Do Air Raids Protect Civilians?

Air Raids and Civilian Protection: A Critical Analysis

Introduction

  • By September 2015, over 11 million Syrians were displaced due to war.

  • The 3,000th air raid against Islamist forces in Iraq and Syria occurred before Easter 2015, with the number projected to reach nearly 5,000 by year's end.

  • Martti Ahtisaari, former Finnish President and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, suggested that diplomacy could have averted the crisis.

    • In 2012, Ahtisaari discussed with Russian UN ambassador Vitaly Churkin the possibility of Assad's resignation.

    • Churkin indicated Russia wouldn't object if Assad resigned with dignity and if the West ceased arming rebels.

    • Ahtisaari's attempts to convey this opening to other Security Council members were unsuccessful.

    • Foreign Policy suggests Russia later added conditions, complicating the consensus.

The Debate: Dignified Exit for Assad?

  • The West, like in Libya with Gaddafi, decided Assad's human rights record didn't warrant a dignified exit.

  • More than 250,000 conflict fatalities later, the question arises whether diplomacy should have been pursued.

Cosmopolitan Argument (Mary Kaldor)
  • Atrocities by IS and Assad should be addressed through global humanitarian norms.

  • Negotiation with perpetrators is unacceptable; they should be captured, tried, and punished.

  • Cosmopolitan law enforcement is the solution to violence.

  • Enforcement of norms establishes a global order; negotiation undermines it.

Political-Realist Critique
  • A normative global order is a fantasy and potentially dangerous.

  • Four premises for a realistic global humanitarian order:

    1. Common values that can be enforced.

    2. Agreement on implementation.

    3. Legitimate actors for enforcement.

    4. Need for a full normative foundation.

Global Norms and Consensus: Challenges

  • Do states resist consensus to protect self-serving interactions?

  • Russia's opposition to anti-Assad intervention in 2014: speculated to protect weapon sales to Assad.

  • China's potential opposition: immature sense of global governance responsibility (Zoellick).

  • Those supposedly protected by global norms often resist this protection.

    • 2008 U.S. Defense Department poll in Iraq: only 2222% felt the U.S. contributed to security; 33% saw the U.S. role as legitimate.

    • British Ministry of Defence poll: 8282% of Iraqis opposed coalition presence; less than 11% believed it improved security.

    • Problems in Afghanistan: Western-trained soldiers turned against trainers.

    • Unpopularity of the U.S. drone program.

  • In Syria:

    • Assad's regime is unpopular, and protection is needed.

    • Radicalization of anti-Assad resistance and IS appeal are problematic.

    • Western interpretation of humanitarian norms is not universally accepted.

    • IS appeal lies in its resistance to the West.

  • Amitai Etzioni: Dialogue is needed instead of simple enforcement of global norms.

  • Implementation issues:

    • Democracy imposed on a national level in Syria, yet military power is exercised undemocratically.

    • Syrians did not vote for U.S. bombings.

    • Democracy and freedom are imposed on national institutions but not on the UN or WHO (Etzioni).

  • Differing interpretations of world politics exist globally.

Legitimate Agency for Enforcement?

  • Post-9/11 asymmetry: eagerness to promote global principles without building global agency.

  • Emphasis on global governance without global government (Etzioni).

  • Democracy's advantage: prevents incompetent/immoral rulers from making unpopular decisions and staying in power.

  • Democratic rulers must align with their constituencies' interests and morals, sidelining Syrian interests.

  • Correlational analysis in the Muslim Middle East: U.S. allies are often more autocratic than U.S. adversaries.

    • Average autocracy score of U.S. allies: 6.946.94 (on a scale of 00 to 1010).

    • Average autocracy score of U.S. adversaries: 6.416.41.

  • Transitions to democracy in the Middle East are often punished by the U.S., except in Bahrain in 1973.

  • Transitions to autocracy have been rewarded more often than punished since World War II.

  • U.S. opposed democratic processes threatening its energy supplies in the Middle East.

  • U.S. strategic interests, the war on terror, and protecting Israel are higher priorities than promoting democracy.

