Chapter 5 Notes: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Measurement

Box 5.1: States, Governments, and Regimes

  • Distinction among state, government, and regime

    • State: centralized political entity that uses coercion to rule a territory; includes institutions like bureaucracy, judiciary, military (e.g., “the state” of France, Iran, Malaysia, India).

    • Government: the set of people who run the state or act on its behalf at a given time; the means through which state power is exercised (e.g., US, Saudi Arabia, Japan in Feb 2023).

    • Regime: the set of rules, norms, or institutions that determine how the government is constituted, organized, and how major decisions are made; typically classified as democratic or dictatorial; focus of the chapter.

  • Democracies and dictatorships come in different types (e.g., presidential, parliamentary, semi-presidential; military, monarchy, civilian regimes).

  • Tunisian case as an illustration of regime evolution within a state

    • Independence from France in 1956; initial civilian dictatorial regime (1956–1987) under Habib Bourguiba.

    • 1987–2011: military dictatorial regime under Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali.

    • January 2011: mass demonstrations during the Arab Spring forced Ben Ali to resign.

    • October 2011: Constituent Assembly elected to draft a new constitution.

    • January 2014: new constitution established a semi-presidential democratic regime.

    • 2020: government led by Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi; Kais Saied as head of state.

    • July 2021: Saied suspended parliament, dismissed the prime minister and cabinet, ruling via decree (described as a “self-coup”).

    • July 2022: referendum passed a new constitution increasing presidential power.

    • Post-2022: debate whether Tunisia remains a democracy; current government under Prime Minister Najla Bouden with President Saied as head of state.

  • Methodological point

    • Political scientists must wrestle with how best to conceptualize and measure political phenomena (e.g., representation, government performance, economic well-being, culture, justice, accountability).

    • Conceptualization and measurement issues in democracy/dictatorship apply similarly to other phenomena discussed in later chapters.

  • Thinking about measurement is essential for good theory testing; without good measures, empirical tests lose meaning.

Early Democracy vs Modern Democracy

  • Key historical idea (Stasavage, 2020): democracy existed long before modern, Western-style democracy; democracy arose independently in various places and times.

    • Early democracy defined as a system where rulers sought consent of those governed and ruled jointly with assemblies or councils independent from the ruler.

    • Early democracy tended to be direct democracy (no intermediaries) or with tight mandates to representatives; assemblies could bind or constrain rulers; decisions by assemblies sometimes not binding, and dissenters could ignore them.

  • Examples of early democratic-like institutions in various regions and eras:

    • Europe: Ancient Greece Ekklesia (adult male citizens), Germanic things, Witan in Anglo-Saxon England, medieval Italian city-states.

    • Outside Europe: Kingdom of Mari (Mesopotamia, 3000–2000 BCE), republican India (Himalayan foothills, 700–600 BCE), Huron and Iroquois in northeastern North America, Tlaxcala in pre-Columbian Mesoamerica, central Africa precolonial societies.

    • Common features: assemblies with significant influence, regular assemblies, some geographic or social constraints on rulers.

  • Characteristics of early democracy:

    • Typically small-scale, population centers permitting easy assembly attendance.

    • More common in hunter-gatherer or highly mobile/remote communities where direct participation was feasible.

    • Direct participation or tightly constrained representative practices; mandates on representatives were possible and binding.

  • Conditions shaping the emergence/disappearance of early democracy (in Stasavage’s framing):

    • Emergence coincides with rulers needing revenue or manpower, driving bargaining with societal actors who had credible exit options.

    • As societies grew and exit options diminished, or when the value of exit options fell, rulers could centralize power and move away from consent-based governance.

    • Where conditions were favorable, rulers built centralized states capable of predation on society; where conditions were less favorable, rulers constrained themselves via assemblies.

  • Modern democracy

    • Broadly: a political system where representatives are regularly chosen in competitive elections under universal suffrage.

    • Modern democracy is representative, not direct: people elect representatives who make policy decisions on their behalf.

    • The shift from direct to representative democracy was driven by the increasing size/complexity of societies, making direct democracy impractical.

    • Elections are competitive when incumbents can lose power; non-competitive elections (incumbents ensured victory) do not constitute democracy.

Box 5.2: Why Bother with Elections?

  • Core idea: competitive elections are valuable for peaceful conflict resolution and accountability.

  • Przeworski (2020) coin-toss analogy

    • Suppose outcomes in elections were determined by a coin toss; heads = incumbent re-elected, tails = incumbent removed.

