vietnam (condensed ver)
đ Introduction to Ho Chi Minh and the Struggle for Independence
Ho Chi Minh was the son of a Vietnamese civil servant within the French government who nonetheless favored Vietnamese independence and brought up his children to become fiercely nationalist. Between 1911 and 1941, Ho Chi Minh went into exile and assumed various identities in western countries, including America.
đ Key Events in Ho Chi Minh's Life
Studied westerners with interest and admiration
Brought a petition for Vietnam's self-determination to Woodrow Wilson in 1919
Became a founder member of the French Communist Party
Established the Indochinese Communist Party in Hong Kong in 1929
Returned to Vietnam in 1941 and established the League for the Independence of Vietnam (Vietminh)
đ€ The Geneva Conference and Eisenhower
The Geneva Conference was intended to settle outstanding issues of the Korean War and First Indochina War. The conference agreed that:
Vietnam would be divided at the 17th parallel by a 'provisional military demarcation line'
French troops would withdraw from the North and Ho's Vietminh forces from the South
Vietnamese could freely choose to live in the South or North
A General Election for the whole of Vietnam would be held before July 1956
The domino theory is a concept that suggests that if one country in a region falls to communism, neighboring countries will also fall, like a row of dominoes.
đ US Involvement in Vietnam
Year | Event | US Involvement |
|---|---|---|
1950 | Truman supplies $100 million to support French military effort | Financial support |
1954 | America supports French to the tune of 80% of its costs in Vietnam | Financial support |
1955 | Diem holds an election in South Vietnam, with 98.2% in favor of Diem | Political support |
đ JFK and US Policy in Vietnam
John F. Kennedy's policy in Vietnam was shaped by events whilst in office. He relied heavily on Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defence, and Dean Rusk, Secretary of State.
Kennedy approved an increase in the ARVN from 150 to 170,000
Kennedy agreed to a vast increase in military advisory personnel, with 12,000 in Vietnam by the end of 1962
Kennedy supplied 300 helicopters to Vietnam
đ Strategic Hamlet Programme and Escalation
The Strategic Hamlet Programme was established to prevent NLF infiltration of peasant communities by moving peasants into new fortified settlements patrolled by armed guards.
The programme was a complete failure, with peasants resenting leaving their ancestral lands and burial grounds
The programme increased support for the NLF and anger towards the South Vietnamese regime under Ngo Dinh Diem
đ Opposition to Diem and the Military Coup
Ngo Dinh Diem's attempt to suppress the 2527th Birthday celebrations for the Buddha led to protests throughout South Vietnam
Thich Quang Duc's self-immolation in June 1963 led to widespread outrage and condemnation of Diem's regime
Kennedy was concerned that Diem would do a deal with Hanoi, and that he and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu had to go
đ« LBJ and Escalation
Lyndon B. Johnson was a strong supporter of the domino theory and believed that prevention of an NLF victory was vital to the defence of the US.
Johnson saw it as his duty to sustain JFK's policies and retained his team of advisers
Johnson was aware that he possessed no popular mandate for escalation in Vietnam, but nor did he think he could pull out of Vietnam despite thinking it was "the biggest damned mess"## Vietnam War Study Guide
đșđž Johnson's Escalation of the Vietnam War
At Christmas 1963, LBJ told his Joint Chiefs of Staff that he did not want to lose South Vietnam or get America into a war before the election.
He said, "Just let me get elected and then you can have your war."
Johnson ignored a message and ordered bombing of torpedo boat bases and an oil depot.
He then told the American people that repeated acts of violence against the armed forces of the United States must be met not only with alert defense, but with a positive reply.
On August 7, 1964, Congress approved Johnson's decision and passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.
It passed in the House of Representatives by 416-0 and in the Senate by 88-2.
It authorized the President to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States.
The administration denied reports that the US destroyers had been involved in covert operations.
The Resolution became the justification for an escalation of American involvement.
The Gulf Tonkin resolution was one of the most controversial and most consequential decisions in American history.
The Gulf of Tonkin incident involved the USS Maddox and the USS Turner Joy being fired upon.
They retaliated and sunk three North Vietnamese torpedo boats in international waters before being ordered to return the following day.
The report by its Captain, Herrick, said that she was under attack upon once again (August 4th) but sent another message to say that this was probably not true.
The resolution gave Johnson the power to wage war in Vietnam.
