Terrorism and counter terrorism in the UK - Lecture 4
Defining terrorism
In this Act “terrorism“ means the use or threat of action where
The action falls within subsection
The use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public
The use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause
Action falls within the subsection if it:
Involves serious violence against a person
Involves serious damage to property
Endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action
Creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public
Is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system
Terrorism Act 2006
Sections 5: Preparation for acts of terrorism;
Section 6 and 8: Providing and receiving training;
Section 11: Membership of a proscribed organisation;
Sections 15 to 18: Fundraising offences;
Section 57: Possession of articles for terrorist purpose;
Section 58: Possession of information likely to be useful to a terrorist
Section 1: Encouragement of terrorism
Section 2: Dissemination of terrorist publications
Section 3: The glorification of the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or generally) of such acts or such offences
Terrorism statistics (Home office, 2025)
Sharp increase in terrorism-related arrests:
1,886 arrests for terrorism-related activity in the year ending 30 September 2025, representing a rise of 660% compared with the previous year (248)
Impact of Palestine Action proscription:
1,630 arrests out of 1,886 (86%) were linked to supporting Palestine Action, following its proscription on 5 July 2025
Other terrorism-related arrests:
of the remaining 256 arrests, a rise of 3% when compared to the previous year, 76 occurred in the most recent quarter July to September 2025, a rise of 21% compared with April to June 2025 (63)
demographic shift driven by Palestine Action arrests:
arrests linked to Palestine Action, where sex is known, were 4.4 times more likely to be female and have considerably altered the age profile of arrests in this period; arrests linked to supporting Palestine Action had an average age of 57 compared to 30 for non-Palestine Action linked arrests
Among arrests unrelated to Palestine Action, minors accounted for 20% (52 of 256); this is broadly consistent with previous years, though the absolute number (52) is the highest recorded to date
Categorising Terrorist Activities
‘Low Sophistication Attacks’
Terrorist activities that require little planning and typically involve weapons made from everyday appliances/objects
Knife attacks
Van/car ramming
Homemade explosives (e.g. peroxide, slow cookers, fairy lights)
Guns (typically stolen)
Term used by UK Counter Terror Police, Low Sophistication Attacks pose the greatest terrorist threat to the UK today
New Terrorism’
Low sophistication: Exeter 2008
22 May 2008 – Nicky Reilly (Mohamed Abdulaziz Rashid Saeed-Alim) failed in an attempt to launch a suicide bomb attack at the Giraffe restaurant in Exeter
Diners in the restaurant heard a loud bang in the toilets
On investigation, Reilly was found covered in acid having inadvertently detonated one of the bombs in a toilet cubicle
Police were called and evacuated the area, finding another explosive device nearby
Low sophistication: Parsons Green 2017
On 15 September 2017, 18-year-old Iraqi asylum seeker Ahmed Hassan boarded a District Line train on the London Underground
While the train was stopped at Parsons Green station, a ‘bucket bomb’ that had been left on the train partially exploded
Around thirty people were taken to hospital for burns and other similar
injuriesThe following day, Hassan was arrested in the Port of Dover attempting to leave the country
Hassan illegally arrived in the UK in 2015 claiming to be an unaccompanied minor
There is conflicting evidence as to whether Hassan had links to ISIS
High sophistication: Manchester 1996
In June 1996, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) detonated a 1,500- kilogram lorry bomb on Corporation Street in the centre of Manchester
The largest bomb detonated in the UK since WWII
Targeting the city's infrastructure and economy, the damage caused was estimated by insurers to be £700 million (equivalent to £1.3 billion today)
Only 9/11 and the IRA’s bombing of Bishopsgate in 1993 cost more
The IRA gave a warning 90 minutes beforehand
75,000 people were evacuated, 20 people injured - zero fatalities
Categorising terrorist Activities
High Sophistication attacks
Planning, preparation, collaboration, co-operation
Posses a lesser riak to the UK today but likely to cause more atrocities than low sophistication attacks
‘Old terrorism‘
The CONTEST Strategy
Following the attacks on 9/11, the British Government was catalysed to develop a realm of policy measures and approaches that sought to counter the threat posed by terrorism and the extremist ideologies that were seen to be underpinning them
CONTEST was introduced in 2003 although it was only after 7/7 that it was bolstered and sought to be ‘mainstreamed’
It was duly revised in 2009, 2011 and 2018
CONTEST was an acronym originally drawn from Counter-Terrorism Strategy
CONTEST aims "to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence” (HM Government, 2018)
Its aim has been referred to among practitioners as an approach that seeks the ‘preservation of normality’
Sought to embed a more ‘joined up’ approach – both domestic and transnational
The 4 Ps
PURSUE
Stopping terrorist attacks “In this country against our interests overseas“ through co-ordinating security services to gather intelligence and disrupt terrorist plans
EG. house raids, surveillance
PREVENT
Responding to “the ideological challenge of terrorism“ and preventing people being radicalised towards terrorism
‘Defuse‘ terrorism at its apparent root
Channel part of PREVENT, those identified as vulnerable to being drawn towards terrorism referred to panels to be ‘supported‘ through a de-radicalisation plan
PROTECT
To “strengthen the UK’s protection against a terrorist attack“ by fortifying its infrastructure, borders and transport system
PREPARE
To “mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack where that attack cannot be stopped“.
