Moral Cognitivism and The Cognitive Value of Art
Arguments Against Moral Cognitivism (Skeptical Arguments)
These arguments stem from skeptical views regarding the possibility of art providing
These arguments challenge the core tenets of moral cognitivism, which asserts that moral judgments express propositions that are objectively true or false. Skeptical arguments typically contend that objective moral truths do not exist, or if they do, humans lack the capacity to reliably know them.
The Argument from Queerness (J.L. Mackie)
Metaphysical Queerness: If objective moral values existed, they would be fundamentally unlike anything else in the natural world. They would be properties that are intrinsically prescriptive, meaning they would "beckon" or "point" towards certain actions. Mackie argues that such self-standing, motivation-inducing properties are metaphysically bizarre and do not fit into a naturalistic worldview.
Epistemological Queerness: If such queer moral properties existed, how would we come to know them? We would need a special faculty of "moral intuition" or "moral perception" that allows us to apprehend these non-natural properties. Mackie finds the existence of such a faculty highly questionable and without empirical support.
The Argument from Disagreement
The pervasive and intractable moral disagreement across cultures and even within societies suggests that there are no objective moral truths. If moral truths were objective and discoverable, one would expect a greater convergence of moral opinion over time, similar to convergence in scientific or mathematical truths.
Skeptics argue that disagreement is best explained by differences in cultural upbringing, personal preferences, and emotional responses rather than by varying attempts to grasp a common objective reality.
The Argument from Explanation (Evolutionary Debunking Arguments)
Our moral beliefs and judgments can be adequately explained by non-moral factors, such as evolutionary pressures, cultural conditioning, and psychological biases. For example, altruistic behaviors might be explained by kin selection or reciprocal altruism, which provided survival advantages, rather than by a response to objective moral goodness.
If our moral beliefs are the product of these non-moral forces, then there is no reason to think that they reliably track objective moral truths. Our moral beliefs might merely be adaptive fictions.
Moral Nihilism and Error Theory
Closely related to Mackie's arguments, moral nihilism claims that nothing is morally right or wrong. Error theory, a specific form of moral nihilism, asserts that all positive moral statements (e.g., "killing is wrong") are false because they attempt to refer to objective moral properties that do not exist. Therefore, moral discourse is systematically flawed.
Arguments Against Moral Cognitivism (Skeptical Arguments)
These arguments challenge the idea that moral judgments express objective truths, suggesting that such truths either don't exist or are unknowable.
The Argument from Queerness (J.L. Mackie)
Metaphysical Queerness: Objective moral values would be bizarre, prescriptive properties unlike anything in the natural world. They would