Risk Management Notes
Risk Management: Controlling Risk In Information Security
Risk Plan
A risk plan involves:
Assessing risks
Identifying hazards
Evaluating risks l
Reviewing risks
Implementing controls
Monitoring risks
Controlling risks
Risk Assessment
Information risks are the combination of likelihood and impact of threats to the confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability of information.
Cyber risk is the likelihood of suffering negative disruption to sensitive data, finances, or business operations.
Cyber risk can be calculated as: or
Risk assessment (as defined by the NIST) is used to identify, estimate, and prioritize risk to organizational operation
Why Risk Management?
Risk Management should answer these questions:
What constitutes sensitive information?
Where is it located?
How much of it is there?
How effectively is it protected?
What are the vulnerabilities that could lead to compromise?
What is the likelihood of compromise?
What is the potential impact?
What is the most effective use of protection resources?
The Purpose of Risk Management
Ensure overall business and business assets are safe
Protect against competitive disadvantage
Compliance with laws and best business practices
Maintain a good public reputation
Avoid data breaches
Reduction of long-term costs
Avoid regulatory issues
Prevent data loss
Security Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is fundamental to the security of any organization.
It is essential in ensuring that controls and expenditure are fully commensurate with the risks to which the organization is exposed.
Security in any system should be based on its risks.
The process to determine which security controls are appropriate and cost effective, is quite often a complex and sometimes a subjective matter.
Risk Analysis
One of the prime functions of security risk analysis is to put this process onto a more objective basis.
There are two types to risk analysis: quantitative and qualitative.
Quantitative Risk Analysis
This approach employs two fundamental elements: the probability of an event occurring and the likely loss should it occur.
Quantitative risk analysis makes use of a single figure produced from these elements, called the 'Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE)' or the 'Estimated Annual Cost (EAC)'.
ALE Calculation: Calculated for an event by simply multiplying the potential loss by the probability.
It is thus theoretically possible to rank events in order of risk (ALE) and to make decisions based upon this.
Problems with Quantitative Risk Analysis
The problems with this type of risk analysis are usually associated with the unreliability and inaccuracy of the data.
Probability can rarely be precise and can, in some cases, promote complacency.
Controls and countermeasures often tackle a number of potential events, and the events themselves are frequently interrelated.
A number of organizations have successfully adopted quantitative risk analysis.
Qualitative Risk Analysis
This is by far the most widely used approach to risk analysis.
Probability is not required, and only estimated potential loss is used.
Most qualitative risk analysis methodologies make use of a number of interrelated elements: THREATS, VULNERABILITIES, CONTROLS
Qualitative Risk Analysis Elements: Threats
THREATS: These are things that can go wrong or that can 'attack' the system. Examples might include fire or fraud. Threats are ever present for every system.
Qualitative Risk Analysis Elements: Vulnerabilities
VULNERABILITIES: These make a system more prone to attack by a threat or make an attack more likely to have some success or impact.
For example, for fire, a vulnerability would be the presence of inflammable materials (e.g., paper).
Qualitative Risk Analysis Elements: Controls
CONTROLS: These are the countermeasures for vulnerabilities. There are four types:
Deterrent controls reduce the likelihood of a deliberate attack
Preventative controls protect vulnerabilities and make an attack unsuccessful or reduce its impact
Corrective controls reduce the effect of an attack
Detective controls discover attacks and trigger preventative or corrective controls.
Relational Model of Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Controls
Depicts the relationships between threats, vulnerabilities, controls, and their impact.
THREAT: Creates likelihood of ATTACK.
VULNERABILITY: Exploited by ATTACK, results in IMPACT.
DETERRENT CONTROL: Reduces likelihood of ATTACK.
PREVENTATIVE CONTROL: Protects VULNERABILITY, reduces IMPACT.
DETECTIVE CONTROL: Discovers ATTACK, triggers controls.
CORRECTIVE CONTROL: Reduces IMPACT.
