Week 2 lecture reading notes GVPT354 - Moral Philosophy of War and International Humanitarian Law Lazar and ICRC readings - 9/9/26
Conceptual Frameworks: Realism, Pacifism, and Just War Theory
Realism: Asserts that moral standards do not apply once armed conflict commences ("once the guns strike up"). Realists view international conflict as a realm governed purely by power, political interest, and necessity rather than moral evaluation.
Pacifism: Holds that no plausible moral theory could ever license or justify the exceptional horrors, destruction, and intentional killing inherent in warfare. Pacifists maintain that war is intrinsically immoral.
Just War Theory: Seeks a normative middle path between realism and pacifism (Ramsey ). Its dual purpose is to justify certain exceptional uses of military force while imposing strict normative limits on how war is initiated and conducted. It acknowledges the real possibility that a fully justified war might ultimately be a chimera.
Methodological Schisms in Contemporary Analytical Philosophy of War
Historical vs. Contemporary Analytic Approaches:
Historical Just War Theory: Examines the historical evolution of war ethics from early civilizations through scholastic thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas to early modern writers on regular war (Cox ; Kalmanovitz ; Reichberg ; Schwartz ).
Contemporary Analytical Just War Theory: Applies formal analytical tools, normative deontology, consequentialism, and contractualism to assess modern warfare.
Institutionalist vs. Interactional Approaches:
Institutionalist Approach: Focuses on establishing morally justified institutions and legal codes—specifically the laws of armed conflict (LOAC)—and directing agents to obey them (Lazar and Valentini forthcoming).
Indirect Consequentialism: Justifies legal institutions if they maximize good long-term outcomes relative to feasible alternatives (Mavrodes ; Dill and Shue ; Shue ; Waldron ).
Contractualism: Views legal institutions as reflecting an actual or hypothetical contract among states and citizens specifying terms of interaction in war (Benbaji , , ; Statman ).
Interactional Approach: Focuses directly on the extra-institutional moral reasons governing individual and group actions. Typically favored by direct/act-consequentialists and non-contractualist deontologists.
The Central Heuristic of Killing: Interactional theory uses killing as a heuristic device because killing is the most presumptively wrongful harm; arguments justifying killing necessarily justify lesser harms.
The All-Things-Considered Conflict: Addresses how individuals morally ought to act when institutional legal rules directly conflict with extra-institutional moral duties (McMahan ; Lazar ).
Empirical/Realistic Scenarios vs. Abstract/Artificial Hypotheticals:
Methodological Spectrum: Analytic philosophers range from using real historical conflicts to sanitized hypothetical scenarios (trolleys, mind-control, meteorites, armed pedestrians).
Abstraction Benefits: Forestalls unhelpful disputes over historical facts and eliminates political allegiance biases.
Abstraction Costs: Epistemically unsound when removed from real-world experience; omits critical operational factors such as fear, trauma, and the "fog of war"; risks showing disrespect to actual victims of war.
Reductivism vs. Exceptionalism (Non-Reductivism):
Reductivism: Claims that killing in war must be justified by the exact same moral principles that govern individual self-defence and third-party defence in daily life (Rodin ; McMahan ). War is viewed as a mere aggregate of individual actions.
Exceptionalism (Non-Reductivism): Maintains that war possesses unique normative features—such as scale, widespread non-compliance, existential political interests, acute uncertainty, LOAC structures, and collective agency—that create distinct moral rules (Zohar ; Kutz ; Benbaji ; Dill and Shue ).
Individualism vs. Collectivism:
Evaluative Individualism vs. Collectivism: Evaluative individualists reduce a collective's moral significance entirely to its members' individual well-being. Evaluative collectivists argue collectives possess independent moral value (e.g., instantiating impersonal values like justice or solidarity; Temkin ).
Descriptive Individualism vs. Collectivism: Descriptive individualists reduce collective acts to individual action components. Descriptive collectivists maintain that certain social acts are irreducibly collective (Kutz ; Walzer ; Lazar ).
The Central Debate: Traditionalists vs. Revisionists
Traditionalists (Legalists):
Grounding: Led primarily by international law and LOAC, seeking to give existing legal norms morally sound foundations.
War Permissibility: Only states possess the right to wage war, restricted to national defence, defence of allies, or humanitarian intervention against "crimes that shock the moral conscience of mankind" (Walzer : ).
