Mead
Overview
Mead argues that the self cannot appear in consciousness as an explicit subject “I”; it is always encountered as an object, the “me.” The central question is: What is involved when the self is presented as an object?
The immediate answer: an object involves a subject; i.e., a “me” presupposes an “I.” Yet this “I” is a presupposition, not a presented content of conscious experience. As soon as the moment of presentation begins, the I has ceased to be the subject for whom the object “me” exists.
The analysis aims to understand the self as revealed by introspection and then subjected to factual analysis, not as a Hegelian self-turning-into-another. It is the self revealed in memory processes where the observer and the observed appear together.
Core result: in a memory-retrospective moment, there is a subject who is now an object of observation; that subject is the same self who acts toward others and toward the self whom he addresses.
The self appearing as “I” is the memory-image self who acted toward himself and toward other selves; the “me” is the experience induced by the action of the “I.”
If the I speaks, the me hears; if the I strikes, the me feels the blow. The me observed and the I who acts are of the same character, the self distinguished from others by the action towards them.
The differences between the memory presentations of the “I” and the “me” correspond to memory images of initiated social conduct vs. sensory responses to that conduct.
Early social conduct precedes introspective self-consciousness: infants respond to others before they call their own attention to themselves.
The I and the Me: fundamental distinction
The I is the subject attitude that cannot appear directly in conscious experience; it becomes present as an observer only when it ceases to be the active subject of the action.
The me is the object of social conduct; it is the experienced content that the I acts toward, and which observes the I’s actions.
The self-conscious ego is a fusion of a remembered actor (I) and the accompanying chorus (the social response) which becomes an object in memory but never a pure subject in experience.
The self is not a static “I” that views itself directly; rather, it is a dynamic process with memory images of past actions and the sensory consequences of those actions.
The social self is thereby the basis for the inner observer and the inner speech that characterizes higher levels of self-awareness.
The mechanism of introspection and inner response
The introspective mechanism is rooted in the social attitude toward oneself; the self is observed by the very responses one has to one’s own conduct.
Introspection is an inner conversation: symbols and forms used in social intercourse generate an inner dialogue when thinking or reflecting.
James’s point (as cited): consciousness is better conceived as being an implication (sciousness) rather than a content; the self’s awareness includes a large inner response to one’s actions, not merely stimulus-and-response in the external field.
However, Mead emphasizes that, in actual experience, there is more than stimuli and responses: there are inner recognitions of one’s own remarks, innervations (postures, attitudes) that would lead to outward responses.
The observer that accompanies self-conscious conduct is the response that one makes to one’s own conduct, not the actual subject responsible for the conduct in propria persona.
The mechanism of introspection is thus an effect of the social attitude toward oneself; the inner dialogue uses social-symbolic content to interpret one’s own actions.
The combination of remembered self (acted upon) and inner response constitutes the self-conscious ego; the self-conscious ego remains an object of experience when presented, never a pure subject in the present moment.
Social origin of the self: infancy and development
The social nature of self arises early: infants engage in social conduct with others before they attend to themselves.
The infant consciously calls the attention of others before attending to himself; he is affected by others before he is conscious of being affected by himself.
The I of introspection (the self that stands before others in social relations) is not the same I implied by presenting oneself as a me.
The me of introspection is the same me that is the object of others’ social conduct; one presents oneself as acting toward others, and this presentation remains in indirect discourse as the subject of the action while still being an object.
The self that observes and the self that is observed are tied together by social stimulation and the ability to respond to others’ stimuli.
The inner observer is the response one makes to one’s own conduct; this is distinct from the actual I who acts, and the observed me who is affected by the action.
Awareness, field of stimulation, and inner consciousness
There is a “running current” of awareness of what we do that is distinguishable from the field of stimulation, whether external or internal.
Many thinkers have assumed self-consciousness is a direct awareness of both subject and object, thinking its own existence along with others; but James argued this is better conceived as consciousness with the thinker as an implication, not a content.
Mead concedes that consciousness includes stimulus, responses, memory images, and organic sensations that constitute the me, but also recognizes a large inner response to what we are doing, saying, or thinking.
The “inner response” accompanies our self-conscious conduct and helps explain why some people feel the self can directly conscious itself as acting and acted upon.
The actual situation is: the self acts with reference to others and is immediately conscious of the objects about it; in memory, the self or other acts are redintegrated. There is then an inner response that functions as the reflective self.
The reflective (inner) self can criticize, approve, and plan; it is the voice of the inner chorus that accompanies social conduct.
When external attention is highly focused on the objective world, inner self-awareness can fade; self-consciousness returns when one recalls the experience.
The role of language, drama, and inner speech
The sounds, gestures, and vocal expressions that people make in addressing others provoke responses in themselves; one cannot hear oneself speak without assuming the attitude one would have if spoken to by others using the same words.
The self which stands over against other selves becomes an object to itself because of hearing oneself talk and replying in the imagined voice of others.
The mechanism of introspection is grounded in the social attitude toward oneself: the inner conversation uses social symbols and the attitudes of others to interpret one’s own conduct.
The mechanism of thought, using symbols of social intercourse, is an inner conversation, not a mere internal monopolization of one’s own mind; it is socially structured.
The self-conscious ego is not a single subject; it is a synthesis of remembered action and inner response to that action.
The self’s social nature is reinforced by the capacity to imagine others’ points of view and roles; this is how social environments become internalized.
It is through this role-taking that one can think of others as selves and adopt their viewpoints for purposes of social interaction; the self becomes part of a larger social field.
Dramatic development into reflective thought and the shift to inner speech
In childhood, the self is dramatic: the mind acts like a play where the actors are one’s social others, and the self is a fusion of the remembered actor and the chorus.
