Concerns: What is the universe in reality?
Early materialist view: All things are collections of atoms.
Different ontological perspectives:
Monism: All is one substance.
Dualism: Reality consists of two fundamentally different substances.
Pluralism: Reality is composed of many substances.
Definition: The study of knowledge and experience.
Central questions:
What do we know?
What can we know?
How do we know if it's true?
Importance: Knowledge may not reflect true reality due to constant change.
Two major epistemological positions:
Rationalism: Knowledge through reasoning.
Empiricism: Knowledge through observation and experience.
Definition: Explaining higher-level phenomena by reducing them to simpler components.
Optical illusions show that perception (proximal stimulus) differs from the actual object (distal stimulus).
Helmholtz's contribution:
Distal stimulus: The actual object.
Proximal stimulus: Sensory representation.
Four propositions:
The mind is nonphysical.
The body is physical.
The mind and body interact.
Physical and nonphysical things cannot interact.
Inconsistent tetrad: All four cannot be true at once.
Example: Seeing coffee involves mental experience, physical vision, and subjective awareness (quale/qualia).
René Descartes framed the modern mind-body problem.
Arguments:
The mind is conscious and nonspatial.
The body is spatial.
Mind and body interact.
Pineal gland: Descartes proposed interaction occurs here.
The mind and body are different substances.
Mind and body causally affect each other.
The mind interacts with the whole brain.
Criticism: Doesn't explain interaction with the entire brain.
Pairing problem: How does one mind affect its body consistently?
Mind and body are the same substance with different properties.
Mental properties are grounded in physical structures.
The mind and body are distinct and do not interact; only correlation.
Gottfried Leibniz: Synchronized by God.
Occasionalism: Events in the body are occasions for God to create corresponding mental events.
Energy/mass remains constant in a closed system ( E = mc^2 ).
Supports physicalism or parallelism.
The mind is a by-product of physical processes; mental events lack causal power.
The mind emerges from physical processes with new properties (supervenience).
The mind doesn't exist; behavior is the object of study.
Mental states are behavioral dispositions.
Criticism: Ignores qualia.
A truly private language for sensations is impossible.
The mind is identical to the brain.
Central State Materialism: the mind is the brain.
Two forms:
Type identity: Mental states are brain states.
Token identity: Each mental event is a brain event.
Mental states are computational states (software vs. hardware).
Multiple realizability thesis: Mental states can be realized in different systems.
Faces the 'missing qualia problem'.
Rejects mental states; folk psychology is false.
No need for mentalistic vocabulary in neuroscience.
Everything is fundamentally mental or spiritual.
Opposes physicalism.
Physical objects are sensory experiences.
Mind and body are two aspects of the same substance.
Qualia cannot be reduced.
Consciousness is a fundamental aspect of the universe.
Panprot