Combatant Equality: All combatants possess equal moral rights to target enemy combatants regardless of whether their cause is just, provided they adhere to jus in bello principles.
Foundations: Anchored by Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars () and codified in Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I ().
Revisionists:
Grounding: Question the independent moral standing of states and challenge state-centric frameworks.
Moral Asymmetry: Reject combatant equality. Combatants fighting for unjust causes (unjust combatants) cannot act permissibly by fighting; their only moral obligation is to lay down their arms.
Scope of Justification: Expand permissions for humanitarian intervention, problematize civilian immunity, and question the moral authority of national defence against bloodless aggression.
Factions: Moral revisionists argue that individuals should follow moral conscience over LOAC in cases of conflict; legal revisionists demand substantive changes to international law itself.
Key Revisionist Theorists: Luban (, ), Holmes (), McMahan (, , ), Norman (), Rodin (), McPherson (), Arneson (), Fabre (, ).
The Framework of Jus ad Bellum: Requisites for Resorting to War
Categorical Temporal Divisions:
Jus ad bellum: Permissibility of resorting to war as a whole.
Jus in bello: Permissibility of specific acts conducted within war.
Jus post bellum: Permissibility of post-war actions, settlements, and reconstruction.
Jus ex bello / Jus terminatio: Normative principles governing war termination and exit (Moellendorf ; Rodin ).
The Six Traditional Ad Bellum Criteria:
Just Cause: Averting a sufficiently severe injury or threat.
Legitimate Authority: Waged by an entity possessing proper authorization to wage war.
Right Intention: Intending solely to achieve the just cause rather than ulterior motives.
Reasonable Prospects of Success: Adequate probability of achieving intended aims.
Proportionality: Morally weighted goods achieved outweigh morally weighted harms inflicted.
Last Resort (Necessity): Absence of less harmful feasible alternative means to achieve the just cause.
Centrality of Necessity and Proportionality:
Structural Function: Necessity and Proportionality operate as the overarching necessary conditions for permissibility. Lacking other criteria (e.g., legitimate authority) simply adds moral bads that necessity and proportionality calculations must outweigh.
Comparative Framework: Proportionality compares candidate actions against the counterfactual scenario of doing nothing (allowing the threat to eventuate). Necessity compares a candidate action against all available alternative options that mitigate or avert the threat.
Subsumption: If necessity is expanded to evaluate all options including doing nothing, necessity subsumes proportionality.
Ex-Ante Decision-Making Under Uncertainty: Evaluated using expected threats and expected harms, calculated via probability-weighted averages of potential outcomes (Lazar ).
Moral Weighting Factors: Harms are weighted based on direct agent responsibility, intentional vs. foreseen harm, partiality toward co-citizens or loved ones (Hurka ; Lazar ; vs. Lefkowitz ), and state self-determination.
Empirical Scale of Destruction in War:
Iraq War (): Caused approximately direct and indirect deaths in its initial years (Hagopian et al. ).
Second World War: Resulted in over direct casualties, representing approximately of the global population.
US Military Energy Use (): The US Department of Defense consumed of all US federal government energy ( to per year), exceeding the total national energy consumption of Denmark, Bulgaria, Serbia, or Slovakia (Energy Information Administration , ).
Environmental Impact: Extensive habitat destruction and pollution, exemplified by the Gulf War oil spill (El-Baz and Makharita ).
Deep Analysis of Ad Bellum Requirements:
Just Cause:
Traditional Just Causes: Limited strictly to national self-defence (or defence of allies) and humanitarian intervention against extreme atrocities.
Grounding Sovereignty: Walzer grounds state sovereignty in individual human rights: providing physical security within borders, protecting a common communal life built over centuries, and upholding political self-determination.
The Bloodless Invasion Objection: Formulated by David Rodin (). If an aggressing army occupies a state without loss of life if no resistance is offered, grounding defensive rights solely in individual security implies the victim state lacks a right to fight back. Resolving this requires appealing to deterrence, risks of unexpected escalation (Fabre ), aggregated political interests (Hurka ; Frowe ), or group rights to self-determination above a population threshold (Margalit and Raz ).
Humanitarian Intervention vs. Adventurism: Walzer requires a higher burden of proof for humanitarian intervention because it infringes state sovereignty. Revisionists argue that states failing to protect member security lose sovereign protection against intervention (Shue ; Caney ). However, low intervention bars risk imperialist military adventurism (Kutz ).
