Anticipations and the Theory of Aggression

Anticipations

• The initial questions in wars (who started the shooting, who crossed the border) are factual and easy to answer, but governments often lie to absolve themselves of aggression.

• Moral judgments on aggression require more than just knowing who initiated the violence; justifications and lies come first.

• Aggression can begin without physical violence (shots fired or borders crossed).

• Individuals and states have the right to defend against imminent violence, even if it's not actual yet.

• This right is severely restricted in legal accounts.

• Caroline case of 1842 (Daniel Webster): pre-emptive violence requires "a necessity of self-defense… instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."

• Webster's view: pre-emption is a last-minute reflex, triggered by an imminent attack.

• This doesn't align with the experience of imminent war, where there's often time for deliberation.

• The decision to strike first is strategic and moral and influences allied, neutral, and domestic opinions.

• The legalist paradigm is more restrictive than the judgments we make; we sympathize with potential victims before instant necessity.

• Spectrum of anticipation: from Webster's reflex to preventive war (responding to a distant danger).

• Distinguishing the criteria that defend the decision to fight from the criteria thought to justify prevention is important.

The Theory of Aggression

Preventive War and the Balance of Power

• Preventive war presupposes a standard for measuring danger, based on the balance of power.

• Preventive war aims to maintain the balance by preventing a shift towards dominance.

• The balance of power doesn't guarantee peace; it often requires force to defend it.

• Edmund Burke (1760): The balance of power was