Institutions in Comparative Politics
Institutions in Comparative Politics
Why Institutions Matter
Institutions are defined as the 'rules of the game' (North 1990).
Formal institutions include constitutions, laws, and legislatures.
Informal institutions encompass norms, traditions, and unwritten rules.
Institutions fundamentally shape incentives, influence conflict resolution, and determine outcomes in politics.
The concept of the state itself is viewed as a collection of institutions (linking back to Week 2a content).
Old vs. New Institutionalism
Old institutionalism focused descriptively on formal constitutions but offered limited analysis of their practical application.
The behavioral revolution (1960s–70s) shifted focus to individuals and their attitudes, sidelining institutions in political analysis.
The New Institutionalisms (1980s–90s) brought a revived focus on institutions, introducing new theories and methods (Hall & Taylor 1996).
The Three New Institutionalisms
The three primary approaches within New Institutionalism are:
Historical Institutionalism (HI)
Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI)
Sociological Institutionalism (SI)
Shared characteristic: All agree that institutions shape behavior and outcomes.
Key differences: They diverge in their views of actors, how institutions exert influence, and the mechanisms of institutional change.
Historical Institutionalism (HI)
Definition: Institutions are rules that shape conflict over extended periods (Hall & Taylor 1996).
Core Concepts:
Path dependence: Institutions establish and reinforce certain patterns of behavior and policy over time.
Critical junctures: These are crises or significant turning points that can lock in entirely new institutional paths.
Policy feedbacks: Existing policies actively shape future political developments and preferences (Thelen 1999).
HI Example I: U.S. Social Security
In the 1930s, the Social Security system initially excluded women and minorities.
These exclusions persisted due to the formation of coalitions that defended the established rules.
This demonstrates how institutions can shape politics long after their initial creation.
Policies create vested interests that make them very difficult to reverse.
HI Example II: Healthcare in North America
Canada: Universal healthcare became deeply entrenched in the 1960s, making its reversal politically impossible.
U.S.: The Affordable Care Act (2010), once implemented and covering millions, became exceedingly difficult to dismantle.
Institutions effectively create constituencies that actively defend them and their benefits.
Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI)
Definition: Institutions are rules that structure strategic interaction among actors.
Actors: Are presumed to be rational and driven by self-interest.
Function: Institutions serve to reduce uncertainty, solve collective action problems, and facilitate cooperation among rational actors.
RCI Example: Duverger's Law
Plurality systems (e.g., U.S., UK) tend to lead to two-party political systems.
Proportional systems (e.g., Netherlands, Israel) tend to result in multiparty systems.
Logic: Voters, acting rationally, avoid 'wasting' their votes on candidates unlikely to win, and these institutional rules then channel their strategic choices.
Sociological Institutionalism (SI)
Definition: Institutions are comprised of norms, symbols, and cultural scripts.
Actors: Are shaped significantly by their identity and culture, not solely by strategic calculation.
Logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen 1984): Behavior is guided by what is considered socially acceptable and legitimate.
SI Example: Quotas & Constitutions
Gender quotas: Often adopted because they are perceived as appropriate and legitimate, rather than purely strategic calculations.
New constitutions: Frequently copied or mimicked from colonizers or neighboring states to gain legitimacy.
This illustrates how institutions spread through cultural legitimacy and diffusion.
Comparing the Three Institutionalisms
Feature | Historical Institutionalism | Rational Choice Institutionalism | Sociological Institutionalism |
|---|---|---|---|
Actors | Historically situated | Rational strategists | Socially constructed |
Institutions | Constrain & enable over time | Rules shaping incentives | Norms & culture |
Change | Critical junctures, policy feedbacks | Equilibrium shifts | Diffusion, legitimacy |
Weaknesses | Deterministic | Too rationalist | Too vague/broad |
Informal Institutions
Formal rules alone are insufficient to explain political reality.
Informal institutions are socially shared rules that operate outside official channels (Helmke & Levitsky 2004).
Clientelism: The exchange of goods or services for political support, typically votes.
Patronage networks: Rewarding allies with jobs or resources (e.g., the spoils system in the U.S.).
Term-limit evasion: Leaders bypassing constitutional rules regarding term limits.
Informal Institutions II: Typology
Complementary: Reinforce formal rules (e.g., UK norms of parliamentary debate).
Accommodating: Adjust to formal rules to achieve specific goals (e.g., informal political coalitions in Brazil).
Competing: Actively undermine formal rules (e.g., bribery undermining anti-corruption laws).
Substitutive: Fill a void where formal rules are weak or absent (e.g., tribal courts in Afghanistan).
Lesson: Informal rules can be as significant as formal constitutions in shaping political outcomes.
Ostrom: Coping with the Commons
Hardin (1968): Proposed the