Physicalist theories

Physicalists believe that, essentially, the mind is not different in nature to the body.

there are different approaches to physicalism:

behaviourism (mental states are behavioural states)
identity theory (mental states are brain states)
eliminative materialism (folk-psychology is a mistaken theory of the mind)
functionalism (mental states are functions within the cognitive system)

A definition of physicalism.

physicalists believe that all things are, ultimately physical substances. if true, this would mean dualism is wrong: in other words, the mind is not distinct from the body; nor it is non-physical. instead there is a subservient relationship between the mental and physical meaning, mental properties depend on physical properties. consciousness can be explained in purely physical terms.

What is philosophical behaviourism. (one of the physicalist theories)

behaviourists argue that mental states, such as beliefs, desires and sensations, are behavioural dispositions. minds are just what people say and do.

in other words, the mind can be reduced to behaviour - mind is behaviour.

which two approaches to behaviourism are given by:

hard behaviourism (associated with Carl Hempel)
soft behaviourism (associated with Gilbert Ryle)

To a behaviourist the mental state of pain is to display the behavioural dispositions associated with being in pain such as say ouch! or bending over or frowning.

Hard Behaviourism by Carl Hempel.

[ ] motivated by the ==verification principles==, which said that all ==meaningful statements== must be ==verifiable/falsifiable== by ==observation==, unless its analytic truth (Ayer).
[ ] Talk of ==things the existence== of which ==cannot== be ==verified== is ==meaningless==.
[ ] since ==other minds== ==cannot== be ==observed==, talk about them is whether ==meaningless== or ==reducible== to ==WHAT CAN BE OBSERVED==.
[ ] Says that ==statements about the mind== are really statements about ==publicly observable behaviour==. we can ==observe== the ==behaviour of others==. In fact, we ==only== have ==access== to the ==behaviour of others==.
[ ] ==Behaviourism== equates mind with ==WHAT IS OBSERVABLE==. any ==propositions== about the ==mind== needs to be ==empirically verifiable==. this also solves the dualist problem of other minds.

Hard behaviourism and philosophy: Analytic reductions.

all propositions about minds can be reduced to propositions about behaviour.
analytic behaviourism, it is a reductive theory. it claims that we can give a complete translation of mental concepts in terms of behavioural concepts.
discussions of mental states is about behaviours, which can be explained using science

e.g Bobby is feeling stressed (mental states) - Bobby’s body has adrenaline surging through it, leading to an increased heartbeat and signs of distress, such as shaking and whimpering (behavioural states)

Behaviourism eliminates the problem of interactionism because the mind is not a distinct substance.
as such, behaviourists argue dualists make a category mistake when they claim the mind and body are separate in some way. AJ Ayer’s verification theory or meaning: meaningful propositions must empirically detectable; dualism was flawed because it was not rooted in experience.

Hempel’s hard behaviourism: ‘Jared’s toothache’.

Jared weeps and makes gestures of such and such kinds.
at the questions ‘what is the matter?’, Jared utters the words ‘I have a toothache’.
closer examination reveals a decayed tooth with exposed pulp.
Jared’s blood pressure, digestive processes, the speed of his reactions, show such and such changes.
such and such processes occur in Jared’s central nervous system.

so, pain is not a private experience causing Jared’s behaviour, it just is the behaviour. it can be empirically established by observation and science.

Problems within Hempel’s hard behaviour.

Issue 1. Multiple Realisability.

multiple realisability: there are many ways in which a mental state can be actualised (expressed in behaviour). In other words, mental states can be realised in behaviour in multiple ways. for example, is someone is sad showing a frowned face and slumped body language but wouldn’t be shown to what sadness is really is to everyone because if someone else would to be sad showing no emotions, just because one person shows a behavioural disposition of sadness doesn’t mean everyone will act upon it.

Soft Behaviourism by Gilbert Ryle.

Ryle criticises Substance dualism.

problem of causal interactions
problem of other minds.

He claims that substance dualism ‘the dogma of the ghost in the machine’, rest on a category mistake.

Categorical mistake: a category mistake therefore, is to treat a concept as belonging to a different logical category from one it actually belongs to (same way the university is mistaken to be a singular building instead of an organisation of buildings).
Ryle argues that dualists make the same sort of category mistake when talking about mental states - they are nothing over and above the behaviours and behavioural dispositions.

Soft behaviourism accepts there is something more to mental states than mere behaviour.

Ryle argued that mental states could be behavioural dispositions, rather than actual or current behaviour.
Behavioural dispositions tell us what a person is likely to do or not do in a certain set of circumstances.
Ryle’s behaviourism, is not a reductive theory. (it’s not reduced to some mental states such if i was sad i show behaviour dispositions of frowning or slouching.)

Hard behaviourism: I am in pain because of toothache, which is why I am crying

Soft behaviourism: I am in pain because of toothache, which could cause me to cry (even though i’m not actually crying)

Ryle argued that mental states can be demonstrated not just through actual behaviour but also in terms of potential behaviour. Dispositions can be expressed, therefore, in terms of hypothetical propositions (i.e if I had a toothache, I might cry)

So categorical statements about mental states (such as the one claimed by hard behaviourists and Hempel) aren’t always possible.

a range of behaviours might occur or not depending on the situation.
So, Ryle himself accepts it is not possible to completely reduce talk of mental states to talk of dispositions.
we might make certain inferences on the basis

Arguments in favour of behaviourism

Behaviour is observable and verifiable in a way that mental states are not: mental states have corresponding behaviours (and soft behaviourism accepts that inner mental states so lead to certain dispositions)

it overcomes the problem of other minds; people behave like they have minds - so, they have minds
it does not have explain mind-body interactionism since the two are the same
soft behaviourism can also account for the multiple realisability of mental states
according to Wittgenstein, mental states must refer to behaviours because, if they only referred to private inner states, we would be to discuss them with other people.

Issue 2 - Circularity

it does not seem to be possible for behaviourism to tell us what mental states ultimately are without talking about other mental states.

can’t dispense with the mental terminology
the process of analysing mental states in terms of behaviour becomes circular in reasoning.
we cannot analyse what behaviour a mental state is a disposition without referring to other mental states, even if these are implicit or hidden. (e.g We can’t specify what set of dispositions my fear is without mentioning my beliefs, my knowledge, my desires and so on)
these other mental states need to be analysed. these can’t be analysed without referring to further mental states.
When Emma kicks a ball she is acting deliberately and we have at least implicit reference to another mental state - a desire to win the football game, the fear of losing etc.

The Bear Example to back this issue up

if we analyse the fear of a bear in behavioural terms:

John is afraid of the bear
John is disposed to run away
John is disposed to make himself big

I can’t understand that behaviour unless I also understand that he desires to stay alive.

However, then I have another mental state that needs analysing so I haven’t completely translated it.

This can go on where you end up referring to another mental states and another, so it becomes circular.

