The Future of Peacekeeping & Enforcement in Somalia and the Horn of Africa
Course & Assignment Context
- Course: Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies – Course Code: IRL 3015
- Lecturer: Dr. Fatuma Ali
- Group Assignment (Group 1) – Members: Peris Awiti 670243, Resian Marima 669948, Wendy Aboudha 669434, Senio Musanhu 670481, Kimani Alvin 671234, Sonia Joy Achieng 668345, Glen Washington 666723, Elijah Mutuku 669934, Ashley Zawadi 671043
Somalia: Introduction – A Crucible of Conflict & Intervention
- State collapse after Siad Barre regime in 1991 triggered:
- Transition from conventional civil war → clan‐based warlordism → globalized jihadist insurgency (Al-Shabaab).
- Somalia as a “laboratory” for evolving UN/AU intervention: traditional peacekeeping → robust peace enforcement.
- Central paradox: coercive external military action ≠ coherent political strategy + local legitimacy.
- “Intervention Trap”:
- Continuous foreign troop presence stops total collapse & Al-Shabaab expansion.
- Yet entrenches Somali National Army (SNA) dependency, weak institutions, and political complacency among elites.
- Proxy theatre for Turkey, UAE, Qatar, Kenya, Ethiopia, etc. – intervention as part of conflict system; premature exit ⇒ Al-Shabaab surge, continued stay ⇒ sovereignty stalled.
Historical Roots of Conflict
Pre-Colonial Era
- Multi-sultanate landscape: Ajuran (13th–17th c.), Adal (14th–16th c.), Ifat (precursor of Adal), Geleedi (18th–19th c.), Majeerteen & Hobyo (19th c.).
Clan Rivalry & Resource Competition
- Patrilineal clans as political–military units:
- Grazing & water (e.g., Darod vs Hawiye).
- Territorial disputes (Isaaq vs Dir).
- Livestock raiding → revenge cycles.
Sultanate Expansion Wars
- Adal–Abyssinian Wars (early 1500s): Imam Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi’s jihad → halted by Abyssinian-Portuguese coalition.
- Geleedi & others fought over Jubba/Shabelle riverine trade–farmland corridors.
Colonial Partition (1884–1960)
- Scramble for Africa → 5 Somali regions: British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland (Djibouti), Ogaden (Ethiopia), Northern Frontier District (Kenya).
- British rule (indirect): Dervish Resistance (1899–1920) – Sayyid Mohamed Abdullah Hassan “Mad Mullah.”
- Italian rule (direct): infrastructure + harsh repression; Fascist period 1930s-1941 intensified exploitation.
Post-Independence to State Collapse
- Siad Barre (1969–1991): Cold-War patronage, clan favoritism, oppression.
- Ogaden War 1977–1978 pivoted Somalia from USSR → USA.
- Barre ousted Jan 1991 by USC, SNM, SPM; vacuum → civil war.
Civil War Dynamics
- USC split (Aidid vs Ali Mahdi) – Mogadishu battle zone.
- Warlordism: mini-state fiefdoms, trade & taxation monopoly, lawlessness.
- Humanitarian catastrophe → early UN/US peacekeeping attempts (1992–1995) failed (Battle of Mogadishu 1993).
Trajectory of International Intervention
| Mission | Years | Chapter | Core Mandate | Key Outcomes |
|---|
| UNOSOM I | 1992–1993 | VI | Cease-fire monitoring & aid corridors | Consent absent → mission creep → insecurity |
| UNITAF | 1992–1993 | VII | “All necessary means” to secure relief | Short-term military success; no political roots addressed |
| UNOSOM II | 1993–1995 | VII | Nation-building, disarmament | Became belligerent vs Aidid; 18 US deaths → “Somalia syndrome” |
| AMISOM | 2007–2022 | VII (AU/UN hybrid) | Protect TFG, fight Al-Shabaab | Drove militants from Mogadishu 2011; high casualties, dependency, funding gaps |
| ATMIS → AUSSOM | 2022–present | VII | Gradual security hand-over to SNA | SNA unready, drawdown delays, severe funding crisis |
Peacekeeping vs Peace Enforcement – Doctrinal & Ethical Issues
- Traditional Peacekeeping (Ch VI): consent + impartiality + minimal force (self-defence).
- Peace Enforcement (Ch VII): no consent, proactive force, impose peace.
- Somalia: Ch VI model failed; necessity pushed AU to enforcement – raises:
- Loss of neutrality → AU seen as combatant.
- Civilian harm from heavy weapons → legitimacy erosion, Al-Shabaab propaganda.
