Hobbes Leviathan: Chapters XIII–XIV Notes

Chapter XIII: Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning Their Felicity and Misery

• Nature has made men so equal in body and mind that no one can claim a unique advantage over another in a way that guarantees personal security or benefit for all time.

  • Even when one man is physically stronger or quicker in mind, differences are not enough to grant lasting advantage once all factors are counted.
  • Prudence is largely experience, which time bestows equally on those who apply themselves; the idea that some possess greater wisdom is often a vanity (they see their own wit up close, others’ wit from afar).
  • This equality of ability leads to equality of hope in achieving our ends.

• If two men desire the same thing and cannot both enjoy it, they become enemies; in pursuing their ends, they seek to destroy or subdue one another.

  • If an invader fears only one other man, others may unite to dispossess him of the fruits of his labor, his life, or his liberty; and vice versa.
  • This mutual diffidence drives people to anticipate and use force or deceit to master others until no power remains that could threaten them.
  • Some pursue greater dominion even beyond security because contesting power is, for some, a pleasure in exercising control.
  • The augmentation of dominion, if it helps a man survive, is considered allowed by nature.

• There are three principal causes of quarrel in the state of nature:

  • 1) Competition: for gain, to subdue others, and to claim persons, wives, children, and cattle.
  • 2) Diffidence: for safety and to defend what one already has.
  • 3) Glory: for reputation and honor, even in trivial matters (a word, a smile, or a differing opinion).

• War is not merely a sequence of battles; it is a condition of ongoing, known hostility in which there is no secure peace. War is a "tract of time" where the will to fight is known during the entire period there is no assurance to the contrary.

  • All other time is peace.
  • In such a state, all arts and knowledge perish: no industry, no agriculture, no navigation, no crafts, no society; life becomes "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short".

• Some may find it hard to accept that nature leads to this dissociation; Hobbes suggests we look to common experiences: locking doors, arming for travel, guarding possessions, and locking chests at home, even in the presence of laws and armed officers. If these precautions exist, the underlying view is that people still expect others to value them as they value themselves.

• Savage conditions in some parts of the world (e.g., America) show the absence of civil government, yet even where government exists, kings and sovereigns maintain force and power to secure industry, often through continual readiness for war (gladiator-like posture with forts, garrisons, and spies).

  • Yet this does not automatically entail misery for all; it can enable industry if the common power enforces peace.

• The transition from war to peace requires a common power to keep all in awe; without such power, there can be no justice or injustice—only force and fraud as the cardinal virtues.

  • In a state without law, there is no property as we know it; there is only use of whatever one can obtain and hold by force.

• The passions that incline men to peace are:

  • fear of death; the desire for things necessary to a comfortable life; and
  • the hope, through industry, to obtain those things.
  • Reason furnishes convenient terms of peace that people may accept, which Hobbes calls the laws of nature, to be discussed in the next chapters.

• The condition of life without a common power is inherently miserable, but there exists a possible escape through reason and agreement.

• The passage finally notes: the ideas of liberty and constraint will be clarified by the two natural laws and the contract in Chapter XIV.

• The savage state is only a model; peoples with some form of governance still experience jealousy and fear, which can motivate war or peace depending on incentives and power dynamics.

• Quoted or paraphrased ideas to remember:

  • "The life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."
    -"The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death, desire of commodious living, and hope by industry to obtain them."
    -"Reason suggests convenient articles of peace upon which men may be drawn to agreement."

Chapter XIV: Of the First and Second Natural Laws, and of Contracts

• The right of nature (jus naturale) is the liberty each man has to use his own power to preserve his own life; liberty is the absence of external impediments, though impediments may diminish one’s power to act but cannot prevent using the remaining power.

  • Distinction: a law of nature (lex naturalis) is a precept discovered by reason that forbids what is destructive of life and prescribes what is necessary to preserve life; right is liberty to do or forbear, whereas law binds and prescribes.
  • In the natural condition of war, every man has a right to everything, including another’s body; hence no security of life or property until a common power is established.
  • Therefore, the fundamental law of nature obliges men to seek peace as far as possible, and, if peace fails, to use all means of war to defend themselves.

• The two laws of nature:

  • 1) Seek peace and follow it.
  • 2) If others seek peace, lay down this right to all things and be content with as much liberty against others as you would allow them against yourself.
  • These form the basis for a social compact: the transition from natural rights to civil rights requires mutual concession to secure peace and safety.

