Spartan Decline Notes
Introduction
The 4th century BC marked both the peak and the overthrow of Spartan power, culminating in the defeat by the Thebans at Leuctra in 371 BC. Explanations for Sparta's decline vary, often influenced by the biases of the authors providing them. Xenophon, for instance, attributed the decline to oath-breaking and wealth-seeking, which he believed led to moral degeneration. In contrast, Aristotle pointed to a manpower shortage, or oliganthropia, as the primary cause, a view supported by examining the number of Spartiates present at battles from Plataea in 479 BC to Leuctra. Cawkwell avoided moral judgments, focusing instead on Spartiate numbers and military organization. Hodkinson attributed the decline to inheritance practices and marriage strategies that caused property concentration, a situation exacerbated by an earthquake and increased wealth following the Peloponnesian War. Cawkwell also suggested that Spartiates had a mercenary streak, which challenged the traditional Spartan myth of probity.
Hodkinson explained that the Spartan myth included equal land allotment (kleros) and a ban on foreign coinage, though alienation was permitted in the 4th century via the Rider of Epitadeus, and the ban on foreign coinage was relaxed after the Peloponnesian War. Hodkinson suggests that King Pausanias created these misrepresentations in a pamphlet after his exile in 395 BC, criticizing imperialist policies. Cawkwell, however, believed that Sparta's decline resulted from the growing professionalism of warfare elsewhere and the military brilliance of Epaminondas. Hodkinson stressed internal factors, such as the undermining of homoioi equality, citizens losing the ability to contribute to syssitia, wealth polarization, and elite patronage networks. Both Cawkwell and Hodkinson emphasize Sparta's inherent conservatism.
Cawkwell argued that Sparta lost its military superiority due to a failure to maintain its lead in military professionalism, while Hodkinson noted that respect for tradition exacerbated long-term trends. Rewards for procreation led to more families being unable to sustain citizen status after inheritance, and respect for property rights prevented land redistribution. Similarly, respect for tradition prevented radical change to citizenship criteria (syssition). Cawkwell and Hodkinson identify underlying continuities in Spartan society, even as the myth was reshaped.
The Decline of Sparta
Cawkwell argued that Sparta's defeat in 371 BC was not due to unwise policies towards other Greek states but rather to Epaminondas' military genius. At Leuctra, only 700 of the 10,000 hoplites were Spartiates, suggesting a shortage. Aristotle stated that the city was destroyed due to manpower shortage (oliganthropia) , though he may have meant that the city lacked reserves to make good losses, not that the defeat was due to a Spartiate shortage. Busolt argued that the disaster at Leuctra was inevitable due to the decline of the Lacedaemonian army.
The Rate of Decline in the Number of Spartiates
In 479 BC, 5,000 Spartiates marched to Plataea, identified as the neotés [‘young men’]. Herodotus’ figure of 8,000 in all during the Persian Wars is credible. By 371 BC, there were no more than 1,000 , confirmed by Aristotle . The rate of decline is debated. Thucydides' calculations for the Spartan army at First Mantinea in 418 BC suggest no more than 2,500, possibly 2,100 Spartiates. If Thucydides was mistaken and the number was 4,000 to 4,500, the decline was gradual in the 5th century but dramatic in the 4th. Toynbee postulated two phases in the Spartan army: the Army of Plataea, where Spartiates and Perioeci were brigaded separately in five lochoi (‘companies’), and the Army of Xenophon, where Spartiates and perioeci fought mixed in six morai (‘divisions’).
