Week 2 lecture reading notes GVPT354 - Moral Philosophy of War and International Humanitarian Law Lazar and ICRC readings - 9/9/26

Conceptual Frameworks: Realism, Pacifism, and Just War Theory

  • Realism: Asserts that moral standards do not apply once armed conflict commences ("once the guns strike up"). Realists view international conflict as a realm governed purely by power, political interest, and necessity rather than moral evaluation.

  • Pacifism: Holds that no plausible moral theory could ever license or justify the exceptional horrors, destruction, and intentional killing inherent in warfare. Pacifists maintain that war is intrinsically immoral.

  • Just War Theory: Seeks a normative middle path between realism and pacifism (Ramsey 19611961). Its dual purpose is to justify certain exceptional uses of military force while imposing strict normative limits on how war is initiated and conducted. It acknowledges the real possibility that a fully justified war might ultimately be a chimera.

Methodological Schisms in Contemporary Analytical Philosophy of War

  • Historical vs. Contemporary Analytic Approaches:

    • Historical Just War Theory: Examines the historical evolution of war ethics from early civilizations through scholastic thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas to early modern writers on regular war (Cox 20162016; Kalmanovitz 20162016; Reichberg 20162016; Schwartz 20162016).

    • Contemporary Analytical Just War Theory: Applies formal analytical tools, normative deontology, consequentialism, and contractualism to assess modern warfare.

  • Institutionalist vs. Interactional Approaches:

    • Institutionalist Approach: Focuses on establishing morally justified institutions and legal codes—specifically the laws of armed conflict (LOAC)—and directing agents to obey them (Lazar and Valentini forthcoming).

    • Indirect Consequentialism: Justifies legal institutions if they maximize good long-term outcomes relative to feasible alternatives (Mavrodes 19751975; Dill and Shue 20122012; Shue 20132013; Waldron 20162016).

    • Contractualism: Views legal institutions as reflecting an actual or hypothetical contract among states and citizens specifying terms of interaction in war (Benbaji 20082008, 20112011, 20142014; Statman 20142014).

    • Interactional Approach: Focuses directly on the extra-institutional moral reasons governing individual and group actions. Typically favored by direct/act-consequentialists and non-contractualist deontologists.

    • The Central Heuristic of Killing: Interactional theory uses killing as a heuristic device because killing is the most presumptively wrongful harm; arguments justifying killing necessarily justify lesser harms.

    • The All-Things-Considered Conflict: Addresses how individuals morally ought to act when institutional legal rules directly conflict with extra-institutional moral duties (McMahan 20082008; Lazar 2012a2012\text{a}).

  • Empirical/Realistic Scenarios vs. Abstract/Artificial Hypotheticals:

    • Methodological Spectrum: Analytic philosophers range from using real historical conflicts to sanitized hypothetical scenarios (trolleys, mind-control, meteorites, armed pedestrians).

    • Abstraction Benefits: Forestalls unhelpful disputes over historical facts and eliminates political allegiance biases.

    • Abstraction Costs: Epistemically unsound when removed from real-world experience; omits critical operational factors such as fear, trauma, and the "fog of war"; risks showing disrespect to actual victims of war.

  • Reductivism vs. Exceptionalism (Non-Reductivism):

    • Reductivism: Claims that killing in war must be justified by the exact same moral principles that govern individual self-defence and third-party defence in daily life (Rodin 20022002; McMahan 2004a2004\text{a}). War is viewed as a mere aggregate of individual actions.

    • Exceptionalism (Non-Reductivism): Maintains that war possesses unique normative features—such as scale, widespread non-compliance, existential political interests, acute uncertainty, LOAC structures, and collective agency—that create distinct moral rules (Zohar 19931993; Kutz 20052005; Benbaji 20082008; Dill and Shue 20122012).

  • Individualism vs. Collectivism:

    • Evaluative Individualism vs. Collectivism: Evaluative individualists reduce a collective's moral significance entirely to its members' individual well-being. Evaluative collectivists argue collectives possess independent moral value (e.g., instantiating impersonal values like justice or solidarity; Temkin 19931993).