Risk Assessment Business Objectives
Focus on key assets
Protect against likely threats
Prioritize future actions
Balance cost with benefits
Identify / Justify appropriate controls
Risk Assessment Positive Factors
Enables security risks to be managed
Maximizes cost effectiveness
Safeguards information assets
Enables IT risks to be taken more safely
Risks
Unauthorised or accidental disclosure
Unauthorised or accidental modification
Unavailability of facilities / services
Destruction of assets
Risk Impact
Monetary losses
Loss of personal privacy
Loss of commercial confidentiality
Legal actions
Public embarrassment
Danger to personal safety
Risk Control Strategy
Risk prevention
Reduction of impact
Reduction of likelihood
Early detection
Recovery
Risk transfer
Risk Assessment Recap
Risk Assessment is a business requirement
Risk Assessment is part of overall security management
Can be complex
Methods exist
Approach must suit your organisation
The Benefits of Security Risk Analysis
Cost Justification
Productivity: Audit/Review Savings
Breaking Barriers - Business Relationships
Self-Analysis
Security Awareness
Targeting Of Security
'Baseline' Security and Policy
Consistency
Communication
Cost Justification
Additional security almost always involves additional expense. As this does not directly generate income, it should always be justified in financial terms.
The Risk Analysis process should directly and automatically generate justification for security recommendations in business terms.
Productivity: Audit/Review Savings
A Risk Analysis program should enhance the productivity of the security or audit team.
By creating a review structure, formalizing a review, and utilizing "self-analysis" features, much more productive use of time is possible. The ability to 'build-in' expertise should also alleviate the need for expensive external security consultants.
Breaking Barriers - Business Relationships
Security should be addressed by both business management and IT staff.
Business management are responsible for decisions relating to the security risk/level that the enterprise is willing to accept.
IT management are responsible for decisions relating to specific controls and application
Risk Analysis should relate security directly to business issues.
Self-Analysis
The Risk Assessment system should be simple enough to enable its use without the need for particular security knowledge, or IT expertise.
This approach enables security to be driven into more areas and to become more devolved.
It enables security to become part of the enterprises culture, allowing business unit management to take more of the responsibility for ensuring an adequate and appropriate level of security.
Security Awareness
The widespread application of a risk assessment program, by actively involving all of staff, will increase security awareness within the enterprise.
Targeting Of Security
Security should be properly targeted and directly related to potential impacts, threats, and existing vulnerabilities
Risk Analysis promotes far better targeting and facilitates related decisions.
'Baseline' Security and Policy
Many enterprises require adherence to certain 'baseline' standards. This could be for a variety of reasons, such as legislation (e.g., Data Protection Act), enterprise policy, regulatory controls, etc.
The Risk Analysis methodology should support such requirements and enable rapid identification of any failings.
Consistency
A major benefit of the application of Risk Analysis is that it brings a consistent and objective approach to all security reviews. This not only applies across different applications but also different types of business systems.
Communication
By obtaining information from different parts of a business unit, a Risk Assessment aids communication and facilitates decision making.
There are also a number of other important, but less tangible, benefits to be accrued via the application of Risk Analysis
Steps of a Risk Management Plan
Step 1: Identify Risk
Step 2: Assess Risk
Step 3: Control Risk
Steps are similar regardless of context (InfoSec, Physical Security, Financial, etc.)
Asset Identification
Identify assets – “anything which needs to be protected” – of value to organization to meet its objectives
Tangible or intangible
In practice, try to identify significant assets
Draw on the expertise of people in relevant areas of the organization to identify key assets
Identify and interview such personnel
See checklists in various standards
Threat Identification
To identify threats or risks to assets ask:
Who or what could cause it harm?
How could this occur?