Toynbee argued that since Sphacteria in 425 BC had mixed Spartiates and perioeci, the reform had already happened, and Thucydides erred in assuming the lochos was the largest unit. Toynbee thought seven lochoi were six morai and one unit of Brasideans and Neodamodeis. However, Toynbee's theory is considered false. There were polemarchs in the army of the Persian Wars, and Thucydides distinguished the Sciritans and the Brasideans and Neodamodeis from the lochoi. A weakness in Toynbee's argument is the assumption that Spartiates and Perioeci were separately brigaded, which is not valid. In 479 BC, 5,000 Spartiates and 5,000 perioeci marched out separately , but Herodotus' account of the fighting shows no separate brigading. He speaks of ‘ten thousand of the Lacedaemonians’ on the right wing, and ‘the Spartiates chose to station the Tegeans next to themselves’. Herodotus does not clearly distinguish ‘Spartiates’ and ‘Lacedaemonians’, and there were no non-Spartiates killed, which is consistent with the Perioeci being in the rear ranks, with the Spartiates in front bearing the brunt . Busolt observed that in the army of the morai 'the strongest', i.e., the Spartiates, were always the ones who confronted the enemy , making Toynbee’s criterion unsound.
Andrewes believes we should double Thucydides’ figures, noting that Thucydides stated that the Spartan array was greater than that of their opponents . Thucydidean numbers for Mantinea seem inconsistent with 6000 Lacedaemonian hoplites alleged by Xenophon for the battle of Nemea in 394 BC. In the first decades of the fourth century, a mora was larger than a lochos as described by Thucydides; the mora destroyed by Iphicrates in 390 BC was 600 strong. How is one to explain what is an increase in Spartan strength if Thucydides’ calculations for 418 BC are correct? After 424 BC, Sparta used non-Spartiates for military purposes. Neodamodeis were probably never incorporated in the morai . There were two other sources of non-Spartiates in the morai which render comparison of the army of 418 BC with that of the early fourth century difficult: the ‘Inferiors’ (Hypomeiones) who were ‘in the army’ . Herodotus knew only of Spartiates and Perioeci in the Spartan army, and the incorporation of the ‘Inferiors’ may well have been a post-Brasidean development. The Perioeci may well have been drawn on ever more heavily. Neither of Andrewes’ second and third arguments is of great force. Thucydides appears to have known a great deal about Sparta and had penetrated ‘the secrecy of the state’ sufficiently to know about the massacre of the helots. He furnishes a large number of names and patronymics. Of the many Spartans he names, only a certain number are described as ‘Spartiate’, and most of the rest are simply ‘Lacedaemonians’. Thucydides had tried, but been dissatisfied about, Spartan casualties. He makes a firm statement about Herodotus’ ‘Pitanate lochos’ – ‘it never existed’ . The army of the Lacedaemonians appeared greater .
There is a way of explaining Thucydides’ statements other than the desperate hypothesis of Thucydides’ making careless calculations, and without misgiving one can confidently accept his figures for the Spartan army in 418 BC. In the sixty years since the Persian Wars, they had dropped by between 69 and 73 percent, and in the fifty years since 418, by between 60 and 54 percent, the larger drop in the earlier period doubtless reflecting the effect of the great earthquake of 465 BC. There was no dramatic drop in the fifty years before Leuctra, but despite the steady decline of the fifth century, Sparta’s military prowess continued.
Compensation for Declining Numbers
After the excitement of 465 BC, the helots, declared to be continually waiting for an opportunity to attack, never revolted again until the Thebans invaded Laconia in 369 BC. The Spartans, however, never ceased to fear a helot uprising , and the occupation of Pylos in 425 BC was quickly followed by the occupation of Cythera, with Spartan fears of the effects seeming to be much the same in both cases . As the number of Spartiates steadily declined throughout the period, one would expect the chances of successful revolt to steadily increase. However, the helots were so afraid of reprisals that they would not move until Sparta had been defeated and a foreign army was in Laconia itself, the position in 369. All the evidence concerning the condition of the helots suggests that they were treated with great severity and cruelty. Both Theopompus, writing in the second half of the fourth century, and Myron of Priene, probably in the third, appear to be describing the position in their own day. The Messenians, as far as we know, remained uncompromisingly intransigent, pining for their long-lost liberty, while the Laconian helots seem to have been curiously ambivalent.
