American Imperialism, the Spanish-American War, and the Origins of World War I

American Imperialism and the Spanish-American War

• Annexation of Hawaii:
  • Motivated by pure acquisition ("We're just gonna take it"), despite Hawaiians being welcoming and hospitable.
  • Queen Liliʻuokalani protested, asserting Hawaiian sovereignty and lack of consent.
• Treatment of Indigenous Peoples:
  • Similar to the Cherokee Nation, who fulfilled U.S. demands but still faced land theft, demonstrating a "because we can" mentality.
  • Historical grievances continue, as seen in places like New Orleans, where historical land dispossession is not forgotten.
• Samoa (1898):
  • Partitioned between the U.S. and Germany, without Samoan consent.
• Spanish-American War (Starts in Cuba):
  • Cuban Independence Movement: Led by José Martí (Cuba Libre), Cubans fought for independence from Spain.
  • Both sides committed atrocities, but Spain was perceived as more culpable due to its greater power.
  • U.S. Imperial Ambitions: The U.S. always assumed it would take Cuba for strategic basing.
  • U.S. ordered Cubans to cease "atrocities" and offered $100,000,000$ to buy Cuba from Spain, echoing the Mexican-American War playbook. Spain, a proud nation, refused.
  • The USS Maine Incident:
    • A warship (battle cruiser, not a battleship) sent to Havana Harbor.
    • Exploded, killing $266$ people.
    • Debunking of Myth: The explosion of the Maine did not cause the war.
      • No conclusive cause was ever found; neither Cubans nor Spaniards were proven responsible.
      • Probably an accident (e.g., cigarette in the weapons magazine).
      • U.S. declared war months later, indicating presidential indecision, not immediate pre-war outrage.
  • Yellow Press: While often blamed ("You give me the pictures, I'll give you the war" - Pulitzer), its influence on the war's outbreak is exaggerated. Pulitzer and Hearst were criticized as "shitty human beings" manipulating public opinion.
  • War Operations:
    • Desultory (lacking a definite plan).
    • Teddy Roosevelt and the Rough Riders charged San Juan Hill, a "militarily pointless" act driven by Roosevelt's desire for glory (he was a "toy cowboy"). Many were shot, reflecting the hollowness of his "glorious" sentiment.
    • Cuban Resistance: Cubans did not want U.S. assistance; they wanted to run their own island, but the U.S. took it anyway.
  • Annexation of the Philippines:
    • The U.S. always wanted the Philippines and seized the opportunity during the war with Spain ("twofer").
    • Admiral Dewey was "loitering" off Manila and took the Philippines, viewing Manila Harbor as strategically vital (like San Diego and San Francisco).
    • Control of the harbor necessitated securing the land and mountains behind it, leading to the annexation of the entire country.
  • Costs and Acquisitions:
    • The war cost $5,000$ American lives, with $400$ killed in action (a "pretty low price").
    • Acquired Guam, Puerto Rico, and Wake Island for coaling stations.

The "Cult of the Cowboy"

• Teddy Roosevelt's Glorification: Roosevelt cultivated the image of the "cowboy" and promoted the "cult of the cowboy," but he was a "toy cowboy"—not a serious one, as he had Brooks Brothers make his uniform.
• Reality of Cowboy Life: Being a cowboy was a "serious job" that would "break you down" into "unemployment." It was one of the "crummiest entry-level jobs," hard to stay healthy, offering no career or independence, as cowboys worked for large ranching companies.
• Propaganda and Mythology: The glorification of cowboys in America is described as propaganda, selling products like minivans.
• Historical Context: Cattle herding is an ancient practice, not peculiar to America. Other cultures with similar figures (Gauchos in Argentina, Vaqueros in Mexico/Brazil) did not glamorize them to the same extent.
• American Idealism: Americans desired an image of "rugged pioneer individualism," which the cowboy mythology fit, despite its disconnect from "real life."
• Societal Deception: Society was "out of touch" with the reality, believing the myth "hook, line, and sinker" for a century.
• Roosevelt's Role: Leaders like Roosevelt promoted this ideal, suggesting a return to "simpler times," without having experienced the reality themselves.

