Financial System, Saving and Investment – Comprehensive Notes

Introduction & Chapter Learning Goals

  • The chapter sets out 5 core objectives:
    1. Describe pivotal financial institutions in the Canadian economy.
    2. Link the financial system to key macro‐variables such as saving, investment, GDP growth.
    3. Build a supply–demand model for loanable funds.
    4. Apply the model to a variety of government policies.
    5. Assess how government budget deficits/surpluses ripple through the economy.
  • Narrative opener: You (a new econ-grad entrepreneur) must finance office computers, desks, etc.—illustrates how saving of one agent funds investment of another.

The Financial System in Broad Strokes

  • Core function: match savers (income > spending) with borrowers (spending > income).
  • Long-run growth link: More saving → larger capital stock → higher labour productivity → rising living standards.
  • Key coordination question: How does the economy equate the supply of funds from savers with the demand from investors? Answer ➜ institutions + the market interest rate.

Institutional Landscape in Canada

Key Regulators
  • OSFI (Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions): federal watchdog for banks, insurers, pension plans.
  • Provincial regulators: oversee credit unions, caisses populaires, mutual funds, securities dealers.
  • Bank of Canada: lender of last resort, monetary policy authority, regulator; coverage elaborated in Ch. 10.
Two Broad Institutional Categories
  1. Financial markets (direct finance).
  2. Financial intermediaries (indirect finance).

Financial Markets

1. Bond Market
  • Bond = certificate of indebtedness (IOU) specifying:
    • Date of maturity.
    • Coupon rate / periodic interest.
    • Principal repayment.
  • Important characteristics
    • Term (time to maturity): long-term bonds pay higher rates to compensate for greater price & liquidity risk (cf. British consol “perpetuity”).
    • Credit risk: probability of default.
      • Canadian federal bonds considered safest (ample tax capacity).
      • Provincial bonds riskier → higher yields; risk differs by province.
      • Corporate bonds pay still higher, esp. junk bonds (speculative grade).
    • Empirical snippet (Oct 2018, 2033–37 maturities):
      • Federal: 1.76%1.76\%; Ontario: 3.02%3.02\%; Loblaws Inc.: 5.06%5.06\%.
  • Bond ratings: Standard & Poor’s, Dominion Bond Rating Service, etc.
2. Stock Market
  • Stock = ownership claim; equity finance vs. debt finance (bonds).
  • Shareholders enjoy residual profits; bondholders receive fixed coupons and priority in distress → higher risk & potential return for stocks.
  • Exchanges
    • U.S.: NYSE, NASDAQ.
    • Canada: TSX; junior issues on TSX-V (Calgary).
  • How to read stock tables
    • Price (close, high, low, 52-week range).
    • Volume (daily turnover).
    • Dividend & dividend yield.
    • P/E ratio: Price/Earnings per share\text{Price}/\text{Earnings per share}; historical norm ≈ 15.
      • High P/E ⇢ optimism or overvaluation; low P/E ⇢ pessimism or undervaluation.
  • Stock indexes: Dow-Jones (30 U.S. giants, since 1896), S&P/TSX Composite (>200 firms). Serve as barometers of expected profitability & macro outlook.

Financial Intermediaries

1. Banks
  • Accept deposits, extend loans.
  • Earn the spread between deposit and loan rates.
  • Provide chequing medium of exchange, making wealth highly liquid (role revisited in monetary-system chapter).
2. Mutual Funds
  • Issue shares to public, use proceeds to buy a diversified portfolio of stocks/bonds.
  • Benefits
    • Diversification for small savers (“don’t put all your eggs in one basket”).
    • Professional management (although index funds—buying the whole market—often outperform after fees because of low turnover & management cost).
  • Fees: typically 0.5%3.0%0.5\%{-}3.0\% of assets annually.
Other intermediaries
  • Pension funds, insurance companies, credit unions, caisses populaires, loan sharks—diverse in form, unified in purpose (channel saving to investment).

FYI: Financial Institutions in Crisis (2007-09)

  • U.S. trigger: housing price collapse → sub-prime mortgage defaults → frozen interbank lending.
  • Global shock: Dow fell ~49 %; S&P/TSX ~44 %; GM bankruptcy (Jun 1 2009).
  • Canadian resilience: tighter mortgage regulation (Bank of Canada & OSFI) limited sub-prime exposure. Mark Carney appointed chair of FSB (2011).
  • Lesson: Transparency & effective regulation vital as instruments grow complex; systemic risk hurts savers, borrowers, employment, growth.

Core Identities (closed economy)
  • Y=C+I+GY = C + I + G (since NX=0NX = 0)
  • Rearranged: I=YCGSI = Y - C - G \equiv S (national saving).
  • Private saving: Sprivate=YTCS_{\text{private}} = Y - T - C.
  • Public saving: Spublic=TGS_{\text{public}} = T - G.
    • T>G ⇒ budget surplus (+ public saving).
    • T<G ⇒ budget deficit (negative public saving).
  • National saving: S=S<em>private+S</em>publicS = S<em>{\text{private}} + S</em>{\text{public}}.
  • Key macro fact: S=IS = I; the financial system must reconcile the two sides.
Distinguishing Terms
  • Saving (households forgo consumption, acquire assets) vs. Investment (purchase of new capital goods, incl. new housing).
    • Example: Buying corporate stock = saving, not investment from macro view; building a factory = investment.

