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13. Oct 10, Fri: Nuclear Weapons

Required Readings (18 pages)

• Paul Avey, “When Nuclear Weapons Fail to Deter: The Ultimate Weapon Is Not

  Always the Best Defense,” Foreign Affairs, March 6, 2025, 7 pages (on Brightspace)

The provided text is an excerpt from a 2025 Foreign Affairs article by Paul Avey, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech, which argues that nuclear weapons often fail to deter non-nuclear adversaries despite their traditional role as the ultimate defense. The author challenges the view of nuclear deterrence by highlighting recent conflicts, such as Ukraine's strikes on Russia and Iran's missile attacks on Israel, where nuclear arsenals did not prevent limited conventional attacks. While the article notes that the fear of mutual destruction has successfully precluded large-scale war between nuclear states like the United States and the Soviet Union, it explains that nonnuclear states often correctly perceive that nuclear powers face significant constraints in deploying such destructive weapons. These constraints include the difficulty of using nuclear weapons in combat without compromising military objectives, the risk of escalation, and the certainty of severe international backlash. Ultimately, the author suggests that nuclear powers need conventional tools to counter threats from nonnuclear rivals, as reliance on the fear generated by nuclear weapons proves insufficient in limited conflicts.

nonnuclear countries still act nuclear (more digilgent)

Briefing Document: The Dual Nature of Nuclear Deterrence

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes an analysis of nuclear deterrence, revealing a critical duality in its effectiveness. The central thesis posits that while nuclear weapons are exceptionally successful at preventing large-scale, direct conflict between nuclear-armed states, they have a demonstrably poor track record of deterring aggression from nonnuclear states. Recent conflicts involving Russia, Ukraine, Israel, and Iran underscore this limitation, showing that the "ultimate weapon" often fails to prevent conventional attacks against a nuclear power.

The failure to deter nonnuclear actors stems from the significant practical and political drawbacks of using nuclear weapons. These include their immense destructiveness, which can conflict with strategic objectives; the risk of radioactive fallout; and the certainty of severe international backlash. Nonnuclear states, recognizing that their actions are unlikely to cross the existential threat threshold required for nuclear retaliation, feel emboldened to pursue limited military goals.

Conversely, deterrence between nuclear peers remains robust due to a shared understanding of mutual vulnerability and the immense risk of uncontrollable escalation. The fear that even a limited exchange could spiral into a full-scale nuclear war induces profound caution, creating a fragile but enduring peace between nuclear powers. The primary strategic implication is that nuclear states cannot rely on their arsenals to deter all threats and must maintain strong conventional military capabilities to counter aggression from nonnuclear opponents.

The Failure of Deterrence Against Nonnuclear States

A core argument is that nuclear weapons have consistently failed to deter nonnuclear states from launching conventional attacks, seizing territory, and inflicting significant casualties on nuclear powers. This dynamic arises because the thresholds for nuclear use are exceptionally high, a fact that nonnuclear states have historically recognized and exploited.

Recent and Historical Evidence

Several contemporary and historical conflicts illustrate this pattern of deterrence failure:

• Russia and Ukraine: Despite possessing the world's largest nuclear arsenal and President Vladimir Putin's frequent allusions to nuclear escalation, Russia has been unable to deter Ukraine from conducting strikes on Russian military bases, cities (including Moscow), and even seizing territory in the Kursk region.

• Israel and Iran: Israel's undeclared nuclear capability did not dissuade Iran from launching direct missile attacks against it in April and October 2024.

• Pakistan and Iran: In early 2024, Iran struck a Sunni militant group operating within Pakistan, another nuclear-armed state.

• Korean War (1950): China intervened directly against U.S. forces, inflicting major losses, despite the United States' nuclear monopoly at the time.

• Yom Kippur War (1973): Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated attack on a nuclear-capable Israel.

• Vietnam War (1968): At Khe Sanh, North Vietnamese forces besieged U.S. Marines, prompting internal U.S. discussions about using tactical nuclear weapons, which were ultimately rejected.

• eypt vs isreal

• argentina vs uk territory 

Causal Factors and Constraints on Nuclear Use

Nonnuclear states are emboldened because they correctly surmise that a nuclear power faces immense obstacles to using its ultimate weapons for anything less than national survival.

The Rationale of Nonnuclear Aggressors

Nonnuclear states are generally incapable of posing a large-scale threat to a nuclear power's homeland or causing the collapse of its military—the two informal but critical thresholds for nuclear use. This relative weakness paradoxically gives them more freedom of action. They often employ specific strategies to further mitigate the already low risk of nuclear retaliation:

• Seeking Powerful Allies: When China intervened in the Korean War, its leaders sought Soviet air support to deter a potential U.S. nuclear attack on Chinese territory.

