Legislative Preferences and Legislative Agenda Control
1. Legislative Goals
Prestige and the value of higher office
Public policy
Reelection
Unified control of governmentā serve in the majority party
The goals induce preferences over policies
Legislators may act as if they favor a specific set of policies for any and all the reasons listed above
2. How a Bill Becomes a Law
State bill is introduced
Committee hearings
Floor action
If passed, sent to the other house: Committee hearings
Floor action
If passed with amendments: referred to original house
If original house concurs: bill goes to the governor
if passed without amendments: bill goes to the governor
If no veto: bill becomes a law
3. Puzzle: Why Doesnāt Policy Reflect Preferences of Median Legislator?
If the median legislatorās ideal point is unbeatable against any status quo, why doesnāt the law simply embody that position?
Explanation 1: Constitutional Structure:
Bicameralismā the two chambers might disagree
Like if the median of the two chambers have opposing parties
Vetoā the president must be onboard with Congress or Congress will need 2/3 vote to override the presidential veto
Explanation 2: Procedural
The filibuster (effective 60 vote threshold in senate for most legislation)
Senators conduct a filibuster and suspend the legislation indefinitely until 60% of the vote is reached to end debate
Agenda controlā what bills get a vote or attention; the speaker has control
4. Agenda Control
Assumptions:
Unidimensional policy space
Euclidean preferences
The legislator with median preference votes for proposed legislation if different
The median point (M) beats all alternatives. If a bill is under consideration: choice between B and the status quo (Q), allowing amendments will eventually move more towards point M
Open Rule: unlimited amendments permitted
With no agenda control, everything will constantly be stuck along M
Closed Rule: no amendments permitted
āUp or down voteā ā either B or Q will be chosen since you canāt get M exactly with no amendments
If B is closer to M than Q, it will pass; otherwise, Q will win
5. The Game: Agenda Control
There is status quo Q
Party leadership decides whether to propose legislation or āgatekeepā
If gatekeep, Q is the outcome
If proposal occurs, floor amendments follow
Open Rule Game
Any proposal put forward will be amended to M
Leaderships effective choice between M or Q
If B is closer to M than Q (2B-M), B will be proposed
Closed Rule Game
There is Q
Leadership proposes legislation, effective choice between B and Q
If B is closer to M than Q, the bill will pass but stay at Q if not
M will only support bills that make it at least as well off as Q