Essays For My Thing
Essay question
Should the goal of a border policy be to minimize the risk to the migrant or the risk to the host country?
Essay Outline
Prompt: Should the goal of a border policy be to minimize the risk to the migrant or the risk to the host country?
Length: 5–6 paragraphs
Sources Used (6 total):
Massey & Pren, Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Policy
Walzer, Spheres of Justice
Benhabib, Citizens, Residents, and Aliens in a Changing World
Androff & Tavassoli, Deaths in the Desert
Schindel, Death by ‘Nature’
(Optional for connection) — a brief tie to “Who Migrates and Why?” for background/motives
I. Introduction
Purpose: Introduce the debate and assert a clear thesis.
Hook Idea:
Across the globe, states justify border enforcement as a matter of national security—yet every year, thousands of migrants die at those same borders.
Context (1–2 sentences):
Modern border policy sits at a moral and political crossroads: should it protect the host country from perceived threats, or protect migrants from systemic harm?
Thesis:
While nations have a right to regulate entry and preserve sovereignty, border policy should ultimately aim to minimize risk to the migrant, because (1) the dangers faced by migrants are often state-produced and morally indefensible, (2) attempts to “protect” host countries frequently backfire and deepen instability, and (3) a just global order demands policies that balance sovereignty with human rights and inclusion.
II. Historical & Policy Context — The Consequences of Protecting the Host Country
Sources: Massey & Pren; Androff & Tavassoli
Topic Sentence:
Efforts to protect the host nation through restrictive border controls have historically led to paradoxical and devastating consequences, both humanitarian and political.
Key Evidence & Analysis:
Massey & Pren: The U.S. “enforcement feedback loop” created more undocumented immigration, not less — turning temporary migration into permanent settlement.
“Policies meant to control immigration actually intensified it” (p. 4).
→ Shows that protecting national interests through restriction often increases migration pressures.Androff & Tavassoli: The “prevention through deterrence” strategy militarized the U.S.–Mexico border, causing over 5,000 migrant deaths.
“These deaths are not inevitable” (p. 172).
→ The pursuit of national safety redefined risk by externalizing harm onto migrants’ bodies.
Connection:
Policies centered on minimizing host-country risk—security, economy, or culture—tend to shift risk rather than eliminate it, transforming borders into humanitarian crisis zones.
III. The Moral Argument — Human Rights and the Value of Life
Sources: Androff & Tavassoli; Schindel
Topic Sentence:
When border policy prioritizes the host nation’s safety over human life, it violates basic human rights and transforms natural environments into instruments of “slow violence.”
Key Evidence & Analysis:
Androff & Tavassoli: Migrant deaths and dehumanizing detentions represent a “human rights crisis” created by deterrence policies.
→ Illustrates the moral cost of neglecting migrant safety.Schindel: The European Union’s policies similarly weaponize “nature,” producing “slow violence” by exposing migrants to the sea and desert.
“Nature can be mobilized as an active factor in border enforcement” (p. 429).
→ The state’s omission of protection equals a form of structural violence.
Connection:
Both texts show that minimizing risk to the host country often means transferring lethal risk to migrants—making safety a privilege of citizenship rather than a universal right.
IV. The Philosophical Dimension — Membership, Sovereignty, and Moral Obligation
Sources: Walzer; Benhabib
Topic Sentence:
Political philosophers like Michael Walzer and Seyla Benhabib reveal that the moral legitimacy of border policy lies not in absolute exclusion, but in balancing sovereignty with human dignity and participation.
Key Evidence & Analysis:
Walzer: Membership is the “first good” societies distribute, yet even closed communities owe “hospitality and assistance” to strangers in need.
“Statelessness is a condition of infinite danger.”
→ Suggests a moral duty to protect migrants’ lives even without granting automatic membership.Benhabib: Argues for porous borders that reconcile sovereignty with universal rights.