• Communicating Limited Goals: During their 1973 attack, Egyptian leaders communicated the limited scope of their offensive to ensure Israel would not overestimate the scale of the threat and resort to nuclear weapons.

• Exploiting the Existential Threat Gap: Ukraine's strikes on Russia, while significant, do not threaten Russia's survival, a reality consistent with past conflicts. Consequently, Putin has stated he sees no need for nuclear use in Ukraine, relying instead on large-scale conventional destruction.

The Success of Deterrence Between Nuclear States

In stark contrast to the dynamic with nonnuclear states, deterrence between nuclear-armed peers has been remarkably effective at preventing large-scale war. The mutual vulnerability to annihilation induces a level of caution that has kept direct conflicts from erupting and contained those that have.

The Logic of Mutual Vulnerability and Escalation

The "nuclear shadow" has successfully precluded major wars between nuclear states. This deterrent effect, which proved more extensive than early theorists like Glenn Snyder predicted, is rooted in the shared fear of uncontrollable escalation.

• The Escalation Ladder: When both sides possess nuclear weapons, even a limited conventional or tactical nuclear exchange carries the potential to escalate "all the way up the ladder" to the use of strategic, city-destroying bombs.

• Preemptive Pressures: In a crisis, leaders may anticipate escalation and feel pressure to launch a preemptive strike to limit damage by destroying the opponent's nuclear forces. The perceived costs of inaction could outweigh the costs of nuclear first-use.

• Inadvertent War: The dangers of accidents, miscalculations, or unexpected events—common features of any war—are magnified exponentially and could trigger a nuclear exchange even if both sides seek to avoid it.

This recognition of shared, profound risk has repeatedly compelled leaders to de-escalate. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, this dynamic was paramount. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev warned U.S. President John F. Kennedy:

"if indeed war should break out, then it would not be in our power to stop it, for such is the logic of war."

Kennedy administration officials later confirmed that the "gravest risk" was not a deliberate decision to escalate but that "events would produce actions, reactions or miscalculations carrying the conflict beyond the control of one or the other or both."

Examining the Exception: The 1999 Kargil War

The direct conflict between India and Pakistan during the Kargil War is a rare example of two nuclear states waging war. However, it is less of an exception than it appears, as specific factors limited the risk of escalation:

• Geographic Containment: The fighting was confined to the mountainous Kashmir region.

• Technical Safeguards: India normally kept its nuclear warheads physically separated from their delivery systems.

• Clear Communication: Both countries maintained lines of communication to prevent miscalculation.

Despite these factors, the fear of nuclear use played a significant role in containing the conflict and preventing it from expanding. Subsequent skirmishes have not developed into full-scale war.

Conclusions and Strategic Implications

The historical record reveals two distinct measures of nuclear deterrence, which policymakers must account for when assessing risk.

A "Nuclear Peace" Analogue

A parallel can be drawn with the democratic peace theory. Just as democracies rarely, if ever, fight wars with one another, a similar dynamic exists between nuclear powers. While not inherently peaceful, nuclear states have managed to maintain a "fragile, often contested, yet enduring peace" with each other due to the shared dangers of escalation.

Differentiated Risk Assessment

This dual nature of deterrence demands a nuanced approach to risk analysis:

• A Nuclear Iran: While a nuclear-armed Iran may feel emboldened to act more aggressively in the Middle East, the history of the nuclear age suggests it may also be compelled to behave more cautiously toward a nuclear-armed Israel.

• Russia and NATO: Russia has refrained from military strikes against NATO countries, despite their extensive support for Ukraine. Likewise, the U.S. has avoided direct intervention. This demonstrates the mutual caution between nuclear actors. Russia's reaction to strikes from U.S. forces would likely be vastly different from its reaction to Ukrainian strikes.

The Primacy of Conventional Forces

The most critical takeaway is that a nuclear arsenal is an insufficient deterrent against a determined nonnuclear opponent with limited goals. Nuclear states must possess robust and effective conventional military tools to counter these more probable threats, rather than relying on the fear of the world's most dangerous weapons. While it is important to exercise caution in drawing sweeping conclusions from the limited data available, the consistent pattern over three-quarters of a century provides a tentative but vital lesson for modern statecraft.

