Epistemology: Scope, Limits, Doctrines, and Refutations of Skepticism

Introduction to Epistemology and Philosophical Foundations

  • Ontology vs. Epistemology:

    • Ontology: Represents direct knowledge of reality (conocimiento directo de la realidad).
    • Epistemology: Constitutes reflective, second-order knowledge (conocimiento reflejo y de segundo orden) that evaluates the scope, boundaries, and limits of direct knowledge.
    • Expository Order: Ontologically, ontology precedes epistemology. However, the expository order follows a deductive structure (as opposed to an inventive, inductive structure), requiring epistemology to be presented first. This matches the expository sequence used for logic and the philosophy of language (which historically formed part of logic).
  • Terminological Synonyms:

    • Epistemology (epistemología) is interchangeably referred to as:
    • Theory of Knowledge (teoría del conocimiento)
    • Gnoseology (gnoseología)
    • Critique of Knowledge (crítica del conocimiento)
  • Branches of Epistemology:

    • General Epistemology (epistemología general): Investigates the general problem of knowledge, its limits, truth, realism, and objectivity. Objectivity is defined as correspondence with reality and reference to objective entities or objects.
    • Special Epistemology (epistemología especial): Applies specifically to individual scientific disciplines and functions as the philosophy of science (filosofía de la ciencia).
    • Hermeneutics (hermenéutica): Examines the validity and limits of interpretation.

Doctrines of Knowledge: Skepticism and Its Modalities

  • Main Epistemological Stances:
    • The critique of knowledge yields three primary positions: dogmatism (dogmatismo), skepticism (escepticismo), and intermediate positions (posturas intermedias).

Text box summarizing Pyrrho of Elis and Pyrrhonian versus Academic skepticism

  • Pyrrhonian Skepticism (Escepticismo Pirrónico):

    • Named after Pyrrho of Elis (Pirrón de Elis, c. 360 – c. 270 BC).
    • Represents the most radical and rigorous form of skepticism.
    • Non-Cognitivist: It does not seek knowledge, making it the most honest form of skepticism.
    • Primary Goal: To achieve ataraxia (peace of mind or tranquility of the soul) by avoiding the disquietude and anxiety (desasosiego) associated with making judgments.
    • Methodology:
    • Isosthéneia (isosthéneia): The principle of equipollence or complete equivalence of opposing opinions.
    • Epojé (epojé / epoche): The complete suspension of judgment resulting from treating all opinions as equipollent.
    • Stance on Argumentation: Pyrrhonists refused to offer or accept any arguments, including their own.
  • Academic Skepticism (Escepticismo Académico):

    • Associated with the later Platonic Academy, including philosophers such as Arcesilaus (Arcesilao) and Carneades (Carnéades).
    • Cognitivist: Practiced doubt with the explicit aim of reaching certain knowledge upon emerging from doubt. Consequently, they were only partial skeptics ("a medias") rather than authentic skeptics.
    • Nature of Doubt: Doubt was temporary, methodical, and manipulated (duda metódica o amañada), rather than a genuine, permanent suspension of judgment.
    • Role of Argumentation: Academic skeptics actively sought arguments. The most notable example is René Descartes, whose argument of the cogito ergo sum rescued him from doubt and established certain knowledge.
    • Reference: M. Beuchot, "Sobre algunos aspectos de la 'argumentación' del escepticismo", Analogía, no. II/3, Mexico, 1988, pp. 83-91.

Epistemological Justification: Foundationalism vs. Anti-Foundationalism

  • Transition from Opinion to Knowledge:

    • Epistemology addresses how cognitive agents transition from mere opinion (mera opinión)—unverified claims—to strongly guaranteed, grounded, or justified knowledge (conocimiento fuertemente garantizado o fundamentado).
  • The Justification Spectrum:

    • Foundationalism (fundacionismo): Asserts that knowledge rests on basic, foundational beliefs.
    • Anti-Foundationalism (antifundacionismo): Denies the existence or necessity of basic foundational beliefs.
    • Moderate Foundationalism (fundacionismo moderado): Positioned as the optimal framework, as advocated by Ernesto Sosa.
    • References:
    • R. M. Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966, pp. 5 ff.
    • E. Sosa, "Más allá del escepticismo, a nuestro leal saber y entender", Cuadernos de documentación filosófica, year 1, no. 1, Rosario, Argentina, 1993, pp. 33-76.