- Regime-protection dilemma supporting perceived corrupt FGS.
Current Conflict Drivers & Internal Dynamics
Al-Shabaab’s Enduring Pillars
- Financial empire ≈ 100 million +/year via taxation, ports, charcoal.
- Governance gap exploitation → sharia courts, swift justice → perceived efficiency.
- Tactical adaptability: rural guerrilla, IEDs, suicide bombings (e.g., El-Adde 2016).
Clan Politics & Fragmented Security Sector
- Federal structure magnifies Hawiye, Darod, Dir, Isaaq competition.
- Tension FGS vs Federal Member States (FMS).
- SNA = mosaic of clan militias; ghost soldiers, regional loyalty, cohesion deficit.
ATMIS/AUSSOM – Operational Realities
- Funding precarity: arrears on stipends; UNSC 2719 framework (UN 75% funding) still contested (US scepticism).
- Transition timeline misaligned with SNA capability → drawdown pauses.
- Static Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) – defensive dispersion; supply routes under IED threat; reliance on UNSOS airlift.
- Protection-of-Civilians (PoC) dilemma: communities desire security yet resent collateral damage.
Regional Actors & Interests
Ethiopia
- Major TCC since 2014; combats Al-Shabaab.
- Tigray war pulled troops; 2024 MoU with Somaliland (Berbera port access) → Mogadishu sovereignty dispute; potential naval base.
Kenya
- KDF entered 2011 (Operation Linda Nchi); mentors Jubaland forces; secures supply routes.
- Economic agenda: trade at $124.5 million (2022) exports; EAC integration.
Djibouti
- Hosts US, France, Japan, Italy, China bases; gateway at Bab-el-Mandeb; revenue vs dependency; US-China rivalry risk.
Geopolitical Chessboard – Patronage Marketplace
- External patrons (Turkey, UAE, Qatar, US, EU, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti).
- Turkey trains Gorgor & Haram’ad for FGS; UAE arms Puntland, etc.
- US backs elite Danab brigade.
- Fragmented security architecture: multiple externally funded units → undermines unified state.
Re-Imagining Future Approaches
Hybrid AU-UN Financing & Command
- Institutionalize predictable funding per UNSC 2719; overcome ad-hoc logistics.
Locally-Led Security Governance
- Leverage Macawisley clan militias – integrate via “Community-Based Security Governance” to avoid new warlordism.
“Smart” Counter-Terrorism
- Target Al-Shabaab finances: financial intelligence sharing, sanctions, empower Somali FRC.
Tech-Enabled Peace Enforcement
- ISR drones, satellite, data platforms (SAGE, Unite Aware) for early-warning & civilian protection; ensure IHL compliance.
Key Lessons Learned
- Primacy of inclusive politics – military gains fragile without reconciliation & constitutional settlement.
- Genuine local ownership – empower traditional mechanisms, grassroots justice, clan reconciliation.
- Predictable, adequate funding – ad-hoc donor model undermines missions.
- Security-Development Nexus – jobs, education, services crucial to undercut Al-Shabaab recruitment.
Four Strategic Axes for a New Course
- Political Primacy: Military subordinate to Somali-led political roadmap.
- Formalized Local Ownership: Integrate community forces; finance grassroots peacebuilding.
- Manage Regional Rivalry: AU & UN coordinate to deter proxy competition; enforce accountability.
- Holistic Security-Development: Synchronize security operations with tangible development & youth employment.
Regional Spillover & Contagion
- Ethiopia & Kenya: Al-Shabaab retaliation, border disputes, internal fragilities (e.g., Ethiopia’s Tigray).
- Sudan & South Sudan: refugee flows, arms proliferation; governance failures (high corruption indices) mirror Somali challenges.
Conclusion – Central Takeaways
- Decades of intervention reveal limits of external peace enforcement; cycle of dependency & geopolitical contestation.
- Sustainable peace = empowered Somalis, legitimate politics, community security, managed regional interests, secure & predictable mission financing.
- International community must shift from primary guarantor → supportive partner nurturing conditions for locally owned peace.
References (Selected)
- Ahmed Ali, F. (2021). Potential Impact of Ethiopia’s War in Tigray on Somali Stability. ISPI.
- Crisis Group (2012). The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia.
- UNSC Resolution 2719 (2023) – Financing AU-led PSOs.
- UNODC (2024). More Powerful by the Day – Terror Financing in Somalia.
- Masuda, K. (2023). Foreign Military Bases in Djibouti.
- Others: Amani Africa, CSIS, ISS, NYU CIC, Georgetown GJIA, Leiden Repository, etc.