Post-Spanish-American War Expansion and U.S. Foreign Policy

• Panama Canal: A direct consequence of the Spanish-American War, aiming for new strategic "lily pads." The U.S. sought land for it.
• Open Door Notes (1899-1900):
  • The U.S., now a Pacific power, declared an "open door" in China, advocating equal trading terms for all nations.
  • Europeans viewed this as hypocritical, asking if the Monroe Doctrine would also apply ("Can we have one in South America?").
  • Double Standard: The U.S. maintained "what's ours is ours and what yours is negotiable," using the Open Door Notes to justify its own interests while appearing principled.
  • Became a core ideology in American foreign policy: the U.S. as an "impersonal, impartial enforcer of rules" beneficial for everyone (but primarily for itself).
• Cuba: Teller (1898) and Platt (1903) Amendments:
  • Teller Amendment: Disavowed U.S. annexation of Cuba, presenting the U.S. as "disinterested."
  • Platt Amendment: While not annexed, Cuba's sovereignty was "highly restricted," making it not a "real country" by U.S. decree. The U.S. wanted control without direct rule.
• Filipino-American War (1899-1902):
  • Called an "insurrection" by some, but Filipinos viewed it as a fight for independence from unwelcome U.S. rule, just as they had resisted Spain.
  • U.S. forces used "heavy concentration camps" to intern civilians, preventing them from aiding guerrillas (similar to the Boer War).
  • Atrocities: Led to starvation, sickness, and death, with estimated deaths ranging from $80,000$ to over a quarter million (possibly $250,000$).
  • Included "waterboarding" and "water torture" (designed to kill), openly used to extract information.
  • Critique: Figures like Mark Twain and William Graham Sumner argued that the U.S. had become like Spain, committing atrocities it supposedly entered the war to oppose.
• Panama Canal Interventions:
  • The U.S. intervened $12$ times in the Panama Canal area between $1856$ and $1903$ .
  • Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (1850): Initially, Britain and U.S. agreed on joint control of any future canal.
  • Hay-Pauncefote Treaty (1900/1901): The U.S. insisted on sole control; Britain conceded (first treaty was renegotiated for complete U.S. advantage).
• Monroe Doctrine Corollaries:
  • Roosevelt Corollary (early 1900s): Flipped the original Monroe Doctrine ("one eighty") from promoting non-interference to asserting U.S. imperial power and control in Latin America.
  • Wilson Corollary (1914): Expanded the doctrine to include Latin American debts, threatening U.S. intervention if European powers tried to collect debts forcibly.
  • Clark Memo (1928): Declared the U.S. as the "sole judge" with the right to intervene whenever, seen either as pro-Latin American or a "blank check" for U.S. action.
• Muscular Latin American Policy (1905-1930):
  • Intensified U.S. interventions: Honduras ($1912$), Nicaragua ($1925-1933$), Veracruz, Mexico ($1914$), Dominican Republic ($1916-1924$), Haiti ($1934$).
  • Established protectorates in the Canal Zone, Haiti, and "Dior" (likely refers to Nicaragua or a similar region).
• U.S. Acquisitions Post-1898: Only the U.S. Virgin Islands were acquired after $1898$ .
• Growth of the U.S. in Size:
  • $1783$ (founding).
  • $1803$ (Louisiana Purchase).
  • $1848$ (Mexican-American War, Gadsden Purchase).
  • Alaska.
  • $1900$: Next major "grab" leading to an empire.
• Scale of American Empire (1913):
  • $0.6\%$ of global land, $1.8\%$ of all colonized people.
  • Relatively small compared to others; its true "power base" was the continental U.S. ("tree with a really big trunk" vs. British Empire's "narrow trunk with really big branches").