    • Descriptive Individualism vs. Collectivism: Descriptive individualists reduce collective acts to individual action components. Descriptive collectivists maintain that certain social acts are irreducibly collective (Kutz 20052005; Walzer 20062006; Lazar 2012b2012\text{b}).

The Central Debate: Traditionalists vs. Revisionists

  • Traditionalists (Legalists):

    • Grounding: Led primarily by international law and LOAC, seeking to give existing legal norms morally sound foundations.

    • War Permissibility: Only states possess the right to wage war, restricted to national defence, defence of allies, or humanitarian intervention against "crimes that shock the moral conscience of mankind" (Walzer 20062006: 107107).

    • Combatant Equality: All combatants possess equal moral rights to target enemy combatants regardless of whether their cause is just, provided they adhere to jus in bello principles.

    • Foundations: Anchored by Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars (19771977) and codified in Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I (19771977).

  • Revisionists:

    • Grounding: Question the independent moral standing of states and challenge state-centric frameworks.

    • Moral Asymmetry: Reject combatant equality. Combatants fighting for unjust causes (unjust combatants) cannot act permissibly by fighting; their only moral obligation is to lay down their arms.

    • Scope of Justification: Expand permissions for humanitarian intervention, problematize civilian immunity, and question the moral authority of national defence against bloodless aggression.

    • Factions: Moral revisionists argue that individuals should follow moral conscience over LOAC in cases of conflict; legal revisionists demand substantive changes to international law itself.

    • Key Revisionist Theorists: Luban (1980a1980\text{a}, 1980b1980\text{b}), Holmes (19891989), McMahan (19941994, 2004b2004\text{b}, 20092009), Norman (19951995), Rodin (20022002), McPherson (20042004), Arneson (20062006), Fabre (20092009, 20122012).

The Framework of Jus ad Bellum: Requisites for Resorting to War

  • Categorical Temporal Divisions:

    • Jus ad bellum: Permissibility of resorting to war as a whole.

    • Jus in bello: Permissibility of specific acts conducted within war.

    • Jus post bellum: Permissibility of post-war actions, settlements, and reconstruction.

    • Jus ex bello / Jus terminatio: Normative principles governing war termination and exit (Moellendorf 20082008; Rodin 2008a2008\text{a}).

  • The Six Traditional Ad Bellum Criteria:

    1. Just Cause: Averting a sufficiently severe injury or threat.

    2. Legitimate Authority: Waged by an entity possessing proper authorization to wage war.

    3. Right Intention: Intending solely to achieve the just cause rather than ulterior motives.

    4. Reasonable Prospects of Success: Adequate probability of achieving intended aims.

    5. Proportionality: Morally weighted goods achieved outweigh morally weighted harms inflicted.

    6. Last Resort (Necessity): Absence of less harmful feasible alternative means to achieve the just cause.

  • Centrality of Necessity and Proportionality:

    • Structural Function: Necessity and Proportionality operate as the overarching necessary conditions for permissibility. Lacking other criteria (e.g., legitimate authority) simply adds moral bads that necessity and proportionality calculations must outweigh.

    • Comparative Framework: Proportionality compares candidate actions against the counterfactual scenario of doing nothing (allowing the threat to eventuate). Necessity compares a candidate action against all available alternative options that mitigate or avert the threat.

    • Subsumption: If necessity is expanded to evaluate all options including doing nothing, necessity subsumes proportionality.

    • Ex-Ante Decision-Making Under Uncertainty: Evaluated using expected threats and expected harms, calculated via probability-weighted averages of potential outcomes (Lazar 2012b2012\text{b}).

    • Moral Weighting Factors: Harms are weighted based on direct agent responsibility, intentional vs. foreseen harm, partiality toward co-citizens or loved ones (Hurka 20072007; Lazar 20132013; vs. Lefkowitz 20092009), and state self-determination.

  • Empirical Scale of Destruction in War:

    • Iraq War (20032003): Caused approximately 500 000500\,000 direct and indirect deaths in its initial 88 years (Hagopian et al. 20132013).

    • Second World War: Resulted in over 60×10660 \times 10^6 direct casualties, representing approximately 3%3\% of the global population.

