DIALOGUE Meta Ethics Article
Page 1: Understanding Meta-Ethics
Definition of Ethics: A sub-branch of philosophy that considers moral obligations, actions, and principles.
Normative Ethics: Examines what actions are required, permitted, or forbidden.
Applied Ethics: Addresses specific moral issues or problems.
Meta-Ethics: A second-order inquiry into the nature of ethical activity, focusing on what we do when making moral judgments and engaging in moral arguments.
Fundamental Questions of Meta-Ethics
What are the meanings of moral terms?
What mental states are involved in accepting moral claims?
Is there a moral reality? What are moral properties and facts?
Can ethical knowledge be obtained?
Areas of Concern within Meta-Ethics
Semantics of Moral Language: Meaning and function of moral terms; truth conditions.
Psychology of Morality: Relationship between beliefs, desires, and actions in moral claims.
Metaphysics of Morality: Existence and nature of moral properties and facts.
Epistemology of Morality: Justification and knowledge in moral claims.
Page 2: Meta-Ethical Positions
Variety of Responses: Different combinations of responses create complex meta-ethical positions.
Realism vs. Anti-Realism
Realism: There are moral facts and propositions whose truth is independent of human judgments.
Anti-Realism: Denies the existence of moral facts independent of human judgments.
Naturalism vs. Non-Naturalism
Naturalism: Moral properties are identical to natural properties.
Non-Naturalism: Moral properties are sui generis and of a special kind.
Page 3: Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism
Cognitivism: Moral judgements express beliefs that can be true or false.
Non-Cognitivism: Moral judgements express attitudes, not beliefs; they are not truth-apt.
Implications of Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism
Cognitivists view moral claims as similar to factual claims.
Non-cognitivists argue moral claims are expressions of emotions or desires.
Page 4: The Argument from Moral Psychology
Motivational Internalism: There is a connection between moral judgments and motivation.
According to Hume, motivations derive from pairs of beliefs and desires.
Challenges to Cognitivism: If moral judgments express beliefs, they should also be tied to desires, which is questioned.
What Non-Cognitivists Propose
Non-cognitivism suggests moral judgments are non-descriptive and project attitudes.
Varieties include emotivism and prescriptivism.
Page 5: Moral Realism
Core Claims of Moral Realism:
Moral judgements describe moral facts that exist independently.
Successful moral judgments state true moral propositions.
Justifications for Moral Realism
Ordinary moral practices reflect realist assumptions.
Examples:
Declarative nature of moral discourse.
The concept of moral knowledge.
Consistency in moral judgments across situations.
Page 6: The Naturalistic Fallacy and the Open Question Argument
G. E. Moore's Contribution: The distinction between properties (goodness) and instances of good things.
Open Question Argument: Questions about goodness are always open despite definitions.
Naturalistic Fallacy: Misunderstanding that moral properties can be defined by natural phenomena.
Page 7: Alternatives to Moral Realism
Expressivism: Denies moral judgments describe the world.
Error-Theory: Accepts that moral judgments aim to describe, but claims they are always false.
Moral Scepticism: Nihilism and quietism as alternatives.
Page 8: Understanding Expressivism
Core Concepts: Moral judgments express attitudes, not beliefs.
Varieties of Expressivism include emotivism and quasi-realism.
Language serves various functions besides description, impacting semantics.
Page 9: Emotivism Explained
A. J. Ayer & C. L. Stevenson: Defenders of emotivism arguing moral statements express emotional responses.
Verificationalist Argument: Moral statements cannot be true or false as they are not verifiable.
Critique of Ayer's Position: Challenges on meaningfulness and function of moral language.
Arguments for Emotivism: Focused on internalism, metaphysical simplicity, and semantic openness.