What is a solution to Issue 2

Give ‘colourless’ scientifically respectable descriptions of behaviour, which have no mental content.

instead of ‘Emma kicked the ball’ we have ‘Emma’s foot lifted from the ground the knee flexed and her leg swung forward causing the foot to impact with the ball’
Instead of saying ‘Paul weeps’ we have ‘water comes out from Paul eyes’.
In this way, all reference to supposedly hidden mental states can be eliminated and we can have a verifiable descriptions of what has happened.
This trouble is that the same bodily movement may on different occasions, manifest itself in any number of different actions.
For example, impacting your foot on a ball may be an attempt to score a goal, returning the ball to its owner, a demonstration of how to kick, tripping over the ball, trying to relieve an itch on your toes etc.
this ‘multiple’ realisability’ of mental states in behaviour makes it very difficult to restate Hempel’s analysis in completely colourless terms.

What is Circularity within Soft Behaviourism?

A soft behaviourist would reply with:

this only applies to analytical behaviourists who think we can give a complete translation of mental concepts in terms of behavioural concepts.
Ryle accepts that it is impossible to specify mental states in terms of dispositions, but thinks that mental are behavioural dispositions nonetheless. He does not give a wholly reductive account.
In general, from observing many different situations, when people are fearful, for example, they will run away or hide or tremble but this does not always describe the behaviours of people involved. we cannot wholly reduce fearfulness to these behaviours.

Issue 3 - Asymmetry between self-knowledge and the knowledge of other people’s mental states.

there is a difference between the way I understand my own mental states compared with those of others. I do not need to observe my own behaviour to know my mental state; but I can only infer the mental states of others by studying their behaviour.
I don’t check in the mirror to know if i’m happy or sad. I dont say ‘im smiling; i must be happy’ I know it through introspection.
While I am aware of my own mental state (e.g I have a toothache), i can only observe the behaviour of other people to be aware that they have a toothache (e.g they are holding their mouth and groaning.)
If behaviourism were true I would have to infer my mental states from my own behaviour - this seems absurd. this suggests there is an inner mental experience which is not reducible to behaviour - so hard behaviourism fails again.

What is Ryle’s observation response

Not a difference in the kind of knowledge; it’s a difference in the amount of knowledge.

We gain knowledge and knowledge of others’ mental states in the same way; by paying attention.
I simply have more information in the case of self-knowledge.
there way I know about my own mental states is through observation. I observe this through my own dispositions.

If i am angry and I have the disposition to punch someone in the face but I don’t do it then I have that knowledge that you don’t know about me. I have more knowledge about myself, but it isn’t a different type of knowledge. it’s the same kind of knowledge. I observed how I was disposed to behave. I was disposed to punch someone in the face.

Thinking is a kind of internal monologue (speech) - and speech is an external behaviour. You can know what someone is thinking by paying attention to what they say. Just as you can know what you’re thinking by paying attention to your own thoughts (what you are saying internally).

Example: very small children go with their dispositions. they don’t filter anything. when children first learn to read, they make mouth movements at the same time or follow the lines with their fingers. later they can carry out the reading process in silence.

What is the Objection to Ryle’s observation

can thinking be adequately understood in terms of inner speech, and can internalised speech form the model for mental processes generally? what about changes in feelings, memories and sense perception?

Also seems to miss the subjective, distinctive quality of certain experiences (what a dualist would term as the qualia) - how a sensation or emotion feels to the person experiencing it. this seems central to our mental lives.
We can argue that Ryle’s analysis of conscious awareness is incomplete.

Issue 4 - The distinctness of mental states from behaviour (including Hilary Putnam’s ‘Super' Spartans’)

The super spartans of ancient greece were known for their ability not to show any emotion despite experiencing great physical or emotional pain.

Putnam ask us to imagine a possible world populated by super-spartans who completely suppress any outward demonstration of pain.
this thought experiment shows that it is conceivable for there to be mental states without any associated behaviour.

Super-Spartans response

If we can conceive of mental states without behaviour, this is hard for the analytical behaviourist, because it shows there is some aspect of mental states which cannot be described purely in terms of behaviour.

so mental states cannot be behaviour.

RESPONSE: soft behaviourism - they are dispositions. the super-spartan may stand on a nail when completely alone and wince and scream, secure in the knowledge that they are alone and can outwardly show the pain.

COUNTER-RESPONSE: Putnam’s super-spartans. the race we are imagining are not even disposed to feel pain. so indoctrinated are they that they no longer have the disposition for pain. these are people (or creatures) who so completely disapprove of showing pain that all pain behaviour has been suppressed. they aren’t acting; this is how they are in everyday life. they no longer have any disposition to demonstrate pain in their behaviour.

RESPONSE TO THAT COUNTER-RESPONSE: Hempel could argue that bodily processes (heart rate etc) can also be used as part of verification process. His behaviourism covers physiological and neurological states and saying that a super-spartan is in pain. given that they do not show pain outwardly, we will have will have to prioritise statements about their physiology and brain processes to verify their mental states.

Such a response would accept that mental states are different to behaviour in the ordinary sense of the word, but not distinct from the physical states of the body. However, if Hempel prioritises the physiological and neurological conditions of verification over behaviour, then his theory starts to sound not like behaviourism but more like another physicalist theory entirely - a kind of tupe identity theory. could argue that we are moving away from principles of behaviourism here.

Issue 5 - dualist arguments applied to philosophical behaviourism

if behaviourism provides the correct analysis of mental concepts, then it is inconceivable for there to be a mind without a body. So if it is conceivable for the mind to exist without the body, then it seems that logical behaviourism must be false.

Dualists argue that, from our own experience (introspection), mental states have a subjective and private dimension, e.g qualia, which cannot be rendered simply in terms of behaviour - hence, my experience of toothache cannot simply be explained through behaviour.
Behaviourism may help to explain the general experience we have, for example when suffering from toothache, it does not fully explain our subjective lived experiences.
you can also use dualist arguments and apply these to philosophical behaviourism.

e.g zombie argument - zombie has the behaviour but no qualia. the zombie may say ‘ouch’ but it doesn’t feel any pain internally, so, the zombie has all the behavioural dispositions associated with pain, but it doesn’t have the mental state of pain. if zombies are possible, then the behavioural disposition of pain is seperate from the mental state of pain. And if the behavioural disposition can be seperate from the mental state then behaviourism is false.

The zombie world is not conceivable response

conceivable = capable of being imagined or thought of without contradiction.

Physicalist can respond by rejecting the premise 3 of the zombie argument: that philosophical zombies are conceivable.
the reason zombies seem conceivable is because we’re labouring under a false illusion that qualia are these spooky non-physical things. once we understand that qualia are, in fact, just physical things, then it becomes inconceivable to imagine a physically identical being that lacks these physical features.
imagining a philosophical zombie would be like saying ‘imagine something that is physically identical but that isn’t physically identical’. It would be a contradiction, and contradiction aren’t conceivable. it would be like trying to imagine a triangle with four sides.
Once we understand that qualia = a physical thing (e.g behaviours or behavioural disposition), it becomes inconceivable for two physically identical beings not to have identical qualia, and so the zombie argument fails to prove property dualism. mental states are behavioural dispositions, and so mental states without behavioural dispositions are inconceivable.

The mind-brain type identity theory (one of the physicalist theories)

the central claim of the identity theory is that the mind is the brain, and so each mental state is literally one and the same things as a brain state.

facts about the mind are reducible to physical facts about the brain.
when we talk about the nature of existence (in other words, ontological), we can say that water is the same as a specific collection of molecules of oxygen and hydrogen atoms.
one the same basis, we can make the same ontological reduction.