Redistributive Wars and Resource Wars: Theoretical proposals for redistributive wars on behalf of the global poor (Luban ; Fabre ; Lippert-Rasmussen ; Øverland ) fail practical necessity and proportionality tests because military force exacerbates poverty (Benbaji ). However, climate-driven resource scarcities may increase the future salience of resource wars.
Just Peace: Ad bellum proportionality must factor long-term post-war consequences far beyond the initial armistice (Bass ; Coady ; May ).
Legitimate Authority:
Statism vs. Revisionist Individualism: Statists restrict war rights to recognized sovereign states. Revisionists argue defensive rights derive directly from individual human rights without requiring state mediation (Fabre ; Finlay ; Schwenkenbecher ).
Authorization vs. State Legitimacy: Proper authorization by a polity is more fundamental than overall state legitimacy (Lazar forthcoming-b; Estlund ; Renzo ). Unauthorized government warfare commits a serious independent moral wrong by subjecting citizens to unchosen moral and prudential risks.
Proportionality Ad Bellum:
Partiality: States are entitled to weight their own citizens' political interests more heavily than those of foreign citizens.
Excluded Goods: Conditional reasons (such as fulfilling military oaths or contractual duties) cannot count as positive goods to make an otherwise disproportionate war proportionate, as they presuppose the decision to fight (Lazar ).
Last Resort (Necessity):
Pre-emptive vs. Preventive War: Pre-emptive action addresses an imminent attack; preventive action addresses potential long-term threat development (Shue and Rodin ; US National Security Strategy ). While preventive war may satisfy last resort theoretically, strict international law prohibitions remain necessary to prevent routine aggressive abuse (Buchanan and Keohane ; Luban ).
The Framework of Jus in Bello: Conducting Hostilities Justly
The Three In Bello Principles:
Discrimination: Targeting noncombatants is strictly prohibited.
Proportionality: Collateral harm to noncombatants is permissible only if not excessive relative to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
Necessity: Belligerents must employ the least harmful feasible military means to achieve their objectives.
Categorical Definitions:
Combatants: Members of organized armed forces, individuals with a continuous combat function, or persons directly participating in hostilities (Haque ).
Noncombatants: All individuals who are not combatants (civilians).
Walzer's Rights-Forfeiture Model:
Combatant Rights Loss: Combatants lose their rights to life and liberty simply by posing a threat or joining armed forces ("allowing oneself to be made into a dangerous man"; Walzer ).
Noncombatant Immunity: Civilians retain their rights intact and cannot be targeted for military goals.
Supreme Emergencies: Circumstances where intentional targeting of noncombatants is permissibly overridden to avert impending catastrophic collapse, such as Nazism in Europe (Bellamy ; Statman ).
Critiques of Combatant Equality and Rights Forfeiture:
Asymmetry of Just Objectives: Military success by unjust combatants inflicts evil rather than averting it; therefore, collateral civilian harm caused by unjust combatants can never be proportionate (McMahan ; Rodin ; Hurka ; Lee ).
Flaws in Threat-Based Rights Loss: Posing a threat in pursuit of a just cause (e.g., Kurdish Peshmerga defending Yazidis against ISIL) does not void one's natural right to life (McMahan , ).
Invalidation of Consent: Just combatants do not waive their rights to be killed by unjust adversaries.
Noncombatant Responsibility and Discrimination:
Citizen Contributions: Industrialized populations contribute significantly to war capacity ( of populations work in war-related industries; Downes : ; Gross : ; Valentino et al. : ) via taxes, war production, and democratic voting.
Non-Firing Combatants: S. L. A. Marshall's () research revealed that only to of WWII Allied combatants fired weapons at the enemy. Grossman () documented a profound psychological aversion to killing in most humans. Many combatants contribute no more threat than typical civilians.
The Responsibility Dilemma (Lazar ):
High Threshold Choice: If liability requires high individual moral responsibility for a wrongful threat to preserve civilian immunity, many combatants are non-liable. Intentionally killing non-liable combatants leads directly to Contingent Pacifism (May ).
Low Threshold Choice: If liability requires minimal causal responsibility for a threat to cover all unjust combatants, millions of civilians become liable targets, destroying Discrimination and leading to Realism.