    • If losers have high chances to win next time, high costs of fighting, and not too large a loss from being ruled by the other side, they will prefer to comply with the coin toss rather than seek power by force.

    • Winners moderate policies to avoid triggering violence by losers; they avoid abusing incumbency to undermine future electoral chances; this prevents bloodshed simply due to the expected turnover.

  • Why voting matters beyond turnover:

    • Voting sanctions incumbents for behavior, enabling accountability.

    • Election results provide information about the strength of each side and the likely costs of rejecting outcomes.

  • Conditions for successful peaceful competitive elections

    • More likely in wealthy, more equally distributed societies (less high-stakes policy battles).

    • More likely in societies with experience that elections do not entail catastrophic outcomes.

    • Polarization reduces the likelihood of peaceful elections; high-stakes polarization increases democratic backsliding risk (e.g., Venezuela, United States cases cited).

England and America: Foundations of Modern Democracy

  • England (Stasavage, 2020): important for modern democracy’s origins

    • Gradual decline of the mandate system that constrained representatives.

    • Glorious Revolution (1688) established parliamentary supremacy over the monarch, leading to a centralized legislature and majority-rule decisions.

    • This fostered competition for legislative majorities and a move toward representative government.

    • Universal suffrage was not immediate; true universal suffrage would take centuries.

  • America: colonial assemblies foster broader political inclusion than Britain by the time of independence

    • Colonies lacked a state apparatus; rulers depended on assemblies for governance and revenue.

    • Land abundance in colonies meant abundant exit options for residents; labor was relatively scarce, increasing dependence on laborers.

    • This dynamic pushed early democracy in the colonies to expand political inclusion to a broader set of people (especially in governing spheres) to sustain rule.

  • Labor scarcity and exit options (Box 5.3)

    • Labor scarcity + land abundance in colonial America led elites to expand political rights for White populations while maintaining coercive labor systems (slavery for Africans).

    • Indentured servants had exit options (could gain property after service); enslaved Africans had highly constrained exit options.

    • This combination explains why early democracy emerged for Whites while slavery persisted systemically for Africans.

  • Transition to modern democracy in the United States

    • U.S. Constitution (1787) marked a transition: representatives elected; centralized power in taxation and war; weakening local mandates; more competition for Congress.

    • 1788: first national-level election with individual suffrage for some groups; full universal suffrage took much longer.

    • 1870: Fifteenth Amendment (Black men could vote); 1920: Nineteenth Amendment (women’s right to vote); 1965: Voting Rights Act extended protections and access.

  • Broader historical point

    • The universal suffrage pattern we see today is a relatively recent development; by 1900, only one country had fully universal suffrage; widespread universal suffrage became normative in the second half of the 20th century.

Box 5.3: Labor Scarcity, Exit Options, and Slavery in America

  • Economic logic: labor scarcity + land abundance creates incentives for coercive labor practices unless exit options are credible

    • If elites control land and labor is scarce, they may need to constrain mobility to obtain labor, or offer coercive terms to attract and retain workers.

    • In many parts of precolonial Africa and among Native American societies, similar dynamics are observed, with slavery or coercive labor arising in labor-scarce, land-abundant environments.

  • Colonial America specifics

    • Land abundant, labor scarce; rulers depended on people’s labor for growth and revenue; broad suffrage for White colonists arose to maintain governance under collective consent.

    • Slavery for Africans persisted due to limited exit options and visible racial hierarchies; indentured White servants had some exit options and potential upward mobility.

    • The combination helped produce a political order that was inclusive for Whites but coercive and exclusionary for Black Africans.

  • Transition in the US: from colonies to a modern democracy with expanded suffrage and civil rights

    • 1787–1788 transition and the long journey to universal suffrage for all citizens (eventually completed mid-20th century).

Box 5.4: Alternation in Power

  • Empirical puzzle: many multi-party democracies experience long-term dominance by a single party (Botswana, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico) before power is formally transferred

    • Botswana: independence 1966; long-run rule by Botswana Democratic Party; no power alternation observed to date.

    • Japan: Liberal Democratic Party dominated for decades; alternation occurred only after long incumbency.

    • Malaysia: initial elections in 1957, 1959, 1964; a pivotal split in 1969; 1969–1990s situation involved emergency measures and a constitution that prolonged one-party rule.

