P1: Historical‐Sociological Approach to State Formation, Violence & the Internal Security Dilemma

Introduction: Why Look Inside the State?

• The course opened with the paradox that states are simultaneously the cure for and the cause of violence in world politics.

• Earlier lenses (political realism, constructivism, anthropology) explained violence through

  • existential insecurity,

  • identity, or

  • culture.

• Missing piece: the social structure within the state.
  → Historical-sociological approach (HSA) puts the state–society bargain at center stage.

Core Question of the Historical-Sociological Approach

• Who commands the state? War-makers or financiers?

  • “Command” = ability to direct coercion and extract resources.

• The balance between competing domestic groups determines how, when, and why violence is used.

Where Do States Come From? — An Evolutionary Story

1. Protection & Extortion: The Two Faces of the State

• Max Weber (post–Peace of Westphalia): a state enjoys the “monopoly of legitimate violence” within a territory.

• Metaphor: states ≈ mafia families—they protect you for a price.

  • Protection → build military capacity.

  • Price → taxation/extortion of citizens.

2. Co-evolution of Armies, Taxation, and War

• Empirical trend (Europe):

  • Size of standing armies rose relentlessly $\uparrow$.

  • Frequency of battles and total battle deaths skyrocketed.

• Mechanism: more taxes $\Rightarrow$ bigger armies $\Rightarrow$ more campaigns $\Rightarrow$ justification for higher taxes.

3. From Cities to Nation-States

1. City: pockets of capital/cash accumulation.

2. Pooling of city revenues builds defense leagues $\Rightarrow$ city-states.

3. City-states network and aggregate into larger states.

4. End-stage: nation-states with expansive territory and high sovereignty.

• Trend line: greater territorial reach $\Rightarrow$ heavier coercion.

4. Charles Tilly’s Capital–Coercion Matrix

• Two ideal growth paths (both converge on the same endpoint):

  1. “Capital first” path: accumulate $\text{capital}\; \rightarrow \; \text{buy coercion}$.

  2. “Coercion first” path: conquer with force $\rightarrow$ extract more $\rightarrow$ enlarge force.

• Destination: high capital + high coercion nation-state.

The State–Society Bargain & the Outbreak of War

• Violence/War emerges whenever the bargain is corrupted—i.e., when extraction or coercion exceeds what society will tolerate.

• Citizens can:

  • Withdraw support, migrate, or rebel.

  • Seek or create alternative “war-makers.”

Empirical Example: Somaliland

• After Somalia’s civil war, northern clans rejected Mogadishu’s leadership and built their own coercive apparatus.

  • New state-like entity protects territory and taxes more effectively.

Explosion in the Number of States

• Period $1816\text{–}1960$: $25 \rightarrow 50$ members (net $+25$).

• Period $1916\text{–}2011$: net $+144$ new states.

• Key waves

  • Post-WWII (collapse of old empires, e.g., Ottoman).

  • Post-colonial (British & French withdrawals).

Foundational Assumptions of HSA

1. State is the prime unit (“national-territorial totality”): territory + government + people + society.

2. Unlike realism’s “unitary actor,” domestic cleavages matter.

3. War & society co-evolve.
   Changes in social organization change the character of war.

Four Historical Regimes of War

Redefining the Security Dilemma

• Realist lens: anarchy + uncertainty between strong states.

• HSA lens: state weakness + uncertainty of domestic command.

  • Agents worry about “who leads society?” not external invasion per se.

• Term: Internal Security Dilemma (ISD)

  1. Leaders of weak states suspect rivals.

  2. Pre-emptive coercion $\Rightarrow$ angers society $\Rightarrow$ insurgency/rebellion.

  3. Cycle erodes state capacity, invites external predators, and/or incites leaders to launch diversionary wars.

Two Consequences of the ISD

1. Higher probability of civil war.
   Coercion disrupts the bargain; citizens seek new protectors.

2. Increased external vulnerability.
   Leaders may attack abroad to regain internal legitimacy, but hollowed institutions hamper war-fighting ability.

Bottom Line

• War is the by-product of a failed state–society bargain.

• Crisis $\rightarrow$ war $\rightarrow$ post-war re-negotiation; the cycle resets the bargain and may temporarily stabilize the state.