Theoretical Solutions to the Responsibility Dilemma
All-Out Revisionist Solutions:
False Belief Responsibility: Argues unjust combatants forfeit rights by causing just combatants to reasonably believe they are liable (McMahan ), or via complicity and collective responsibility (Kamm ; Bazargan ).
Critique: Analogy to a prankster acting like a suicide bomber (Ferzan ; McMahan ; Lazar ). Blameless responsibility for false beliefs cannot render killing objectively permissible.
Moderate Traditionalist Solutions:
Moral Distinction Principle: Asserts that killing noncombatants is intrinsically worse than killing combatants, even when both are non-liable.
Conditional Rights Waiver: Combatants offer a limited conditional waiver by wearing uniforms and operating openly to draw fire away from civilians. If adversaries refuse to lay down arms, they act better by targeting combatants rather than civilians (Lazar , ; Pettit ).
Lesser-Evil Permissions: Killing innocent combatants is easier to justify as a lesser evil than killing innocent civilians. Unjust combatants achieving defensive or protective outcomes may act permissibly on lesser-evil grounds without establishing combatant equality.
All-Out Traditionalist / Institutionalist Solutions:
Contractualist Account: States and citizens benefit from mutual agreements allowing armies to obey state orders without evaluating war justice; combatants waive rights via optimal legal contracts (Benbaji , ).
Democratic Obedience: Duty to obey democratic military orders stems from state epistemic authority (Estlund ; Renzo ) and civilian control of armed forces (Ryan ; Raz ).
Long-Term Utility / Horror Minimization: Strict adherence to traditional LOAC minimizes total long-term wrongful deaths amidst self-deception and war fog (Shue , , ; Dill and Shue ; Waldron ; Roberts ).
The Moral Distinction and Foundations for Sparing Civilians
Four Foundations of Moral Distinction (Lazar ):
Necessity: Intentionally targeting civilians is rarely necessary and often wanton. Pointless civilian killing demonstrates total moral contempt. Examples of civilian targeting include the WWI German blockade ( deaths), Chechnya bombardment (Lyall ), Taliban operations, and urban attacks in Mumbai and Paris.
Opportunistic vs. Eliminative Harm: Combatants are killed eliminatively (removing a threat posed by the person). Civilians are killed opportunistically (using civilian suffering instrumentally to coerce government policy; Quinn ; Frowe ; Quong ; Tadros ).
Epistemic Justification: Killing individuals while knowing the act is objectively wrong is worse than killing under reasonable beliefs of permissibility (Lazar ).
Vulnerability and Defencelessness: Moral duties to protect vulnerable and defenceless innocent individuals heighten the wrongfulness of civilian harm relative to combatant harm (e.g., Highway of Death, Iraq ).
In Bello Proportionality and Intentions:
Intended vs. Unintended Harms: Grounded in the Doctrine of Double Effect (Quinn ; Rickless ; McIntyre ; Delaney ; Thomson ; Tadros ).
Involuntary Human Shields: ISIL operating within civilian zones in Raqqa. Faulting defenders for human shielding (Walzer ; Keinon ) risks unfairly reducing civilian rights protections without individual voluntary action or using civilians instrumentally for deterrence (Smilansky ).
In Bello Necessity and Force Protection:
Force Protection Balances: Combatants must bear operational risks to minimize civilian casualties up to reasonable limits (Geneva Convention Protocol I Article ; Walzer and Margalit ; McMahan ; Luban ).
Statutory Provisions and Treaties of International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
Definition and Foundations:
Scope: A set of public international law rules seeking to limit armed conflict effects for humanitarian reasons. Regulates conduct during conflict (jus in bello). Also termed "the law of war" or "the law of armed conflict".
Distinction from Jus ad Bellum: Public international law under the UN Charter prohibits interstate force except for self-defence (Article ) or UN Security Council authorization. IHL applies neutrally once conflict begins, regardless of cause or legitimacy.
Sources: Treaties, customary international law, and general legal principles (Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article ).
Historical Milestones: 1864 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field; 1868 Declaration of Saint Petersburg (prohibiting specific explosive projectiles).
Core IHL Treaties:
The Four Geneva Conventions of (Universally Ratified):
Geneva Convention I (GC I): Wounded and sick in armed forces in the field.
Geneva Convention II (GC II): Wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea.
