, data platforms (SAGE, Unite Aware) for early-warning & civilian protection; ensure IHL compliance.

Key Lessons Learned

  1. Primacy of inclusive politics – military gains fragile without reconciliation & constitutional settlement.
  2. Genuine local ownership – empower traditional mechanisms, grassroots justice, clan reconciliation.
  3. Predictable, adequate funding – ad-hoc donor model undermines missions.
  4. Security-Development Nexus – jobs, education, services crucial to undercut Al-Shabaab recruitment.

Four Strategic Axes for a New Course

  1. Political Primacy: Military subordinate to Somali-led political roadmap.
  2. Formalized Local Ownership: Integrate community forces; finance grassroots peacebuilding.
  3. Manage Regional Rivalry: AU & UN coordinate to deter proxy competition; enforce accountability.
  4. Holistic Security-Development: Synchronize security operations with tangible development & youth employment.

Regional Spillover & Contagion

  • Ethiopia & Kenya: Al-Shabaab retaliation, border disputes, internal fragilities (e.g., Ethiopia’s Tigray).
  • Sudan & South Sudan: refugee flows, arms proliferation; governance failures (high corruption indices) mirror Somali challenges.

Conclusion – Central Takeaways

  • Decades of intervention reveal limits of external peace enforcement; cycle of dependency & geopolitical contestation.
  • Sustainable peace = empowered Somalis, legitimate politics, community security, managed regional interests, secure & predictable mission financing.
  • International community must shift from primary guarantor → supportive partner nurturing conditions for locally owned peace.

References (Selected)

  • Ahmed Ali, F. (20212021). Potential Impact of Ethiopia’s War in Tigray on Somali Stability. ISPI.
  • Crisis Group (20122012). The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia.
  • UNSC Resolution 27192719 (20232023) – Financing AU-led PSOs.
  • UNODC (20242024). More Powerful by the Day – Terror Financing in Somalia.
  • Masuda, K. (20232023). Foreign Military Bases in Djibouti.
  • Others: Amani Africa, CSIS, ISS, NYU CIC, Georgetown GJIA, Leiden Repository, etc.