“No liberal democracy can close its borders to refugees and asylum seekers.” (p. 713)
→ Advocates for inclusive, participatory citizenship rooted in human rights and civic contribution.
Connection:
Together, these thinkers insist that the moral core of democracy depends on how it treats outsiders—thus, minimizing migrant risk aligns with democratic justice and global ethics.
V. Reframing “Risk” — Whose Safety Truly Ensures Stability?
Sources: “Who Migrates and Why?” (background); synthesis of all sources
Topic Sentence:
A sustainable border policy must redefine “risk” as a shared human condition rather than a zero-sum game between nations and migrants.
Key Evidence & Analysis:
“Who Migrates and Why?” shows that migration often stems from economic displacement, inequality, and global interdependence—conditions shaped partly by host nations themselves.
→ The “risk” migrants pose is often a mirror of systemic global issues, not individual threat.Policies that minimize migrant suffering foster stability and moral legitimacy, while deterrence fuels resentment, death, and international criticism.
Connection:
Protecting migrants ultimately protects the host country—not just morally, but politically—by preventing cycles of instability and injustice that endanger both sides.
VI. Conclusion
Restate Thesis (with nuance):
Ultimately, border policy should aim to minimize risk to the migrant—not because national security is unimportant, but because the greatest threats to nations arise when they abandon human dignity as a guiding principle.
Synthesize:
From the U.S.–Mexico border to the Mediterranean Sea, history and theory show that deterrence breeds danger, while humane policy fosters genuine safety.
Final Insight:
To secure borders without losing humanity, states must see migrants not as risks to contain but as human beings whose protection affirms the very values borders claim to defend.
✨ Summary of How Each Source Fits
Minimizing Risk to the Migrant: Rethinking the Goal of Border Policy
Across the globe, states justify border enforcement as a matter of national security—yet every year, thousands of migrants die at those same borders. Modern border policy sits at a moral and political crossroads: should it protect the host country from perceived threats, or protect migrants from systemic harm? While nations have a right to regulate entry and preserve sovereignty, border policy should ultimately aim to minimize risk to the migrant, because the dangers faced by migrants are often state-produced and morally indefensible, attempts to “protect” host countries frequently backfire and deepen instability, and a just global order demands policies that balance sovereignty with human rights and inclusion.
Efforts to protect the host nation through restrictive border controls have historically led to paradoxical and devastating consequences, both humanitarian and political. Douglas Massey and Karen Pren’s Unintended Consequences of U.S. Immigration Policy illustrates how the U.S. government’s enforcement-heavy approach to border control created what they call an “enforcement feedback loop.” Rather than reducing migration, these policies turned circular, temporary migration into permanent settlement, as migrants were discouraged from returning home once crossing became too dangerous. Policies “meant to control immigration actually intensified it,” undermining their original purpose. Similarly, David Androff and Carrie Tavassoli’s Deaths in the Desert reveals how the U.S. strategy of “prevention through deterrence”—which redirected migration routes into deadly deserts—has caused more than 5,000 migrant deaths. These deaths, they note, are “not inevitable,” but the predictable outcome of policies that externalize danger. In both cases, the goal of minimizing risk to the host country simply transferred risk onto migrants’ bodies, transforming borders into humanitarian crisis zones rather than sites of national protection.
When border policy prioritizes the host nation’s safety over human life, it violates fundamental human rights and transforms natural environments into instruments of “slow violence.” Androff and Tavassoli characterize migrant deaths and the mistreatment of asylum seekers as a “human rights crisis” directly created by deterrence-based enforcement. By making death a tool of policy, such strategies dehumanize migrants and erode the moral legitimacy of the state. Similarly, Estela Schindel’s Death by ‘Nature’ explores how European Union border regimes weaponize natural landscapes—deserts, seas, and mountains—by framing migrant deaths as accidents of nature rather than the result of policy. Schindel argues that “nature can be mobilized as an active factor in border enforcement,” meaning that the state’s refusal to protect migrants constitutes a form of structural violence. Both authors expose how the pursuit of host-country security displaces harm rather than preventing it, making safety a privilege of citizenship instead of a universal right.