Keir A. Lieber & Daryl G. Press, “Nuclear Escalation: How America’s Adversaries

Have Hijacked Its Old Deterrence Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 102, Issue 6 (Nov/Dec 2023) pp. 45-55 (Library link)

• the provided text is an abstract and excerpt from a 2023 Foreign Affairs magazine article written by Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, which addresses the resurgence of nuclear escalation risks in international politics. The authors argue that U.S. adversaries like North Korea, Russia, and potentially China and Iran are adopting the coercive nuclear escalation strategy originally developed by NATO during the Cold War. This strategy allows conventionally weaker states to use the threat of nuclear war, even limited tactical strikes, to deter or halt a conventional invasion by a superior military power, leveraging the immense risk of uncontrolled escalation to compel a cease-fire. The source ultimately cautions that the United States must take these nuclear threats seriously and adjust its military planning to avoid inadvertently triggering a nuclear conflict by cornering desperate, nuclear-armed foes

lecture notes

• argument = nuclear weapons can be used to de-eseclate conflicts

• nuclear v nuclear- conflict less likely 

• want land = use nuclear weapon-land ruined

• military gap conventional weapons = weaker military w/ less conventional weapons incentive to use controlled nuclear weapon escelate de escelate 

• russia weaker today ukriane= u.s allies adapt this soviet union/ land in germnay favor soviet union/western europe fear of conventional attck by soviet union 70,000 weapon btw russia and u.s= stability instability 

• stability instability paradox = stability no war instability= convential warfare as they please / london invasion not enough conventional army —> full scal nuclear war/ conqured or full scale war=produce no winners —> limited use of nuclear weapons 

• limited nuclear weapon=covey power + ability to fullscale war 

• putin usinstability stability use if war btw russia nd us happen

• smaller country use influence against other actor/country military forces arent always used to influence other actors=costly

• military sffairs officers plan asked to think about worst situation

• AI benefit countries who produce computer parts/ parts needed for AI

• AI benefit china and u.s more?  

Nuclear weapons once again loom large in international politics, and a dangerous pattern is emerging. In the regions most likely to draw the United States into conflict-the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, eastern Europe, and the Persian Gulf-U.S. adversaries appear to be acquiring, enhancing, or threatening to use nuclear weapons. North Korea is developing intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach the United States; China is doubling the size of its arsenal; Russia is threatening to use nuclear weapons in its war in Ukraine; and according to U.S. officials, Iran has amassed enough fissile material for a bomb. Many people hoped that once the Cold War ended, nuclear weapons would recede into irrelevance. Instead, many countries are relying on them to make up for the weakness of their conventional military forces.

Still, optimists in the United States argue that the risk of nuclear war remains low. Their reasoning is straightforward: the countries that are building up and brandishing their nuclear capabilities are bluffing. Nuclear weapons cannot paper over conventional military weakness because threats to escalate-even by a desperate enemy-are not credible. According to the optimists, giving credence to the nuclear bluster of weak enemies is misguided and plays squarely into their hands.

Briefing Document: The Return of Coercive Nuclear Escalation

Executive Summary

The risk of nuclear escalation in a conventional conflict is significantly greater than is widely believed in the United States. A dangerous pattern is emerging where U.S. adversaries—notably Russia, North Korea, and Pakistan, with China as a potential future case—are adopting a nuclear strategy of "coercive escalation" to offset their conventional military inferiority. This strategic playbook was ironically invented and perfected by the United States and its NATO allies during the Cold War to deter the numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces. The strategy relies on the limited, coercive use of nuclear weapons not to achieve a military victory, but to create shock, demonstrate resolve, and signal that a conflict is spinning out of control. This approach aims to pressure a conventionally superior opponent into accepting a ceasefire. The credibility of this threat stems from desperation; a regime facing catastrophic defeat and potential annihilation has a higher resolve and a greater willingness to risk nuclear war than its aggressor. The United States is in grave danger if it underestimates the will of these desperate, nuclear-armed adversaries and dismisses their threats as mere bluffs. Washington must re-acquaint itself with the brutal logic of the very strategy it pioneered.

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1. The Resurgence of Nuclear Threats and a Flawed Optimism

Nuclear weapons are once again a central feature of international politics, particularly in regions where the United States is most likely to be drawn into conflict: the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, Eastern Europe, and the Persian Gulf. U.S. adversaries in these areas are actively acquiring, enhancing, or threatening to use nuclear weapons to compensate for weaknesses in their conventional military forces.

• North Korea is developing intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States.

• China is in the process of doubling the size of its nuclear arsenal.

• Russia is overtly threatening nuclear weapon use in its war against Ukraine.

• Iran, according to U.S. officials, has amassed enough fissile material for a nuclear bomb.