Realism, Idealism, and the Scope of Knowledge

Text box contrasting Skepticism, Realism, Naive vs Critical, and Idealism

  • Core Philosophical Positions on Reality:

    • Skepticism: The denial or systematic doubt that reality can be known.
    • Idealism: Asserts that exterior reality cannot be directly known because all knowledge is purely conceptual and internal to the subject (conceptual e interno al sujeto).
    • Realism: Asserts that exterior reality existing independently of the subject can be known.
  • Forms of Realism:

    • Naive Realism (realismo ingenuo): Assumes that humans can know everything directly and easily. Naive realism collapses when confronted with errors of sensory perception, errors of logical reasoning, and the inherent limitations of human reason in practical matters.
    • Critical Realism (realismo crítico): The most defensible stance. It unifies sensory perception and reason by critically analyzing and sifting (cribar) our cognitive faculties and processes to establish their exact scope and boundaries.
  • Critical Realism vs. Cartesian Criticism:

    • Critical realism differs from standard Kantian/Cartesian criticism (criticismo tal cual). Unchecked Cartesian doubt risks devolving into idealism.
    • Critical realism operates by adopting the working hypothesis that reality is knowable, followed by a critical investigation to discover the limits and gaps of that knowledge.
    • Reference: M. Beuchot, Sobre el realismo y la verdad en el camino de la analogicidad, Universidad Pontificia de México, Mexico, 1998.

Refutation of Skepticism, Subjectivism, and Relativism

  • Self-Refutation of Alternative Initial Hypotheses:

    • Hypothesis of Unknown Knowledge: Stating "we cannot know whether we know or do not know" is self-refuting (autorrefutante). Claiming ignorance of whether we know actually asserts knowledge of one's own state of ignorance.
    • Frank Skeptical Hypothesis: Assuming at the outset that we know nothing in any way creates a dead-end position with no exit into knowledge.
    • Idealist Hypothesis: Traps the subject within internal mental representations, removing any path or doorway toward external reality.
  • Pragmatic and Logical Refutations:

    • Karl-Otto Apel: Formulated the argument of performative contradiction (contradicción performativa) or practical/pragmatic self-refutation (autorrefutación práctica o pragmática). Denying knowledge at the outset implicitly relies upon and asserts knowledge in the very act of denial.
    • Bertrand Russell: Highlighted the logical self-refutation of skepticism. When a skeptic asserts "Nothing is certain," they designate at least one proposition as certain: that nothing is certain.
    • Ludwig Wittgenstein: Declared skepticism to be unintelligible (ininteleptible), meaningless, and lacking sense. Because it functions as a metaphysical proposition, skepticism is devoid of meaning.
    • Mechanism of Self-Cancellation: Even proposing a suspension of judgment (epojé) or methodical doubt requires employing reason (i.e., knowing something beforehand), which automatically cancels the claim of absolute skepticism or doubt.
    • Reference: A. Tomasini Bassols, El pensamiento del último Wittgenstein, Trillas, Mexico, 1988, pp. 51 ff.
  • Self-Refutation of Subjectivism and Relativism:

    • Subjectivism: The statement "everything is subjective" asserts at least one objective fact: that everything is subjective.
    • Relativism: The statement "everything is relative" implies that the principle itself is relative, thereby revealing an underlying absolute. Claiming that everything is relative proclaims at least one absolute truth.
    • Implication for Absolutes: Acknowledging the logical structure of relativism opens the door to absolute truths and absolute values (verdades absolutas o valores absolutos), though these absolutes are restricted to a very small set of basic ideas, principles, and values.

Reason, Circularity, and Peirce's Concept of Abduction

  • The Problem of Circularity in Reason:

    • Evaluating whether reason is capable of knowing requires using reason itself.
    • Setting boundaries on reason necessitates employing reason.
    • Attempting to directly prove the reliability of reason involves unavoidable logical circularity (circularidad).
    • Epistemological Approach: Rather than attempting a circular direct proof of realism or knowledge, epistemology presupposes reason in order to analyze and criticize its boundaries.
  • The Presumption of Realism:

    • Starting from non-realism is a dead end (callejón sin salida) and is just as naive as naive realism.
    • Postulating the hypothesis of realism and continually testing/contrasting it represents a far more critical and rigorous methodology.
    • Entering into any theoretical stance—whether skeptical, idealist, subjectivist, or relativist—unavoidably presupposes realism.
  • Peirce's Concept of Abduction:

    • Abduction (abducción): Identified by Charles Sanders Peirce as the natural, spontaneous attitude and cognitive disposition that human beings experience through direct experience.
    • Abduction serves as the natural starting point for human inquiry and hypothesis formation.
    • Reference: S. Barrena, La razón creativa. Crecimiento y finalidad del ser humano según C. S. Peirce, Rialp, Madrid, 2007, pp. 80 ff.