Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I-II

Aristotle (384-322 BCE) was Greek, but not an Athenian like Socrates and Plato. He

was rather a ‘foreigner’ who came to Athens from Macedonia to study with Plato at

Plato’s school, the Academy. After Plato’s death in 347, he returned to Macedonia to

become tutor to the young Alexander the Great. In 334 he founded his own

philosophical school in Athens, called the Lyceum. He was eventually forced to leave

Athens for political reasons and died in 322.

Aristotle produced many works during his lifetime, including philosophical

dialogues, most of which have been lost. What survived are more specialized or

esoteric works probably written for his students at the Lyceum. The text we’re

reading, the Nicomachean Ethics, is one of these.

Aristotle was the first to develop formal tools for doing philosophy and use them

systematically to solve philosophical problems. He also developed logic from a set

of informal procedures into a powerful formal system, insisting on the neutrality of

logic with respect to all other fields of philosophy. Unlike Plato, who thought

philosophy deals with abstract ideas, Aristotle was more interested in investigating

the nature of concrete things – the trees and tables and ships and horses we see

around us every day. He concedes that Plato’s ideas might be more knowable per se,

or in themselves, but not to us. That is because for Aristotle, human knowledge

comes from our senses and actual experience of the world, not by intuiting the

eternal forms of things with our minds.

Aristotle’s more empirical approach to philosophy is evident at the very beginning

of our text, where he remarks, “the good has rightly been declared to be that at

which all things aim” (Nicomachean Ethics I.1; online eText). This is a platitude

rather than a question or a puzzle– something he thinks everyone would accept as a

starting point; likewise, it is supposed to be totally uncontroversial when Aristotle

claims at NE I.4 that most people regard happiness as the highest good, even if they

disagree about what makes one happy. He proceeds to test these common-sense

observations, always with an eye to our nature and capacities as human beings,

almost like a modern-day scientist.

Book I

Chapter 1

All human activities aim at some good, although some goods are subordinate

to others (bridle-making is a good for “the art of riding,” which is presumably

a good for ends like waging war, commerce, and recreation).2

o Q: Is waging war, or commerce, or recreation an end-in-itself? If not,

what is the higher end? What do we do it for?

Aristotle thinks everything has a purpose or end or something it is for; this is

represented in his philosophy via the concept of final causality, also known as

teleology (from the Gk.  or telos = end).

Chapter 2

The science of the good for human beings is politics: by this, Aristotle means a

body of knowledge that is both practical and normative, telling us how to

organize our personal and collective lives.

Aristotle notes that the good “of the state seems at all events something

greater and more complete whether to attain or preserve” than the good of

an individual person (NE I.2; online eText). So the good of the state is

greater than that of the individual.

Chapter 3

Aristotle tells us not to expect more precision than the subject matter allows.

Ethics is not like mathematics and so it won’t have simple, final answers that

are completely right (or wrong).

o Q: Who is Aristotle criticizing here? If you said ‘Socrates, Plato, and

the philosophical definition crowd’, you’d be right!

Aristotle insists that life experience is crucial for knowledge of the good;

young people are too easily swayed by passion to make good judgements in

ethics!

Chapter 4

First platitude: everyone agrees that the highest of all goods is happiness

(Gk. eudaimonia), the activity of “living well and doing well”.

But there is disagreement about how to achieve happiness: some say we

should seek pleasure; others say wealth, or honour. But the answer also

changes depending on the circumstances of the individual: those who are ill

identify it with health, those who are poor with wealth, and so on.

Note that while Aristotle starts with common sense beliefs, he does not stop

with them. People’s unexamined beliefs are all over the place, and so

philosophy must be employed to examine them and find out which are true.

Chapter 5

Aristotle identifies three kinds of human life: (i) the “life of enjoyment,” (ii)

the political life, and (iii) the contemplative life.

He dismisses the life of pleasure or enjoyment as too “slavish” and more

“suitable to beasts”, whereas those who pursue the political life do so

because they seek to be honoured. But honour isn’t secure because it

requires other people to bestow it; still, the fact that people are honoured for

their virtue tells us that “virtue is better”, that is, a higher good than honour.3

Aristotle pauses for a moment to consider the problem that you don’t cease

to be a virtuous person when you are asleep, or even while suffering

misfortunes that make you unhappy. So how can virtue be an activity? But

he doesn’t try to resolve this yet.

Aristotle also sets aside discussion of the contemplative life until later, in

Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics.

