The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Brush with Annihilation

The Cuban Missile Crisis: Near-Annihilation and Lessons Learned

Contrasting Stances and Initial Communications

  • Kennedy's Objective: President Kennedy aimed to prevent the United States from entering a war, a goal shared by the speaker (I was trying to help him keep us out of war).

  • General Curtis LeMay's Stance: General LeMay, under whom the speaker served in World War II, advocated for an aggressive approach, specifically stating, let's totally destroy Cuba.

  • Khrushchev's Dual Messages:

    • First (Soft) Message: This message, appearing to be dictated under stress or while inebriated (dictated by a man who was either drunk or under tremendous stress), offered a guarantee: if you'll guarantee you won't invade Cuba, we'll take the missiles out.

    • Second (Hard) Message: Received before a response to the first, this message was dictated by a bunch of hardliners. It effectively warned: if you attack, we're prepared to confront you with masses of military power.

The Wisdom of Empathy: Tommy Thompson's Counsel

  • Tommy Thompson's Background: A former U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Thompson and his wife had a personal relationship with Khrushchev and his wife, having literally lived with Khrushchev and his wife upon occasion.

  • Thompson's Recommendation: Despite the president's initial skepticism (We can't do that. It'll get us nowhere.), Thompson urged Kennedy to respond to the soft message.

  • Thompson's Rationale (Empathy):

    • Thompson believed Khrushchev's gotten himself in a hell of a fix.

    • He reasoned that Khrushchev would be looking for a way out, specifically if I can get out of this with a deal that I can say to the Russian people, Kennedy was gonna destroy Castro, and I prevented it.

    • Thompson, understanding Khrushchev's mindset, was confident he would accept such a deal, and Thompson was right.

  • The Principle of Empathy: The speaker emphasizes the critical importance of empathy: We must try to put ourselves inside their skin and look at us through their eyes just to understand the thoughts that lie behind their decisions and their actions.

Influences on Soviet and Cuban Perspectives

  • Khrushchev's Advisers: They insisted that there can be no deal unless you somewhat reduce the pressure on us when you ask us to reduce the pressure on you.

  • Bay of Pigs Invasion: The failed U.S. attempt to invade Cuba (Bay Of Pigs) undoubtedly influenced our thinking and, more significantly, the thinking from a Cuban and a Russian point of view.

  • Assassination Attempts on Castro: The U.S. had made attempts to assassinate Castro under Eisenhower and under Kennedy and later under Johnson. This fact, unknown to the speaker at the time, was known to the Cubans and Russians.

  • Calls for Invasion: Additionally, major voices in The US were calling for invasion.

Khrushchev's Profound Warning on War

  • The Rope and Knots of War Metaphor: In his first message, Khrushchev articulated a powerful warning:
    We and you are not pulling the ends of a rope, which you have tied the knots of war. Because the more the tool is pulled, the tighter the knot will be tied. And then it'll be necessary to cut that knot. And what that would mean is not for me to explain to you.

  • Personal Experience of War: Khrushchev conveyed his understanding of war's destructive nature:
    I have participated in two wars and know that war ends when it is rolled through cities and villages everywhere sowing death and destruction. For such is the logic of war. If people do not display wisdom, they will clash like blind moles, and then mutual annihilation will commence.

The Role of Luck and Lingering Danger

  • Near-Miss: The speaker states emphatically that we lucked out. It was luck that prevented nuclear war. We came that close to nuclear war again.

  • Rationality vs. Annihilation: Despite all leaders involved — Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro — being rational individuals, they came that close to total destruction of their societies. This danger exists today.

  • Major Lesson: The fundamental lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis is that The indefinite combination of human fallibility and nuclear weapons will destroy nations.

  • Current Nuclear Arsenal: The speaker questions the morality of 7,500 strategic offensive nuclear warheads, of which 2,500 are a 15-minute alert to be launched by the decision of one human being.

Shocking Revelations from Fidel Castro (19921992)

  • Discovery of Nuclear Presence: In January 19921992, during a meeting chaired by Castro in Havana, the speaker learned that in October 19621962, there were 42 nuclear warheads, including 90 tactical warheads on the island during the crisis.

  • Speaker's Reaction: The speaker was incredulous (I couldn't believe what I was hearing) and interjected, requesting to pause the meeting as this information was totally new to me.

  • Questions to Castro: The speaker posed three critical questions:

    1. Did you know the nuclear warheads were there?

    2. If you did, would you have recommended to Khrushchev in the face of The US attack that he used them?

    3. If he had used them, what would happen to Cuba?

  • Castro's Staggering Answers:

    1. I knew they were there.

    2. I would not have recommended the Khrushchev. I did recommend the Khrushchev that they'd be used. (Castro affirmed he would have advised their use).

    3. What would happen to Cuba? We would have totally destroyed.

  • Willingness to Accept Destruction: Castro was willing to accept that level of destruction for Cuba. He equated it to Kennedy's potential actions in a similar scenario: mister Ratmire, if you and president Kennedy had been in a similar situation, that's what you would have done. The speaker deeply hoped we would not have done it.

US Strategic Advantage and Internal Disagreement

  • Nuclear Superiority: At the time, the U.S. had a 17 to 1 strategic advantage in nuclear numbers and had conducted 10 times as many tests as they had.

  • Test Restrictions: The U.S. believed it could retain this advantage if tests were limited.

  • Chiefs' Opposition: The military chiefs were all opposed to limiting tests, asserting somebody's gonna cheat.

  • Absurd Justification for Continued Testing: When asked how will they cheat?, the chiefs responded, test them behind the moon. The speaker dismissed this as absurd.

  • Historical Empathy Challenge: The speaker notes that it's almost impossible for our people today to put themselves back into that period.

Personal Experience and Extreme Warfare Planning

  • Near-War Incidents: As Secretary of Defense for 7 years, the speaker recounts we came within a hair's breadth of war with Soviet Union on three different occasions.

  • Living the Cold War: His role meant experiencing the Cold War 24 hours a day, 365 days a year for 7 years.

  • 100100 Megaton Bomb: During the Kennedy administration, a 100-megaton bomb was designed and tested in the atmosphere.