Spartiates at home in Sparta did not dare to leave their shields in a usable condition , fearing that Sparta was on the point of destruction and that their oppressors would shortly oppress no more. The authorities saw fit to make a proclamation to the helots that if any was willing to take up arms and join the ranks, he should receive solemn assurances that those who joined in the fight would be free. It was said that over 6,000 responded . The mirage spartiate bedazzled all classes alike. The Perioeci, who could be relied on to fight side by side with Spartiates, were so loyal that the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War saw fit only to ravage Perioecic territory, not to expect revolt. The helots too were sufficiently loyal to wish only for freedom within the Spartan system, not for freedom from that system. When asked what his intention had been, he replied that he wanted to be ‘inferior to no one’ in the state , suggesting that a revolution may have been planned very similar to that proposed by King Agis in 243 BC, viz. a vast increase of Spartiates . The Spartan way of life was the ideal, or so all classes conceived it, including even those helots who were not imbued with Messenian nationalism.
Herodotus appears to have known of only the threefold division of Spartiates, Perioeci, and helots. By 400, the two classes of ‘Inferiors’ and ‘Neodamodeis’ have emerged . In the third century, Myron can name no less than five kinds of freed slaves. Herodotus appears to have known of only the threefold division of Spartiates, Perioeci, and helots. The information Thucydides provides about the Neodamodeis suggests that the decision in 424 BC to allow Brasidas to use non-Spartiates in the service of the state was a major turning point. He first mentions them, and as a distinct class, in 421 BC . In 425 BC, helots who were ready to help break the blockade of Sphacteria were promised their freedom . In the Ionian War, we meet a Perioecus in command of a squadron of thirteen ships . The Spartan commander sent out by the city with 700 hoplites to assist Cyrus in his revolt, Chirisophus, had as his second-in-command Neon of Asine .
The Neglect of the Laws of Lycurgus
Much has been made of the corrupting effects of the importation of wealth, but the matter should be viewed with skepticism. When at the end of the Peloponnesian War Lysander sent home the money in his possession, it was proposed that this gold and silver coin should not be allowed to remain in the city and that the ancient iron spits should continue to be the only currency in the city. Love of money was an ancient Spartan disease. One should therefore regard the statements about the great change in the early fourth century with great skepticism. Spartiates probably remained as formidable as ever on the field of battle. In the Corinthian War, the Argives had shown a marked reluctance to face the Lacedaemonian shields. To survive a lost battle was held to be equivalent to fleeing from the enemy.
The Defeat at Leuctra
The right explanation is to be found in the Theban development of the art of war. At Leuctra, the Spartan army was utterly out-generalled. In considering the state of the Spartan military power in 371, the allies can be left out of account. The system instituted in either 382 or 378, whereby members of the league could pay for the requisite number of troops instead of themselves providing them, may in an age of ever-increasing professionalism have been an advantage. There is no precise information on the amount of military training undergone by the non-Spartiates in the army. Excellent physical condition is ascribed to various kinds of non-Spartiates. Spartiates and non-Spartiates seem to have looked alike on the battlefield, purple-clad and longhaired. In the course of time, there may not have been a very marked difference in their fighting. As Aristotle remarked , Spartan superiority had in the past derived from the fact that Spartans alone trained for war, whereas latterly others had matched their professionalism: ‘now they have rivals in their education; formerly they had none’. The battle would be decided by what Thucydides had termed [empeiria (‘experience’)]. Xenophon’s remark about the uniqueness of the battle of Coronea could with justice have been repeated about any of the subsequent military engagements in the period he covered. It suggests that the art of war was developing so fast that every battle was in some sense novel. Before the battle, it was agreed to draw up the army sixteen deep; when the Thebans’ turn to command came round, they made their army ‘thoroughly deep’ . The Thebans did not act as expected; they concentrated themselves fifty deep on the left wing, an unheard-of thing, advanced to battle ‘obliquely’, i.e., in such a way that the Thebans would engage the Spartans before contact was possible elsewhere, ensured protection for the rest of the army by