THE MIND = THE BRAIN.

ALL MENTAL STATES = BRAIN STATES

in other words, they have a contingent identity.

How does mind-brain type identity theory differ from behaviourism?

ontological reduction is different from analytic reduction

Analytic reduction: involves the use of language, comparing mental states and behaviours, and arguing they are effectively the same thing.

e.g bobby is in pain; he is screaming and holding his leg.
an analytic reduction is attempting to eliminate the need for certain types of language by saying it can be expressed in other terms. e.g Analytic behaviourists think we can talk about mental states in terms of behavior without any loss of meaning.

Ontological reduction: goes further, and drawing on neuroscientific and psychological research, all mental states can literally be - or, one day, will be - explained through an empirical understanding of brain processes. other examples of ontological reduction/contingently identical things are:

lightning is electrical discharge
water is h20
sound is a tran of compression waves travelling through the air
heat is molecular kinetic energy.

THESE ARE ALL THE SAME.

an ontological reduction is concerned with what actually exists in reality. the identity claim is not analytic or conceptual.

the claim is not that ‘pain’ means ‘the firing of nociceptors’
but two distinct concepts ‘pick out’ the same thing (like water and h20)
mind brain types identity theorists do not think we can talk about mental states in terms of brain states. that would mean my statement ‘i feel happy this morning’ could be expressed, without any loss of meaning, in terms of endorphins firing in my brain. this is clearly not a reasonable position.
So, according to type identity, pain ontologically reduces to c-fibers firing, but it does not analytically reduce to it. it is an empirical discovery that pain and c-fibers are the same thing, but we can have two concepts that are actually related to the same thing.
Water is H20, the concept are distinct but the properties are the same, the same is true of ‘sensation’ and ‘brain process’

Type Identity Theory

mind-brain type identity theory: mental properties are physical properties of a brain.

E.g thinking a thought is exactly the same thing as certain neurons firing.

Interpret ‘physical properties’ to cover properties investigated by natural sciences.

there are lots of types of physical properties, e.g swan is a bird (biological) and white (colour).
mental properties are a sort of physical property - highly complex neurophysiological properties.

Remember that identity theorists accept that our vocabularies of mental and physical states have different meanings. However, their claim is that they nonetheless refer to the same thing. this is what makes the theory ontologically reductive, not analytically reductive. the term ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’ clearly has different meanings - one is a star that appears in the morning and one is a star that appears in the evening. However, as it happens, they both refer to the same object - Venus. Same things goes on with our talk of minds and brains.

What are the strengths of identity theory?

they defend their position by pointing to physical processes which we know have been responsible for the development of human beings, both as individuals and as a species.
it’s hard to make sense of the dualist idea that an immaterial substance should become attached to our brains at some point in our evolutionary history or from the point of conception.
a physicalist account like identity theory, therefore, fits far better with our current scientific understanding.
neuroscience making great advances in our understanding of the mechanisms underlying human behaviour and our various mental capacities. it can explain much our behaviour in terms of the brain’s physical properties; this knowledge compares favourably with the lack of detailed or precise information the dualist can provide about the nature and workings of spiritual substance.
real time imaging techniques show that subjects engaged in specific mental activities such as mental arithmetic, imagining performing some activity, recalling past events, and so on, correlated with specific areas of the brain becoming active. if identity theory is correct, this is exactly what we would expect to see.

Ockham’s Razor

if states of consciousness cannot be accommodated within the physical picture they would be nomological danglers (Smart), meaning that they would not fit into the system of laws which govern everything else in the universe.
this offends against Ockham’s Razor - the principle that, given two competing hypotheses, if their explanatory power is equal, then the simpler explanation should be preferred.
So, according to Smart, type identity theory can predict everything that dualism can, but type identity theory does so with one entity (the brain) rather than two (mind and brain).
we shouldn’t posit extra entities to explain the mind. we can explain just as much about mental states by referring to the brain as we can by referring to a non-physical mind. for example, when i feel pain, brain scans show that my c-fibres get activated. and when my c-fibres get activated, i feel pain. this suggests they are the same thing. we don't need to posit an additional substance here.

Issue 1: Location problem

brain states have a definable physical location. if my c-fibres are firing, you could put me in an MRI scanner, and find out the exact location of the c-fibres firing.
the issue is that identity theorists must be committed to saying that mental states have the same locations, size and shape as brain states.
According to Leibniz’s law of indiscredibility of identicals, for two things to be identical they have to share exactly the same properties. mental states must share exactly the same properties as brain states.
Yet it doesn’t seem that mental states have a physical location in the same way brain states do. it is nonsensical to say that my belief that rabbits have long ears is two centimetres to the right of my desire for spaghetti, and that it is two nanometres wide. mental states are not just the sort of things that have spatial location.

Smarts response to location problem

all this really adds up to is ‘thoughts having a location doesn’t sound right’ - that doesn’t mean that mind-brain identity theory is not right.
our use of language simply hasn’t caught up with neuroscience; language has developed in a largely dualistic framework. therefore, our language lags behind.
once our understanding of the brain has developed sufficiently, and once we become well versed in its terminology, we may all find ourselves complaining our c-fibres are firing, rather than talking about the pain in our leg.
it may no longer seem odd to talk about our belief that the prime minister is rubbish is located in the cerebellum.
this on its own does not make mind-brain identity theory incorrect. the problem is a linguistic one only. just because it sounds weird to talk about mental states having physical location, that doesn’t show that they don’t have a physical location in space.

Issue 2 Dualist response: appeal to the evidence of introspection

introspection reveals to me a world of thoughts, sensations, emotions and so on, not an area of electrochemical impulses in an organ in my head.
mental states and properties are radically unlike neurophysiological states and properties, and therefore they can’t be the same things.
arguments for property dualism are more successful against type identity theory.
the subjective experience of pain (what it feels like) is an essential part of our concept of pain.
any attempt to reduce this experience to purely objectively observable neurological processes inevitably leaves something out - namely the existence of qualia.
brain processes are (In principle) publicly observable, but my pain is a private event. a property dualist would argue that no matter how much we may know about the neurological basis of pain, there remains some aspects of the conscious experience that escape scientific explanation.
the potential existence of qualia might give reason to suppose that we cannot simply claim that mind is brain. two people might have an area of their brain lighting up in response to seeing the colour red, yet their experiences of seeing the colour may be very different in terms of what it is like for them. different ways of experiencing pain etc.

Conceivability argument

mental states without brain states are conceivable
so, mental states without brain states is possible
so, mental states are not brain states
so, type identity theory is false.

But!

What is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible.
physicalist stance - mind without the body is not conceivable - if Descartes were to suggest that H20 is conceivable without water, anyone who knows about chemistry would realise he was making a mistake. they are the same thing since H20 is water. anyone who can conceive of the mind without the brain. mind is the brain.

Divisibility argument

my body/brain is divisible
my mind is indivisible
Leibniz law - for any two things to be identical they have to share exactly the same properties.
therefore, my mind and body/brain are separate substance.

But!