He said it was like grandma's night-shirt, it covered everything.
In November 1964, Johnson won a landslide election victory against Barry Goldwater.
Goldwater had called for escalation of the war against the North Vietnamese.
Johnson appeared like the peace candidate by comparison.
Johnson was waiting until after the election to pursue the very policies advocated by his opponent.
He had gained Congressional approval for all necessary measures without the need for a declaration of war.
As a result of the resolution, Johnson's approval rating rose from 42 to 72%, helping him to win the 1964 election.
On February 7th 1965, the Holloway Camp at Pleiku was attacked while McGeorge Bundy and Robert McNamara were in Vietnam on a fact finding mission.
Eight Americans were killed and 100 were injured.
They assumed that Hanoi had planned the attack against the American base and that it had been planned to coincide with their visit.
Based on those assumptions, McNamara and Bundy recommended escalation.
The immediate reprisal for Pleiku was a bombing campaign known as Flaming Dart, which in turn led to Rolling Thunder, but also to increasing NLF attacks on American air bases.
On March 8 1965, 3500 US Marines arrived in South Vietnam.
These were the first official US combat troops to be sent in to the country.
It was presented to the country as a short-term measure.
By the end of 1965, there were nearly 200,000 American troops in Vietnam.
An opinion poll of 1965 indicated that 80% of Americans supported the bombing raids and the deployment of troops.
Westmoreland argued that the 23,000 troops in Vietnam were not enough to defend American interests and requested more troops to fight the double threat from Vietcong and the PAVN (Peopleâs Army of Viet Nam).
The first major engagement between US troops and North Vietnamese (PAVN) troops took place at Ia Drang Valley on the 26th October 1965.
It saw the first major use of helicopters in battle.
It ended in a high kill rate of 10:1.
It was considered a success for Westmoreland's strategy, but the North Vietnamese also considered it a success.
They learned to avoid direct confrontation or at least to minimise US firepower by clinging to the belt of the enemy (i.e. getting as close to the American perimeter as possible so as to make the use of air power and artillery too dangerous.
The US journalist Joseph Galloway described Ia Drang as the battle that convinced Ho Chi Minh he could win.
In April 1965, Johnson gave a speech in which he summed up the reasons the US had to escalate its commitment to Vietnam.
He spoke of North Vietnam as a puppet of Communist Russia and China who wanted to conquer the whole of Asia.
America had to fight if it wanted to live in a free world.
Doris Kearns Goodwin argues that Johnson's need to appear tough on foreign policy in order to stop conservatives defeating his domestic plans and his Great Society dreams was more important for Johnson.
He desperately wanted to avoid a Third World War.
Johnson's presidency marked a massive escalation in the Vietnam War.
The majority of American journalists, as well as congress and the American people and all of Johnson's advisers were in favor of escalation at this early stage.
There were a few dissenting voices:
George Ball, under secretary of state
Mike Mansfield the Senate Leader
Ambassador Maxwell Taylor feared that American troops would fair no better than the French and would only serve to undermine the nationalist credentials of the Saigon regime.
Johnson remained more cautious than his Joint Chiefs of Staff and restricted their freedom of movement to fight a Limited War.
It was designed to avoid confrontation with China or Russia.
This strategy would put him at odds with his generals, and particularly Westmoreland.
đ»đł PAVN and NLF Strategies and Tactics
The Key Significance of the Peasantry
One of the main reasons the Americans could not defeat the Communists was because they were unable to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people.
Mao Zedong taught that the peasants were the key to success.
The guerrillas had to move among the peasantry like the fish swims in the sea.
General Giapâs strategy was to use the Vietcong for incessant guerrilla warfare to wear down Saigon and its American ally.
The North Vietnamese PAVN force would be sent in only to fight conventional set-piece battles at times and places of its choosing.
LĂȘ Duáș©n, Ho Chi Minhâs most trusted adviser and eventual successor, argued that unless the North encouraged armed resistance, Vietnam would never re-united.
Ho agreed to supply the guerrilla units with aid and encouraged them to unite.
The North Vietnamese and NLF were engaged in a total war where every man woman and child was mobilised in fighting, repairing, nursing, supplying, concealing and defeating the foreign enemy and its puppets.
For example, around 50,000 women were employed repairing the Ho Chi Minh trail.
In achieving total war, the peasants were key.