  • Domestic pressures on U.S. foreign policy are driven by nationalism (John Mueller).

    • Americans overvalue American lives and undervalue foreign lives.

    • Constituencies prioritize American interests over the interests of those supposedly being protected.

  • Lack of local ownership and agency in protecting civilians and humanitarian norms.

  • External insistence on democracy has weakened developing states (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, Syria).

  • Successful state formation often contradicts human rights principles applied to mature states.

  • State formation pacifies interactions and enables democracy and human rights.

  • Cosmopolitan progress needs inter-civilizational dialogue for consensus and shared ownership of global values.

What If There Is No Consensus?

  • Mary Kaldor: Cosmopolitan order cannot wait for total global consensus.

  • Political realists (Henry Kissinger): Sustainable global governance requires order and legitimacy, not just coercion.

  • Building order without shared legitimacy is unsustainable.

  • Dreaming of normative crusades before missions are realistic is dangerous.

  • Sanctions preventing complicity in genocides and humanitarian violations are uncontroversial.

  • Financial sanctions against elites (freezing assets) have a relatively high success rate (up to 8080% after World War I) when elites are already weakened.

  • Sanctions punishing entire states are less successful (affect targets in only 11 in 33 cases).

  • Hostile nations imposing sanctions to promote human rights or democracy: failed totally in 8080% of cases.

  • Sanctions imposed without consensus are detrimental to humanitarian values.

  • Karl and John E. Mueller: Economic coercion is a "sanction of mass destruction."

  • Military force against entire countries often leads to worse rulers.

  • Syria: Western support of anti-Assad forces is an example.

  • Western humanitarian interventions tend to escalate conflicts and intensify killing.

  • Two-thirds of conflict fatalities in Northeast and Southeast Asia after WWII occurred in internal disputes where outsiders imposed solutions.

  • In such conflicts, 9898% of fatalities occurred after outsiders intervened militarily.

  • In Syria, direct conflict fatalities tripled after Western air strikes and CIA interference.

  • Since the end of the Cold War, the willingness to protect people from state power and terrorist violence has increased, leading to "protection wars" or "New International Wars".

  • Wars in Somalia, Iraq, northern Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen caused 4545% of the world’s conflict fatalities in 2013 and 7474% in 2010.

  • Enforcement of humanitarian principles in the absence of global consensus has become a major problem.

  • Figure 1: Fatalities of Enforcement of Global Protective Humanitarian Norms as a Percentage of All Conflict Fatalities

Conclusions

  • Enforcement of humanitarian norms is resisted when it prioritizes the self-interest of protecting nations.

  • When global humanitarian governance fails to develop global agency, "protection" can harm civilians.

  • Enforcement of norms before consensus and global agency is a failure.

  • Without a genuine interest in developing a global humanitarian regime, effective global governance is impossible.

  • Norms are disputed, interpretations vary, and enforcement agency is missing.

  • Simple enforcement of norms is not a substitute for dialogue and negotiation.

  • "Cosmopolitan protection wars" or "new international wars" reveal that new wars are not apolitical and criminal.

  • Efforts at neutral policing have led to enforcement of norms that harm those intended to be protected.

  • Instead of enforcement, focus on dialogue and creating a normative consensus on global humanitarian protection.

  • Western ambassadors should have negotiated with Russia on Assad's exit.

  • Cosmopolitan Argument (Mary Kaldor)

    • Atrocities should be addressed through global humanitarian norms; negotiation with perpetrators is unacceptable; cosmopolitan law enforcement is the solution.

  • Political-Realist Critique

    • A normative global order is a fantasy; sustainable global governance requires order and legitimacy, not just coercion.

  • Global Norms and Consensus Challenges

    • States resist consensus to protect self-serving interactions; differing interpretations of world politics exist globally.

  • Legitimate Agency for Enforcement

    • Post-9/11 asymmetry: eagerness to promote global principles without building global agency; lack of local ownership and agency.

  • What If There Is No Consensus?

    • Sustainable global governance requires order and legitimacy; sanctions preventing complicity in genocides are uncontroversial, but hostile nations imposing sanctions to promote human rights have largely failed.