Chapter 6

Aristotle’s criticism of Plato: “Forms have been introduced by our friends

<i.e., Plato and his followers at the Academy>”, but they’re abstract and

eternal, whereas the good we’re looking for is here and now, a quality of

particular things. That good should also be attainable by us.

Plato didn’t show how the Forms or ideas are related to each other, whereas

Aristotle wants to figure out how goods are ordered: which ones we seek to

get other things we desire and which ones we seek for themselves.

o For more on Plato’s ideas or Forms, watch the short film “The Cave”

posted on our eClass site.

Chapter 7

Lots of things are instrumentally good because they get us something else

that is good (consider money, which has almost zero value in itself but which

is valuable for acquiring other goods). But the ultimate or final good is that

for the sake of which everything else is done.

What kind of good is “always desirable in itself and never for the sake of

something else”? Answer: happiness. All other things are chosen for the

sake of happiness (eudaimonia). For this reason, happiness is also said to be

self-sufficient.

The Human Function Argument: Aristotle contends that we can get a

“clearer account” if we figure out what our function is. This function must be

proper or “peculiar” to us as humans, not shared with other things (which

excludes the life of sensory pleasure, since it is common to us and non-human

animals). Our proper function must be unique to us.

The function of human beings is an “activity of the soul” according to reason;

this is our particular excellence, or virtue (Gk. arete – Plato used this word

too!)

Aristotle emphasizes that he is merely providing an outline here and that

he’ll fill in the details in later books. He is a careful, methodical philosopher.

Book II

Chapter 1

Aristotle says, “states of character arise out of like activities” (NE II.1; online

eText). Nobody becomes good without actually doing something.

This is a crucial point: moral virtue is something we acquire, by

practicing it, and the same is true of vice, or moral badness.4

Acting morally is accordingly like being a good builder or lyre-player; these

involve know-how rather than know-that (where what comes after the ‘that’

is a philosophical definition).

Chapter 2

Again, Aristotle emphasizes that he is not after a philosophical definition:

“ the present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the others

(for we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to

become good, since otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use)” (NE

II.2; online eText)

Ethics from this practical perspective involves figuring out how to produce

habits, or states of character, that are praiseworthy: virtues like courage and

temperance

Aristotle gives us a hint: usually the good lies on a mean between excess

and deficiency; for example, courage is the state of character between

cowardice (too little) and rashness (too much)

Chapter 3

Aristotle turns to the question of motive or what causes us to act (he is

nothing if not a good observer of the natural world, including human

society): virtues (and vices) are established and reinforced by the pleasures

and pains that result from activity. So, “the man who abstains from bodily

pleasures and delights in this very fact is temperate, while the man who is

annoyed at it is self-indulgent, and he who stands his ground against things

that are terrible and delights in this or at least is not pained is brave,

while the man who is pained is a coward” (NE II.3; online eText)

How an action feels determines whether we do it again.

This offers an important clue about how to make someone good or virtuous:

we must make what is noble or advantageous pleasant to do!

Chapter 4

Aristotle here gives a kind of philosophical definition of virtue, but it is also

contextual (he thinks circumstances are important in ethics and that Plato

missed this): The agent must be “in a certain condition” when acting

virtuously: “in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must

choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action

must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character” (NE II.4; online

eText). Note: knowledge is necessary but not sufficient for virtue!

Another dig at Plato: “most people …do not do these [good actions], but take

refuge in theory and think they are being philosophers and will become good

in this way, behaving somewhat like patients who listen attentively to their

doctors, but do none of the things they are ordered to do. As the latter will

not be made well in body by such a course of treatment, the former will not

be made well in soul by such a course of philosophy” (ibid.).5

Chapter 5

Virtue is a state of character in the soul, rather than a passion or faculty;

we can’t help feeling passions like joy, envy, hatred, or pity, and in the same

way, it doesn’t make sense to praise or blame people for their ability to feel

these passions; therefore, virtue must be about how we choose to act on the

basis of such feelings. How are we moved by what we feel?

Chapter 6

Further, virtue is a state of character that makes us good and makes us do

our work well. Virtue is also said to be on a mean, or ‘intermediate’ between

two extremes (see ch. 2 above), and will vary relative to the subject, just as

the right amount of meat for Milo the wrestler is more than for you or me.

Aristotle’s official definition of virtue: “Virtue, then, is a state of

character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us,

this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which

the man of practical wisdom would determine it” (NE II.6; online eText)

o Q: What limitations are introduced when Aristotle defines virtue in

this way? Is the right thing to do always on a mean?