MRI imaging shows clear ‘parts’ of the brain. a corpus callosotomy is a surgical procedure for epilepsy where the main connection between the left and right hemispheres of the brain is severed. perhaps surprisingly. patients go on to live perfectly normal lives.

The brain surgery example

is a complete physical account of someone’s bain states enough to everything we need to know about their mental states?
imagine that you are being operated on by an incredible neuroscientist. you are on the operating table with your skull open and brain exposed. you are conscious and can watch your brain on screen as she operates. in other words, you have access to the sample physical information (although she has more knowledge)
she knows you’re afraid - adrenaline is rising etc and she can observe it.
she is an incredibly talented doctor, but does she know what fear feels like for you? does she fully understand and have knowledge of your fear?
if yes, there’s nothing for mind brain identity theory to answer.
if not, and you think she can make a very educated guess about what fear is like for you but she can’t fully know because that qualia remains private to you, then mind-brain type identity theory can’t work.

the zombie argument

the zombie argument for property dualism can also be used against type identity theory.
type identity theory say pain is identical to c-fibres firing. but we can imagine a zombie with the brain state (c-fibres firing) but not the mental state (pain).
so, if philosophical zombies are possible, pain and other mental states are not the same as brain states.

BUT!

Zombies are metaphysically impossible. mental states just are brain states in the same way water just is h20, and so it is metaphysically impossible to have the brain state without the mental state in the same way that it is metaphysically impossible to have water without h20.

Knowledge argument

Mary knows everything about the physical processes involved in colour vision.
but she learns something new when she experiences colour herself.
therefore, there is more to know about colour vision than what is given in identity theorists account of it, as a brain state. namely qualia.
Hence, mind-brain identity theory is false.

BUT!

She learns nothing new. if all mental states are type-identical to physical states there is nothing to learn about them except the knowledge about the physical states themselves, and Mary has leant all of that in her black and white room. the intuition that Mary wouldn’t know what it’s like to see red is just that - an intuition because our understanding of neuroscience here may be is still developing. and this intuition is unreliable: actually all physical knowledge would also include knowledge of the qualia too, what it’s like to see red. so, she wouldn’t learn anything new when she first sees red. many learn a different type of knowledge, but not new knowledge e.g acquaintance knowledge.

Issue 2 dualist responses: appeal to the evidence of introspection

another way the identity theorist can respond to this issue is to point out that it is quite possible for the same thing to appear in different ways.
the way that the brain appears to itself via introspection may be as a realm of conscious experiences - thoughts, sensations, emotions etc, but when we examine the brain from the outside looking in, it appears as a physical organ with electrochemical activity.
the fact that the mind appears radically different from the brain doesn’t show that it isn’t in fact the brain.
it’s just that the nature of the access that introspection provides to the goings on of our brains is very different from the access provided by our eyes.

Issue 3: Multiple realisability

Hilary putnam argues that mental states cannot be reduced to brain states because mental states are multiply realisable. e.g the same mental states can come from many different brain states.
this is an issue for identity theorists because they claim that each type of mental states must be exactly identical to a type of brain state. so, if I cut my finger on a knife and feel a ‘pain’ mental state, there should be an identical ‘pain’ brain state. it would be the same for everybody else.
this may be all well and good when we are talking about the pain human beings feel, but what about other species?
for example, an octopus has a very different brain set up to humans. let’s say that octopuses have o-fibres, instead of c-fibres. However, if you stabbed an octopus and it writhed around, surely you would thought it’s in pain. But if type identity theory is true, this isn’t possible: an octopus can’t feel pain, because pain is c-fibres firing, and an octopus doesn’t have c-fibres
Hilary putnam also uses the example of silicone based aliens. these are conceivable.
if type identity is true, then an alien and a human can’t both have the same belief that ‘grass is green’ because my brain is made from carbon and the alien’s brain is made from silicone. but this just seems wrong: we both share the same mental state (the belief that the grass is green) despite our differing physical states.

Variations in identity theory: types and tokens.

a type is a certain kind of thing, a token is an instance of a thing.
the name Lee has two types of letter (L and E) and three tokens (L, E, E)
In a deck of playing cards, there is only one type of thing (cards) but 52 tokens (king of hearts, queen of spades etc) or with cards, for instance, we may call a certain class of objects - such as cars - a ‘type’, whilst a particular car - a flat punto - may be called a ‘token’, or representative of that type.
turing to the mind, if i wish it were friday or thursday this week and wish it were friday on thursday last week, then these mental states would be different tokens (instances) of the same type of mental state. the type of mental state called ‘wishing it were friday’ can happen in the same person at different times and each occasion would represent a different token of the same type.
at the same time, tokens of this type can (and do) occur in different people. so both you and i might now wish it were friday, in which case we would both be experiencing a different token of the same type of mental state.
token identity theory allows for the identity to be much more specific.
each token mental state is identical with a particular token brain event.
this would mean that mental states are multiply realisable. each type of mental state, such as the belief that it is friday, can be identical with a different type of brain state. Moreover, different creatures can have different types of brain and brain states, which nonetheless and identical with the same mental states that we enjoy, such as pain. so we no longer need to deny that dogs and aliens can suffer.

Token identity theory Vs Type identity theory

Token identity theory:

individual mental states are identical to individual brain states (token-token identity theory).

my brain is brain state X.

the cat’s pain is brain state Y.

Your pain might be brain state Z, and your pain tomorrow could be a different brain state because something could happen to your brain and it could change.

Individual instances (tokens) of the same type.

Type identity theory:

types of mental states are identical to types of bain states (type-type identity theory).

pain is brain state X.

Eliminative materialism theory (one of the physicalist theory)

Key term:

Eliminative: to be an eliminativist about something is simply to get rid of it completely - i.e deny its existence. atheists are eliminativist about God - they deny that God exists.

in other words:

the theory that at least some of our basic, common sense (folkk psychological) mental states/properties are fundamentally mistaken and should be abandoned, as they don’t refer to anything that exists.
we used to explain erratic behaviour in human beings as demonic behaviour. we would act accordingly and try to exorcise the demons to change behaviour. the more we learnt about neuroscience and different reasons for erratic behaviour, we realised that those demons don’t exist anymore. we don’t reduce these demons to something else. they simply are no longer there as part of our world view.
same with mental states (hopes, fears, sensations etc) for eliminative materialists - not a reductive theory.

Introducing eliminative materialism - the black death

between 1346 and 1353, a plague ravaged europe - the black death.
they could accurately identify victims from their symptoms and believed that the disease was brought on by ‘bad air’.
with the advance of germ theory, we are now pretty confident the disease was caused by a pathogen - most probably bacteria spread by fleas carried by rats.
so this has shown that ‘bad air’ has nothing to do with the spread of disease and we would probably want to say that ‘bad air’ doesn’t really exist. we have decided it has not place in a proper account of the black death.
by explaining the disease scientifically we have been able to eliminate ‘bad air’ from our vocabulary and from our picture of what exists.
in the same way, the eliminativist argues that our vocabulary of mental states will be eliminated once we have a more advanced understanding of our brains.