Despite these developments, a faction of "optimists" in the United States argues that the risk of nuclear war remains low. Their reasoning is that threats of nuclear escalation from conventionally weak states are not credible and are therefore bluffs. This viewpoint holds that giving credence to such "nuclear bluster" plays into the hands of these adversaries.

However, this assessment is dangerously flawed. The risk of nuclear escalation is much greater than appreciated because these adversaries are successfully employing a strategy developed decades ago by the West to solve the exact same problem: how to convincingly threaten a nuclear-armed opponent from a position of conventional weakness.

2. The Original Playbook: NATO's Cold War Strategy of Coercive Escalation

During the Cold War, particularly in the late 1950s, NATO faced a significant conventional military imbalance, with Warsaw Pact forces outnumbering them by approximately three to one in manpower. NATO’s initial strategy of responding to a Soviet invasion with an all-out U.S. nuclear strike became untenable once the Soviet Union developed a robust retaliatory nuclear capability. This left NATO with a "lose-lose choice": either lose a conventional war or initiate a mutually catastrophic nuclear exchange.

To solve this conundrum, NATO developed a strategy of coercive nuclear escalation.

• Core Concept: Instead of a single, massive retaliatory strike, NATO planned to respond to an invasion with a limited use of nuclear weapons, likely tactical ones with small yields and short ranges, against military targets.

• Strategic Goal: The primary objective was not to alter the military balance on the battlefield. Rather, it was to deliver a profound shock to Soviet leaders, demonstrating that the conflict was spiraling into an uncontrollable nuclear disaster and thereby compelling them to halt their invasion and accept a ceasefire.

• The Logic of Resolve: The strategy operated as a "competition in pain." Analysts reasoned that in a defensive war, the NATO allies—fighting for their freedom and territory—would have a higher level of resolve than the Soviets, who would be waging a war of aggression. In a contest of wills, the side that cares the most holds the advantage.

• Implementation: To support this strategy, the U.S. deployed thousands of tactical nuclear weapons to Europe and created a "nuclear sharing" arrangement, where U.S. weapons would be transferred to several NATO allies during a war.

Though criticized as immoral and foolishly reliant on the ability to control escalation, this strategy of deliberate, coercive nuclear use became the foundation of Western defense against an overwhelming foe. It established nuclear weapons as "the ultimate weapons of the weak."

3. Modern Adherents to Coercive Escalation

Today, conventionally outmatched, nuclear-armed countries have adopted NATO's old playbook to deter more powerful adversaries.

Pakistan

Pakistan faces a significant conventional imbalance with its principal adversary, India, which has a larger population, GDP, and military budget. With its major cities located close to the Indian border, Pakistan relies on its nuclear arsenal to deter or halt an Indian invasion.

• Arsenal: Pakistan possesses approximately 170 nuclear warheads, a third of which are tactical.

• Stated Doctrine: Former head of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, has stated that tactical nuclear weapons "blocked the avenues for serious military operations by the other side" and provide a "strategic shield" to blunt India's conventional superiority.

• Goal: Pakistan cannot win a nuclear war against India but can inflict tremendous pain, thereby coercing India to halt a conventional military campaign.

North Korea

Pyongyang’s conventional military is vastly outmatched by the combined forces of South Korea and the United States, with decrepit equipment and poorly trained troops. Consequently, North Korea leans heavily on its nuclear arsenal for its defense.

• Stated Doctrine: Leader Kim Jong Un stated in 2022 that while the primary mission of his nuclear arsenal is deterrence, its "unexpected second mission" is to repel an attack if deterrence fails.

• Motivation: North Korean leaders fear the fate of rulers like Saddam Hussein and Muammar al-Qaddafi, who were killed after losing conventional wars. With their regime and lives at stake, they face immense pressure to initiate a nuclear exchange to compel a ceasefire.

Russia

Following the Cold War, as its conventional military power declined relative to the West, Russia adapted NATO's Cold War strategy to its new circumstances.

• Doctrine: Russia's nuclear doctrine calls for escalation to deter or halt the most serious military threats to its security. Its war plans and military exercises integrate tactical nuclear weapons.

• Application in Ukraine: President Vladimir Putin has framed the war in existential terms. If he perceives that a complete defeat in Ukraine threatens his regime, he is considered capable and likely willing to initiate coercive nuclear use.

• Explicit Threats: Senior officials have made direct links between the war and nuclear escalation. Dmitry Medvedev stated in July 2023 that Russia "would have to use nuclear weapons" if Ukraine's counteroffensive succeeded. Putin has claimed Russia would use "all means at its disposal" to defend annexed territories.