Threats are anything that hinders or prevents an asset providing appropriate levels of the key security services:
Confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability, authenticity and reliability
Assets may have multiple threats
Threat Sources
Threats may be
Natural “acts of god”
Man-made and either accidental or deliberate
Should consider human attackers
Motivation
Capability
Resources
Probability of attack
Deterrence
Any previous history of attack on the organization
Elements of Threat Identification
Depends on risk assessors experience
Uses a variety of sources
Natural threat chance from insurance stats
Lists of potential threats in standards, IT security surveys, info from governments
Tailored to organization’s environment
And any vulnerabilities in its IT systems
Vulnerability Identification
Identify exploitable flaws or weaknesses in the organization’s IT systems or processes
Hence determine the applicability and significance of threat to organization
Need combination of threat and vulnerability to create a risk to an asset
Again can use lists of potential vulnerabilities in standards etc
Risk Identification steps
The steps to risk identification are:
Identify your organization’s information assets
Classify and categorize assets into useful groups
Rank assets based on necessity to the organization
Risk Assessment steps
The steps to risk assessment are:
Identify threats and threat agents
Prioritize threats and threat agents
Assess vulnerabilities in the current InfoSec plan
Determine the risk of each threat
Where:
R = Risk
P = Probability of threat attack
V = Value of Information Asset
M = Mitigation by current controls
U = Uncertainty of vulnerability
Risk Control steps
The steps to risk control are:
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA)
Single Loss Expectancy (SLE)
Annualized Rate of Occurrence (ARO)
Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE)
Annual Cost of the Safeguard (ASG)
Feasibility Analysis
Organizational Feasibility
Operational Feasibility
Technical Feasibility
Political Feasibility
Risk Control Strategy Implementation
Risk Assessment - Single Loss Expectancy (SLE)
Expected monetary loss each time a risk occurs
Calculated by multiplying the asset value (AV) by exposure factor (EF)
The exposure factor is the percentage of asset value likely to be destroyed by a particular risk (% of asset affected)
Risk Assessment - Annualized Loss Expectancy (ALE)
Expected monetary loss over a one-year period
Multiply SLE by annualized rate of occurrence
Annualized rate of occurrence (ARO): probability that a risk will occur in a particular year
It can be calculated by multiplying the annual rate of occurrence (ARO) by single loss expectancy (SLE).
Example Calculation
Suppose that an asset is valued at $100,000, and the Exposure Factor (EF) for this asset is 25%.
The single loss expectancy (SLE) = 25% × $100,000 = $25,000.
Assume annual rate of occurrence = 1, then annualized loss expectancy = 1 × $25,000 = $25,000
Formulas
Where:
Asset Value = AV
Single loss expectancy = SLE
Exposure Factor = EF
Annualized loss expectancy = ALE
Annualized rate of occurrence = ARO
Cost-Benefit Analysis = CBA
Annual Cost of the Safeguard = ASG
Feasibility analysis
Organizational: Does the plan correspond to the organization’s objectives?
Operational: Will shareholders (users, managers, etc.) be able/willing to accept the plan?
Technical: Is the necessary technology owned or obtainable? Are our employees trained and if not can we afford to train them? Should we hire new employees?
Political: Can InfoSec department acquire the necessary budget and approval to implement the plan? Is the budget required justifiable?
Risk control Strategies
Defense
Transferal
Mitigation
Acceptance (Abandonment)
Termination
Risk Control Strategy: Defense
Defense: Prevent the exploitation of the system via application of policy, training/education, and technology. Preferably layered security (defense in depth)
Counter threats
Remove vulnerabilities from assess
Limit access to assets
Add protective safeguards
Risk Control Strategy: Transferal
Transferal: Shift risks to other areas or outside entities to handle
Can include:
Purchasing insurance
Outsourcing to other organizations
Implementing service contracts with providers
Revising deployment models
Risk Control Strategy: Mitigation
Mitigation: Creating plans and preparations to reduce the damage of threat actualization
Preparation should include:
Incidence Response Plan
Disaster Recovery Plan
Business Continuity Plan
Risk Control Strategy: Acceptance
Acceptance: Properly identifying and acknowledging risks, and choosing to not control them
Appropriate when:
The cost to protect an asset or assets exceeds the cost to replace it/them
When the probability of risk is very low and the asset is of low priority
Otherwise acceptance = negligence
Risk Control Strategy: Termination
Termination: Removing or discontinuing the information asset from the organization
Examples include:
Equipment disposal
Discontinuing a provided service
Firing an employee
Pros and Cons of each strategy
Strategy | Pros | Cons |
|---|---|---|
Defense | Preferred all-round approach | Expensive and laborious |
