Plato Five Dialogues: Euthyphro Vocabulary Flashcards
Context and Purpose
Source: Plato’s Euthyphro, a early Socratic dialogue focused on defining piety (holiness).
Setting: Outside the king-archon’s court in Athens. Socrates is with Euthyphro as both face legal matters.
Immediate backdrop: Socrates has been indicted by Meletus for ungodliness and corrupting the youth; Euthyphro is prosecuting his own father for murder, a case his family and friends deem impious.
Core aim of the dialogue: to seek a universal definition of piety and explore how such a definition can be universally applied to actions, not just situational cases.
Method on display: the Socratic elenchus (refutation) and pursuit of the Form or essential nature of piety, rather than just examples of pious acts.
Notable theme: contrast between particular actions and universal definitions; the tension between religious practice and ethical concepts in public life.
Key Concepts Introduced
Piety (hosion) initially defined by ritual knowledge and performance (auspices, prayers, sacrifices), then broadened toward general pious conduct.
Genus and species (the rough Aristotelian distinction used in early dialogues): generator or general class (genus) versus specific instances (species).
The Form (eidos) concept: the single, universal quality that makes all pious actions pious; later associated with Platonic Forms.
The one Form of piety: Socrates seeks a single form that underwrites all pious actions, not merely a collection of examples.
The divine sign (daimonion): Socrates mentions a personal divine sign that guides his actions, introduced earlier in other dialogues and referenced here as a persistent motif.
The Acropolis, Lyceum, deme, king-archon, and other civic-religious terms: context for how piety and law intersect in Athenian life.
The broader philosophical issue: whether moral terms like piety have a fixed, universal essence or merely reflect divine approval (divine command) or human interpretation.
Setting and Civic Contexts
The king-archon’s court: the venue for indictments dealing with religious matters in Athens.
Meletus: the prosecutor against Socrates; a young, obscure figure from the Pitthean deme.
The Lyceum: an outdoor gymnasium near Athens where intellectuals debated; Socrates and others engaged in dialogue there.
A deme: a local political division of Attica; citizenship ties and civic life are organized around demes.
The Acropolis: centerpiece of religious life with major temples and festivals, including the robe festival for Athena.
Characters and Roles
Socrates: conducting a personal inquiry into the nature of piety; uses elenchus to press for a universal definition.
Euthyphro: a self-described expert on piety and religious matters; prosecuting his father for murder; serves as interlocutor and test case for definitions.
Meletus: Meletus’ indictment frames Socrates’ position as a target of the divine-ward controversy.
The crowd and public opinion: referenced in terms of how people react to religious matters and philosophical inquiries.
The Moving Target: Progression of Definitions of Piety
Definition 1 (Euthyphro’s initial proposal): Piety is what Euthyphro is doing now—the prosecution of a wrongdoer (his father) for murder.
Socrates’ response: A single action is not a universal definition of piety; need a general form that would apply across cases.
Definition 2 (Piety as what is loved by the gods): Prosecution is pious because it is loved by the gods. (Euthyphro’s account at this stage aligns with divine approval as the criterion.)
Socrates prompts examination of whether the divine opinions are stable or vary across cases.
Definition 3 (Piety as what all the gods love): The pious is what all gods love; the impious is what all gods hate.
Problem 1: Gods disagree about many things (justice, virtue, etc.), so how can there be a single standard across all gods?
Problem 2: If what is loved by the gods is pious, then the divine affection itself would need justification separate from piety (leading to circularity).
The Euthyphro Dilemma arises from Definition 3: Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because the gods love it?
If X is pious because the gods love it, then piety depends on divine permission (divine whim may change).
If the gods love X because it is pious, then piety is independent of divine love and exists prior to the gods’ approval.
The Form of Piety (The One Form) and Its Implications
Socrates asks for the Form itself: “What is the form that makes all pious actions pious?”
Euthyphro’s attempt to articulate the Form through a general rule: “The pious is what all the gods love” and “the pious is what is dear to the gods.”
The critique: if the Form is identical to whatever all gods love, then conflicting divine judgments threaten a single, stable definition.
The distinction between the god-loved and the pious emerges clearly: they are not identical; one is loved by the gods, the other is what makes actions pious.
Example of the problem in practice: actions can be loved by some gods and hated by others; therefore, the same action could be both god-loved and god-hated, undermining a uniform definition.
The Care/Service Metaphor: What Is Piety’s Aim?
Euthyphro’s later attempt reframes piety as the care of the gods, akin to how humans care for horses, dogs, cattle, or slaves serve masters.
The care analogy explores what piety aims at: the good or benefit of the object cared for (the gods).
The causal question: do the gods benefit from human offerings and prayers, or is the offering primarily for human benefit and respect?
Euthyphro’s guiding claim: piety is the care of the gods, as slaves care for their masters; a service-oriented view rather than a profit-based exchange.
The practical test: if piety is the care of the gods, what is the outcome or achievement of that care (the gods’ health, success, or well-being)?
Socrates’ critique: the care metaphor risks implying that piety has to improve the gods, which seems misguided since gods are often viewed as perfect; thus care should be about something other than “improving” the gods.
The exchanges of gifts and prayers are described as a kind of trade, but Socrates questions what the gods actually gain from human offerings.