In December 1960, the National Liberation Front (NLF) was formed under Hua Tho.
Americans would later call the group the Vietcong.
He was a Saigon lawyer.
It put together a 10-point programme which included the replacement of Diemâs regime and the redistribution of land to peasants, free of charge.
Vietcong military philosophy was heavily influenced by Sun Tzuâs Art of War which emphasised the political and psychological dimensions of warfare and focussed less on territorial conquest than on psychological dominance and by Mao Zedongâs application of this philosophy in China.
NLF Tactics
All NLF soldiers were issued with a series of directives that they were supposed to observe, which included:
Avoid damage to the land, crops, houses and belongings of the people.
Not to insist on buying or borrowing what the people are not willing to sell or lend.
Never to break our word.
To help them in their daily work (harvesting, fetching firewood, carrying water, sewing, etc.).
The good behaviour could be tempered by ruthlessness.
During the Tet offensive, for example, unfriendly people were dragged out of their houses in Hue and were shot, clubbed to death or buried alive.
Communists worked hard to win over the peasantry, offering them a fairer distribution of land and urging Communist soldiers to avoid the rape and pillage that was characteristic of the South Vietnamese ARVN behavior.
Villagers often gave them NLF fighters the food, shelter and hiding places necessary for survival.
This would place both ARVN and American troops in an invidious position â they had no way of knowing who they could trust in the villages, so that the very people they were allegedly there to protect became indistinguishable from the enemy.
Given that peasant life was essentially collaborative and communal to begin with, it was not difficult for the Communists to claim that their system best represented the interests of peasants in the first place.
Even in areas supposedly controlled by the Saigon government, a web of informants and a multitude of social organisations were used to comfort, control and motivate the people.
The aim of the NLF was to involve the enemy in a long drawn out war and thereby to wear it down.
Thus the NLF, based in the thick forests of South Vietnam, began by taking control of the villages in the rural areas.
As their strength grew and the enemy retreated, they began to take the smaller towns.
"The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." - Mao Zedong, 1933
The NLF relied heavily on night attacks and Punji traps.
They were made from the most readily available materials â sharpened bamboo sticks, stuck into a pit covered by a lattice of twigs and leaves.
American troops would unwittingly step into these traps.
Such traps were designed to maim, not kill, since it would be more debilitating to burden the enemy with medical evacuation.
Punji traps were also a form of germ warfare since the hollow bamboo sticks were filled with excrement to ensure maximum chances of infection and long-term incapacitation or a slow painful death.
Variations on the punji trap included snake pits and keep sake-lose hand in which items Vietcong thought Americans might want as souvenirs were left in the path of oncoming soldiers, but which would detonate if picked up.
NLF soldiers would also make use of the 800 tonnes of explosives that failed to detonate from US bombing raids from 1965.
The NLF made use of supply paths, based on ancient footpaths through the jungles on the borders between Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, known to Americans as the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
It was protected from aerial sight by a triple canopy of jungle foliage.
It was traversed on foot and by bicycle but would eventually provide a route for Soviet-supplied trucks.
In the villages they controlled, the NLF often built underground tunnels which led out of the villages into the jungle.
They also contained caverns where they stored their printing presses, surgical instruments and the equipment for making booby traps and land mines.
The NLF were sent out in small units of between 3 and 10 soldiers with limited knowledge of other units so that, if captured, they would be unable to give the enemy information.
They were told not to go into combat unless it outnumbered the enemy and was certain of winning.
It therefore concentrated on attacking small patrols or poorly guarded government positions.
Ho was greatly assisted by China and Russia, but that help was not as visible as the help received from the Americans by the South.
He was able to tap into the traditional suspicion of foreigners and to combine the appeal of nationalism and equality.
Vietnam had always struggled for its existence against hostile foreign intervention and therefore displayed unusual patience and resilience.
North Vietnamese Tactics
PAVN troops were employed for set piece battles.
The fist of which was fought at the landed zone at Ia Drang in the November 14th of 1965.
It was a 34 day battle that resulted in 305 American and 3561 North Vietnamese deaths.
A body count of 10:1 was confirmation of the success of Westmorelandâs strategy.
The America proved unable to sustain its losses.
Ia Drang taught PAVN and NLF troops the importance of clinging to the belt.
This entailed getting as close to the enemyâs perimeter as possible so as to prevent them from using the air-technology and artillery they relied upon.