Philosophically, thinkers such as Michael Walzer and Seyla Benhabib show that the moral legitimacy of border policy lies not in absolute exclusion, but in balancing sovereignty with human dignity and participation. In Spheres of Justice, Walzer defends a community’s right to determine its own membership but simultaneously emphasizes that “statelessness is a condition of infinite danger.” Even closed societies, he writes, owe “hospitality and assistance” to strangers in need. This perspective reveals a moral obligation to protect migrants’ lives—even if full membership is not immediately granted. Seyla Benhabib, in Citizens, Residents, and Aliens in a Changing World, extends this argument by calling for porous borders that reconcile national sovereignty with universal human rights. “No liberal democracy,” she writes, “can close its borders to refugees and asylum seekers.” For Benhabib, inclusion is essential to the democratic project itself. Together, Walzer and Benhabib suggest that true sovereignty is not expressed through exclusion, but through the ethical management of inclusion—aligning border policy with the protection of human dignity.
A sustainable border policy must therefore redefine “risk” as a shared human condition rather than a zero-sum game between nations and migrants. As Who Migrates and Why? explains, migration often stems from economic displacement, inequality, and global interdependence—conditions shaped in part by the very nations that now seek to keep migrants out. The “risk” migrants pose to host countries is not an inherent danger, but a mirror reflecting global structural inequities. Policies that minimize migrant suffering and create legal, humane pathways for movement foster both stability and legitimacy. In contrast, deterrence-based strategies breed resentment, death, and international condemnation, ultimately undermining the host country’s moral and political security. Protecting migrants, then, is not just an act of compassion—it is an act of self-preservation that strengthens the ethical and social fabric of the host nation.
Ultimately, border policy should aim to minimize risk to the migrant—not because national security is unimportant, but because the greatest threats to nations arise when they abandon human dignity as a guiding principle. From the U.S.–Mexico border to the Mediterranean Sea, history and theory show that deterrence breeds danger, while humane policy fosters genuine safety. A border that protects only one side is not truly secure. To defend borders without losing humanity, states must see migrants not as risks to contain but as human beings whose protection affirms the very values borders claim to defend.
If countries are going to have borders, who should they keep out? Are there non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory grounds for denying people entry?
Won’t be used! At all!
Walzer writes that there is no obligation to allow entry to ‘strangers’: “[S]tates are simply free to take strangers in (or not).” Do countries have an obligation to let some people in, and if so, whom?
Essay Outline
I. Introduction — Framing the Moral and Political Question
Hook: Begin with Walzer’s quote—states’ supposed freedom to exclude “strangers.” Contrast it with the global reality of migration and human interdependence.
Context: Modern states control borders as a key aspect of sovereignty, yet globalization, displacement, and inequality complicate this authority.
Thesis: While Walzer claims states are free to exclude outsiders, multiple moral, legal, and practical frameworks suggest otherwise. Countries have an obligation to admit certain groups—particularly refugees, children, and those displaced by global inequalities—because human rights, justice, and interdependence demand shared responsibility.
Sources to mention: Walzer (through Carens’ critique), Carens, Benhabib, Bhabha, Massey.
II. Body Paragraph 1 — The Moral Argument for Inclusion (Carens vs. Walzer)
Focus: Carens’ The Case for Open Borders directly challenges Walzer’s communitarian logic.
Carens argues that citizenship is “the modern equivalent of feudal privilege,” unjustified from any consistent moral perspective.
Applying Rawls’s veil of ignorance globally: no one would accept exclusion based on birthplace.
From a utilitarian standpoint, global happiness increases through freer movement; restrictions mostly protect unearned privilege.
Walzer’s view—that states are “free” to exclude—rests on the analogy of states as “clubs.” Carens rebuts that states, unlike private associations, must treat all individuals equally.