The Market for Loanable Funds (Model)

  • Definition: hypothetical single market where supply = national saving; demand = planned investment.
  • Price variable: real interest rate rr (nominal minus inflation).
  • Supply curve: upward sloping (higher rr incentivises saving).
  • Demand curve: downward sloping (higher rr raises cost of capital → less investment).
  • Equilibrium: rr^* adjusts to equalise SS and II.
  • Shortage of funds (at low rr) → lenders raise rates; surplus (high rr) → rates fall.
  • Interpretative flexibility: Whether deficit shifts S leftward or D rightward is semantic; substance is identical—higher rr, lower private investment.

Policy Experiments Using the Model

1. Saving Incentives
  • Policies: GST (consumption tax), larger RRSP room, introduction of TFSA.
  • Effect ➜ supply curve S<em>1S</em>2S<em>1\rightarrow S</em>2 rightward.
    • rr falls (e.g., 5 → 4 %), II rises (e.g., 120 → 160 B).
  • Debate: Raises aggregate saving? Benefits skew to high-income households?
2. Investment Incentives
  • Example: Investment tax credit.
  • Demand curve D<em>1D</em>2D<em>1\rightarrow D</em>2 rightward.
    • rr rises (5 → 6 %), inducing more household saving (movement along S), II increases (120 → 140 B).
3. Government Budget Balance
  • Budget deficit: reduces public saving ⇒ supply left shift S<em>1S</em>2S<em>1\rightarrow S</em>2.
    • rr rises (5 → 6 %), private investment crowds out (120 → 80 B).
  • Budget surplus: opposite: S shifts right, rr down, investment up → fosters growth.
  • Dynamic feedbacks
    Vicious circle: persistent deficits → slower growth → lower tax base → larger deficits.
    Virtuous circle: surpluses → higher growth → rising revenue → larger surpluses.

Canadian Debt Case Study

  • 1975-1997: consecutive federal deficits; federal debt-to-GDP climbed to ~73 % (1996).
  • 1997-2008: surpluses; ratio fell to 32 % (2009).
  • Post-2009: recession → renewed deficits; ratio stabilised near 36 % (2014-18).
  • Provinces: debt-to-GDP about 6 % pre-1982 ➜ ~30 % by 2000; after respite, rising again post-2009.
  • Aggregate (all levels): ~64 % of GDP in 2018.
  • Creditworthiness: Canada retains triple-A with major agencies; U.S. & U.K. have lost at least one AAA.
FYI: Measuring Debt More Broadly
  • Net debt = liabilities – financial assets (federal net debt 2017: 714\text{ B}$).
  • Unfunded liabilities (implicit promises) ≠ captured in net-debt stats.
    • Demographics → rising health-care costs (44 % of public health spending for 65+).
    • Public sector pension plans (federal unfunded liability ≈ 246\text{ B}$ in 2018).

Ethical, Philosophical, Practical Themes

  • Inter‐generational equity: deficits shift tax burden to future taxpayers.
  • Regulation vs. innovation: need balance to foster transparency without stifling financial creativity.
  • Diversification principle: mitigate idiosyncratic risk; raises question of employer-stock concentration risk for workers.

Connections & Real-World Relevance

  • Builds directly on Ch. 7 growth theory (saving → capital accumulation).
  • Provides analytical scaffold for later chapters on money (banks as money creators) & fiscal–monetary interactions.
  • Historical episodes (2007-09 crisis, Canadian deficit cycles) ground the abstract model in lived macro outcomes.

Key Formulae & Numerical Anchors

  • Output identity (closed): Y=C+I+GY = C + I + G.
  • Saving identities:
    S=YCGS = Y - C - G
    S=(YTC)+(TG)=S<em>private+S</em>publicS = (Y - T - C) + (T - G) = S<em>{\text{private}} + S</em>{\text{public}}.
  • Equality: S=IS = I.
  • Real vs. nominal rate: r=iπr = i - \pi.

Core Vocabulary (must-know)

  • Financial system, financial market, bond, stock, financial intermediary, mutual fund, national saving, private/public saving, budget surplus/deficit, market for loanable funds, crowding out, vicious/virtuous circle, government net debt.

Chapter Take-Aways

  • Financial institutions efficiently allocate scarce resources across time & agents.
  • National saving is the well-spring of investment; policies altering saving or investment incentives manifest through the loanable-funds market.
  • Persistent deficits can jeopardise growth via higher interest rates and crowded-out capital formation; sustained surpluses can generate the opposite virtuous dynamic.
  • Sound regulation and transparency are pre-conditions for the financial system to function as an effective intermediary—crises underscore this necessity.