    • US Military Energy Use (2000–20132000\text{--}2013): The US Department of Defense consumed 80%80\% of all US federal government energy (0.75×1015 BTU0.75 \times 10^{15}\,\text{BTU} to 1.0×1015 BTU1.0 \times 10^{15}\,\text{BTU} per year), exceeding the total national energy consumption of Denmark, Bulgaria, Serbia, or Slovakia (Energy Information Administration 2015a2015\text{a}, 2015b2015\text{b}).

    • Environmental Impact: Extensive habitat destruction and pollution, exemplified by the Gulf War oil spill (El-Baz and Makharita 19941994).

  • Deep Analysis of Ad Bellum Requirements:

    • Just Cause:

    • Traditional Just Causes: Limited strictly to national self-defence (or defence of allies) and humanitarian intervention against extreme atrocities.

    • Grounding Sovereignty: Walzer grounds state sovereignty in individual human rights: providing physical security within borders, protecting a common communal life built over centuries, and upholding political self-determination.

    • The Bloodless Invasion Objection: Formulated by David Rodin (20022002). If an aggressing army occupies a state without loss of life if no resistance is offered, grounding defensive rights solely in individual security implies the victim state lacks a right to fight back. Resolving this requires appealing to deterrence, risks of unexpected escalation (Fabre 20142014), aggregated political interests (Hurka 20072007; Frowe 20142014), or group rights to self-determination above a population threshold (Margalit and Raz 19901990).

    • Humanitarian Intervention vs. Adventurism: Walzer requires a higher burden of proof for humanitarian intervention because it infringes state sovereignty. Revisionists argue that states failing to protect member security lose sovereign protection against intervention (Shue 19971997; Caney 20052005). However, low intervention bars risk imperialist military adventurism (Kutz 20142014).

    • Redistributive Wars and Resource Wars: Theoretical proposals for redistributive wars on behalf of the global poor (Luban 1980b1980\text{b}; Fabre 20122012; Lippert-Rasmussen 20132013; Øverland 20132013) fail practical necessity and proportionality tests because military force exacerbates poverty (Benbaji 20142014). However, climate-driven resource scarcities may increase the future salience of resource wars.

    • Just Peace: Ad bellum proportionality must factor long-term post-war consequences far beyond the initial armistice (Bass 20042004; Coady 20082008; May 20122012).

    • Legitimate Authority:

    • Statism vs. Revisionist Individualism: Statists restrict war rights to recognized sovereign states. Revisionists argue defensive rights derive directly from individual human rights without requiring state mediation (Fabre 20082008; Finlay 20102010; Schwenkenbecher 20132013).

    • Authorization vs. State Legitimacy: Proper authorization by a polity is more fundamental than overall state legitimacy (Lazar forthcoming-b; Estlund 20072007; Renzo 20132013). Unauthorized government warfare commits a serious independent moral wrong by subjecting citizens to unchosen moral and prudential risks.

    • Proportionality Ad Bellum:

    • Partiality: States are entitled to weight their own citizens' political interests more heavily than those of foreign citizens.

    • Excluded Goods: Conditional reasons (such as fulfilling military oaths or contractual duties) cannot count as positive goods to make an otherwise disproportionate war proportionate, as they presuppose the decision to fight (Lazar 2015b2015\text{b}).

    • Last Resort (Necessity):

    • Pre-emptive vs. Preventive War: Pre-emptive action addresses an imminent attack; preventive action addresses potential long-term threat development (Shue and Rodin 20072007; US National Security Strategy 20022002). While preventive war may satisfy last resort theoretically, strict international law prohibitions remain necessary to prevent routine aggressive abuse (Buchanan and Keohane 20042004; Luban 20042004).

The Framework of Jus in Bello: Conducting Hostilities Justly

  • The Three In Bello Principles:

    1. Discrimination: Targeting noncombatants is strictly prohibited.

    2. Proportionality: Collateral harm to noncombatants is permissible only if not excessive relative to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

    3. Necessity: Belligerents must employ the least harmful feasible military means to achieve their objectives.

  • Categorical Definitions:

    • Combatants: Members of organized armed forces, individuals with a continuous combat function, or persons directly participating in hostilities (Haque 20172017).