Rather than break the morale of the Northerners as intended, the Hanoi government used American air raids to rally the people against the foreign enemy.
In Hanoi itself, the government made excellent preparations against air raids.
Two million northerners, mostly women, were employed in shock brigades to repair the effects of air raid damage to roads and railways.
The Ho Chi Minh Trail was never a single path, but had many branches.
Traffic could be switched to other branches whilst repairs were done when one was damaged by American bombers.
Along the route were dotted repair workshops, stores, depots, hospitals and rest camps.
"The North Vietnamese knew why they fought and were wiling to wait, suffer and persevere to achieve their aims in a way that many Americans and South Vietnamese were not.â - Saunders
đșđž U.S. and ARVN Tactics in Vietnam
Background
American attempts to win the hearts and minds of the peasantry were limited to aid that rarely reached the peasants for whom it was intended but which was diverted into the pockets of urban elites in Saigon.
The methods employed to defeat the enemy alienated friendly and neutral Vietnamese and Americans alike, and played a fundamental role in American failure in Vietnam.
A key component of the American strategy and tactics was war from the air.
This took two key forms:
Bombing
Helicopter support for ground troops in search and destroy missions
Neither tactic succeeded in their goals of depleting the enemyâs ability to wage war and destroying its morale.
The US made a fateful commitment to scorched earth tactics in order to deprive the enemy of the environment it needed to succeed â regardless of the impact it would have on the rural population it was supposed to be defending.
General Westmorelandâs overall strategy was attrition, to wear the enemy down.
The Americans relied on superior technology.
American firepower would be concentrated more on South than on North Vietnam.
This was partly because Johnson wanted to fight a limited war focussed on protecting the continued existence of an independent South Vietnam, and avoiding confrontation with China and Russia.
It was also because of the hidden presence of guerrilla soldiers in the midst of the rural areas and villages of south Vietnam.
Rolling Thunder
Three months after his election as president, Johnson launched Operation Rolling Thunder into North Vietnam.
These were to be regular raids; with the objective of destroying the North Vietnamese economy and to stem the supply of soldiers to the Vietcong.
Bombing was also directed against areas controlled by the NLF in the South.
The Operation was expected to last 8 weeks; it lasted 3 years.
The bombs dropped included defoliants such as Agent Orange and incendiary devices using Napalm.
Rolling Thunder: Failures
There were few factories to bomb.
The countryside was mostly affected.
It encouraged even greater support for the war from North Vietnam.
It did not stop the supplies to the Vietcong.
The costs to the US often outweighed the benefits.
In 1967 the US magazine Life calculated that it cost the USA $400,000 to kill one Vietcong fighter, a figure that included 75 bombs and 400 artillery shells.
Napalm dropped from the air â often mistakenly on innocents â was an exceedingly cruel and indiscriminate weapon.
Its developers at Dow Chemical Company improved it by adding polystyrene so that it could not be removed easily and white phosphorous so that it would continue to burn even under water.
Although the Joint chiefs of Staff told Johnson they could destroy North Vietnamâs industrial and economic base and morale, there were relatively few North Vietnamese factories and roads to destroy.
Supplies and materiel came from China and the USSR.
Bombing succeeded only in raising North Vietnamese morale and determination whilst losing hearts and minds in both South Vietnam and America itself.
Operation Rolling Thunder has been called one of the most ambitious, wasteful and ineffective air campaigns in the history of warfare.
One of the key reasons for this was the restrictions placed upon bombers for fear of escalating Chinese involvement (China had its first nuclear missile test on October 16, 1964).
There was a 30 mile restriction area around Hanoi and a ten mile restriction area around Haiphong.
Dozens of valuable strategic targets were strictly off limits, and pilots were only allowed to bomb what was on the Washington-approved target lists.
As a result of American dependence on air power, the NLF attacked American air bases and landing sites, necessitating further US escalation and ground cover.
Rolling Thunder: Successes
It damaged North Vietnamâs war effort and disrupted its supply routes.
It caused considerable damage to North Vietnamese towns and cities.
Roughly 800 tonnes per month failed to explode thus could be used by the NLF to make landmines.
The key effect of bombing was to alienate people in South Vietnam and in America.
Search and Destroy
In response to attacks on American air bases, General Westmorelandâs strategy on the ground was known as search and destroy.
This involved patrolling American military sites to remove the enemy.