Conclusion of paragraph: On moral grounds, countries are obligated to admit those whose exclusion perpetuates arbitrary inequality—especially the poor, the persecuted, and those seeking basic safety.
Sources: Carens (primary), Walzer (via Carens’ critique)
III. Body Paragraph 2 — The Legal and Human Rights Obligation (Benhabib & Bhabha)
Focus: Liberal democracies have binding obligations rooted in international human rights.
Benhabib: the paradox between human rights and sovereignty reveals that no democracy can “close its borders to refugees and asylum seekers.”
She calls for “a middle course” between open borders and thick nationalism—redefining citizenship as a social practice that evolves from civic participation.
Bhabha extends this to the rights of children, who are doubly vulnerable (“double jeopardy”) as minors and non-citizens.
International law (CRC, Refugee Convention) establishes children’s right to family unity, protection, and asylum—obligations states routinely violate.
Conclusion of paragraph: Countries, especially liberal democracies, legally and morally owe protection to refugees and child migrants; sovereignty cannot justify harm to human dignity.
Sources: Benhabib, Bhabha
IV. Body Paragraph 3 — The Structural and Economic Obligation (Massey & Torpey)
Focus: Migration is not an individual choice but a structural consequence of global systems that wealthy states helped create.
Massey’s Theoretical Synthesis shows migration stems from development itself, not underdevelopment—global capitalism and labor demands generate cross-border movement.
Segmented labor markets in rich economies depend on migrant labor for low-wage work.
Torpey: states have “expropriated the legitimate means of movement,” using passports and borders to control mobility and sustain inequalities.
Thus, states that benefit from global economic systems that displace and exploit workers bear a responsibility to accommodate those affected.
Conclusion of paragraph: The obligation to admit migrants arises from shared participation in systems that cause migration—making exclusion ethically inconsistent.
Sources: Massey, Torpey
V. Body Paragraph 4 — Pragmatic and Policy-Based Responsibility (The Merkel Plan)
Focus: Practical models prove that compassion and control can coexist.
The Merkel Plan shows that states can uphold humanitarian duties while maintaining order—accepting refugees safely and legally.
Germany’s approach illustrates that moral obligation does not equal chaos; rather, controlled admissions restore “public confidence” and prevent deaths.
This counters Walzer’s assumption that admitting strangers threatens community stability; structured compassion strengthens legitimacy.
Conclusion of paragraph: Ethical responsibility to admit migrants can be implemented effectively when paired with cooperative, realistic policy frameworks.
Sources: The Merkel Plan, possibly linked back to Benhabib’s “porous borders” argument.
VI. Conclusion — Reconciling Sovereignty with Shared Humanity
Restate Walzer’s claim as a moral minimum—but insufficient for a globalized world.
Summarize: Carens and Benhabib reveal universal moral and legal obligations; Massey and Torpey show structural responsibility; Bhabha and the Merkel Plan demonstrate specific duties to vulnerable groups and practical solutions.
Final insight: Sovereignty grants states control, but justice demands compassion. Countries are obligated to admit at least those displaced by violence, inequality, and dependency—because freedom of movement, like freedom of speech, is central to human dignity.
Optional closing quote: “The treatment of aliens, foreigners, and others in our midst is a crucial test case for the moral conscience of liberal democracies.” — Benhabib.
Summary of Sources Used (6 total)
Joseph Carens — The Case for Open Borders → moral and philosophical argument for open borders.
Seyla Benhabib — Citizens, Residents, and Aliens in a Changing World → reconciliation of human rights and sovereignty.
Jacqueline Bhabha — International Migration Law and the Rights of Children → protection of child migrants and legal obligations.
Douglas Massey — Why Does Immigration Occur? → structural/economic causes of migration.
John Torpey — Coming and Going → states’ control over movement and its implications.
The Merkel Plan → pragmatic example of balancing compassion and control.