    • Mexico: Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) held power for many decades until 2000; the question is whether long incumbency indicates dictatorship or a dormant potential for peaceful alternation.

  • Implication in DD framework

    • DD codes a country as a dictatorship if there is no evidence of power alternation under identical electoral rules.

    • The presence of alternating power is a crucial condition for distinguishing democracy from dictatorship; long-term single-party dominance can still be coded as dictatorship by DD if there is no recorded alternation under the same rules.

Classifying Democracies and Dictatorships

  • Core problem: to understand why some countries are democracies and others dictatorships, one must measure democracy and classify regimes.

  • Theoretical underpinning: concepts are abstract; measurement requires operationalization (converting a concept into observable indicators).

  • Dahl’s view of democracy: two key dimensions

    • Contestation: extent to which people can organize into competing blocs, form parties, express free speech/assembly, and elect leaders in free and fair elections.

    • Inclusion: who gets to participate; breadth of the electorate; how inclusive the franchise is.

  • Dahl’s two-dimensional diagram (conceptual): top-left (high contestation, low inclusion) vs. top-right (high contestation, high inclusion) etc.; modern democracies generally in the top-right (high contestation and high inclusion).

  • Modern democracy can be viewed as a system where representatives are elected in competitive elections under universal suffrage, with a degree of inclusion and contestation that matches the concept.

Three Measures of Democracy and Dictatorship

  • Overview: three widely used measures – Democracy-Dictatorship (DD), Freedom House, Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)

  • DD (Bormann & Golder, 2022)

    • Annual measure for 190+ countries from 1946–2020.

    • Conceptualization: democracies are regimes in which governmental offices are filled via contested elections; both chief executive and legislature must be elected; there must be more than one party; there must be an alternation in power under identical electoral rules.

    • Operational rules:

    • Democracy if and only if all four conditions hold:
      C<em>1:Chief executive is electedC<em>1: \text{Chief executive is elected} C</em>2:Legislature is electedC</em>2: \text{Legislature is elected}
      C<em>3:There is more than one partyC<em>3: \text{There is more than one party} C</em>4:An alternation in power under identical electoral rulesC</em>4: \text{An alternation in power under identical electoral rules}
      D=1 if C<em>1C</em>2C<em>3C</em>4, else D=0.D=1 \text{ if } C<em>1 \land C</em>2 \land C<em>3 \land C</em>4, \text{ else } D=0."

    • Dictatorship if any condition fails.

    • Key characteristics: minimalist, procedural, dichotomous (democracy vs dictatorship), ignores inclusion dimension.

    • Strengths/weaknesses: simple, replicable; may miss nuances of inclusion and quality of democracy.

  • Freedom House

    • Annual global freedom measure since 1972; 2022 coverage: 195 countries + 15 territories.

    • Not strictly a democracy measure but widely used as a proxy for democracy/freedom.

    • Two dimensions: Political Rights and Civil Rights.

    • Political rights: 10 questions (0–4 points each) on electoral process, pluralism/participation, government functioning.

    • Civil rights: 15 questions (0–4 points each) on freedom of expression, association, rule of law, personal autonomy.

    • Scoring and scaling:

    • Political rights score out of 40 → scaled to 1–7; Civil rights score out of 60 → scaled to 1–7.

    • Overall Freedom House score = average of the two 7-point scales.

    • Regime type continuum: often categorized as Free (Democratic), Partly Free (Mixed), Not Free (Dictatorship).

    • Difference from DD: includes substantive outcomes and civil rights; treats democracy as a continuum rather than a strict dichotomy.

  • Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem): Electoral Democracy (Teorell et al. 2019)

    • Annual measure for 182 countries from 1900 to today; multiple conceptions of democracy (electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian).

    • Focus here is on electoral democracy (procedural): captures contestation and inclusion through several components.

    • Five core components:

    • Freedom of Expression

    • Freedom of Association

    • Clean Elections

    • Percentage of the Population with Suffrage

    • Elected Officials

    • Scoring and uncertainty:

    • Each component score 0–1; component indicators feed into low-level indicators; measurement uncertainty is explicitly reported.

    • Two-stage aggregation to a final score:

    • Define five component scores: FE, FA, CE, SUF, EO.

