The explosions at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3 and Unit 4 and implications on the evaluation of 1F3 accident

Introduction

  • Investigates the explosions at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3 and Unit 4

  • Focus on understanding the explosion events during the accidents

Keywords

  • Hydrogen Fireball

  • Explosion

  • Fukushima Daiichi

  • BSAF

  • MELCOR

  • Severe accident

Overview of Explosions

  • Three explosions occurred during the nuclear accidents:

    • Unit 1 (1F1) at 3:36 PM on March 12, 2011

    • Unit 3 (1F3) at 11:01 AM on March 14, 2011

    • Unit 4 (1F4) at 6:14 AM on March 15, 2011

  • Videos of 1F1 and 1F3 show different explosion dynamics; 1F4 remains unknown due to lack of video.

Hydrogen Generation Estimates

  • Total hydrogen equivalent needed for 1F3 explosion estimated at 1450 kg (after rounding).

  • For both 1F3 and 1F4 explosions combined, approximately 2100-2400 kg of hydrogen equivalent must be generated.

  • Estimate suggests that 71.3~81.5% of potential hydrogen sources could have contributed.

Methodology for Estimating Combustible Gases

  • Estimation based on:

    • Hydrocarbon-based explosion database

    • Empirical correlations predicting fireball size of hydrocarbon fuel explosions

  • Fireball explosion data should supplement severe accident analyses.

Explosion Dynamics

  • Notable dynamics for each explosion:

    • 1F1: Fast deflagration; approx. 130 kg of hydrogen burned at about 8-9% concentration.

    • 1F3: More powerful mushroom-shaped fireball lasting over 9 seconds; characterized by multi-mode combustion including notable convection.

  • 1F4 likely a similar deflagration to 1F1 but specifics remain unclear.

Conditions Leading to Explosions

  • Three time windows identified for gas migration from drywell to the reactor building:

    1. 5-hour period during the second water injection (drywell pressure > 4 bars)

    2. 3-hour period during the third unsuccessful venting

    3. 4-hour period during the fourth unsuccessful venting

  • Investigates factors for the 1F3 explosion including:

    1. Pre-explosion ignition conditions

    2. Contribution of H2 from vented gas during 1F3 venting

    3. Role of PCV head failure during the explosion

In-Vessel and Ex-Vessel Hydrogen Generation

  • In-vessel hydrogen from metal oxidation and ex-vessel hydrogen generation during core-concrete interactions critical for explosions.

  • Must analyze gas generation rates related to timing of vessel failures to understand explosion phenomena better.

Comparison with BSAF Phase 2 Study

  • BSAF Phase 2 comparison shows variability in hydrogen generation across organizations:

    • Ranges: 600 kg to 1220 kg (in-vessel) and 0 kg to 1200 kg (ex-vessel)

    • Total generation estimates range from 600 kg to 2420 kg.

  • One analysis closely aligns with the estimated value.

Conclusion

  • Explosions at Fukushima Daiichi were significantly influenced by combustible gases derived from hydrogen generation.

  • Understanding these explosions provides insights into severe reactor core meltdown accidents within BWR design.

  • Emphasizes improvements required in accident analysis models, particularly relating to hydrogen production mechanisms.

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