Michael Walzer famously writes that states are “simply free to take strangers in (or not),” asserting a community’s right to self-determination through border control. Yet this claim, rooted in state sovereignty, clashes with the moral and political realities of an interconnected world. Migration today is not merely a voluntary choice but a product of global inequality, conflict, and shared responsibility. While Walzer’s communitarian logic defends exclusion in the name of collective identity, multiple moral, legal, and structural frameworks challenge his premise. Countries do have an obligation to admit certain groups—particularly refugees, children, and those displaced by systems of inequality—because justice, human rights, and interdependence require that freedom of movement not be confined by arbitrary borders.
Joseph Carens’s The Case for Open Borders directly confronts Walzer’s assertion that states are morally entitled to exclude outsiders. Carens argues that citizenship functions as “the modern equivalent of feudal privilege,” a morally arbitrary distinction that locks people into conditions of inequality based solely on their birthplace. Using Rawls’s veil of ignorance, Carens proposes that if individuals designed global institutions without knowing where they would be born, they would reject restrictive borders as unjust. From a utilitarian perspective, freer movement enhances global welfare, while restrictions preserve unearned privilege for citizens of wealthy nations. Walzer’s analogy of states as “clubs” that can choose their members fails because political communities are not private associations but public institutions bound by moral equality. Thus, on moral grounds, states have an obligation to admit those whose exclusion perpetuates avoidable harm—particularly the poor, the persecuted, and the displaced.
Beyond morality, international law establishes binding human rights obligations that restrict states’ freedom to exclude. Seyla Benhabib argues that liberal democracies face a “paradox of democratic legitimacy,” where sovereignty collides with the universal rights of all persons. She contends that democracies cannot “close their borders to refugees and asylum seekers” without undermining their own moral foundations. Citizenship, in her view, must be redefined as a flexible practice that evolves through participation and belonging, not a fixed legal status. Jacqueline Bhabha extends this argument to children, who experience what she calls a “double jeopardy” as both minors and non-citizens. International conventions such as the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child guarantee the right to family unity, protection, and asylum—yet states frequently violate these principles in the name of sovereignty. Together, Benhabib and Bhabha demonstrate that states are not morally or legally free to deny entry to refugees or children fleeing persecution; to do so is to abandon the universal commitments at the heart of liberal democracy.
Structural and economic realities further expose the shared responsibility of wealthier states for global migration. As Douglas Massey explains in his Theoretical Synthesis, migration is not caused by underdevelopment but by development itself. Global capitalism, trade, and labor demand generate migration flows, as workers seek opportunity in economies that depend on their labor while denying them belonging. John Torpey adds that modern states have “expropriated the legitimate means of movement” through passports and visas, transforming mobility into a privilege of the powerful. Because developed nations benefit from the very systems that displace and exploit others, they bear a corresponding obligation to receive migrants affected by those systems. Exclusion under these circumstances is not the exercise of freedom but the perpetuation of inequality.
Pragmatically, fulfilling these obligations does not mean chaos or the collapse of national control. The Merkel Plan, implemented during Europe’s refugee crisis, illustrates that compassion and order can coexist. Germany accepted hundreds of thousands of refugees while establishing safe, legal channels for entry and integration. Rather than undermining stability, this policy restored public confidence and saved countless lives. It demonstrates that ethical responsibility can be enacted through structured, cooperative frameworks. As Benhabib suggests, “porous borders” do not erase sovereignty; they redefine it in a way that honors human dignity. The Merkel Plan proves that moral obligation can be realized through pragmatic governance.
Ultimately, Walzer’s conception of sovereignty as the right to exclude may define a moral minimum, but it is insufficient in a world marked by global interdependence. Carens and Benhabib reveal that justice and human rights require the inclusion of certain groups; Massey and Torpey show that the economic systems of wealthy states create the very migrations they seek to prevent; and Bhabha and the Merkel Plan highlight the special duty owed to the most vulnerable and the feasibility of humane policy. Sovereignty grants states control over borders, but justice demands compassion. Countries are obligated to admit at least those displaced by violence, inequality, and dependency—because, as Benhabib reminds us, “the treatment of aliens, foreigners, and others in our midst is a crucial test case for the moral conscience of liberal democracies.”