    • Noncombatants: All individuals who are not combatants (civilians).

  • Walzer's Rights-Forfeiture Model:

    • Combatant Rights Loss: Combatants lose their rights to life and liberty simply by posing a threat or joining armed forces ("allowing oneself to be made into a dangerous man"; Walzer 20062006).

    • Noncombatant Immunity: Civilians retain their rights intact and cannot be targeted for military goals.

    • Supreme Emergencies: Circumstances where intentional targeting of noncombatants is permissibly overridden to avert impending catastrophic collapse, such as Nazism in Europe (Bellamy 20042004; Statman 20062006).

  • Critiques of Combatant Equality and Rights Forfeiture:

    • Asymmetry of Just Objectives: Military success by unjust combatants inflicts evil rather than averting it; therefore, collateral civilian harm caused by unjust combatants can never be proportionate (McMahan 19941994; Rodin 20022002; Hurka 20052005; Lee 20122012).

    • Flaws in Threat-Based Rights Loss: Posing a threat in pursuit of a just cause (e.g., Kurdish Peshmerga defending Yazidis against ISIL) does not void one's natural right to life (McMahan 19941994, 20092009).

    • Invalidation of Consent: Just combatants do not waive their rights to be killed by unjust adversaries.

  • Noncombatant Responsibility and Discrimination:

    • Citizen Contributions: Industrialized populations contribute significantly to war capacity (25%25\% of populations work in war-related industries; Downes 20062006: 157–158157\text{--}158; Gross 20102010: 159159; Valentino et al. 20102010: 351351) via taxes, war production, and democratic voting.

    • Non-Firing Combatants: S. L. A. Marshall's (19781978) research revealed that only 15%15\% to 25%25\% of WWII Allied combatants fired weapons at the enemy. Grossman (19951995) documented a profound psychological aversion to killing in most humans. Many combatants contribute no more threat than typical civilians.

  • The Responsibility Dilemma (Lazar 20102010):

    • High Threshold Choice: If liability requires high individual moral responsibility for a wrongful threat to preserve civilian immunity, many combatants are non-liable. Intentionally killing non-liable combatants leads directly to Contingent Pacifism (May 20152015).

    • Low Threshold Choice: If liability requires minimal causal responsibility for a threat to cover all unjust combatants, millions of civilians become liable targets, destroying Discrimination and leading to Realism.

Theoretical Solutions to the Responsibility Dilemma

  • All-Out Revisionist Solutions:

    • False Belief Responsibility: Argues unjust combatants forfeit rights by causing just combatants to reasonably believe they are liable (McMahan 2011a2011\text{a}), or via complicity and collective responsibility (Kamm 20042004; Bazargan 20132013).

    • Critique: Analogy to a prankster acting like a suicide bomber (Ferzan 20052005; McMahan 2005c2005\text{c}; Lazar 2015a2015\text{a}). Blameless responsibility for false beliefs cannot render killing objectively permissible.

  • Moderate Traditionalist Solutions:

    • Moral Distinction Principle: Asserts that killing noncombatants is intrinsically worse than killing combatants, even when both are non-liable.

    • Conditional Rights Waiver: Combatants offer a limited conditional waiver by wearing uniforms and operating openly to draw fire away from civilians. If adversaries refuse to lay down arms, they act better by targeting combatants rather than civilians (Lazar 20132013, 2015c2015\text{c}; Pettit 20152015).

    • Lesser-Evil Permissions: Killing innocent combatants is easier to justify as a lesser evil than killing innocent civilians. Unjust combatants achieving defensive or protective outcomes may act permissibly on lesser-evil grounds without establishing combatant equality.

  • All-Out Traditionalist / Institutionalist Solutions:

    • Contractualist Account: States and citizens benefit from mutual agreements allowing armies to obey state orders without evaluating war justice; combatants waive rights via optimal legal contracts (Benbaji 20082008, 20112011).

    • Democratic Obedience: Duty to obey democratic military orders stems from state epistemic authority (Estlund 20072007; Renzo 20132013) and civilian control of armed forces (Ryan 20112011; Raz 19851985).