    • Multiplicative index:
      MI=FE×FA×CE×SUF×EOMI = FE \times FA \times CE \times SUF \times EO

    • Additive index (weighted):
      AI=(0.25×FE)+(0.25×FA)+(0.25×CE)+(0.125×SUF)+(0.125×EO)AI = (0.25 \times FE) + (0.25 \times FA) + (0.25 \times CE) + (0.125 \times SUF) + (0.125 \times EO)

    • Final V-Dem electoral democracy score:
      V-Dem=0.5×MI+0.5×AIV\text{-}Dem = 0.5 \times MI + 0.5 \times AI

    • Range: 0 to 1; includes uncertainty ranges for each component/score.

  • Cross-measure comparisons and notable patterns

    • In 2021, classification shares differed by measure:

    • DD: 62.9% democratic

    • Freedom House: 42.3% democratic

    • V-Dem: 51.7% democratic

    • General agreement for clear cases (e.g., US, Australia, Sweden as democracies; China, Saudi Arabia, North Korea as dictatorships).

    • Mixed regimes show substantial disagreements across measures (Africa and parts of South America).

    • The choice of measure affects empirical findings about causes and consequences of democracy (Casper & Tufis 2003; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010; Elkins 2000).

  • Bolivia classification example (Figure 5.5)

    • Bolivia’s regime classification between 1978–1987 varied across DD, Freedom House, and V-Dem due to differing underlying concepts and aggregation rules.

Comparing Dahl and DD vs Continuous Measures

  • Dahl’s conceptualization (procedural): two dimensions – contestation and inclusion

    • Contestation: freedom to organize into competing blocs, form parties, free speech/assembly, free and fair elections.

    • Inclusion: who gets to participate (voting rights, naturalization, etc.).

    • Dahl’s framework aligns with a minimalist, procedural view of democracy.

  • DD vs Dahl

    • DD adopts a minimalist, purely procedural/dichotomous view (democracy vs dictatorship) with contestation as the main driving dimension; largely ignores Dahl’s inclusion axis.

    • DD treats regime type as a dichotomy rather than a continuum, arguing that regimes with uncontested offices are not democracies.

    • Dahl’s view would treat some regimes as democracies if they meet inclusive criteria, even if contestation is limited; DD would not.

  • The debate on continuous vs dichotomous conceptualization

    • Some scholars (Bollen & Jackman, 1989) argue democracy is a matter of degree; continuous measures capture nuances.

    • Others argue regimes cannot be half-democratic; a clear-cut break between democracies and dictatorships is more meaningful for some analyses.

    • The appropriate approach depends on research question: transitions vs backsliding vs effects of democracy on outcomes.

  • Practical implications

    • The three measures (DD, Freedom House, V-Dem) are highly correlated for clear cases but diverge on mixed regimes.

    • Different measures can lead to different empirical conclusions; researchers should match the measure to their theoretical concept and research question.

Validity, Reliability, and Replicability of Democracy Measures

  • What validity means in this context

    • Validity: the extent to which a measure accurately represents the concept it is intended to reflect.

    • Challenges include: attributes included, aggregation method, measurement level, and whether the measure’s development aligns with the theoretical concept.

  • Attributes and aggregation

    • The choice of attributes must reflect the underlying concept without over- or under-inclusion.

    • DD uses a multiplicative aggregation of necessary conditions; if any condition fails, democracy is not achieved.

    • Freedom House uses additive aggregation; attributes are considered interchangeable; a country can compensate a low score in one attribute with a high score in another.

    • V-Dem uses a hybrid approach (multiplicative and additive) and weights some attributes differently; this can reflect a more nuanced view of democracy.

  • Measurement levels

    • DD: nominal (democracy vs dictatorship) because it is a dichotomous classification based on necessary conditions.

    • Freedom House and V-Dem: interval or ratio-like in practice; provide continuous scores (and V-Dem provides a true 0–1 continuum with underpinning uncertainty).

  • Reliability

    • Reliability refers to the consistency of a measure across time and coders.

    • DD is highly reliable due to observable, objective criteria (elections, parties, alternation).

    • Freedom House and V-Dem rely on expert coders; subjectivity can reduce reliability, particularly for earlier years.

    • V-Dem mitigates some reliability concerns by employing multiple coders and reporting uncertainty ranges.

  • Replicability and data transparency

    • Replicability: ability of others to reproduce the measure’s construction and results.

    • King emphasizes the need for full data access and transparent coding rules for replication.

    • DD provides clear coding rules; Freedom House provides limited disaggregation; V-Dem disaggregates data and offers extensive metadata.

    • DA-RT (data access, production transparency, analytic transparency) movement advocates for public data, transparent production, and transparent analyses to improve reliability and trust.

