Readings

2020 – Christopher Layne, The Return of Great-Power War

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1. Layne’s view on the potential for a U.S.–China war

  • War is not only possible, but likely in the coming decades.

  • The U.S. and China are on a “collision course” driven by power transition dynamics and competition for status.

👉 Bottom line:
Layne is pessimistic — great-power war is returning, not disappearing.

2. Three main reasons for optimism (that Layne critiques)

Layne says people wrongly believe war won’t happen because of:

  1. Economic interdependence

    • Idea: trade ties reduce conflict

    • Problem: WWI shows interdependent states (Britain & Germany) still fought

  2. Nuclear deterrence

    • Idea: MAD prevents war

    • Problem: new tech (low-yield nukes) makes limited nuclear war thinkable

  3. Liberal international order

    • Idea: institutions (UN, WTO, etc.) preserve peace

    • Problem: order is weakening internally and externally, making conflict more likely

👉 Key takeaway:
All three “peace arguments” are overstated or eroding.

3. Two great powers leading to WWI (1914)

  • United Kingdom (established power)

  • Germany (rising power)

👉 This is Layne’s central analogy for U.S.–China today.

4. The ideological turn in U.S.–China policy

  • U.S. increasingly frames rivalry as:

    • Democracy vs. communism

  • Example: rhetoric portraying China as a “Marxist-Leninist regime” and ideological threat

Layne’s critique:

  • This makes conflict more likely

  • Turns rivalry into a zero-sum ideological struggle

  • Makes compromise look like appeasement

👉 He prefers a traditional great-power rivalry approach, not ideological crusade.

5. What the U.S. could do (but likely won’t) to reduce war risk

To avoid war, the U.S. would need to:

  • Accept China as a great-power equal

  • Retract its security commitment to Taiwan

  • Recognize China’s regional dominance (sphere of influence)

  • Stop promoting liberal values inside China

👉 BUT:

  • Layne says this is very unlikely, because it would mean accepting the end of U.S. primacy

👉 Conclusion:
War becomes more likely because the U.S. won’t accommodate China’s rise

2024 – Miller, Do Power Transitions Always Lead to War?

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1. ‘Thucydides Trap’ – names & events

  • Concept popularized by Graham Allison

  • Based on Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War:

    • Sparta (dominant power) vs. Athens (rising power)

  • Famous idea:

    • War caused by “the growth of Athenian power and the fear it caused in Sparta”

👉 Used today to describe U.S.–China rivalry

2. Main arguments of power transition theory

Core ideas:

  • International system has:

    • Status quo (dominant) power

    • Rising challenger

  • Rising powers:

    • Become strong enough to challenge dominance

    • Are often dissatisfied with the existing order

  • Result:

    • This competition often leads to war

👉 Classic expectation:
Power shifts → instability → potential conflict

3. Why rising powers challenge the dominant power

Miller emphasizes a key refinement:

  • Rising powers challenge not just because of power, but because they are:

    • Dissatisfied with the international order

    • Want a greater share of benefits, status, and influence

More specifically, they:

  • Accept some parts of the system

  • Reject others

  • Try to:

    • Gain recognition as equals

    • Reshape rules gradually

    • Use existing institutions to advance their rise

👉 Important nuance:

  • Rising powers are not fully revisionist

  • They work within the system while trying to change it

Big Takeaway Across Both Readings

  • Layne (2020) → pessimistic realism

    • War likely

    • U.S. should accommodate China (but won’t)

  • Miller (2024) → more nuanced theory

    • War is not inevitable

    • Outcome depends on:

      • How the dominant power manages the order

      • Whether dissatisfaction is managed or inflamed