• The Gospel-like command and its secular equivalent:

  • The first law of nature yields the precept: "Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them"; and the Latin maxim quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.
  • This is the basis for reciprocal restraint and cooperation in civil society.

• Laying down rights and mutual transfer: when a person renounces or transfers a right, the effect is to remove hindrances to others’ enjoyment of their rights; the suppression of a right is not necessarily a grant of a new right to someone else unless explicitly transferred.

  • Renunciation or transfer must be signified by credible signs (words, actions, or both).
  • The bonds of obligation arise from such signs, which rely on fear of consequences if violated.
  • Some rights cannot be renounced (e.g., resisting those who would take life by force) because there is no perceived benefit to renunciation of life.
  • The motive for renunciation is primarily security of person and life.

• The mutual transfer of right is what we call a contract.

  • There is a distinction between transferring the right to the thing itself and transferring the means of enjoying it (delivery vs. title).
  • The delivery of the thing may occur at different times relative to the transfer of the right (immediate vs. future).
  • A pact or covenant is one form of contract where performance may be deferred; the keeping of promises constitutes the contract’s enforcement.
  • If both parties perform simultaneously, no problem arises; if one party performs first, fear of the other’s non-performance complicates the validity in mere nature.
  • In a civil state, with a sovereign power, the party who performs first can be bound by the social contract to perform; fear of violation by others is mitigated by the sovereign’s power.

• When there is a transfer of the right to the thing, the means of enjoyment are transferred as well (e.g., selling land includes rights of the herbage and what grows on it).

  • The sovereign’s transfer includes rights to levy taxes and to appoint magistrates; the right to defend and maintain the government is part of the transferred authority.

• Contracts with other beings or with God is problematic:

  • Covenants with beasts are impossible because they do not understand language or signification of right; covenants with God require mediation by those God speaks through (prophets or His lieutenants).
  • Vows contrary to the law of nature are void; what is commanded by natural law binds regardless of a vow.
  • If it later proves impossible, the covenant remains binding to the value or the genuine endeavour to perform, but not to the impossible.

• The enforceability and end of covenants: two ways to end a covenant are performance and forgiveness (restitution of liberty by re-transferring the right).

  • Covenants entered into under fear in the state of nature remain obligatory; for example, ransom payments by prisoners of war or a weaker prince granting peace under fear.
  • Even in civil states, if a new fear arises, the covenant may be renewed or voided.

• The matter of covenant validity depends on deliberation about future events; covenants concern what is to come and be reasonably possible to perform.

  • If the matter could not hinder a man from promising, it should not be inadmissible as a hindrance to performance.
  • The transfer of a right implies the transfer of the means to enjoy it: e.g., selling land transfers the associated produce and streams that sustain it.
  • The right to government, including levying money to support soldiers and appointing magistrates, is understood to be part of civil sovereignty.

• Covenants with brute beasts are impossible; covenants with God are possible only through mediation of God’s representatives; oaths to contrary to natural law are ineffective and vows against natural law bind not.

• Oaths and their role in civil society:

  • In the lack of civil power, an oath is a method to strengthen covenants through fear of God—the belief in divine punishment or accountability. The example is the primitive form: "Let Jupiter kill me else, as I kill this beast."
  • Our form: "I shall do thus, and thus, so help me God."
  • Oaths add nothing to the obligation if the covenant is lawful; if the covenant is unlawful, it is not binding even if sworn.
  • Oaths are only meaningful when sworn in a way that the swearer regards as binding (i.e., by God or by some authority that is considered divine by the speaker).
  • Oaths are sometimes used in political or religious contexts to strengthen promises; unnecessary oaths to God are a profanation when the swearer does not truly believe in the divinity invoked.

• Two primary sources of fear that can sustain covenants in the absence of civil power:

  • Fear of the invisible power (God or gods).
  • Fear of those whom one would offend or who would punish noncompliance.
  • The former is the religious foundation for the obligation to keep faith before civil order arises. The latter is a practical check in the absence of a sovereign coercive power.

• Overall implications:

  • Hobbes argues that in the state of nature, life is brutal, and without a sovereign, there is no justice or injustice, only force. A social contract and a sovereign are necessary for the establishment of civil peace and security.
  • The laws of nature serve as precursors to political and civil obligations, guiding individuals toward peace while preserving the freedom to defend themselves.
  • The concept of contract, consent, and the transfer of rights provides a foundation for political authority, property rights, and civil liberty within a commonwealth.