  • Implications for using measures

    • All measures involve simplification; rely on judgments and data availability.

    • The chosen measure should align with the research question; complexity of democracy often necessitates minimalist measures for comparisons or targeted questions about transitions or causal mechanisms.

    • Researchers should be explicit about limitations and consider multiple measures to assess robustness of findings.

Conclusion: Measurement Trade-offs and Best Practices

  • Measuring abstract political phenomena like democracy is inherently difficult and requires trade-offs between simplicity and richness.

  • Minimalist/procedural measures (e.g., DD) are valuable for studying transitions and regime-type dynamics, particularly when you want a clear, replicable dichotomy.

  • More substantive measures (Freedom House) capture quality of democracy and civil/political rights, but may introduce circularity if used to predict those same outcomes.

  • Continuous measures (V-Dem) provide nuanced gradations of democracy and explicitly incorporate measurement uncertainty, offering flexibility for different research questions.

  • Practical guidance for researchers

    • Align measure choice with research question and theory: transitions and regime type vs. quality/outcomes of democracy.

    • Be explicit about aggregation, attributes, and measurement level; justify attribute inclusion and weighting schemes.

    • Consider the trade-offs between reliability and validity; acknowledge potential biases in expert-coded measures, especially for historical years.

    • Use multiple measures to check robustness; report uncertainty ranges (as in V-Dem) and ensure replication by sharing data and coding rules (DA-RT principles).

    • Be cautious in interpreting “mixed regimes”; cross-measure differences can reflect conceptual differences rather than measurement errors.

  • Final philosophical note

    • Democracy is multifaceted and context-dependent; the goal of measurement is to enable theory testing, not to claim perfect, universal truth about every regime.

    • The field should continue developing better measures while recognizing the value of simpler, well-justified proxies for specific research purposes.

Appendix: Key Formulas and Definitions

  • Democracy (DD) criterion (aggregated, dichotomous):

    • Democracy if and only if all four conditions hold:
      {extC<em>1: extChiefexecutiveiselected[2mm]extC</em>2: extLegislatureiselected[2mm]extC<em>3: extThereismorethanoneparty[2mm]extC</em>4: extAnalternationinpowerunderidenticalelectoralrules extDemocracy=1extifC<em>1C</em>2C<em>3C</em>4; 0extotherwise<br>ext(dichotomous)<br>\begin{cases} ext{C}<em>1:\ ext{Chief executive is elected}[2mm] ext{C}</em>2:\ ext{Legislature is elected}[2mm] ext{C}<em>3:\ ext{There is more than one party}[2mm] ext{C}</em>4:\ ext{An alternation in power under identical electoral rules} \ ext{Democracy} = 1 ext{ if } C<em>1 \land C</em>2 \land C<em>3 \land C</em>4; \ 0 ext{ otherwise}<br>ext{(dichotomous)}<br>\end{cases}

  • V-Dem: five components and final score

    • Let FE = Freedom of Expression, FA = Freedom of Association, CE = Clean Elections, SUF = Suffrage, EO = Elected Officials.

    • Multiplicative index:
      MI=FE×FA×CE×SUF×EOMI = FE \times FA \times CE \times SUF \times EO

    • Additive index:
      AI=(0.25×FE)+(0.25×FA)+(0.25×CE)+(0.125×SUF)+(0.125×EO)AI = (0.25 \times FE) + (0.25 \times FA) + (0.25 \times CE) + (0.125 \times SUF) + (0.125 \times EO)

    • Final V-Dem score:
      V-Dem=0.5×MI+0.5×AIV\text{-}Dem = 0.5 \times MI + 0.5 \times AI

  • Freedom House score (conceptual, not a single equation here): two dimensions (Political Rights, Civil Rights) aggregated to a 1–7 scale per dimension; overall score is the average of the two 1–7 scales; categories often used: Free, Partly Free, Not Free.

  • Conceptual dimensions (Dahl):

    • Contestation: freedom to organize, form parties, elections, etc.

    • Inclusion: who is allowed to participate (suffrage, naturalization, etc.).

Notes

  • The content above captures the major and many minor points raised in the transcript, including historical context, theoretical distinctions, three major democracy measures, their strengths/weaknesses, and methodological considerations for validity, reliability, and replication.

  • Throughout, explicit numerical references are included where they appeared (dates, numbers of countries, scales, and specific year ranges).