Because a mortar attack could be launched from distance, it was not sufficient merely to patrol the immediate perimeter of an air base.
The search had to be conducted twenty miles into the wider countryside and the surrounding villages.
In a bid to maintain the morale of American troops, ordinary soldiers served 365 days; marines 13 months.
What was saved in morale was lost in valuable experience and unity.
Officers only completed five months on the front line before being moved to a training, organisation or desk job.
This meant that many of the troops under their command had more experience of combat than they did.
American soldiers were at a distinct disadvantage.
They did not know the terrain and were constantly in danger of ambush.
The hunter became the hunted.
Vietcong forces developed close-range tactics and attacked American soldiers at every opportunity.
Vietnam was a war without frontiers.
This had two key consequences:
Anyone could come under attack at any time.
Since success could not be measured in terms of land taken, Westmoreland focussed on attrition and body count.
The large scale use of helicopters and the blasting of zones where they were to land were not conducive to finding VC who would normally hide when they heard the noise.
American troops found it difficult to distinguish between genuine enemy soldiers and the peasants who they suspected of colluding and protecting them.
The result was a break down in trust between the American troops and the civilians they were allegedly there to supposed to protect and led American soldiers to treat peasants with suspicion, fear and eventually, brutality.
The most notorious incident came to light in 1969 when news broke that a band of American soldiers had massacred an entire civilian population in My Lai during the Tet Offensive of 1968.
A key example of Search and destroy was in Operation Cedar Falls in 1967.
20 American battalions entered an area north of Saigon and used defoliants, bombing and bulldozers to clear the land in a bid to deprive the Vietcong of the rural environment they depended upon for their success.
The result was 6000 people were evacuated from their homes as their lands were destroyed.
Only a few VC were found.
In 1967, the CIA reported that less than one percent of nearly two million Allied small unit operations conducted in the last two years resulted in contact with the enemy.
"After their homes had been wrecked, their rice confiscated â if they werenât pro-Vietcong before we got there, they sure as hell were by the time we left.â - a marine
Between 1967 and 1968, fewer than 1% of the two million small unit operations led to any contact with the enemy.
Body Count
Westmoreland believed that at some point the enemy would reach crossover point when it could no longer replace its losses.
The most infamous example was so-called Hamburger Hill.
It was fought between 10 and 20th May 1969 during Operation Apache Snow.
A strategically unimportant fortified hill 937, was taken by a frontal assault at the cost of 72 deaths and over 400 wounded US soldiers, only to be abandoned and re-taken by the enemy almost immediately.
The focus on body count had further consequences for morale.
One of these was that US regiments would be involved in bloody battles to take Vietcong positions, only to abandon them and have them immediately reoccupied by the enemy.
Another unfortunate consequence of the emphasis on body count was that all dead bodies began to be counted as enemy kill.
Since this became the measure of success â medals, rations, promotions etc. â US soldiers became less discriminating in order to increase body count.
The most notorious example was the massacre at My Lai on 16 March 1968 which resulted in 347 unarmed civilians being beaten and killed by American soldiers and their officers, including, old men, women, children and even babies.
The impact of Zippo raids on the soldiers themselves was to undermine their own belief in the rightness of their cause.
Volunteers and draftees alike would begin to question what they were doing.
The presence of American ground troops had three main consequences:
It served to undermine the commitment of ARVN troops, many of whom preferred to leave the fighting to the Americans.
It served to undermine the nationalist credentials of the Saigon regime who was depicted by the Vietcong as a puppet of American imperialists.
It turned friendly civilians into civilians hostile to Saigon and its American ally.
According to the Vietnam veteran Philip Caputo, soldiers carried with them the implicit convictions that the VC would be quickly beaten and that they were doing something altogether noble and good.
By the end of their tour of duty those assumptions had been seriously undermined.
Many returned home to find themselves spat upon and ostracised, and jeered if they wore their uniform.
Some even found the families they left behind had been victimised by anti-war protestors.
Johnson appeared to be losing the battle for hearts and minds at home.
The collapse of the home front damaged troop morale and hamstrung the government in Washington, and provides another reason for American failure overall.
ARVN Weaknesses â âSearch and Avoidâ
American assumptions about the war were already being challenged by 1967.
Why was America unable to defeat a small nation?
What was American achieving by being in Vietnam in the first place?