Damage control and recovery from an attack
CONTEST Strategy: Context
Gearson & Rosemont 2015, p.1039
“…discussions over the effectiveness of British CT [counter-terrorism] policy have become polarized, and arguably represent a clear case of where terrorism research more generally has genuinely become stagnant.
On one hand, some of the fierce criticism that has been levelled toward the U.K. authorities' CT efforts has appeared harsh, if not exaggerated; prominent civil liberties campaigners' assertions that the country's measures resemble the arrangements found in totalitarian states such as North Korea, for example, appear off the mark.
By contrast, it is also fair to observe that the praise CONTEST has often received in both domestic and international security policymaking circles may have served to conceal its limitations in strategic terms—as will be shown, important aspects of the strategy are far from being fully addressed.
Indeed, we would go so far as to suggest that, had CONTEST's evolution been more strategic from the outset, some of the difficulties and problems now facing British CT practitioners might have already been substantially mitigated, if not largely avoided”
CONTEST Strategy: Success or failure?
Gearson & Rosemont 2015, pp.1054-5
“…it is the prevention of fatalities (and casualties more broadly) in the United Kingdom that remains what matters most to counterterrorism practitioners working in the security and intelligence agencies; not discussions on the merits and limitations of strategy in this context, important as these may be.
Accepting this logic, those implementing CONTEST appear to have decided not to fundamentally reform the strategy because it is apparently ‘what works’ in countering terrorism.
This does not mean to say that terrorism and its underpinning ideology has been ‘prevented’ or even effectively challenged, as a truly strategic approach might advocate, or that this is not an equally important policy objective…
…any belief that CONTEST has succeeded is a narrow reading of the aim—the risk of terrorism can hardly be said to have been reduced and public concerns about terrorism remain high”
The PREVENT Strategy
It was only after the 7/7 terror attacks on London’s public transport system was the PREVENT strand introduced and ‘mainstreamed’
PREVENT claims to offset the risk of terrorism by challenging its apparent roots – i.e. the underlying ‘extremist ideology/ies’ and the people who may be ‘vulnerable’ to them
This approach infers the relationship between extremism and terrorism is something akin to ‘conveyor belt’ – a theory that has been largely discredited by a wide range of figures and experts
Necessary to remember that unlike terrorism which includes an ‘action’, extremism can be mere ‘thinking’ albeit with or without a subsequent or associated ‘action’
Basic approach
Legislation
Prosecution
Incarceration
Prevent approach
Actual and/or perceived vulnerability
Referral
Pre-criminal intervention
De-radicalisation
Conveyor Belt Theory
Estudios Estratégicos y Políticas de Seguridad y Defensa, 2018
Pre-radicalisation
Background factors
Meeting places (Opportunity)
Conversion and identification
Conversion
Identification
Triggers
Meeting places
Conviction and indoctrination
Conviction
Catayst
Meeting places
Action
Action
Reinforcement
Key components
Meeting places
The PREVENT Strategy: CHANNEL
The CHANNEL programme was introduced in 2007
In essence, CHANNEL is PREVENT’s ‘early detection system’
CHANNEL involves those identified as being ‘vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism’ being referred to multi-agency panels (police, youth workers, healthcare and education providers)
CHANNEL panels provide voluntary support to ‘de-radicalise’ them, possibly involving behavioural plans and ‘ideological/theological support’
CHANNEL has been made statutory for specified authorities (including universities)
Frontline staff (lecturers, social workers etc) are expected to look out for signs of vulnerability when undertaking their professional duties
PREVENT referrals (Home office, 2025)
8,778 referrals made to Prevent in the year ending 31 March 2025 (21% increase on 2024)
the education sector 3,129 referrals, accounting for 36% of all referrals this year
individuals aged 11 to 15 accounted for the largest proportion (36%) of referrals
as in previous years, most referrals were male (7,605; 89%)
‘Extreme Right-Wing’ concerns accounted for 21% (1,798) of referrals, higher than those related to ‘Islamist Extremism’ (10%; 870); compared with the previous year, the proportion of referrals for ‘Extreme Right-Wing’ concerns increased (up from 19%; 1,314 of 6,921), while the proportion for ‘Islamist Extremism’ decreased (down from 13%; 913 of 6,921)
the ‘no ideology’ type of concern accounted for the largest proportion of referrals (4,917; 56%)
around one-third of Prevent referrals (2,955 of 8,778) had at least one mental health or neurodiversity (MHND) condition recorded
Mixed unclear or unstable (MUU)
At its most straightforward, MUU refers to the worldview of those for whom there is a combination of different elements taken from multiple ideologies (mixed), that shift asymmetrically between them (unstable), and who do not present a coherent ideology yet may still pose a terrorism risk (unclear)
While MUU is applied to those who do not necessarily fit too easily into traditional and/or historical categories relating to ideologies, evidence from counter-terrorism practitioners has begun to identify certain trends and similarities among them