China: A Potential Future Adopter

Unlike the others, China has not explicitly adopted nuclear threats to compensate for conventional inferiority. It currently espouses a "no-first-use" policy and has focused on strengthening its conventional forces. However, this position is nuanced and could change.

• Exceptions to Policy: Chinese military documents suggest Beijing would consider exceptions to its no-first-use policy if it faced a major defeat in a high-stakes conventional war, such as over Taiwan.

• Force Modernization: Since around 2019, China has been increasing the size, readiness, and diversity of its arsenal. These updates enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces, a key prerequisite for a state to be able to initiate wartime escalation without fearing its entire arsenal could be destroyed in a counterstrike.

• Future Possibility: While not its current posture, China’s leaders could change their official stance and adopt a coercive escalation strategy if a conflict against the United States went badly.

4. The Logic of Desperation: Why Coercive Escalation is Credible

Skeptics who dismiss nuclear threats from weaker powers as hollow misunderstand the fundamental logic of coercive escalation. The goal is not to win the war militarily but to force its termination.

• Shock Over Military Gain: A limited nuclear strike's purpose is to demonstrate in a shocking manner that the war is spinning out of control. It aims to convince Western leaders and populations that the adversary, facing an existential threat, will continue to inflict pain to avoid defeat.

• The Advantage of Higher Resolve: The strategy hinges on a contest of wills. A leader like Putin, if he believes defeat will lead to his downfall and death, has far more at stake than Western leaders supporting Ukraine. This desperation provides a credible willingness to escalate further. If NATO responded to a Russian nuclear strike with conventional attacks, Moscow could simply use nuclear weapons again, just as NATO planned to do against the Soviets.

• A Competition in Pain: The reasoning is brutal, akin to blackmail or torture. A self-interested leader facing a catastrophic, regime-ending defeat may conclude that nuclear escalation is the only remaining option.

5. Policy Implications and Strategic Recommendations for the United States

The United States faces grave danger if it underestimates the resolve of desperate, nuclear-armed adversaries. It is imperative that U.S. policymakers take the growing threat of coercive nuclear escalation seriously.

• Prudent Rhetoric and Arms Provision: The Biden administration has shown an understanding of these risks in the Ukraine conflict by moderating rhetoric (moving away from statements that Putin "cannot remain in power") and limiting the types of weapons provided to Ukraine to manage escalation dangers.

• Limited Wartime Objectives: U.S. planners have wisely encouraged allies like South Korea to consider wartime objectives far short of complete victory. For example, responding to a North Korean artillery attack by destroying the artillery positions rather than marching on Pyongyang could avoid pushing the Kim regime to the nuclear brink.

• Develop Escalation-Aware War Plans: The U.S. military must develop strategies for waging conventional war in a way that reduces the adversary's incentive to escalate. This includes:

  • Minimizing attacks on an enemy's national command-and-control networks.

  • Avoiding strikes on an enemy's nuclear forces.

  • Refraining from targeting the enemy leadership itself.

• Goal of U.S. Strategy: The objective should be to escalate conventionally without threatening the survival of an enemy regime, thereby reducing the likelihood that a desperate leader will resort to nuclear weapons.

The United States must recognize that after decades of post-Cold War foreign policy ambition, it now faces nuclear-armed adversaries who oppose its objectives. To understand what these foes may be capable of, U.S. leaders need only look to their own history.

Key Quotes

"The risk of nuclear escalation during conventional war is much greater than is generally appreciated."

"In contests of resolve, after all, the side that cares the most has the advantage."

"NATO's strategy made nuclear weapons the ultimate weapons of the weak, the perfect tool for holding off powerful rivals."

"Coercive nuclear escalation is a competition in pain-both inflicting it and suffering it-which is a type of conflict that invariably favors the desperate."

"If any forces try to violate the fundamental interests of our state, our nuclear forces will have to decisively accomplish [this] unexpected second mission." - Kim Jong Un, 2022

"It would be tragic for Washington to stumble into nuclear war because it discounted the very strategy that it invented decades ago." 

-nuclear winter= nuclear weapon hides the sun / nuclear war huge amount of smoke= over entire earth artifical winter

human wave attacks= 

soviet union ww2 absorb alot of casualities stalin kept fighting 20 million death 

dem vs auth more casualty phobic 

countrys do not 

russia u.s treaty 2026 exp to limit nuclear war heads

• recap= suicide terrorism popular in 2010s

u.s against nuclear proliferation but turning blind eye to nuclear weapon developmnet