In April 1967, General Westmoreland said: In evaluating the enemy strategy, it is evident to me that he believes.
Background
The corruption and mismanagement that characterised the government in Saigon permeated its armed forces.
Theft of American supplies, including rifles and ammunition, took place on an industrial scale.
Americans took a very dim view of their South Vietnamese allies, whose tactics they called Search and Avoid.
ARVN officers did not get on with the peasants they were supposed to be defending.
80% of peasants in Vietnam were Buddhist, but only 5% of the ARVN leadership were.
ARVN wages were so low that soldiers depended upon American surplus and of course the selling of American supplies on the black market.
The morale and performance of ARVN was another factor in explaining the defeat of the the Saigon government and its American allies.
â The Tet Offensive
The Tet Offensive was a turning point in the Vietnam War, challenging American assumptions and expectations about the war. It occurred during a presidential election year, influencing public opinion and policy decisions.
Objectives of the Tet Offensive
Le Duan's Plan: Launch a major assault on 36 provincial capitals and five major cities, including the U.S. embassy in Saigon.
Expected Outcomes:
A mass uprising of the South Vietnamese people against their government.
Desertion of large numbers of ARVN soldiers to the Communist side.
Westmoreland's Prediction: The defeat of the NLF was in sight due to their inability to replace soldiers lost in combat.
Key Events and Battles
Siege of Khe Sanh (January 21st â April 8th, 1968)
Giap's Intention: To replicate Dien Bien Phu, using similar geography and the same division (304th PAVN).
Alternative View: To distract and draw American troops away from provincial capitals like Hue and Saigon.
Initial Assault: Massive mortar, artillery, and rocket barrage on American positions.
Challenges:
Low cloud and fog impeded close U.S. air support.
PAVN captured the road between Khe Sanh and its sister base, Lang Vei.
American Response:
Operation Niagara: Massive air strike involving thousands of sorties by B-52 bombers.
Over 110,000 tons of explosives and napalm dropped on PAVN positions.
Outcome:
Giap's forces made a final effort to storm Khe Sanh on February 29th but were beaten back by ARVN forces.
The siege ended on April 8th, 1968, with Operation Pegasus re-establishing control over Route 9.
The U.S. abandoned the base on July 5th, risking another siege, and a North Vietnamese flag was raised over the base.
Bell UH-1 âHueyâ Helicopters were vital in the resupply of Khe Sanh
Battle of Huáșż (January 30th â March 3rd, 1968)
Scale of the Battle: One of the longest and bloodiest battles of the war.
Forces Involved:
18 American and ARVN battalions against 10 PAVN and NLF battalions.
Challenges:
Underestimation of PAVN/NLF forces by the U.S. command.
Lack of coordination between American/ARVN units.
Competing demands for air support, restricted by poor weather.
Casualties:
452 ARVN deaths and 216 American deaths.
Estimates of PAVN deaths varied from 1,000 to 5,000.
Walter Cronkite's Assessment: After visiting Huáșż, he concluded that the war was mired in stalemate.
President Johnson reportedly said, "If Iâve lost Cronkite, Iâve lost Middle America."
Battle of Saigon
NLF Tactics: Launched 35 battalions at Saigon, including attacks on the Presidential Palace, National Radio Station, and U.S. Embassy.
U.S. Embassy Breach: NLF troops managed to breach the perimeter of the U.S. Embassy.
Famous Image: Eddie Adams' photograph of General Brigadier Loan executing Bay Lop captured on February 1st, 1968.
Loan had been told that the suspect had killed his six godchildren, a police major who was Loanâs aide-de-camp, and one of his closest friends, including the majorâs family as well.
Impact on American Opinion
Challenged Assumptions: Television reports of attacks, such as the U.S. embassy breach and the siege of Khe Sanh, challenged the assumption that America was winning the war.
Casualty Rates: U.S. casualty rates peaked during February 1968, exceeding 500 per week.
"Crossover Point": The New York Times ran a story on March 10th about Westmoreland's request for 206,000 more men, galvanizing anti-war sentiment.
Johnson's Response
March 31st Address: President Johnson announced an end to the bombing in North Vietnam and declared that he would not seek another term as president.
Troop Levels: Approved only a small increase in troop numbers.
Westmoreland's Recall: Westmoreland was recalled to the United States and replaced by General Creighton Abrams.