Should those admitted with a temporary status be able to acquire a pathway to permanent residency and then citizenship, after some time living in a country? Why or why not?
🧭 INTRODUCTION
Goal: Introduce the issue, establish the ethical and democratic stakes, and state your thesis.
Opening hook idea:
Across history, the United States has defined belonging through shifting rules — sometimes by birthplace, bloodline, or bureaucratic time. Today, millions of people live and work under “temporary” status, contributing to their communities without any clear path to permanence.
Context:
Temporary statuses like TPS, DACA, and guest worker visas allow people to stay legally but deny them the political and moral recognition implied by long-term residence.
Thesis (clear, defensible):
Yes — those admitted under temporary status should be granted a pathway to permanent residency and citizenship after years of living in a country, because time spent contributing to a community holds moral and democratic value (Cohen, Cott), permanent exclusion creates unjust hierarchies reminiscent of past discriminatory systems (Baynton), and the contributions of long-term temporary residents prove both their integration and necessity (CAP). Restricting such a pathway also undermines democratic ideals while preserving symbolic but exclusionary border control (Andreas) — a contradiction even liberal theorists reject (Carens).
🧩 BODY PARAGRAPH 1: Time as a Moral and Political Measure of Belonging (Cohen, Cott)
Claim: Historically, time-in-residence has served as moral evidence of civic commitment and virtue — denying its value now contradicts the nation’s founding principles of equality.
Evidence & Analysis:
Cohen: “Time works elegantly as a means to translate abstract democratic goods like loyalty and civic virtue into tangible political terms.”
Founders (Madison, Jefferson) used time as a test of readiness for citizenship, not race or origin.
Cott’s summary of Cohen: jus temporis (the right of time) was the moral bridge between living and belonging.
Modern law devalues this principle: temporary residents’ time “does not count” at all — a “moral inequality” that implies they are “incapable of citizenship.”
Connection to prompt:
Thus, a pathway to permanence after years of residence restores jus temporis as a measure of belonging, aligning policy with both moral equality and historical precedent.
⚖ BODY PARAGRAPH 2: The Human and Economic Realities of “Temporary” Lives (Center for American Progress)
Claim: TPS holders and other long-term temporary residents already live as integral members of U.S. society; denying them a path to citizenship is both economically and morally incoherent.
Evidence & Analysis:
Average TPS holder residence: 19–22 years — hardly “temporary.”
“Nearly one-third of households with Salvadoran, Honduran, and Haitian TPS holders have mortgages.”
273,200 U.S.-born citizen children — families deeply embedded in American life.
Economic impact: Removing them would cost $164 billion in GDP over 10 years and $6.9 billion in lost Social Security/Medicare contributions.
Connection:
Their long-term residence, economic participation, and family ties already demonstrate the civic virtue Cohen describes. Citizenship would simply recognize an existing moral and social reality.
🧬 BODY PARAGRAPH 3: Moral Hierarchies and Historical Patterns of Exclusion (Baynton)
Claim: Excluding long-term temporary residents echoes historical injustices that defined citizenship by moral or physical “defect,” not equality.
Evidence & Analysis:
Baynton: “Defect” was used to justify exclusion of those deemed unfit — including the poor, disabled, or racially “undesirable.”
Denying certain groups the right to have their time “count” repeats this logic: their contributions are seen as less worthy, their presence less legitimate.
Cohen’s parallel: The devaluation of immigrants’ time mirrors earlier eras when only “some people’s time counted.”
Connection:
By withholding a path to citizenship, modern policy reproduces hierarchies once justified by eugenics or racism — contradicting democratic equality and moral progress.
🧱 BODY PARAGRAPH 4: Democratic and Security Implications of Exclusion (Andreas)
Claim: Contemporary border systems prioritize control and symbolism over justice, producing “rightless” residents who weaken democratic legitimacy.