    • Long-Term Utility / Horror Minimization: Strict adherence to traditional LOAC minimizes total long-term wrongful deaths amidst self-deception and war fog (Shue 20082008, 20102010, 20132013; Dill and Shue 20122012; Waldron 20162016; Roberts 20082008).

The Moral Distinction and Foundations for Sparing Civilians

  • Four Foundations of Moral Distinction (Lazar 2015c2015\text{c}):

    1. Necessity: Intentionally targeting civilians is rarely necessary and often wanton. Pointless civilian killing demonstrates total moral contempt. Examples of civilian targeting include the WWI German blockade (500 000500\,000 deaths), Chechnya bombardment (Lyall 20092009), Taliban operations, and urban attacks in Mumbai and Paris.

    2. Opportunistic vs. Eliminative Harm: Combatants are killed eliminatively (removing a threat posed by the person). Civilians are killed opportunistically (using civilian suffering instrumentally to coerce government policy; Quinn 19891989; Frowe 20082008; Quong 20092009; Tadros 20112011).

    3. Epistemic Justification: Killing individuals while knowing the act is objectively wrong is worse than killing under reasonable beliefs of permissibility (Lazar 2015a2015\text{a}).

    4. Vulnerability and Defencelessness: Moral duties to protect vulnerable and defenceless innocent individuals heighten the wrongfulness of civilian harm relative to combatant harm (e.g., Highway of Death, Iraq 19911991).

  • In Bello Proportionality and Intentions:

    • Intended vs. Unintended Harms: Grounded in the Doctrine of Double Effect (Quinn 19891989; Rickless 19971997; McIntyre 20012001; Delaney 20062006; Thomson 20082008; Tadros 20152015).

    • Involuntary Human Shields: ISIL operating within civilian zones in Raqqa. Faulting defenders for human shielding (Walzer 20092009; Keinon 20142014) risks unfairly reducing civilian rights protections without individual voluntary action or using civilians instrumentally for deterrence (Smilansky 20102010).

  • In Bello Necessity and Force Protection:

    • Force Protection Balances: Combatants must bear operational risks to minimize civilian casualties up to reasonable limits (Geneva Convention Protocol I Article 57(2)(a)(ii)57(2)(a)(ii); Walzer and Margalit 20092009; McMahan 2010b2010\text{b}; Luban 20142014).

Statutory Provisions and Treaties of International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

  • Definition and Foundations:

    • Scope: A set of public international law rules seeking to limit armed conflict effects for humanitarian reasons. Regulates conduct during conflict (jus in bello). Also termed "the law of war" or "the law of armed conflict".

    • Distinction from Jus ad Bellum: Public international law under the UN Charter prohibits interstate force except for self-defence (Article 5151) or UN Security Council authorization. IHL applies neutrally once conflict begins, regardless of cause or legitimacy.

    • Sources: Treaties, customary international law, and general legal principles (Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 3838).

    • Historical Milestones: 1864 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field; 1868 Declaration of Saint Petersburg (prohibiting specific explosive projectiles).

  • Core IHL Treaties:

    • The Four Geneva Conventions of 19491949 (Universally Ratified):

    • Geneva Convention I (GC I): Wounded and sick in armed forces in the field.

    • Geneva Convention II (GC II): Wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea.

    • Geneva Convention III (GC III): Prisoners of war (POWs).

    • Geneva Convention IV (GC IV): Protection of civilians and "protected persons" (nationals in enemy/occupying hands, stateless persons, IDPs, refugees, journalists).

    • Additional Protocols:

    • Additional Protocol I (19771977 - AP I): Protection of victims in international armed conflicts, including self-determination wars against colonial domination, alien occupation, and racist regimes.

    • Additional Protocol II (19771977 - AP II): Protection of victims in non-international armed conflicts meeting specific intensity and organizational thresholds (excluding internal disturbances, riots, or sporadic acts of violence).

    • Additional Protocol III (20052005 - AP III): Adoption of the Red Crystal distinctive emblem.

