Study Notes on Contemporary Debates in Epistemology

Contemporary Debates in Epistemology

Overview

  • Editors: Matthias Steup, John Turri, Ernest Sosa.

  • Publisher: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

  • Publication Year: 2014

Can Skepticism Be Refuted?

  • Skepticism Premise: Choice between ordinary beliefs and skeptical hypotheses is evidentially underdetermined.

  • Jonathan Vogel's Argument:

    • Inference-to-the-Best-Explanation: Uses to challenge the premise of evidential underdetermination.

    • Isomorphic Hypothesis: Matches cause and effect relationships of the real world hypothesis (assumes things are as perceived).

    • Comparison of Hypotheses:

    • Isomorphic hypothesis is more complex; it uses pseudo-shapes and pseudo-locations instead of genuine ones.

    • This complexity is not justified by increased explanatory power.

    • Conclusion: Preference for the real world hypothesis allows rejection of the evidential underdetermination premise, and hence skepticism.

Richard Fumerton's Response Essay

  • Inferential Internalism Framework:

    • Knowing propositions about the external world requires:

    1. Evidence E making propositions probable.

    2. Knowledge that E makes those propositions probable.

    • Challenges for Inferential Internalists:

    • Avoiding infinite regress.

    • Identifying evidence that confirms skeptical hypotheses are false.

    • Doubt on Inference-to-the-Best-Explanation: Skeptical hypotheses may provide simpler explanations.

    • Skeptics question the truth-guiding nature of inference-to-the-best-explanation.

Section II: The Refutation of Skepticism by Jonathan Vogel

A. Knowledge and Skepticism

  • Importance of Knowledge: To deny knowledge implies endorsing skepticism about the external world.

  • Deceiver Argument Outline:

    1. Proposition m (mundane belief) must not be underdetermined to claim knowledge.

    2. Belief m is underdetermined.

    3. Conclusion: do not know m.

B. Underdetermination Principle (UP)

  • UP Definition: If q is a competitor to p, knowledge of p requires non-arbitrary rejection of q.

  • Alternate UP: A subject can know p only if p has more epistemic merit than q.

C. Analysis of the Deceiver Argument

  • Validity: The deceiver argument is logically valid.

  • Focus on Premises: Premise (1) applies UP to mundane propositions; premise (2 claims all face equal competitors (skeptical hypothesis).

  • Goal: Refute premise (2) to combat skepticism.

D. Domestic vs. Exotic Skepticism

  • Domestic Skepticism: Challenges existing epistemic principles but does not undermine them.

  • Exotic Skepticism: Contests the legitimacy of these principles, arguing for potential deeper skepticism.

Section III: Counterarguments to Skepticism

A. Factors Influencing Epistemic Merit

  • Five distinctions of opinions regarding justification against skepticism:

    1. No basis for rejecting skeptics - conditional skepticism.

    2. Epistemic rationality allows rejection of skeptical hypotheses.

    3. Belief in mundane propositions is justified by methodological conservatism.

    4. Experience justifies beliefs in mundane propositions.

    5. Skeptical hypotheses can be self-refuting or inconsistent.

B. Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE)

  • Principle of IBE: Choose A over B when A explains a relevant body of facts better.

  • Obstacles:

    • Clarity on what contributes to explanatory goodness is lacking.

    • The complexity of the skeptical hypothesis is often overlooked.

C. The Minimal Skeptical Hypothesis (MSH)

  • Definition: Experience caused in a delusory manner; lacks explanatory power and depth.

  • Example: Explaining false experiences without genuine causal relations.

D. The Isomorphic Skeptical Hypothesis (ISH)

  • Definition: A sophisticated skeptical hypothesis structurally identical to the Real World Hypothesis (RWH).

  • Challenge: Explanation matching that of RWH without legitimacy.

E. Explanatory Advantages of RWH over ISH

  • Emphasis on genuine shapes and locations as crucial to explanatory success.

  • RWH is favored for being more economical in its explanations.

Section IV: Challenges and Conclusions

A. IBE's Role in Refuting Skepticism

  • Critical Views on IBE: Simplicity does not guarantee epistemic justification or truth.

  • Skepticism about induction provides further challenges, complicating the response to skepticism about the external world.

B. Indirect Responses to Skepticism

  • Acceptable Presumptions: Must find grounding in shared epistemic principles to engage with skepticism meaningfully.

  • Conditional Reasoning: Invokes hypothetical scenarios evaluating common sense versus skeptic beliefs.

C. Conclusions on Skepticism

  • Some skeptics can be refuted, while others cannot but might need not be addressed.

Acknowledgments

  • Thanks to numerous individuals for contributions and support throughout the project.

References

  • Rosen, D. (General acknowledgments)

  • Additional sources mentioned throughout the text spanning philosophical research relevant to epistemology and skepticism topics.