Key term:

Animism:

animist religions are religions that explain the behaviour of the natural world in terms of the action of spirits.
according to these religions, the wind can feel anger, the moon jealousy, the river generosity and the sea fury.
animist religions can be thought of as giving a very basic theory of why the natural world behaves as it does.
according to this theory, things in the natural world have mental states, and their behaviour is to be explained in terms of these states.
although we can see how people might once have found this theory plausible, modern science has shown that it is completely false.
the behaviour of things like the wind and the ocean is explained by physics rather than spirits.
the animist theory of these things may once have seemed plausible, but it should now be rejected.

Key term:

Folk psychology:

a theory of the mind (psychology) held by ordinary people (folk) regarding the prediction and explanation of people’s behaviour constituted by the statements about the mind ordinary people are inclined to use. for example, one explanation for somebody buying a can of coke is that ‘they desired a drink’ or ‘they were hoping to quench their thirst’.
in other words - the everyday psychological concepts and explanations/predictions of behaviour we use. the way ordinary folks think of and talk of the mind, referring to things like beliefs, sensations, memories etc. the basis for the way we explain the behaviour of people in day-to-day life) e.g she believes she will win, she hurt her ankle.

In eliminative materialism

the theories we’ve looked at so far seek to analyse folk psychology terms in various ways.
type identity theory reduces the folk psychology concept of pain to c-fibres.
behaviourism reduces it to a set of behavioural dispositions.
all these theories implicitly agree that pain is a thing that exists and that it can be reduced to something - but they disagree about what it reduces to.
eliminative materialism rejects this view. eliminativists argue that folk psychology concept don’t reduce to anything and so should instead be eliminated.

(a non-reductive theory)

Folk psychology and eliminative materialism

the everyday explanation that we give a human behaviour are in some ways very like the explanation given by animism.
we explain why people act as they do by talking about their mental states e.g we say they are angry, jealous or upset.
like animist explanation, these explanations can be thought of as coming from a very basic, common-sense theory of human behaviour, which we can call folk psychology.
eliminative materialists use the similarities between animism and folk psychology to argue that, like animism, folk psychology is wrong and should be eliminated from scientific discussion.

Folk psychology and neuroscience

to show folk psychology is wrong, we need a modern scientific theory which explains human behaviour better than it does.
according to the churchlands, this theory is neuroscience. once we have a proper theory of how the brain works, it will provide us with much better explanations of human behavior than the ones given by folk psychology.
in support of this idea, they give a number of reasons for thinking that neuroscience is a better theory than folk psychology.
the next subsection describe these reasons: if these reasons show that neuroscience is a better theory than folk psychology than they give us reason to reject folk psychology and thus to deny the existence of mental states.

Reason 1: folk psychology is lacking in its perspective power.

folk psychology is a scientific theory like any other, and so we should treat it as such, if a better theory comes along, we should abandon the folk psychology theory in favour of the better theory.
scientific theories have laws and rules, and these laws can be used to make predictions.
for example, the laws of gravity can predict where Mars will be in the sky on the 17th August 2127. A scientific theory that makes accurate predictions is a better theory than one that makes an inaccurate predictions.
folk psychology has its own - loosely defined - set of laws and rules. and folk psychology laws dont have hugely accurate predictive power. for example, you might predict ‘if she gets sad she will cry’ or ‘if he has the belief that eating
However, the predictions of folk psychology are not 100% accurate.
sometimes a person will surprise you by behaving in a way you dont expect. for example, our folk psychology framework may predict that someone will be sad and cry in response to a sad film, but then they dont.
so, in terms of predictive power, folk psychology is not a perfect scientific theory.

Reason 2: neuroscience can explain much more than folk psychology.

once neuroscience has given us a full understanding of the workings of the brain, we will be able to use it to explain all aspects human behaviour.
but there are many aspects of human behaviour that folk psychology seems unlikely ever to explain.
one such is the purpose of sleep. why is it that we need to sleep for around eight hours a day?
neuroscience can explain this in terms of the role that sleep plays in clearing our brain of toxins.
but folk psychology can give no real explanation. the only thing it can say is that we must sleep because we get tired. but this is no real explanation, but ‘getting tired’ just means ‘becoming disposed to sleep’, similarly, folk psychology can’t really explain why people get depressed; neuroscience can.
another thing that folk psychology seems unable to explain is non-linguistic learning - e.g an infant’s ability to learn a language, or learn how to walk.
although neuroscience can’t yet fully explain this, it is making progress towards it. but folk psychology does not seem capable of explaining things of this kind; it is incomplete.

Reason 3: neuroscience is making much faster progress than folk psychology.

folk psychology has existed for thousands of years, and yet cannot explain much more now than it could in the time of the ancient greek
the romans would have said folk psychology things like ‘he laughs when he’s nervous’. just in their own language.
neuroscience has existed for not much more than one hundred years, and yet can already explain far more than it could at it inception, and is making faster progress all the time. it has advanced over time.
the ability to make rapid, accelerating progress of this kind is the hallmark of a good scientific theory.
a theory which has made no progress for some time is, by contrast, generally taken by scientists to be a bad theory, that needs to be replaced.
In defence of folk psychology, some claim that it has made some progress over the last hundred years.
Freudian theories of the subconscious mean that we have a much better understanding now of how the mind works. and modern psychology is developing successful treatments for mental illness, like cognitive behavioural therapy, that were not available to previous generations.
in response to this, eliminative materialists would argue that this progress is not nearly enough to make folk psychology a serious rival to neuroscience.
once neuroscience has a full understanding of the brain, we will be able to develop theories of the subconscious and treatments for mental illness that go far beyond anything that folk psychology could provide.

Reason 4: neuroscience fits much better with other scientific theories.

the theoretical entities referred to in neuroscience are exactly the same as the entities referred to in biology, chemistry and physics.
it can be seen as a branch of biology, and fits perfectly with it.
folk psychology is not like this. the properties that it refers to, like qualia and intentionality, are not referred to in other scientific theories and cannot easily be understood in terms of them.
this makes folk psychology a much worse theory, in scientific terms, than neuroscience. the best scientific theories fit together with other theories to provide a unified account of the phenomena that they explain. neuroscience does this but folk psychology does not.
some phrases from biology have already entered our everyday language, such as ‘having an adrenaline rush’; the churchlands may well be correct that neuroscientific language will quickly follow suit.

Issue 1: intuitive certainty of the existence of mental states

although churchland’s argument make a strong initial case for eliminative materialism, there are a number of significant issues for the theory.
firstly, it goes against perhaps the strongest and most certain intuitions we have.
the first and most obvious is that introspection seems to provide us with very strong evidence for the existence of mental states.
I am directly aware of the existence of desires, thoughts and pains, e.g of the belief that it will rain which causes me to pick up my umbrella, or of the desire for food which causes me to go to the fridge.
therefore, any theory that denies their existence has to be false.
Descartes’ cogito shows that the on thing we can be certain of is the existence of these states - even if we can be sure of nothing else, we can still be sure of the existence of our own mind because we have mental states - so how can the eliminativist plausible deny their existence?

