Kiseskey v. Carpenters' Trust for Southern California

Court: Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four
Date: June 22, 1983
Case Number: Civ. No. 66721
Reporter: 144 Cal. App. 3d 222; 192 Cal. Rptr. 492; 1983 Cal. App. LEXIS 1865

Respondents' petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied on August 18, 1983.
The court reversed the judgment, allowing for potential punitive damages due to intentional infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium.

Plaintiffs sought review from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County due to a dismissal based on the statute of limitations against a union for the intentional infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium.

The appeal focused on whether the statute of limitations commenced before the actual accrual of emotional distress, which was treated as a question of fact; hence it could not be determined at the demurrer stage of trial.

For Plaintiffs and Appellants: Boies & O'Rourke, Ronald K. Miyamoto, Jeffery D. Palumbo
For Defendants and Respondents: Haight, Dickson, Brown & Bonesteel, Roy G. Weatherup, Robert L. Washburn

First Cause of Action: Intentional infliction of emotional distress alleged against union representatives who insulted and threatened Kiseskey's life unless he signed a new agreement with the union.
Second Cause of Action: Loss of consortium by Susan Kiseskey due to her husband's injuries arising from the defendants' actions.
Specific dates and threats made by union representatives were mentioned, indicating a continuous course of conduct meant to intimidate and cause emotional distress to Peter Kiseskey.

Defendants claimed to execute tasks and act within their employment scope.
Specific instances of verbal threats included:
- October 17, 1977: Threat based on Kiseskey’s potential hospitalization if he did not comply with union demands.
- November 20, 1977: Warning of potential physical harm to Kiseskey if he did not rejoin the union.
- December 20, 1977: Threats regarding the safety of Kiseskey and his children.
Allegations also pointed to emotional distress leading to Kiseskey suffering a heart attack on January 9, 1978.
Plaintiffs sought punitive damages citing the defendants' actions as malicious and intentionally harmful.

Contention 1: The statute of limitations for intentional infliction of emotional distress is one year per California Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (3).
Contention 2: The statute does not commence until the cause of action accrues.
Contention 3: A cause of action is believed to accrue only after severe emotional distress arises from the outrageous conduct of the defendant.
Contention 4: The existence of outrageous conduct is a fact to be determined by a jury, not at the demurrer stage.
Contention 5: The trial court's dismissal based on statute of limitations was prejudicial error, as emotional distress severity must be assessed individually and not preemptively resolved in favor of the defendants.

Contest allegations based on previous complaints.
Assert that emotional distress claims do not constitute a proximate cause of injury.
Maintain that plaintiffs' claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations, as the acts allegedly causing distress occurred over a year prior to the filing of the original complaint.

Acknowledgment that general demurrers are not to be sustained unless the complaint clearly fails to state a cause of action based on assumed facts.
Legal precedents are referenced to support the premise that factual assertions must be assumed as true in demurrer evaluations.
The court's ruling indicates that the plaintiffs adequately alleged facts constituting outrageous conduct based on their experiences with union representatives.
The court underscored critical elements required to establish intentional infliction of emotional distress as per California law:
- Outrageous conduct by defendants.
- Intent to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of inflicting emotional distress.
- Significant emotional suffering.
- Actual and proximate causation of the distress.

The court ultimately determined that the accusations of severe emotional distress and outrageous conduct were sufficiently alleged, and thus the court reversed the dismissal order.
The distinction between mere insults and actionable outrageous conduct was emphasized, confirming the court's position on evaluating the case holistically rather than relegating it to rudimentary insults.
The right to seek damages for both the emotional distress and the resulting heart condition was upheld, setting a favorable precedent for plaintiffs in similar cases.

The plaintiffs adequately pled the case for punitive damages against Carpenters' Trust based on the actions of its employees, with allegations supporting intentional and malicious conduct.
The interpretation of terms such as "permission and consent" was elaborated upon, indicating a sufficient basis for punitive actions to be taken against the principal for the conduct of its agents.

The judgment and order for dismissal were reversed, allowing the case to proceed in court for further examination and potential remedies for the plaintiffs involved.