Geneva Convention III (GC III): Prisoners of war (POWs).
Geneva Convention IV (GC IV): Protection of civilians and "protected persons" (nationals in enemy/occupying hands, stateless persons, IDPs, refugees, journalists).
Additional Protocols:
Additional Protocol I ( - AP I): Protection of victims in international armed conflicts, including self-determination wars against colonial domination, alien occupation, and racist regimes.
Additional Protocol II ( - AP II): Protection of victims in non-international armed conflicts meeting specific intensity and organizational thresholds (excluding internal disturbances, riots, or sporadic acts of violence).
Additional Protocol III ( - AP III): Adoption of the Red Crystal distinctive emblem.
Specialized Treaties Prohibiting Weapons and Methods:
Gas Protocol (): Prohibition of asphyxiating, poisonous gases and bacteriological methods.
Cultural Property Convention () and its and Protocols.
Biological Weapons Convention ( - BWC).
Environmental Modification Convention ( - ENMOD).
Certain Conventional Weapons Convention ( - CCW) and Protocols I--V (including Protocol IV Blinding Laser Weapons, Protocol V Explosive Remnants of War).
Chemical Weapons Convention ( - CWC).
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention ( - APMBC / Ottawa Treaty).
Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict ().
Enforced Disappearance Convention ().
Convention on Cluster Munitions ( - CCM).
Customary International Humanitarian Law:
Binds all states and non-state armed groups.
ICRC Customary IHL Study demonstrated that customary law provides extensive protections in non-international armed conflicts where treaty rules are limited.
Conflict Classification and Operational Scope:
Application: Appraised factually on the ground; applies equally to all belligerents.
International Armed Conflict (IAC): State vs. state, military occupation, or self-determination wars under AP I.
Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC): Government vs. non-state group, or non-state groups fighting each other. Requires minimum organizational structure and combat intensity.
Double Classification: Situations containing coexisting IAC and NIAC dimensions, handled via parallel application.
Mandatory Protections and Emblems:
Core Safeguards: Humane treatment without adverse distinction; strict prohibitions on murder, torture, and reprisals.
Differentiated Care: Mandatory specific measures targeting special vulnerabilities of women, children, and persons with disabilities.
Protective Emblems: Red Cross, Red Crescent, Red Crystal, and Red Lion and Sun (historical). Used for protective purposes (medical/religious units) and indicative purposes (Red Cross Movement ties).

Operational Hostility Restrictions:
Core Principles: Distinction (civilians/objects vs. combatants/military objectives), Proportionality (direct and indirect/reverberating collateral harm balance), and Precaution (active precautions in attack, passive precautions protecting civilian areas).
Prohibited Tactics: Starvation, perfidy (AP I Article ), giving no quarter, widespread long-term severe environmental damage, and targeting dangerous forces (dams, dykes, nuclear power plants).
Implementation Mechanisms, Enforcement, and Future Directions
State Implementation Responsibilities:
Duty to Respect and Ensure Respect: Mandatory under Common Article of the Geneva Conventions.
Penal Legislation: Enacting national laws penalizing "grave breaches" (war crimes).
Administrative Measures: Dissemination through military instruction, recruiting legal advisors, issuing emblem protection legislation, and generating identity cards.
Statutory Compliance and Enforcement Mechanisms:
Institutional Procedures: Protecting powers system, official enquiry procedures, and the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission (AP I Article ).
International Criminal Tribunals: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ( - ICC) operating on complementarity (Article war crimes); ad hoc tribunals (ICTY for former Yugoslavia, ICTR for Rwanda); hybrid courts (Cambodia, Lebanon, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste).
IHL vs. International Human Rights Law (IHRL):
Scope: IHRL applies continuously during peacetime and armed conflict (subject to statutory derogations); IHL applies strictly during armed conflict.
Emerging Frontiers in Warfare Philosophy:
Technological Warfare: Normative evaluation of targeted drone strikes and Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS).
Non-State/Asymmetric Conflicts: Resolving legitimate authority and discrimination challenges in irregular civil wars (Parry ).
Post-War Duties: Developing comprehensive jus post bellum frameworks governing post-conflict justice, liability, and reconstruction.
Group Agency and Moral Collectivism: Analyzing group agency, collective liability, and individual representation in collective action (List and Pettit ; Lazar ).