The Road to Operation Desert Storm: US Strategy and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

Post-Cold War Geopolitics and the Quest for Unipolarity

• The End of the Cold War (November 1989): Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Soviet Union's ideological struggle with the United States ended. The U.S. emerged as the primary victor.

• The Unipolar Ambition: From $1989$ to the destruction of the World Trade Center in $2001$, the White House sought to solidify a "unipolar world"—a perpetual system of a single superpower with unrivaled dominance.

• Suppressing Minor Powers: With no great powers rivaling the U.S. in military or economic terms in the near term, Republican and Democratic administrations focused on suppressing minor powers that defied American trade and security preferences.

• The Interregnum (1989–2001): This twelve-year period functioned as an interregnum between the Cold War and the Global War on Terror. Efforts to manage Iraqi President Saddam Hussein during this time revealed that regional constraints in the Middle East and South Asia persisted despite the Soviet Union's decline.

Constraints on Hegemony and the Vietnam Syndrome

• Resistance to Combat Operations: Ordinary citizens and decorated military leaders remained averse to high casualties in offensive combat operations abroad. This resistance limited the options available to hawkish civilian leaders in Washington.

• Technological Limits: While military technology could punish Saddam Hussein, it could not force him to relinquish territory without a ground invasion.

• Operation Desert Storm Calibration: The four-week air war and four-day ground war were specifically calibrated and circumscribed to minimize American casualties.

• The Political Objective: The U.S.-led coalition committed to leaving Saddam Hussein in power in Baghdad, avoiding a foreign military occupation of over $20,000,000$ Iraqis.

• The "Vietnam Syndrome": The conflict suggested that while the U.S. had not entirely overcome its post-Vietnam hesitance for foreign interventions, leaders were finding ways to deploy supremacy toward lasting political dominance.

The Transformation of U.S.-Iraqi Relations

• Ally to Adversary (Summer 1990): Contrary to retrospective views of Saddam as an eternal foe, he was a close U.S. security partner during the Reagan administration and the early Bush years.

• Historical Cooperation (1980s):

  • The U.S. blocked sanctions against Iraq even after Saddam used chemical weapons against Iranians and Iraqi Kurds.

  • The U.S. authorized the export of dual-use technologies for Iraq’s chemical and nuclear weapons programs.

• The Bush Administration Strategy (1989): George H.W. Bush chose to embrace Saddam rather than alienate him, viewing Iraq as a regional power and a necessary partner in the Persian Gulf.

• Escalation of Assistance (1990):

  • U.S. agricultural credits to Baghdad exceeded $1,000,000,000 \text{ dollars}$.

  • Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly called Iraq a "force for moderation" in February $1990$.

• Ignored Warnings: The U.S. discounted Saddam’s execution of a British-Iranian journalist in March $1990$ and his April $1990$ threat to incinerate $1/2 \text{ of Israel}$ if struck by the Israeli military. The White House even admonished Capitol Hill policymakers who sought to sanction Iraq.

Iraq’s Economic Crisis and Domestic Survival

• Internal Instability: Saddam’s primary concern was staying in power. Between November $1988$ and January $1990$, he survived four coup or assassination attempts.

• The Cost of the Iran-Iraq War:

  • Iraq began the war with $35,000,000,000 \text{ dollars}$ in foreign exchange reserves and ended it in $1988$ with $80,000,000,000 \text{ dollars}$ in debt.

  • Annual debt payments: $5,000,000,000 \text{ dollars}$.

  • Post-war reconstruction cost: $230,000,000,000 \text{ dollars}$.

  • Oil revenue: $13,000,000,000 \text{ dollars / year}$.

  • Military spending: $12,900,000,000 \text{ dollars}$ for a $1,000,000 \text{ soldier}$ military.

