imperialism and warfare

A political organization continuous with the operations of the state is the monopoly of the use of legitimized violence

Projections of armed force:

• Outward: warfare (defense of polity of conquest of other polities)

• Inward: policing/security, incarceration, judicial punishment, enforcement of decision, etc.

Outward and inward violence go together and reinforce each other

“The imperial boomerang”: as states develop instruments of domination to use in the periphery, they will also start to use them at home

Hannah Arendt: the rise of totalitarianism in Europe stems from its colonial efforts abroad

Achaemenid empire grew due to big armies and explosive conquest

Cyrus the Great (r. 559-530): author of the Achaemenid empire, responsible for the pan-West Asian conquests

Babylonian Royal Chronicles accounts Cyrus’s attempt to conquer Persia (most likely got defeated)

Persian power extends all the way through Anatolia to the Halys river

The Persians later defeat the Lydians, capturing the capital Sardis, extending their power all the way to the Aegean sea (c. 540 BCE)

Cambyses II (530-522): shown honoring local elites, respecting religious traditions, adopting forms of Egyptian culture

• Seen as legitimate pharaoh

Persians defeated the Egyptians by a landslide at the Nile River Valley Delta

From the 6th century onwards, most Persian kings are concerned w consolidation rather than expansion

Achaemenid army had a central core (permanent professional elite standing force under control of the king and composed of exclusively ethnic Persians) 

Greek sources like Herodatus exaggerate the size of the Achaemenid army. However, it is true the size of the Achaemenid army was by far the biggest in West Asia.

The Achaemenid army is built upon and maintained bc it was so well resourced and equipped

Spartans, though very powerful, had issues as well. It was a slow and tedious process to mobilize the army

Athens: Long Walls

• Prevented Sparta from penetrating the city of Athens itself

• Created a fundamentally asymmetrical strategic situation

Sparta’s ambition is to crush Athens, while Athens’ ambition is to simply stay inside their walls and bring resources from the outside to sustain themselves and wait out the Spartans

After the war breaks out, the first 10 years is known as  Archidamian war

War strategy → plague, disease, loss of farmland

425: Athenians finally take an offensive, sail naval fleet to Pylos and Sphacteria and take some hostages. As a result, the Spartans become horrified of a permanent Athenian military Garrison in that location bc it threatened the safety of Laconia. This successfully deters the Spartans from sending in their yearly cavalry to attack Attica.

Battle of Delium (424): Spartans crush Athenians in a land battle

• But this battle is turning point where both sides are becoming tired and want to negotiate peace. Spartans did not want a military garrison in Pylos and the Athenians were sick and tired of seeing their property get destroyed.

Nicias

Peace of Nicias (421)

Alcibiades: incredibly flamboyant and handsome Athenian who is by far the most rich and most beautiful

• Persuaded Athenians to attack Sicily bc apparently the other Sicilians hate Syracruse so much that they will do anything to take them down, including providing the Athenians with support (food, money etc) to support them. This backfired greatly bc Syracuse receives backup from the Spartans and their main navy gets trapped inside the harbor and crushed.  Every Athenian was slaughtered, sufferings were on an enormous scale, and their army was destroyed in totality.

Battle of Mantinea (418)

After a decade’s worth of war, not much has changed… Mostly a stalemate… Then, something massive happens–the Athenians launch an expedition into Sicily, but they severely underestimated the size of the island and how many inhabitants live there

Athenians become more Sparta-like in their expedition of Sicily while Syracuse becomes more ambitious

Athens gambled big on Sicily and lost big. The campaign was a total failure and left Athens very vulnerable. The following year, the Spartans take advantage of this weakness and establish a garrison in Decelea, with advice from Alcibidiades, who was exiled and prosecuted in Athens so he switches sides and helps the Spartans.

Alcibiades leads a Spartan Navy to Chios to get them to revolt against Athens. which works.

During the Peloponessian war, the smaller cities faced factional issues with a civic conflict between Spartan supporters and Athens supporters

Alcibiades abolishes political pay and establishes a property requirement to run for office… Known as the oligarchic Revolution of 400

• Only lasts a few months before democracy is restored

Alcibiades is called back and restored to Athens and put in charge of the Athenian fleet

Aegospotamai: this defeat here forces the Athenians to defeat bc they could no longer recover from this loss like they could with Sicily

Sparta contemplates what to do with Athens… Athens had to get rid of their long walls, give up all of their overseas possessions as well as their navy, but they are not crushed entirely–Spartans want to keep them around as a piece on the chess board to keep the Thebes in check bc they were quickly growing in power

From a military standpoint, in the context of antiquity, a naval power never had the capability to deliver a knockout punch against a land power

The Spartans ended up building a navy which they never did before which changed the calculus