Transferal | Easy and effective | Dependence on external entities |
Mitigation | Effective when all else fails | Guarantees company loss |
Acceptance | Cheap and easy | Rarely appropriate, unsafe |
Termination | Relatively cheap and safe | Rarely appropriate, requires company loss |
Standard Approaches to Risk Management
U.S CERT’s Operationally Critical Threat Assessment Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) Methods (Original, OCTAVE-S, OCTAVE-Allegro)
ISO 27005 Standard for InfoSec Risk Management
NIST Risk Management Model
Microsoft Risk Management Approach
Jack A. Jones’ Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR)
Delphi Technique
Analyze Risks
Specify likelihood of occurrence of each identified threat to the asset given existing controls
Management, operational, technical processes, and procedures to reduce exposure of the organization to some risks
Specify consequence should threat occur
Hence derive overall risk rating for each threat:
In practice, very hard to determine exactly
Use qualitative not quantitative ratings for each
Aim to order resulting risks in order to treat them
Determine Likelihood Rating
Likelihood | Description |
|---|---|
1 Rare | May occur only in exceptional circumstances and may be deemed as “unlucky” or very unlikely. |
2 Unlikely | Could occur at some time but not expected given current controls, circumstances, and recent events. |
3 Possible | Might occur at some time, but just as likely as not. It may be difficult to control its occurrence due to external influences. |
4 Likely | Will probably occur in some circumstances, and one should not be surprised if it occurred. |
5 Almost Certain | Is expected to occur in most circumstances and certainly sooner or later. |
Determine Consequence Rating
Consequence | Expanded Definition |
|---|---|
Insignificant | Generally a result of a minor security breach in a single area. Impact is likely to last less than several days and requires only minor expenditure to rectify. |
Minor | Result of a security breach in one or two areas. Impact is likely to last less than a week but can be dealt with at the segment or project level without management intervention. Can generally be rectified within project or team resources. |
Moderate | Limited systemic (and possibly ongoing) security breaches. Impact is likely to last up to 2 weeks and generally requires management intervention. Will have ongoing compliance costs to overcome. |
Major | Ongoing systemic security breach. Impact will likely last 4-8 weeks and require significant management intervention and resources to overcome, and compliance costs are expected to be substantial. Loss of business or organizational outcomes is possible but not expected, especially if this is a once-off. |
Catastrophic | Major systemic security breach. Impact will last for 3 months or more and senior management will be required to intervene for the duration of the event to overcome shortcomings. Compliance costs are expected to be very substantial. Substantial public or political debate about and loss of confidence in the organization is likely. Possible criminal or disciplinary action is likely. |
Doomsday | Multiple instances of major systemic security breaches. Impact duration cannot be determined, and senior management will be required to place the company under voluntary administration or other form of major restructuring. Criminal proceedings against senior management are expected, and substantial loss of business and failure to meet organizational objectives is unavoidable. |
Determine Resultant Risk Consequences
Likelihood | Doomsday | Catastrophic | Major | Moderate | Minor | Insignificant |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Almost Certain | E | E | E | E | H | H |
Likely | E | E | E | H | H | M |
Possible | E | E | E | H | M | L |
Unlikely | E | E | H | M | L | L |
Rare | E | H | H | M | L | L |
Risk Level Description
Extreme (E): Will require detailed research and management planning at an executive/director level. Ongoing planning and monitoring will be required with regular reviews. Substantial adjustment of controls to manage the risk is expected, with costs possibly exceeding original forecasts.
High (H): Requires management attention, but management and planning can be left to senior project or team leaders. Ongoing planning and monitoring with regular reviews are likely, though adjustment of controls is likely to be met from within existing resources
Medium (M): Can be managed by existing specific monitoring and response procedures. Management by employees is suitable with appropriate monitoring and reviews.
Low (L): Can be managed through routine procedures.
Document in Risk Register and Evaluate Risks
Asset | Threat/ Vulnerability | Existing Controls | Likelihood | Consequence | Level of Risk | Risk Priority |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Internet Router | Outside Hacker attack | Admin password only | Possible | Moderate | High | 1 |
Destruction of Data Center | Accidental Fire or Flood | None (no disaster recovery plan) | Unlikely | Major | High | 2 |
Risk Treatment Judgement
If the Cost of Treatment is uneconomic so accept.