• Refused Accommodations: Saddam sought three primary helps from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which they largely refused:

  1. Debt Forgiveness/Aid: He requested $30,000,000,000 \text{ dollars}$ in loan forgiveness and $30,000,000,000 \text{ dollars}$ in new grants. Saudi Arabia offered only $200,000,000 \text{ dollars}$ and Kuwait offered only $40,000,000 \text{ dollars}$.

  2. Oil Prices: Saddam wanted OPEC to cut supply to raise prices. Instead, Kuwait and the UAE allegedly overproduced, suppressing global prices and costing Iraq over $90,000,000,000 \text{ dollars}$.

  3. Oil Infrastructure: Saddam wanted to lease the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan from Kuwait to create docks for large oil tankers, which Kuwait denied.

The Road to Invasion (May–August 1990)

• July 11 OPEC Meeting: Hussein’s request to reduce production was rejected.

• Bellicose Rhetoric: Foreign Minister Tarik Aziz described the economic pressure as a conspiracy and an existential threat, stating "our children will not be barred from food."

• Military Buildup:

  • July 19, 1990: $3 \text{ Iraqi divisions}$ ($35,000 \text{ soldiers}$) moved within $10 \text{ to } 30 \text{ miles}$ of the border.

  • July 27, 1990: $100,000 \text{ troops}$ were amassed.

• American Indifference (July 31, 1990): Assistant Secretary John Kelly testified that the U.S. had no defense treaties with Gulf countries and took no position on border disputes. Iraqi intelligence interpreted this as a lack of risk for American reaction.

• The Blitz (August 2, 1990): Armored divisions captured Kuwait City. The Emir (Sheikh Jabbar al Sabah) and his bodyguard fled to Saudi Arabia through traffic. The Emir's brother was killed during the assault.

• Strategic Outcome: Saddam gained control of $1/5$ of the world’s oil supply.

Shift to Confrontation: Operation Desert Shield

• Initial Hesitation: Brent Scowcroft (National Security Adviser) noted the first reaction was "this is a little conflict" and "we don't much like Kuwait anyway." Colin Powell (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) initially opposed war based on lessons from Vietnam and Lebanon.

• The Influence of Margaret Thatcher: During a summit in Aspen, Colorado, Thatcher convinced Bush to confront Saddam. She compared Saddam to a potential Hitler and argued that "aggressors must be stopped… thrown out decisively."

• "This Will Not Stand": On August 5, Bush denounced the aggression on the White House lawn. On August 8, he declared "a line in the sand has been drawn."

• The Threat to Saudi Arabia: CIA warnings indicated over $100,000 \text{ Iraqi troops}$ (and later $140,000$) moving toward the Saudi border, threatening another $1/5$ of the world's oil.

• Convincing the Saudis: The Saudis initially feared the U.S. would demonstrate weakness and pull out. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and General Norm Schwarzkopf met with King Fahd, promising a deployment of $200,000 \text{ troops}$. King Fahd agreed, stating, "Okay."

• Mobilization: The largest troop movement since World War II began, with U.S. forces operating from Arab soil for the first time.

Questions & Discussion

• Question from Lee Hamilton (D-IN) to John Kelly (July 31, 1990):

  • Question: "What if Iraq charged across the border into Kuwait? The United States would not be obligated to engage US forces there?"

  • Response (Kelly): "That is correct."

• Dialogue at Camp David/White House Regarding Saudi Arabia:

  • Question (Bush/Advisers): "Is he gonna stop at the borders of Kuwait… or move down to the oil fields?"

  • Context: Nobody knew for sure, but the decision was made to defend Saudi Arabia without initial consensus on liberating Kuwait.

• Reaction to Bush’s "This Will Not Stand" Declaration:

  • Colin Powell’s reaction to Scowcroft: "That'll teach us to leave you up at Camp David alone with him."

• The Use of Thallium:

  • The transcript notes Iraqi intelligence used Thallium—a poison impacting the nervous system—to eliminate opposition figures. It leads to death within $1 \text{ month}$ of administration.