Response this this:

churchland replies to this objection by pointing out that there are comparable defences of other ‘folk’ theories.
we used to believe that the sun orbited the earth, and we seemed to have very strong sensory evidence that shaped our belief that the earth is stationary.
churchland argues that our belief in folk psychology shapes our introspective experience in the same way.
we seem to have very strong introspective evidence for the existence of mental states. but our interpretation of this evidence is shaped by folk psychology, and may be very different once we have stopped believing this theory.
also, eliminativism can respond that eliminative materialism doesn’t deny the existence of mental phenomena altogether. they are not claiming that when we believe, or desire or hope, there is absolutely nothing going on in our mind.
they are claiming that the explanation of those mental phenomena is incorrect. folk psychology is the wrong account of these mental phenomena. terms like ‘desire’ and ‘hurts’ and the language of a out-of-date theory.

Issue 2: folk psychology has good predictive and explanatory power

we saw that churchland criticises folk psychology for its explanatory and predictive failures.
but, we can respond that folk psychology does explain and make accurate predictions about people behave. we can give a robust defence of it.
we use folk psychology all of the time to explain why other people act as they do and predict theory behaviour (he is running because he is scared: he has an umbrella because he believes that it will rain; if she wins the lottery she will be happy and jump about cheering.)
when it comes to predicting a person’s behaviour, if there is a child who suffers abuse or neglect, we can reliably say they might be more likely to misbehave or be violent at school because of the differences developed in their beliefs, feelings and desires. we cannot easily do the same by describing neurophysiological state of the brain.
neuroscience has not yet come anywhere near to giving us an alternative to these explanations. the brain is a highly complex structure and this makes it incredibly difficult for neuroscience to predict even the simplest behaviours in the list above.
folk psychology is a universal theory, found in all cultures, and we would never have been able to build great civilisations without it.
and it is likely that we would continue to use its vocabulary even if a better theory was found (as we have with talk of the sun rising and setting)

Response to this:

churchland would reply to these points by arguing that they do not show that folk psychology is correct.
all that they show is that it might be a useful fiction - a simplified version of the truth that is useful in cases where we do not have time or knowledge to give an explanation that is fully accurate.
a useful fiction is still a fiction - so the usefulness of folk psychology shows nothing about whether mental states really exist.
it may turn out that something like them does exist - but we can’t know one way or another until a complete understanding of the brain has been reached.
further, even if folk psychology is more accurate than neuroscience at present, a future neuroscience will be superior to folk psychology.
just because it does have reasonable accuracy at predicting and explaining human behaviour, it is still a flawed theory of the mind and a far less accurate model than most theories in, for example physics and chemistry.
whereas folk psychology often gets predictions of behaviour wrong, a physics theory like general relativity will always make accurate predictions about e.g where a planet will be in the sky.
the correct theory of mind must be equally accurate and the only way to achieve such accuracy will be through neuroscience.

Issue 3: Eliminative materialism is self-defeating

imagine the eliminative materialist is asked the following question: do you believe that eliminative materialism is true?

what can they say?

Not ‘Yes’, because their view commits them to saying that there are no beliefs.

but not ‘No’ either, because then they are giving up on their view.
eliminative materialism claim that belief don’t exist - they are a mistaken folk psychology concept. but, in arguing for eliminative materialism, the eliminative materialist is expressing his belief in the theory. after all, why would anybody argue that something is true if they didn’t believe it was true? arguments are expressions of belief.
so, if the eliminative materialist believes that eliminative materialism is true, then this disproves his own theory: the eliminative materialist has proved that beliefs exist.

Response to this:

this response commits the fallacy of begging the question. it assumes the very thing it is trying to prove that beliefs exist.
eliminative materialists don’t deny the existence of mental phenomena entirely - it just denied that folk psychology is the correct account of them. eliminative materialist can accept that there is something going on in the case of what we currently call ‘beliefs’, but it just disagrees that folk psychology is the correct model of what’s going on. neuroscience and brain states, not concepts such as ‘beliefs are the more accurate theory of why eliminative materialists assert the claim such as ‘eliminative materialism is true’

Question: explain eliminative materialism and the response that folk psychology has good predictive and explanatory power. 12 marks. upcoming thursday 16/03/23

define eliminative materialism
use an example to back up this theory
then talk about the response in depth.

Introduction to functionalism (one of physicalist and can be a dualist theory)

What is functionalism?

functionalism is associated with Hilary Putnam
functionalism is often characterised as a physicalist theory of mind, as many functionalists suggest that everything is physical, or supervenes on the physical.
However, functionalism is also compatible with dualism
it’s also an approach that maintain that mental states can be characterised in terms of functions.

watch video notes:

what information about the theory? go watch ‘what is functionalism’

turing is a term in functionalism which the turing test gives rise to the intuition that if a computer can act enough like a human, such that we cannot tell that it is not one, then it effectively is conscious. functionalism is the formal position which codifies this intuition.

Functionalism is basically saying that if something acts like a particular mental state, then it is that mental state. say that fear is a state which the functionalist defines as producing concern for bodily harm and the desire to either fight off an enemy or run from it. it does not matter if the biological components, like adrenaline are present. so long as the products of fear are present they could be created by circuits, organic compounds, or anything else for a particular state to be defined as fear.

Realisation is for the functionalist mental states can be ‘realised’ by different physical states. even if we have drastically different internal compositions from alien or synthetic life forms, it does not mean that we cannot all experience the same kinds of mental states.

Psycho-physical can be contrasted to functionalism, which simply says that for every mental state there is a physical brain state which is identical to it. Our emotions are nothing more than our physical states, so we cannot share three emotions with beings that have a different internal make up than we do if they act similarly.

Functionalism

all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles which can be multiply realised and mental states can be reduced to functional states.
they believe that mental states are best understood as being functional entities, like hearts or can openers
mental states are functional states within an organism. they are best understood by what they do.

functional states

many everyday objects are defined not by what they are made of, or how they are designed, but by what task they perform. in other words, we often characterise things by their function: transport, furniture and so on.
can openers may be made from different materials or could be designed differently but this doesn’t prevent them all being can openers. this is because what makes something a can-opener is the fact that it opens can. it is defined by its functions, that is, by what it does or is used for rather than in terms of the stuff of which it is made or the details of its design.
things like bodily organs such as a heart. what makes something a heart is not what it is composed of or precisely how it is put together, but what it does, Anything that pumps blood around the body counts as a heart and different animals have hearts of different designs and materials. we now have artificial hearts composed of metal and plastic, but for all that, they are still hearts. what makes them hearts is the task they perform.

Key Idea: input and output

mental states can be reduced to functional states
we can understand each of the things the mind does (i.e the mental states) in terms of functions. one function is memory. another sensing pain, another believing the eating animals is wrong.
describing what a mental state will output for a set of inputs describes its functions (e.g what it does)
inputs and outputs can be physical stimuli (smells and sounds), other mental states (happiness and hopes) and behaviours (smiling and crying)
to be a mental state is just to be a state with certain input and output relations to stimuli, behaviour and other mental states.