These include being strongly influenced by previous high-profile cases of mass violence and expressing adulation for mass killers including terrorists and school shooters
So too do they express a morally accepting attitude towards violence and mass murder, often in conjunction with a generalised or specific hatred towards a particular group of people
In addition, violence is justified as being necessary as a means of righting a perceived wrong and/or in response to personal (and at times, group) grievances
Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015: PRevent Duty
‘Prevent’ is one strand of the UK Government’s counter-terrorism strategy and is commonly referred to as the counter-extremism strategy
Among others, Prevent claims to offset the risk of terrorism by challenging its apparent roots – i.e. the underlying ‘extremist ideology/ies’
It necessary to remember that unlike terrorism which includes an ‘action’, extremism can be mere ‘thinking’ albeit with or without a subsequent or associated ‘action
Under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, the Government made significant changes to Prevent including the introduction of the ‘Prevent Duty’
The Prevent Duty is a statutory duty which requires Relevant Higher Education Bodies (RHEBs) to have due regard to the need to prevent people being drawn into terrorism and support and protect those who might be susceptible to being drawn into terrorism
PREVENT in Transformation
PREVENT has undergone various iterations - move to a more ‘top-down’, sector-driven implementation as opposed to being based in communities (PREVENT 2.0)
‘No ungoverned spaces’ – strategy identified mosques, universities and other similar spaces as being in need of greater scrutiny (Prevent Statutory Duty)
‘Safeguarding’ – required closer co-operation between welfare function of safeguarding (e.g. healthcare, education etc) and that of PREVENT
Marked shift towards clamping down on ‘non-violent extremists’ and ‘apologists’ and ‘propagandists’ for terrorism
A less nuanced stance adopted on what/who constitutes ‘extremists’
Need to adhere to ‘fundamental British values’ seen as the litmus test to decide who were ‘acceptable’ to engage with and also fund
Criticising PREVENT: Statutory Duty
Allen (2017) ‘Is PREVENT Harming Universities?’
Via the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, the Government made significant changes to Prevent including the creation of a new statutory duty
British universities were identified as ‘special authorities’ because the government believed they were uniquely placed to prevent people from being drawn into violent extremism and terrorism
Accordingly, universities were duly required to provide specialist counter-terror training for staff, carry out risk assessments on students identified as being vulnerable to extremist ideologies, and provide appropriate welfare programmes for them
The rationale was that those working within universities would be best placed to see ‘changes’ in behaviour and outlook among those being radicalised or at least vulnerable to becoming so
PREVENT: Positive change
Allen (2017) ‘Challenges and Changes in relation to Preventing Violent Extremism in Birmingham’
“Some stakeholders did question the extent to which negative perceptions about PREVENT…were commonly held among Muslim communities, especially among Muslims with a younger demographic. As some stakeholders explained, many young Muslims did not have a detailed understanding of PREVENT…Likewise, because young people had grown up in a post-9/11, post ‘war on terror’ world, so
the relevance and resonance of such events were far less significant and determinative for them than they maybe were for older and possibly more politically astute individuals. Some suggested that because this was the ‘norm’ for many young Muslims, it likely diluted the significance of some of the criticisms cited previously about PREVENT in particular.” (p.4)
Allen (2017) ‘Challenges and Changes in relation to Preventing Violent Extremism in Birmingham’
“there was a shared view that some change was already evident in the city about perceptions of PREVENT…Aligning this with the start of the Syrian civil war, some spoke about how the safeguarding aspect of PREVENT had had a positive impact through stopping a number of individuals from travelling to the Middle East. This positive impact was especially evident among the families of those who were stopped. As it was explained, PREVENT interventions not only meant that loved ones were stopped from travelling to a war zone and being potentially killed but so too did the interventions also avoid them from the potential of having their homes raided, being arrested and subsequently imprisoned” (p.3)
PREVENT: Independent review
Findings from the Independent Review published February 2023 included 34 recommendations
The Home Secretary, Suella Braverman immediately announced that all 34 would be “swiftly” implemented – in the next 12 months
Need to refocus PREVENT on Islamist-inspired extremism
Understandings of what constitutes Extreme Right Wing have been disproportionately applied
Need to expand the Prevent Statutory Duty to job centres and immigration centres
Fundamental British values remain valid
Criticisms of PREVENT are “untrue” and “grotesque insult[s]”
Incel ideologies are not extremist
Hindu nationalist (Hindutva) ideologies are unproblematic and caused by anti-India/Indian sentiment shared by Pakistani clerics