ECON 111 Freakonomics Set 7 – Incentives, incentives, incentives

Foundations and Types of Incentives

  • Incentive Function: Incentives serve as foundational mechanisms using carrots (rewards) and sticks (punishments) to steer behavior and encourage desired outcomes.
  • Economic / Financial Incentives: Direct monetary rewards or penalties, such as a 3 dollar3\,\text{dollar} per pack cigarette sin tax or wage adjustments.
  • Social Incentives: Pressures derived from interpersonal dynamics and reputation, such as municipal bans on smoking in public dining spaces to prevent public disapproval.
  • Moral Incentives: Ethical appeals to do the right thing, such as publicizing that black-market cigarette trafficking finances terrorism.

Policy Design and Unintended Consequences

  • Policy Misalignment: Interventions backfire when incentives fail to align individual self-interest with intended societal goals.
  • Mexico City Driving Restrictions (1989): A mandatory one-day-per-week rotating driving ban prompted households to purchase inexpensive, older second vehicles, ultimately increasing net emissions.
  • London Congestion Charge (2003): Implementing an 8 dollar8\,\text{dollar} fee (later increased to approximately 15 dollars15\,\text{dollars}) reduced vehicle traffic by 20 %20\,\% and boosted bus ridership by 14 %14\,\%, despite generating lower-than-projected public revenue and reducing downtown retail foot traffic.
  • Deputizing Monitoring via Aligned Interests: Fast-food receipt guarantees offering free meals if no receipt is issued deputize customers to monitor cash transactions, eliminating internal register theft without added surveillance costs.
  • Shared Cost Distortions: Splitting dining bills evenly lowers individual marginal cost to 16\frac{1}{6} of actual expenditure, incentivizing diners to order more expensive items than when paying individually.

Comparison of gasoline and diesel taxes across countries

Social Incentives, Norm Nudging, and Preference Gaps

  • Peer Influence and Herding: The peer network is the single strongest predictor of smoking behavior; an increase in peer smoking from 20 %20\,\% to 30 %30\,\% increases individual smoking probability by 25 %25\,\%.
  • Fundamental Attribution Error: The systematic tendency to attribute actions to personal character traits while ignoring significant situational and social pressures.
  • Declared vs. Revealed Preferences:
    • In residential energy trials directed by Robert Cialdini, subjects stated environmental protection was their primary motivation and peer behavior was least important.
    • Revealed preferences demonstrated that door hangers displaying "Join your neighbors in conserving energy" achieved the only statistically significant energy reduction.
  • Perverse Norm Nudging: Displaying signs at Petrified Forest National Park in Arizona stating that theft removes 14 tons14\,\text{tons} of wood annually caused theft rates to increase by establishing theft as a prevalent social norm.

Crowding Out and Distorted Schemes

  • Haifa Daycare Study: Introducing a 3 dollar3\,\text{dollar} fine for parents arriving more than 10 minutes10\,\text{minutes} late doubled late pickups; paying the fee erased moral guilt, and late pickups persisted even after the fine was removed.
  • Charity Canvassing in Israel: High school canvassers raised the highest donations under pure altruistic appeals; introducing a small commission (1 %1\,\%) degraded performance below the no-commission baseline by crowding out intrinsic moral duty.
  • Small Stipends: Blood donations decrease when donors receive modest stipends rather than recognition for altruism.
  • The Cobra Effect: A bounty on dead cobras in colonial Delhi prompted citizens to breed cobras; when the bounty was discontinued, released cobras made the infestation worse.
  • Corporate Quotas: The Wells Fargo "Eight is Great" cross-selling quota prompted employees to open millions of unauthorized accounts, culminating in an initial 185 million dollar185\,\text{million}\,\text{dollar} fine from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
  • Tax Enforcement (1987): Requiring Social Security Numbers for claimed dependents on April 15, 1987, eliminated 7 million7\,\text{million} fraudulent exemptions in the United States.

The Economics of Cheating

  • Calculus of Fraud: Individuals cheat when benefits are high, risk of detection is low, and penalties are negligible.
  • Standardized Testing Cheating: Under No Child Left Behind (2002) sanctions, approximately 5 %5\,\% of Chicago Public Schools (CPS) classrooms exhibited teacher cheating, characterized by altering 88 to 1010 consecutive difficult questions for low-performing students.
  • Algorithmic Detection: Cheating in classrooms is identified by statistical anomalies, including identical strings of right answers on hard questions paired with incorrect answers on simple ones.
  • Sumo Bout-Rigging:
    • Sumo rankings determine elite status, income, and privileges across the 6666 wrestlers in the makuuchi and juryo divisions.
    • Achieving an 8th8^{\text{th}} win in a 1515-bout tournament prevents rank demotion.
    • On final tournament days, wrestlers with a 7−77-7 record won 79.6 %79.6\,\% of matches against 8−68-6 opponents (predicted win rate: 48.7 %48.7\,\%) and 73.4 %73.4\,\% against 9−59-5 opponents (predicted: 47.2 %47.2\,\%).
    • In subsequent rematch bouts with no promotion at stake, the win rate of the former 7−77-7 wrestler fell to 40 %40\,\%, indicating reciprocal collusion.

Algorithmic pattern detection of identical consecutive answers in suspicious classroom

The Illusion of Knowledge and Overconfidence

  • Reputational Asymmetry: Society punishes admissions of ignorance and rewards confident predictions, encouraging people to conceal lack of knowledge.
  • Early Development: In testing children aged 55 to 99, 76 %76\,\% attempted to answer unanswerable questions rather than stating they did not know.
  • Forecasting Accuracy: A study by Philip Tetlock evaluating roughly 300300 experts over 20 years20\,\text{years} found their forecasts performed no better than crude extrapolation algorithms; CXO Advisory Group found financial market experts achieved only a 47.5 %47.5\,\% accuracy rate.
  • Overconfidence Bias: Approximately 80 %80\,\% of drivers evaluate their driving skills as above the median driver.

Loss Aversion, Framing, and Real-World Scaling

  • Loss Aversion Principle: Losses inflict greater psychological dissatisfaction than equivalent gains provide pleasure relative to a baseline reference point.
  • Endowment Effect and Status Quo Bias: People disproportionately value resources they currently own, discouraging change; this mechanism underpins 3030-day trial periods and vehicle test drives.
  • Chicago Teacher Incentive Experiment: Teachers given an upfront 8,000 dollar8{,}000\,\text{dollar} bonus that was subject to clawback if students missed benchmarks achieved significantly better student math outcomes than teachers offered identical bonuses paid at year-end.
  • Pre-Paid Commissions: Sales representatives receiving commissions in advance outsell those paid retroactively, even when retroactively paid options offer higher nominal compensation (e.g., 10 dollars10\,\text{dollars} advance vs. 12 dollars12\,\text{dollars} retroactive).
  • Voltage Drop in Policy Scaling: The drop in intervention efficacy when moving from small trials to population scale, caused by administrative sludge, indirect outcome metrics, limited recipient attention, and population heterogeneity.