  • Specialized Treaties Prohibiting Weapons and Methods:

    • Gas Protocol (19251925): Prohibition of asphyxiating, poisonous gases and bacteriological methods.

    • Cultural Property Convention (19541954) and its 19541954 and 19991999 Protocols.

    • Biological Weapons Convention (19721972 - BWC).

    • Environmental Modification Convention (19761976 - ENMOD).

    • Certain Conventional Weapons Convention (19801980 - CCW) and Protocols I--V (including Protocol IV 19951995 Blinding Laser Weapons, Protocol V 20032003 Explosive Remnants of War).

    • Chemical Weapons Convention (19931993 - CWC).

    • Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (19971997 - APMBC / Ottawa Treaty).

    • Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict (20002000).

    • Enforced Disappearance Convention (20062006).

    • Convention on Cluster Munitions (20082008 - CCM).

  • Customary International Humanitarian Law:

    • Binds all states and non-state armed groups.

    • 20052005 ICRC Customary IHL Study demonstrated that customary law provides extensive protections in non-international armed conflicts where treaty rules are limited.

  • Conflict Classification and Operational Scope:

    • Application: Appraised factually on the ground; applies equally to all belligerents.

    • International Armed Conflict (IAC): State vs. state, military occupation, or self-determination wars under AP I.

    • Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC): Government vs. non-state group, or non-state groups fighting each other. Requires minimum organizational structure and combat intensity.

    • Double Classification: Situations containing coexisting IAC and NIAC dimensions, handled via parallel application.

  • Mandatory Protections and Emblems:

    • Core Safeguards: Humane treatment without adverse distinction; strict prohibitions on murder, torture, and reprisals.

    • Differentiated Care: Mandatory specific measures targeting special vulnerabilities of women, children, and persons with disabilities.

    • Protective Emblems: Red Cross, Red Crescent, Red Crystal, and Red Lion and Sun (historical). Used for protective purposes (medical/religious units) and indicative purposes (Red Cross Movement ties).

ICRC vehicle displaying Red Cross protective emblem viewed through a damaged barrier
  • Operational Hostility Restrictions:

    • Core Principles: Distinction (civilians/objects vs. combatants/military objectives), Proportionality (direct and indirect/reverberating collateral harm balance), and Precaution (active precautions in attack, passive precautions protecting civilian areas).

    • Prohibited Tactics: Starvation, perfidy (AP I Article 37(1)37(1)), giving no quarter, widespread long-term severe environmental damage, and targeting dangerous forces (dams, dykes, nuclear power plants).

Implementation Mechanisms, Enforcement, and Future Directions

  • State Implementation Responsibilities:

    • Duty to Respect and Ensure Respect: Mandatory under Common Article 11 of the Geneva Conventions.

    • Penal Legislation: Enacting national laws penalizing "grave breaches" (war crimes).

    • Administrative Measures: Dissemination through military instruction, recruiting legal advisors, issuing emblem protection legislation, and generating identity cards.

  • Statutory Compliance and Enforcement Mechanisms:

    • Institutional Procedures: Protecting powers system, official enquiry procedures, and the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission (AP I Article 9090).

    • International Criminal Tribunals: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (19981998 - ICC) operating on complementarity (Article 88 war crimes); ad hoc tribunals (ICTY for former Yugoslavia, ICTR for Rwanda); hybrid courts (Cambodia, Lebanon, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste).

  • IHL vs. International Human Rights Law (IHRL):

    • Scope: IHRL applies continuously during peacetime and armed conflict (subject to statutory derogations); IHL applies strictly during armed conflict.

  • Emerging Frontiers in Warfare Philosophy:

    • Technological Warfare: Normative evaluation of targeted drone strikes and Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS).

    • Non-State/Asymmetric Conflicts: Resolving legitimate authority and discrimination challenges in irregular civil wars (Parry 20162016).

    • Post-War Duties: Developing comprehensive jus post bellum frameworks governing post-conflict justice, liability, and reconstruction.

    • Group Agency and Moral Collectivism: Analyzing group agency, collective liability, and individual representation in collective action (List and Pettit 20112011; Lazar 2012b2012\text{b}).