Reasons for Empire Building (Equifinality)

• Universal Trend: "Everybody's doing it" because they can and believe it will "pay off in the long term."
• Cost-Benefit Analysis: Empires only started considering cost-benefit analysis in the $1950$s; earlier decisions were based on "status" or fuzzy long-term projections.
• Lack of Single Cause:
  • Cannot be regime type (various systems did it).
  • Cannot be economic system.
  • Cannot be timing of industrialization.
  • Cannot be cultural leadership.
• U.S. and Russia as Exceptions: Domestic "political delays" (instability) "slowed them down," but they were also the "two biggest states that have the least need to expand," thus under less pressure.
• Ideas as "Window Dressing": Different empires used different "ideas" to justify the "same stuff," indicating that the "ideas aren't doing the heavy lifting" but "resonate because they pay domestically."
• Conclusion: The U.S. became an empire by $1900$ due to "rising capability," "need for force projection capability," and the general trend of other nations. Domestic factors caused some lag but were "intervening variables." Rationales differed ("max of justifications, covering stories"), but behavior did not.

Recommendations

1. Remember the Maine:
   • Like the "alibi" and the "cowboy," it's a "bullshit myth" that people accepted.
   • No one truly knows why the Maine sank.
   • A lesson that "the less confident the less information someone has, the more confident they tend to assert something" to compensate for "evidentiary frailty."
2. No Double Standards:
   • Examine U.S. actions during its rise to global power.
   • Use this as a "baseline" for expectations from rising powers like China, recognizing they "probably aren't gonna be well-behaved" and that "great powers will be great powers."
   • Advocates for realistic expectations rather than moral superiority.
3. Retrenchment vs. Expansion:
   • Britain maintained its power for a long time by "avoiding wars" and "curtailing its ambitions to be proportionate to its relative power." ("retrenchment of working").
   • German expansion, in contrast, "is not gonna work."
   • Curtailing power can work, but "rising and expanding your power is no guarantee of working either."

World War I: Background and Entry Factors

• Historical Significance: An "epic failure" resulting in $20$ to $30$ million deaths (half on each side: $10$ to $15$ million), plus the post-war influenza pandemic. The same problems were "relitigate[d]… at twice the cost within a generation."
• Case Study: World War I is a case study of "power transition" and the "Thucydides trap" (Graham Allison's term), where a rising power challenges a ruling one, often leading to major war.
• U.S. Entry - Debunked Conventional Wisdom:
  • "War to end all wars" / Promote democracy: Lofty, but "none of those fit the fact pattern well at all."
  • "Merchants of death": "Incredibly sordid and base story" suggesting Wall Street and weapons manufacturers engineered U.S. entry for profit.
• Explaining U.S. Entry:
  • Third Image Reason (Systemic Level): The "vortex" of Europe, primarily due to the "alarming" relative "distribution of power." U.S. prevented one power from controlling "resources of Europe and Asia" (geopolitics) which could threaten its own sphere of influence (Monroe Doctrine). This pattern repeats in WWII and casts a "long shadow" over the Cold War (George Kennan's thinking).
  • Second Image Reasons (Domestic/State Level) for Outbreak: Poor leadership and bad institutions (Germany, Russia), mastery of Europe at stake.
• Dependent Variable: U.S. "war entry or exit" based on the Correlates of War (COW) definition: two armed groups (states) and $1,000$ battle deaths per year.
• IR Concepts for WWI:
  • Security Dilemma: One actor's efforts to increase security make others feel less secure, leading to a negative spiral (arms races, war).
  • Preventive vs. Preemptive War:
    • Preemptive: Hitting an enemy who is imminently about to attack (e.g., friend warns you about being dumped at lunch, so you dump them at recess). This is defensive.
    • Preventive: Striking before a potential threat can become a problem, stopping a future, not imminent, threat (e.g., ending a perfectly fine date because you imagine future "shitty children"; letting a cute tiger cub go before it grows up and eats you). Bismarck: "committing suicide for fear of death."
    • Distinction is crucial: States often claim preemption for what is actually prevention, making it seem defensive.
  • Hegemony: Greek for leadership; one state is "head and shoulders stronger" (e.g., U.S. became hegemonic, but didn't want others to be).
  • Relative vs. Cumulative Gains:
    • Relative Gains: Concern over whether an adversary gains more power than oneself, even if both gain. Matters because "power can beget more power."
    • Cumulative Gains (Tipping Point Fears): Fear that a state will gain control of critical resources (e.g., Western Europe, Japan) and dramatically "upend the balance of power."
  • Anarchy: In an anarchic international system, if someone wants to bully you, you must be able to stop them (tied to cumulative gains).
• Scope: $1900$ to $1920$, worldwide.
• Arguments for WWI's Occurrence (Broader Concepts):
  • Third Image (Power Shifts/Stability Theory):
    • Hegemon provides public goods but dwindles its own power via "relative gains problems" (e.g., Britain providing trade, U.S. with tariffs and low defense spending).
    • Uneven growth rates and regional dominance lead to shifts or expectations of shifts in power trends.
  • Second Image (Domestic Politics/Dysfunction):
    • Civil-Military Relations: Generals prioritizing battle victories over political goals, disconnecting means from ends.
    • Interdependence/Economic Stories:
      • "You don't go to war people you trade along with." (Contradicted by WWI)
      • "Merchants of Death": Powerful actors (arms dealers, Wall Street) hijack foreign policy for private gain.
    • Democratic Peace Theory: Retrospectively, some argue Germany's non-democratic nature made war more likely.
  • First Image (Bad Leadership):
    • Individuals like Woodrow Wilson, Kaiser Wilhelm II, Czar Nicholas II, Prime Minister Grey made bad decisions.
    • "Cult of the Offensive" arguments: A collective belief that offense always prevailed, creating an echo chamber leading to everyone needing to attack first.