As thinking evolves, the dramatic representation gives way to the forum and workshop of thought; inner speech becomes the primary means of thought, though the social mechanism remains.
The dramatis personae gradually fade in emphasis from the external voice and gesture to the inner meanings and cues of speech; inner imagery becomes the bare cues for action.
The process shows the social basis of even abstract thinking and religious self-consciousness: the need to address an audience or to render inner thoughts communicable to others.
Ethics, moral development, and the reconstruction of the self
The self, as a mere habit organization, is not self-conscious; character is thus an imperfect self that becomes differentiated when a moral problem appears.
When a moral issue arises, there is disintegration of the old self and the appearance of different voices or tendencies within reflective thought.
There is a reciprocal relation between the self and its object: the content and values of the object shape the self, and the self’s consciousness of that object influences the values that guide action.
The consciousness of a new object (new value) often precedes awareness of the new self that responds to it; direct attention tends first to the object rather than to the self.
When the self becomes an object, it appears in memory; the attitude implied by it is already formed.
Distracting attention from the object to the self risks losing objectivity, a flaw criticized not only in moral agents but also in scientists.
Assuming the essential social character of ethical ends, moral reflection involves conflict among values voiced by the old self and new tendencies. To surrender to the old self is selfishness, defined by habitual emphasis on those values.
The goal is not to let the old self predominate but to reconstruct a social situation so that the new object and its values are adequately recognized by all personal interests.
The new self that answers to the new situation can only appear in consciousness after the new situation has been realized and accepted; the old self may enter as a challenger if it remains dominant against others’ interests.
Solution is the construction of a new world that harmonizes conflicting interests, allowing the new self to emerge and function in this expanded social framework.
The moral solution differs from scientific problem-solving: moral problems involve concrete personal interests and require reconstruction of the entire self in relation to the other selves, whereas science generally involves changing a theoretical stance while maintaining personal allegiance to the old hypothesis until its replacement is justified.
The growth of the self thus proceeds through partial disintegration, the emergence of new voices in the forum of reflection, the reconstruction of the social world, and the appearance of a new self that answers to the new object.
The logic of moral reconstruction mirrors the scientific process: abandon the old theory or attitude, formulate and accept a new end, and identify with the new end only after its acceptance. The old self cannot be the determinant in presenting the new world; it must be reorganized into a broader social framework.
The scientific vs the moral path: a guiding analogy
The abandonment of old theories in science parallels the abandonment of old self-attitudes in morality.
Once a successful hypothesis (or moral end) overcomes conflicts, one may identify with it, but not in terms that privilege the old personality against the new observations and hypotheses.
A scientist may name the new hypothesis after himself and celebrate his enlarged scientific personality in triumph; the moral agent likewise reconstructs the self around the new social end, not clinging to the old self as the determining factor.
The fundamental difference lies in scope: science often considers abstract, impersonal ends; morality centers on concrete personal interests and the people affected by those interests.
Connections, implications, and ethical-social relevance
The self’s social foundation underlines the role of other selves in shaping personality, including religious self-consciousness.
The self’s reconstruction suggests ethical accountability is embedded in social relations; the moral agent’s growth is a relational achievement rather than an isolated transformation.
The internal self-consciousness is inseparable from social roles and imagined perspectives of others; personal identity arises through connections with a broader social world.
The approach emphasizes the continuity between childhood socialization, language development, role-taking, inner speech, and moral growth, showing a unified theory of the social self.
Mead cites other thinkers (Baldwin, Royce, Cooley) to acknowledge the prior recognition that social conduct fosters self-consciousness and that memory images of social interactions ground the self’s content.
Practical and broader implications
Educational and developmental implications: moral and civic education should leverage role-taking, social feedback, and imagined perspectives to cultivate a more complex, cooperative self.
Religious self-consciousness and ethical reflection are grounded in the same social mechanisms, including inner dialogue and the rehearsal of others’ voices in one’s own conscience.
The theory supports a social psychology of ethics: moral growth emerges from negotiating and reconciling competing ends within a community-centered framework, rather than from solitary deliberation.
Summary of key points
The self is not directly present as a pure subject in conscious experience; it appears as an object (the me) within a social-influenced stream of consciousness.
The I is a presupposition that can reveal itself only by ceasing to be the active agent; the self’s subjectivity is revealed through the process of introspection and memory, not as a straightforward present content.
The self-conscious ego arises from the fusion of remembered action (I) and the inner responses and social content that accompany that action (me and the chorus).
The development of self is fundamentally social: infant interactions lay the groundwork for later introspection, role-taking, and inner speech.
The inner conversation, aided by language and symbols from social intercourse, underlies thought and self-awareness.
The self can imagine and adopt the roles and voices of others, which makes the self a social organism embedded in a broader network of social relations.
Moral development involves disintegration and reconstruction: new values and new objects lead to a reconstructed self that harmonizes competing personal and social interests; the old self may be subordinated, but the process requires the new object and end to be realized and accepted.
The moral reconstruction is akin to the scientific process of shifting hypotheses, but it uniquely centers concrete personal interests and social relations rather than abstract impersonal models.
The theory emphasizes the ethical and religious relevance of social self-formation, arguing that our most profound transformations occur in the context of others and the broader social world.
References to the source material
Mead, George Herbert. The Social Self. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 10 (1913): 374-380.
Related discussions and cross-references to Baldwin, Royce, and Cooley as foundational figures acknowledged by Mead.
Endnotes (contextual)
The text is part of The Mead Project and is presented in the public domain; page references (375–380) correspond to the original pagination.