Evidence & Analysis:
Andreas: Borders have been “reconfigured” to police “clandestine transnational actors,” blurring lines between migrants and threats.
The U.S. creates a population “governed but not represented,” as Cohen also warns — a democratic contradiction.
The symbolic appeal of strict borders (“security theater”) satisfies politics, not morality.
A pathway to citizenship would reinforce, not weaken, democratic security by replacing exclusion with lawful belonging.
Connection:
Excluding long-term temporary residents for the sake of border symbolism undermines the moral and civic legitimacy of the state — trading equality for illusionary control.
🌍 BODY PARAGRAPH 5: Philosophical and Moral Justification for Inclusion (Carens)
Claim: From a moral standpoint, denying citizenship to long-term residents is indefensible; liberal egalitarianism demands open or at least permeable borders.
Evidence & Analysis:
Carens: Citizenship in wealthy democracies is “the modern equivalent of feudal privilege.”
Rawlsian fairness: If we didn’t know where we’d be born, we’d design a world with open or inclusive mobility.
Libertarian and utilitarian perspectives also support the moral right to move and belong after residence and contribution.
“What gives anyone the right to point guns at peaceful migrants?”
Connection:
Providing a pathway to citizenship after years of lawful residence fulfills basic liberal principles of equality, consent, and moral worth.
🏁 CONCLUSION
Reaffirm Thesis:
To deny permanent residency and citizenship to long-term temporary residents is to deny the moral meaning of time, equality, and contribution.
Synthesize:
Cohen and Cott show that time represents moral inclusion; CAP demonstrates the human and economic proof of belonging; Baynton exposes the historical dangers of defining worth by exclusion; Andreas warns of the democratic cost; and Carens reminds us that freedom of movement is a moral right.
Should Those with Temporary Status Have a Path to Citizenship?
Across history, the United States has defined belonging through shifting rules — sometimes by birthplace, bloodline, or time lived within its borders. Today, millions of people live under “temporary” statuses like TPS or DACA, contributing to the economy and their communities without a path to permanence. Those admitted under temporary status should be granted a pathway to permanent residency and citizenship after years of living in a country, because time spent contributing to society holds moral and democratic value, long-term exclusion creates unjust hierarchies, and these residents already prove their integration through work, family, and civic life.
Historically, time-in-residence has been treated as moral evidence of belonging. Elizabeth Cohen explains that “time works elegantly as a means to translate abstract democratic goods like loyalty and civic virtue into tangible political terms.” Early American thinkers saw time as proof of commitment to the nation, not a disqualifier. Yet today, temporary residents’ years of contribution “do not count” toward citizenship, as if their labor and presence were invisible. Restoring time as a measure of belonging would align modern immigration policy with democratic equality and the nation’s founding principles.
The realities of “temporary” life make exclusion both unjust and impractical. According to the Center for American Progress, the average TPS holder has lived in the U.S. for nearly two decades, with many owning homes and raising U.S.-born children. Removing them would cost billions in lost GDP and taxes. Their deep community ties already demonstrate civic virtue and economic necessity. Granting a path to citizenship would simply acknowledge an existing reality: these individuals are part of the American social fabric.
Excluding long-term residents also repeats old injustices. As historian Douglas Baynton notes, societies have long used ideas of “defect” or unworthiness to deny rights to marginalized groups. Treating temporary residents’ years as meaningless mirrors this same logic — that only some people’s time counts. Such exclusion contradicts the democratic principle that all individuals deserve equal moral consideration.
Ultimately, as political philosopher Joseph Carens argues, citizenship in wealthy democracies functions as “the modern equivalent of feudal privilege.” If people could choose rules without knowing where they’d be born, they would favor systems that reward contribution, not accident of birth. Providing a pathway to citizenship honors equality, civic virtue, and human dignity — the very ideals that define democracy itself.
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