Input ▻ function ▻ output

input: c-fibres firing or physical stimuli with the toe colliding with the door

function: the mental state of pain

output: the behaviour of crying or the mental state of frustration.

another one:

input: a visual stimuli of seeing a bear with sharp teeth

function: the mental state fear

output: the behaviour of running away or the mental state of the desire to never hike again in that area

functionalist analysis of pain

a definition of pain would treat it as that mental state which is produced by damage to the body and whose role is to trigger other mental states such as wanting to avoid the source of pain as well as pain behaviour such as inspecting the damage or hopping on one leg.
that function is what mental states, such as pain, are any state that plays exactly that function role is a pain.
functions should be understood within the context of the entire mind. so, the functions of pain, for example, isn’t simply to cause behavioural dispositions (like behaviourism claims). part of the function of pain is to cause other mental states - such as the belief that you are in pain, or a desire for the pain to stop.

functionalism - multiple realisability

mental states (beliefs, desires, pain etc) are constituted solely by their functional role, which means, their causal relations with other mental states, sensory input and behavioural outputs.
it’s not interested in what mental states are (hardware): it’s interested in what mental states do or accomplish (software program).
dualist functionalists would think it is ‘mind-stuff’ or souls or spirits that instantiates human minds. physicalists would say that mental states supervene on states of the brain.
since mental states are identified by a functional role, and precise materials is not what defines them, they are said to be realised on multiple levels; in other words, they are able to be manifested in various systems, even perhaps computers, so long as the system performs the appropriate functions. while a computer’s program performs the functions algorithmically on inputs to give outputs, a brain performs the function via it’s biological operations and responses.

multiple realisability

functionalists maintain that if something functions like it has a mind, then it has a mind.
thus, a mind can be a brain - but it could also be a group of computer chips in a computer, or some green slime in the chest of an alien - it could even be a non-physical mental substance.
the fact that mental states are multiply realisable is the cornerstone of functionalism, not a criticism of it.

	rough definition	1st realisation	2nd realisation	3rd realisation
Chair	an object with the function of supporting a person’s weight properly when they sit on it.	wooden chair	folding chair	deckchair
Lawnmower	an object with the function of cutting grass to a certain length.	Hand-pushed lawnmower	petrol driven lawn mower	ride on lawnmower
Pain	an internal state with the function of generating pain behaviour in response to bodily damage, and further mental states.	c-fibres firing	the damage of the body	the physical stimuli

functionalism is associated with the philosopher Hilary Putnam
functionalism is the theory that mental states can be reduced to functional states
So, what it is to be a mental state is just to be a state with certain inputs such as Anger and Jealousy and certain outputs like crying and being annoyed
pain, according to a functionalist is that the input is the physical stimuli of a ball hitting my head which proceeds with the function of pain with the output of the behaviour of saying ouch.
since mental states are identified by a functional role, and precise material is not what defines them, they are said to be multiply realised.

the computer analogy

functionalists have compared computational systems and operations of the mind.
computer hardware compared to the brain.
computer software compared to the mental functioning of the mind.
it’s a useful analogy because hardware and software are not different entities or different substances nor are they identical to each other:

it is the way that the brain is organised and the manner of its operations that allow it to be minded, although computers are not yet sophisticated enough to be minded today, possibly they will at some point in the future.

the advantages of functionalism over behaviourism

they do seem pretty similar.
however, behaviourists miss an important step. they try to define each type of mental state solely through environment input and behavioural outputs. functionalists deny that this is possible.
they would argue that to characterise a mental state, it is inadequate simply to look at what is observable on the outside. it must also involve reference to all of the other mental states with which it is causally connected.
functionalism doesn’t face the often considered fatal, difficulty that behaviourism does - that we can conceive of people being in mental states but without them displaying the associated pain behaviour (the super spartan example).
it is quite possible for someone to be in a state which typically produces certain behavioural outputs, which because of some countervailing consideration, doesn’t on the occasion.
Putnam’s super super spartan doesn’t show pain behaviour because the processes other mental states, the desire to suppress the behaviour, which prevents the typical causal sequence from happening.
because functionalism is clear that mental states are defined in terms of their functional role in this complex network of other mental states, we shouldn’t expect the same mental state always to produce the same behaviour.

the advantages of functionalism over identity theory

they would agree that a mental state such as pain would result in pain behaviour
a big difference through would be multiple realisability, type identity theorists would have no being whose brain is not made out of the same basic stuff as ours has a mind.
hence the spaghetti brained martian who is showing pain behaviour would not be in pain.
However, functionalists are able to deal with this problem because although the physiology is very different from ours they might still be functionally equivalent to the extent to which they instantiate a similar set of internal states.

re-visiting qualia

qualia are defined as the intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible to you, how its subjective to you.
particularly problematic for the functionalists.
this is because qualia can’t be explained in terms of what caused them; the experience of redness, or pain or softness. can only really be understood by experiencing these things yourself, there is something about how red looks, or how soft material feels, or how birdsong sounds, that can’t be explained just by talking about what those experiences do or what caused them in the brain, in this case, there is something that functionalism can’t account for.

functionalism and qualia

if phenomenal properties are qualia, then they cannot be completely understood in terms of their causal roles (inputs and outputs) because functions are not intrinsic properties.
it is not what causes them and what they cause in turn that makes pain or the smell of coffee or the visual sensation of red what it is.
what it is like to experience these mental states - how pain actually feels itself etc, how coffee smells - can’t be analysed in terms of functions. it isn’t just causal relations.
so if qualia exists, then functionalism cannot explain phenomenal consciousness. (there is more to pain than just what causes it and what it causes)

Issue 1: the possibility of a functional duplicate with inverted qualia (Ned Block)

functionalism fails to account fo qualia, dualists would argue that any theory of mind must account for it.
this argument employs the inverted spectrum thought experiment. that the spectrum of private colour qualia that i experience is inverted to yours. so i see yellow as yellow but yellow is blue to someone else however, they still call it yellow. similarly, when i call blue is blue to me but yellow to someone else although call it blue.
someone might see a blue banana and a yellow sky. but because the language is the same we don’t notice the difference.
functionalism says mental states are functional states
if functionalism is true, then two functionally identical mental states are the same mental state.
my mental state when i look at green grass is functionally identical to yours but phenomenally different.
therefore, our two mental states are not the same mental state despite being functionally identical.
therefore, functionalism is false.
we could question whether the inverted spectrum thought experiment is actually conceivable. if the hypothesis itself can’t be confirmed then does the thought experiment become nonsensical. it can be argued that we cannot make coherent sense of the supposed difference between you and m, if we cannot point to anything in the world that would establish the difference. it is not verifiable. also, if the difference make no difference then it is no difference at all. the functionalist state remains the same so functionalism stands.
However, if you tweak the thought experiment so that you used to have normal vision then had your colour spectrum inverted there would then be empirical evidence of the difference. and yet, although my visual system is no longer physically identical with yours, we could imagine me learning the vocabulary words to become fully functionally equivalent to you and everyone else. this scenario is conceivable.
so with the strengthened criticism you can argue that there is more to qualia than is captured by the functionalist account.

response: there would be functional differences in this scenario

functionalists may deny, in circumstances like this, that you could learn to use colour works in a functionally identical way to others. if the neutral pathways are switched then so too will be a functional change.
in other words, in the inverted qualia example you would not have functional duplicates. there would be certain functional differences.
If I ask Jeff ‘is the banana a bright happy colour or mournful and sad’ and Jeff replies ‘that’s is a dismal, miserable colour then there would be a functional difference. so a functional duplicate which inverted qualia may not be possible
what if you asked someone if blue/red was a warm/cold colour?
if someone and me saw red and green are switched. then we wouldn’t agree on whether red was more similar to orange. we would give different answers. this. then results in a functional difference. and if probed on your associations with the colours. you may as well reveal this, so the output changes.