Media's Role đ°
Uncensored Coverage: Vietnam was the worldâs first "living room war," with largely uncensored press and television coverage.
Critical Reporting: Coverage increasingly questioned the American conduct of the war, focusing on the suffering of innocent civilians.
Cronkite's Influence: Walter Cronkite's conclusion that the war could not be won significantly impacted public opinion.
Peter Braestrup of the New York Times said of the Tet Offensive that for the first time in modern history the outcome of the war was determined, not on the battlefield but on the printed page and, above all on the TV screen.
The My Lai Massacre as turning point
Publicity Impact: The publicity surrounding the My Lai massacre proved to be an important turning point in American public opinion. It illustrated the deterioration that was taking place in the behaviour of the US troops and undermined the moral argument about the need to save Vietnam from the âevils of communismâ.
Life Magazine: One of the most influential acts during the war was the decision of Life Magazine in 1968 to fill one edition of its magazine with photographs of the 242 US soldiers killed in Vietnam during one week of the fighting.
Nick Ut Photograph: One of the most haunting photographs of the war, taken by the Vietnamese photographer Nick Ut, was published by the New York Times in 1972, which depicted Kim Phouc, a little girl whose clothes had been burned off by a napalm attack on her village on June 8th, shouting NĂłng quĂĄ, nĂłng quĂĄ (âtoo hot, too hotâ).
The Draft and its effects
Protests: Protests began almost as soon as ground troops were officially deployed in Vietnam, with students and their teachers holding âteach-insâ in universities. In the Spring of 1965 the Students for a Democratic Society led a 25,000 strong March on Washington.
Draft Cards: In October 1967 draft cards were publicly burned throughout the country.
Kent State Shootings: In May 4th 1970 â one such protest at Kent State University led to a massacre resulting from a confrontation between students and young, nervous, under-trained, and badly-led national guardsmen (some of whom had probably joined the national guard in order to avoid the draft). Armed with live ammunition, they shot four students to death and injured several others.
Conclusions
Senior Officials' Impact: David Schmitz argues that Tet's impact on senior officials in the Johnson administration was more significant than its impact on the public.
Wise Men's Advice: On March 25, 1968, the "Wise Men" advised Johnson to seek some kind of retreat.
Economic Factors: The US government deficit dramatically increased, weakening the dollar and causing a gold crisis.
Fulbright Hearings: The hearings culminated in 1971, when a number of Vietnam veterans testified before the Fulbright Committee , led by John Kerry.
Pentagon Papers: The 1971 publication of the Pentagon Papers revealed that the government had not been honest with the people or with Congress about the nature of its interventions in Vietnam.
đ VIETNAMISATION AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE:
Nixon's Approach
"Peace with Honor": November 1968, Nixon won the presidential election in which Vietnam was a central issue, on the basis that he would seek âpeace with honour.â
New Doctrine: Nixon presented a new doctrine of foreign policy that was based not on containment but on a policy of sending US troops only when US was directly threatened.
Vietnamization: A policy to encourage the ARVN to take more responsibility for fighting the war.
In June 1969, Nixon announced the first troop withdrawals â 25,000.
Secret Bombing: Nixon gave permission to the army to bomb NLF bases in Cambodia, kept secret from the American public.
Demoralization
Vietnamization failed because:
Troop Morale: Once US troops knew they going home they were less willing to risk their lives for military gains whose point was lost on them.
Fragging: Officers who put their soldiersâ lives at risk were liable to be killed by their own platoon.
ARVN Issues:
ARVN were unable to recruit enough soldiers â even though half of South Vietnamâs male population aged 15 to 49 were enlisted.
The army was corrupt.
Military manuals were in English and ARVN troops were often unable to understand how American-supplied equipment.
Phoenix Programme: Nixon continued and developed the Phoenix Programme â in which Vietnamese were trained by the CIA to infiltrate peasant communities to identify NLF sympathisers, at which point Death Squads would be sent in to execute them.## Paris Peace Talks and Christmas Bombing đ
By 1972, Nixon concluded that victory in Vietnam was unattainable. Henry Kissinger developed a plan where:
U.S. troops would withdraw from Vietnam
There would be a cease-fire.
566 American prisoners held in Hanoi would be returned.
The governments in North and South Vietnam would stay in power until new elections could be arranged to unite the whole country.
The plan had a significant issue: While U.S. troops would leave, North Vietnamese troops could remain in the South.