Risk Register (Example)
Asset | Threat/ Vulnerability | Existing Controls | Likelihood | Consequence | Level of Risk | Risk Priority |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Reliability and integrity of the SCADA nodes and network | Unauthorized modification of control system | layered firewalls & servers | Rare | Major | High | 1 |
Integrity of stored file and database information | Corruption, theft, loss of info | firewall, policies | Possible | Major | Extreme | 2 |
Availability and integrity of Financial System | Attacks/errors affecting system | firewall, policies | Possible | Moderate | High | 3 |
Availability and integrity of Procurement System | Attacks/errors affecting system | firewall, policies | Possible | Moderate | High | 4 |
Availability and integrity of Maintenance/ Production System | Attacks/errors affecting system | firewall, policies | Possible | Minor | Medium | 5 |
Availability, integrity, and confidentiality of mail services | Attacks/errors affecting system | firewall, ext mail gateway | Almost Certain | Minor | High | 6 |
Risk Assessment Methodology Overview
Step | Explanation |
|---|---|
Data Classification | Which data is considered sensitive? |
Data and Asset Inventory | Where is the sensitive data located, and which systems are used to manage it? |
Exposure Analysis | Which units/departments and systems handle the most sensitive and highest quantities of data? |
Threat Analysis | What are the various scenarios in which data may be compromised? |
Vulnerability Assessment | Analysis of vulnerabilities that could facilitate threats and expose assets? |
Controls Analysis | How is the data currently protected from threats? How are vulnerabilities mitigated? |
Cost-benefit Analysis | How should improvements be prioritized? |
Data classification
Start with the data classification policy.
Consider other potentially sensitive data, for example:
Student Info
SSN
Financial Info
Credit Card Info
Driver’s License
Protected Health Info
Academic Records
Employee / Faculty (HR) Info
SSN
Payroll Info
Driver’s License
Bank Account Info
Protected Health Info
Alumni and Donor Info
SSN
Credit Card Info
Driver’s License
Bank Account Info
Financial Data
University Finances
Point-of-Sale
Customer Credit Card Data
Physical Plant
Buildings, Facilities, Utilities
Grounds
Cyber Infrastructure
Access Info, Logs, LDAP
Other PII
Human Subject Research
Key Performance Indicators
Protected Health Info (PHI)
Info in Non-medical Systems
Intellectual Property
Courseware, Research, Papers, Books, Code
Library
Citation DB
Digital Full Text
Circulation
Data and asset inventory
Map the assets to data types and locations and attempt to roughly quantify the data
Exposure analysis
After completing the inventory exercise, identify the key assets and departments on which to focus.
Vulnerabilities Risk Assessment
Controls Assessment
Controls Threats
Assets (Apps, DBs, etc.)
Departments and Units
Regulations
Threat analysis
Select an appropriate threat model:
Malicious activity
Malfunction
Human error
Environmental
Controls analysis
Start at a high level and drill down.
For example, we examine:
Access Control
Encryption
Backup / Restore
Physical / Environmental Control
Monitoring
Documentation
Anti-Virus
Control Maturity Model
Stage | Description |
|---|---|
Stage 0: Nonexistent | Lack of any recognizable control process |
Stage 1: Initial/Ad Hoc | Some control exists, but it is not formalized or documented |
Stage 2: Repeatable but Intuitive | Controls exist, but they are not a formal part of a program |
Stage 3: Defined Process | Controls and related policies and procedures are in place and adequately documented. |
Stage 4: Managed and Measurable | Controls and related policies and procedures are in place, adequately documented, and measure for effectiveness. |
Stage 5: Optimized | Technology is leveraged to its fullest extent to document and implement processes, control objectives, and activities. |
Cost-Benefit Analysis
Review exposures, vulnerabilities, and potential impact
Create a list of remediation options
Estimate costs and compare with benefits
Outline security roadmap
Identify long-range plans
Highlight action items
Quick wins
High-priority exposures
Determine on-going risk assessment schedule
To revisit units and departments
Visit new units and departments
Drill down on areas that need further investigation and more detail