Counter-Response:

one response is to change the thought experiment.
what if it wasn’t just two colours that were inverted, but the entire colour spectrum.
it is not just red and green, for example, that’s inverted. but the whole spectrum. this could keep all of the similarity relations as well.
so, someone who sees red as green also sees orange as blue. and so they say that red is similar to orange, but what they see is what i see when i look at green and blue.
also with colour ‘association’, if asked if blue is a warm/cold colour we may still get a functionally identical response. when children are taught colours. we could argue, they are also taught associations with the colours:

Nursery teacher: that is red ‘it a warm colour’

child: what they are looking at is blue to them - ‘ok’

therefore, argument for functional duplicates with different qualia (mental states) still stands.

Issue 2: the possibility of a functional duplicate with no qualia.

Ned Block ‘troubles with functionalism’.
Block accuses functionalism of liberalism which is ascribing a mind to things that don’t have them.
he gives two examples that could be functionally equivalent to a human but which we would be reluctant to ascribe mentality to.

Homunculi-Head

literally a head full of tiny men.
imagine your head is hollowed out and contained within it are a set of tiny people who work to have the same machine code as you.
the functionalist account would suggest that this is homunculi-head would have a mind just like you do.
However, Block argued that it would not be minded.

China Brain

suppose that the whole nation of China was reordered to simulate the workings of a single brain (that is, to act as a mind according to functionalism). each chinese person act as (say) a neuron, and communicates by special two-way radio in the corresponding way to the other people. the current mental state of the china brain is displayed on satellites that may be seen from anywhere in china. the china brain would then be connected via radio to a body, one that provides the sensory inputs and behavioural outputs of the brain.
so if the body is damaged, messages are sent up to the china mind, and they perform some particular action, like moving the foot. the china mind is a functional duplicate of the brain.
thus, the china brain possesses all the elements of a functional description of mind: sensory inputs, behavioural outputs, and internal mental states causally connected to other mental states. if the nation of China can be made to act in this way, then, according to functionalism, this system would have a mind.
Block’s goal is to show how unintuitive it is to think that such an arrangement could create a mind capable of thoughts and feelings. He argues that the China mind would have no collective consciousness. no qualia.
the people of china would have a busy time of it reacting to the input signals and would - we must imagine - successfully cause the body to hop on one leg, yelp and make efforts to remove the nail. but would anyone actually feel any pain?
remember the population of China is roughly equal to the number of neurons. in a brain and the two way radios replicate the firings of the neurons. according to functionalism, the china brain would actually be in pain, say given the appropriate inputs such as being stabbed.
but this seems intuitively false.
just because the state of the China brain is functionally identical to human pain, it clearly isn’t actually in pain. so functionalism must be false: there’s clearly more to mental states than their functional role.

argument in standard form

functionalism holds that all mental states can be reduced to functional states.
a functional duplicate of a person without any qualia (consciousness) is possible e.g China Brain
qualia are mental states
therefore, not all mental states are functional states

therefore functionalism is false.

functionalist response

would a system which completely replicates the human brain have a mind?

Yes:

simplest response is this, despite it seeming unintuitive, the chinese mind does in fact realise proper mental states like qualia.
mental states after all, can be realised by whatever physical structure produce the necessary causal inputs and outputs.
for example, think of an ant or bee colony - seem to work together to produce a mass intelligent response even though each individual ant lacks intelligence on an individual level.
if you find it doubtful that any of these systems can have emergent qualia, then why not doubt the brain can have them too?
if we have the knowledge to replicate our brains in such a manner we might well discover the level of individual or group understanding from each individual may give rise to conscious activity and qualia.
functionalists can reply that the Chinese system won’t be functionally identical to you (a human mind). for instances, it could be disrupted by things that your mind isn’t disrupted by e.g the radios running out of batteries or the system being disrupted by bad weather.

true, but irrelevant, says Block, say this could happen. if it doesn’t then we have functional duplication. and the functionalist must say that the chinese system is conscious. Second, these disruption don’t count as inputs or outputs. any more than having a brain tumour counts as an ‘input’ to our mental states. it is not part of their functioning - that’s why they are disruptions.

functionalists can object that the chinese system is much more slower than our brains.

but replies Block, why should this matter for whether it has mental states? couldn’t there be much slower minds than ours? in any case this is just an objection about what is physically possible. a chinese system that operated as fast as our bains is still metaphysically possible.

a physicalist response

strongest response would come from the physicalist.
If Block’s objection works, then not everything about the mind can be explained in terms of functions. but perhaps we can combine functionalism and physicalist positions.
this means we have to disregard within a functional framework. does this impact one of the advantages of functionalism, the multiple realisability component?
if the chinese system can have intentional mental states (beliefs, desires etc), then functionalism provides an accurate account of all mental states except for consciousness of phenomenal properties, which involves qualia. why should this be? we could argue that the intrinsic properties of qualia depend on the specific physical properties of the system that realises the functional states.
it can be argued that there are some essential physical properties, perhaps linked to the biology or structure of the brain, required in order to produce certain elements of conscious activity.
functionalism can’t account for phenomenal properties on it’s own.

these are the result of functional properties + the physical properties of the system

e.g pain depends on our physiology.

so what mental states has depend on its functional properties and it’s intrinsic physical properties. mental states are still nothing more than physical states playing a functional role. a physical, functional duplicate of a person with consciousness will have the same conscious state.
the china mind, is not possessing these essential physical properties. will not have phenomenal experience and Block’s argument is quashed.

Issue 3: the knowledge mary argument can be applied to functional facts

jackson’s knowledge argument attempted to show that no reduction of mentality to the physical is possible. this argument can likewise be levelled at functionalism.
if mary know all of the physical and functional facts about colour and what happens when humans experience colour but learnt something from experiencing it herself, then there is more to experiencing qualia than the functionalist view can account for.
so, functionalist is false or at least incomplete.

the knowledge/mary argument can be applied to functional facts

however, a functionalist account of qualia could still be correct.
on this view qualia provides us with a short cut by which we represent complex functional and relational information.
a real advantage in a hostile environment - if the body is damaged you don’t need a full physiological account to assess the damage. likewise with colour you don’t need a full functionalist account. we are able to access this information quickly through qualia.
Qualia may seem to us subjectively to have an intrinsic nature which escapes a functional reduction. However, this appearance may be consequences of us not being aware of the detailed functional facts which ultimate constitute such mental states.
therefore, if qualia is a representation of functional states then there is no reason that Mary wouldn’t be able to deduce their nature from he complete knowledge of the physical and functionalist facts.

Monday 12 mark question to prepare for ‘outline functionalism and explain how the possibility of a functional duplicate with no qualia challenges this view’.

the china brain argument.

key words

reduced
functional roles
multiple realisability
inputs and outputs
sensory, physical stimuli and behaviour.

no responses to the china brain experiment.

SAY WHY ITS AN ISSUE FOR FUNCTIONALISM.