The Outbreak of World War I

• Escalating Crises (Testing Power Dynamics):
  • Moroccan Crises: Tangier ($1905-1906$) and Agadir ($1911$). Germany's attempts to "barge its way into Africa" alarmed others, revealing Kaiser Wilhelm II's aggressive bullying tactics.
    • Britain initially favored alliance with Germany but was alienated by German naval buildup and aggressive behavior.
  • Balkan Incidents: Bosnian Crisis ($1908$) and First Balkan War ($1912$). Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary clashed over expansion towards Turkey (Baghdad Railway).
  • These crises were "indications of something" but not necessarily pre-ordained war. Many times, crises did not lead to war (only $5\%$ of militarized interstate disputes escalate to COW war definition).
• The Spark: Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand (June 28, 1914):
  • Killed by Gavrilo Princip in Vienna through a "bizarre series of events" and a "lucky" shot to the carotid artery.
  • Counterfactuals: This single event is linked to the rise of Lenin and Hitler, suggesting profound historical impact.
  • Revenge Motive: Austria-Hungary demanded retribution.
• Chain Reaction:
  • Germany's "Blank Check": Germany, seeing Austria-Hungary as its only ally and believing "aggression pays," gave unconditional support.
  • Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Serbia: Threatening Serbian independence; Serbia conceded almost everything, but the ultimatum was designed for rejection.
  • Mediation Fails: British PM Edward Grey's conciliatory efforts were ignored.
  • Austria-Hungary Declares War on Serbia (July 28, 1914): Motivated by fear of Serbian independence leading to the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
  • Russian Mobilization: Russia, having been "pushed around too many times by Germany," mobilized (a slow, months-long process).
  • German Mobilization: Germany mobilized quickly (2-3 weeks), driven by fear of Russian growth and commitment to the Schlieffen Plan.
    • Kaiser Wilhelm II's indecision (rescinding then reissuing the mobilization order) showed lack of clear strategy.
  • Alliances Enforce:
    • Russia sought to stand up for "pan-Slavism."
    • France honored its alliance with Russia, fearing German dominance.
    • Britain signaled its entry if Belgium was violated.
• Schlieffen Plan and Belgium:
  • The Schlieffen Plan required invading France through neutral Belgium, knowing it would bring Britain into the war (Belgium created after Napoleon as a "unsinkable aircraft carrier" for British power projection).
  • Germany chose this path as their "best hope" for a swift military victory.
• Underlying Motivations (Preventive War):
  • Germany mobilized "to preempt mobilization of Russia" and prevent "growth of Russia."
  • Russia mobilized "to prevent the growth of Germany."
  • Both nations feared the long-term potential of the other, especially Russia's trajectory.