President Thieu rejected the agreement, proposing 129 changes. He wanted the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Vietnam recognized as an international border and South Vietnam recognized as a sovereign state.
Kissinger, aiming to reassure the Communists and convince Thieu of the U.S.'s dedication to a compromise, announced "[w]e believe that peace is at hand" in a televised press conference.
However, after the North Vietnamese saw the new demands, they retracted their concessions and wanted to renegotiate.
Linebacker II (The Christmas Bombing) đ
Negotiations stalled, leading to Linebacker II, a "maximum effort" bombing campaign targeting Hanoi and Haiphong. Restrictions on American bomber command were lifted.
It became known as the 'Christmas bombing'.
Over eleven days, 100,000 bombs were dropped.
The destructive power equaled five times that of the Hiroshima bomb.
The bombing was condemned worldwide, with headlines calling it "Genocide," "Stone-Age Barbarism," and "Savage and Senseless."
Nixon faced pressure due to Kissinger's "peace at hand" statement and fears that the new Democrat-controlled Congress would legislate an end to the war, preventing him from achieving "peace with honor."
North Vietnam returned to negotiations but refused to change the agreement terms. On January 27, 1973, Nixon signed the Paris Peace Accords, as proposed in October. The U.S. effectively agreed to withdraw.
Final Withdrawal and Communist Victory đ
The last U.S. combat troops left in March 1973. An uneasy truce followed until early 1974, when fighting resumed between the NLF and ARVN. President Nguyen Van Thieu requested more aid from the U.S.
U.S. aid decreased from 30billionayearto30billionayearto1 billion.
Thieu announced he had a letter from Nixon promising military support if the NLF was winning.
Due to Watergate, Nixon couldn't help and resigned on August 9th, replaced by Gerald Ford.
In March 1975, the NLF won victories, and Hue and Danang fell. Senior ARVN officers went into hiding.
Gerald Ford's efforts to support South Vietnam were rejected by the Senate.
On April 25th, 1975, President Thieu accused America of betrayal, resigned, and left the country.
On April 29th, 1975, America started Operation Frequent Wind, evacuating American personnel and vulnerable Vietnamese supporters.
Evacuations by fixed-wing aircraft were impossible due to the bombing of Saigon airfield. The American Embassy was overwhelmed with people seeking evacuation. President Ford ordered the end of evacuations at 3:27 am, leaving 400 people inside the embassy when it fell to the communists. Helicopters were ditched into the sea to make room for evacuees on American ships.
Effects of the War on Vietnam đ„
An estimated 4 million Vietnamese were killed or wounded, including 1.3 million civilians.
Similar numbers were left homeless, leading to a refugee crisis in the South as people fled to the cities.
Economic Impact
The economic impact of the Vietnam War was caused by the U.S. commitment to a scorched earth policy to combat the enemyâs guerrilla tactics.
The bombing damaged infrastructure like dams and canals, creating craters in rice paddies and hillsides.
By the war's end, there were an estimated 21 million bomb craters in Vietnam.
Air Force planes sprayed 18 million gallons of herbicide containing dioxins on six million acres.
An additional 1,200 square miles were bulldozed flat.
Senator Gaylord Nelson stated in 1972:
âOur program of defoliation, carpet bombing with B-52s, and bulldozing . . . did not protect our soldiers or defeat the enemy, and it has done far greater damage to our ally than to the enemy.â
The combination of bombing and chemicals destroyed nearly half the crops in South Vietnam.
Before the war, the country had been a large rice exporter but became reliant on imports.
8 million tonnes of bombs were dropped on Vietnam between 1965 and 1973.
Social Impact
The social impact of the American war and the presence of the US army in Vietnam was enormous.
Rural livelihoods were destroyed by the war, causing dependence upon American consumption and aid.
Vietnamese civilians became involved in crime, drugs and prostitution in order to make a living.
When the US army left it took some 300,000 jobs and billions of dollars worth of aid with it.
James Fenton wrote:
âSaigon was an addicted city, and we were the drug. The corruption of children, the mutilation of young men, the prostitution of women, the humiliation of the old, the division of the family, the division of the countryâit had all been done in our name.â
In the longer term, the effects of Agent Orange are still felt at a genetic and environmental level in the form of birth defects and cancers throughout the rural population of Vietnam. Many of the tropical forests have still not recovered.