The Dialectical Moves and Key Arguments
The problem of universal definitions: moving from concrete cases to universal form is central to Socratic method; definitions must cover all cases, not just the one being discussed.
The interdependence of terms: pious, impious, god-loved, and god-hated are treated as distinct concepts, each with its own logical consequences.
The problem of divine disagreement: if the gods disagree about justice and piety, a universal standard is even harder to establish.
The logical structure: if A is pious because gods love it, but gods disagree or change their minds, A’s status as pious becomes unstable; if A is loved by gods because it is pious, piety is independent of divine approval and rests on an objective standard (a Form).
The Daedalus and Proteus metaphors (footnotes): Daedalus can cause other people’s statements to move; Proteus can change form to evade scrutiny. These metaphors illustrate the difficulty of pinning down fixed definitions for slippery terms.
The Divine Sign and Socratic Attitude toward Knowledge
Socrates describes his divine sign as a guiding, non-automatic inner warning that prevents him from certain actions; in Euthyphro, this sign is acknowledged but not defined as a standard for others.
He uses the sign to justify his ongoing pursuit of wisdom and to challenge others (like Meletus) who claim to have certainty about divine matters.
The dialogue repeatedly returns to the issue of how one can claim knowledge of the divine when even the gods themselves disagree or hold divergent views.
Civic and Ethical Implications
The dialogue raises questions about the nature of religious authority and moral knowledge in a democratic city-state.
It probes whether morality is grounded in divine command or in an objective, rational standard accessible through reasoned inquiry.
The Euthyphro dilemma has had lasting influence on discussions of divine command theory in ethics and philosophy of religion.
Notable Footnotes and Contextual Details (Selected)
1: Euthyphro’s role as a professional priest and public expert on ritual and piety; possible references to other works (Cratylus).
2: The Lyceum is an outdoor gymnasium where philosophical discussion occurs with youths; civic spaces used for intellectual discourse.
3: A deme is a local unit within Attica; citizenship is tied to deme registration.
4-5: The divine sign and the assembly are referenced as part of public religious life and democratic decision-making.
6-7: The anecdote about Zeus, Cronus, Uranus, Hephaestus, Hera and the broader mythic context to illustrate differing divine actions across gods.
8-9: The Acropolis and its sacred role, including the festival related to Athena’s robe; the public display of religious reverence.
10-11: The analogies of tradition and rational inquiry as Socrates tries to locate a universal form for piety.
12-13: The conversation about whether the pious is a part of the just or whether all pious actions share a single part of justice.
14-15: Distinctions between what is loved by the gods and what is pious; the logical separation of these terms to avoid circularity.
16-17: The Daedalus and Proteus references illustrate the challenge of keeping arguments fixed and the danger of moving the terms around.
18-19: The care-of-the-gods view and the idea that piety is a kind of service; the analogies of care and the aim of service to the gods.
20: The dialogue concludes with Euthyphro’s departure and Socrates’ lament that the inquiry remains unresolved; the philosophical pursuit continues beyond this encounter.
Key Terms and Quick-Reference Glossary
Piety (hosion): initially ritual knowledge and performance; broadened to general pious conduct.
Impiety: lack or violation of piety.
Form (eidos): the universal essence that makes pious actions pious; the “one Form” that underwrites piety.
Genus and species: a methodological distinction used to move from a general class to particular instances.
Euthyphro Dilemma: the central problem of whether the pious is loved by the gods because it is pious, or whether it is pious because it is loved by the gods.
God-loved vs pious: different but related concepts that Socrates distinguishes to tease out the underlying essence.
Care of the gods: an early attempt to define piety as care, service, or duty toward the gods, analogous to how humans care for dependent beings.
Service to the gods: the notion that piety involves acts that serve or please the gods (prayer, sacrifice, gifts), but not necessarily to benefit the gods in a literal sense.
Daedalus (myth): a reference to the inventor who could move things he made; used to illustrate the difficulty of keeping arguments fixed.
Proteus (myth): a sea-god who could change shape; used to illustrate shifts in argument or definition.
Acropolis, Lyceum, king-archon, deme: civic-cultural terms for the setting and institutions of Athenian life.
Quick Takeaways for Exam Preparation
Euthyphro’s dialogue is a methodical search for a universal definition of piety, revealing tensions between particular actions and general terms.
The key philosophical moment is the Euthyphro Dilemma: is piety defined by divine approval or does divine approval flow from an independent standard of piety?
The Forms/essences notion (eidos) is introduced as a way to capture the universal trait shared by pious acts, not merely a catalog of examples.
The discussion about care of the gods reframes piety as service rather than mere ritual compliance, prompting questions about whether such service benefits the gods or serves human interests.
The dialogue ends without a definitive definition, illustrating Socratic pedagogy: progress comes through disciplined questioning rather than easy answers.
Connections to Broader Themes
This dialogue foreshadows the Platonic theory of Forms and the method for isolating universal properties in ethics.
It lays groundwork for later discussions on the nature of divine command theory and the relationship between morality and religion in philosophy.
The tension between public ritual practice and rational inquiry about ethical terms remains a central theme in many later moral-philosophical debates.