Builds on earlier lectures examining international cooperation problems.
Focus: factors that enable or hinder negotiation and membership in International Environmental Agreements (IEAs), a.k.a. Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs).
Central question: How do states overcome collective-action problems & the tragedy of the commons to manage transboundary environmental issues?
International Environmental Agreement (IEA) / Multilateral Environmental Agreement (MEA)
Formal, negotiated treaty among \ge 3 states to address a cross-border environmental problem.
Bilateral Environmental Agreements: only two parties; mentioned but not central today.
Collective-Action Problem
Situation where individual states have incentives to free-ride on others’ efforts, producing under-provision of a public good (clean environment).
Tragedy of the Commons
Over-exploitation of shared resources when property rights & monitoring are weak.
Not every environmental issue receives a treaty.
Wide dispersion in:
Topics covered (species, pollution, climate, water, etc.).
Number & identity of signatories.
Depth/strength of commitments & enforcement.
Research goal: explain when negotiations start, why they succeed/fail, and which countries join.
Visibility
Highly visible degradation (smog, oil spills) → easier to mobilize domestic & international pressure → more likely treaty initiation.
Example offered: urban haze that is literally seen by citizens.
Crisis / Disaster Triggers
Acute events (chemical spills, river fires) galvanize public & political will.
Science-based evidence accumulation
As data mount, perceptions of urgency ↑.
Agreement on Underlying Goal / Problem Definition
Upstream vs. downstream river users illustrate divergent perceptions.
If states disagree on whether a problem exists → negotiations stall.
Similarity of Stakes
Unequal impacts → asymmetry in willingness to act.
Convergence can occur over time as damage becomes widespread or highly documented.
Consensus on Solutions & Burden Sharing
Who should reduce emissions? Who bears costs? Upstream vs. downstream parallels again.
Generates data, forecasts, causal attributions.
Builds epistemic consensus → narrows uncertainty → fosters common diagnosis/solutions.
Limitation: internal scientific disputes can slow action.
U.S., EU, etc. can act as agenda setters; leverage economic & diplomatic carrots/sticks.
E.g., UN system: convene conferences, circulate reports, solidify terminology.
Cannot coerce but can lower transaction costs & increase issue salience.
Allies imitate or pressure one another (both government channels & societal linkages).
Mobilize domestic publics; lobby negotiators.
Partner with IOs to stage meetings, side-events, hearings.
Economic stakeholders lobby for/against agreements depending on cost-benefit calculus.
Existence of countervailing industries (e.g., renewables) can shift alignment over time.
Ideological orientation shapes belief in regulation & multilateralism.
U.S. case: alternating presidential administrations illustrate policy swings.
Justice dimensions: upstream vs. downstream, developed vs. developing world, historical responsibility.
Legitimacy: need inclusive negotiation processes to avoid power imbalances.
Precautionary principle: act amid scientific uncertainty to forestall irreversible damage.
Dataset aggregates all signed MEAs; two visualizations discussed.
Shows time-series escalation then potential plateau/decline.
Useful proxy for overall tempo of environmental treaty-making.
Pre-1960s: majority in species protection.
Post-1960s: rise of pollution-oriented agreements—aligned with visibility narrative (urban smog, acid rain).
New issue domains emerge over decades; older ones fade as solved or deprioritized.
Reinforces earlier material on anarchy, lack of centralized enforcement, & need for institutions.
Concrete case of how issue characteristics interact with international politics to enable cooperation.
Track current negotiations (e.g., plastic pollution treaty, climate COPs) to map theory → practice.
Compare visibility/crisis & interest-alignment hypotheses against ongoing cases (Amazon deforestation, Arctic shipping lanes).
Create matrices listing: issue visibility, stake symmetry, scientific consensus, dominant actors, domestic politics to predict negotiation outcomes.
Collective-action payoff structure: Benefiti<Costi if alone cooperating, but \sumi \text{Benefit}i > \sumi \text{Cost}i collectively.
Treaty growth function (heuristic): IEAt=f(Visibilityt,Crisist,InterestAlignmentt,IOActivationt,DomesticSupportt).
Transformation of industry positions over time.
Enforcement & compliance mechanisms post-signature.
Quantitative modeling of ratification and effectiveness.