From the Second World War to the Cold War: 1944-1954; The Alliance for Progress: The 1960s

I. Democratic openings at the end of World War II

• The immediate postwar period (mid-1944 to mid-1946) saw a dramatic wave of democratization across Latin America, even though the region would later reverse much of it by 1954.
• At the start of 1944, Uruguay was the only clear democracy; Chile, Costa Rica, and Colombia had credible democratic features (civilian governments, elections with varying degrees of suffrage and participation, and formally respected civil liberties).
• Argentina had been democratic in the early 1930s but was undermined by an infamous 1930s “infamous decade” culminating in a military coup in June 1943.
• Revolutionary Mexico featured elected presidents (Cárdenas in 1934, Avila Camacho in 1940) but the PRM/PRI dominated, and reelection was forbidden; elections were competitive but controlled.
• During the last year of WWII and the first year after, democracy consolidated in countries where it already existed and began to expand in others.
• Examples of consolidation and transition (1944–1946):
  • Costa Rica: Calderón Guardía (elected 1940) handed over power to Teodoro Picado (elected, though with fraud/intimidation allegations).
  • Colombia: Alfonso López resigned in July 1945; Alberto Lleras Camargo acted as president; 1946 elections saw Mariano Ospina Pérez win on a bipartisan National Union ticket, ending sixteen years of Liberal rule.
  • Chile: 1946 elections brought Gabriel González Videla to power (third Popular Front president since 1938).
  • Ecuador: ADE-led popular rebellion (1944) ousted Arroyo del Río; Velasco Ibarra installed with 1945 Constituent Assembly.
  • Cuba: Batista allowed free elections in June 1944; Ramón Grau San Martín won; Grau defeated Carlos Saladrigas (Batista’s candidate).
  • Panama: 1945 Constituent Assembly appointed interim president Enrique A. Jiménez; elections delayed to 1948.
  • Peru: Free elections in June 1945; José Luis Bustamante y Rivero (Frente Democrático Nacional) won; APRA joined Bustamante’s cabinet in 1946.
  • Venezuela: Medina Angarita liberalized; 1945–1946 elections and democratic openings; 1945–1947 elections won by Acción Democrática (AD).
  • Mexico: 1946 primary elections introduced for posts other than president; Alemán elected in 1946; democracy remained largely rhetorical for the presidency.
• Major transitions from military or military-backed regimes to democracy also occurred in several countries: Guatemala (Ubico ousted, Arévalo elected in 1944), Brazil (Vargas liberalization in 1945 and elections in December 1945), Argentina (1945–46 reactivation of liberal opposition and steps toward elections in 1946), Bolivia (1960s dictatorship beginnings were prefigured by 1946 changes and coalition dynamics). By 1947–1948 the bloc of nations with democratic origins expanded, though most of these democracies were fragile or transitional.
• Four notable features of democratization at the end of WWII:
  • Progressive parties and movements came to power or shared power, seeking to extend middle-class and worker participation, and promote social reform and economic development (e.g., Auténticos in Cuba, AD in Venezuela, APRA in Peru, Peronists in Argentina). These movements were often personalist and populist; they sometimes advanced democracy but could retreat from democratic norms over time.
  • The Latin American left, especially Communists, gained influence in the immediate postwar period due to antifascist fronts and postwar prestige of the Soviet Union. Communist parties were legalized or tolerated, and membership rose (see figures below). They benefited from wartime alliances and antifascist coalitions.
  • Organized labor was integrated into democratic politics for the first extended postwar period as the working class expanded and unionization surged. By the end of WWII, unionized workers numbered roughly $3.5 \text{ to } 4 \times 10^6$ across Latin America; the Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina (CTAL) claimed about $3.3 \text{ million}$ members in 16 countries. Postwar militancy and social pact dynamics pushed labor into political bargaining but also made it a target for anti-left crackdowns later.
  • The meaning and discourse of democracy broadened: democracy came to symbolize not just elections and rule of law, but wider popular participation (especially urban working-class) and alignment with national economic development and social justice; democracy was linked to a broader “ideology of production” and development goals, not simply a liberal political order.
• The wartime and immediate postwar liberal climate was reinforced by a broad liberal tradition in Latin American politics and a surge of wartime propaganda in favor of U.S. democracy and the American way of life, largely transmitted via Nelson Rockefeller’s Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA). This helped seed democratization even as economic and political actors were calculating how to preserve stability after the war.

II. The United States response to postwar political developments (1944–1945): shifting policy toward democracy

• The hard or primary interests of the United States in Latin America remained geopolitical/strategic (hemispheric defense) and economic (trade and investment), but there was also a soft interest in disseminating U.S. ideas, culture, and political institutions. Democracy was seen as potentially stabilizing in the long run, but political openness could threaten immediate strategic interests.
• Historically, the U.S. favored democracies but dealt with dictatorships when needed for stability or wartime unity; nonintervention was a central policy under the Good Neighbor Policy, yet it sometimes allowed or even supported undemocratic regimes (e.g., Trujillo, Somoza).
• In World War II, the U.S. cooperated with all regimes that opposed the Axis; this included maintaining ties with dictators like Vargas in Brazil through financial credits, favorable commodity pricing, and Lend-Lease, which helped preserve regimes perceived as strategic allies. Vargas received more than 70% of all Latin American lend-lease aid.
• As the war ended and the postwar order emerged, U.S. policy began to reflect a clearer stance in favor of democratic governance, though ambiguities persisted. Notable themes:
  • Ambassadors and officials frequently argued that promoting democracy should be weighed against nonintervention and strategic realities; some warned that ignoring democratic openings could undermine moral leadership and legitimacy.
  • In a 1944–1945 arc, U.S. officials like Walter Thurston (El Salvador) warned that tolerating dictatorships while promoting democratic ideals undermined credibility and could empower anti-U.S. sentiment. The tension between nonintervention and democracy promotion was widely debated among diplomats.
  • A growing realization emerged that supporting dictatorships during the war could complicate postwar democratic reform and fuel popular opposition to the United States.
  • In late 1944–1945, there were concrete moves toward supporting democratic processes: the Chapultepec Conference (1945) led a regional push for democratic principles; Braden, appointed August 1945 as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American affairs, actively championed democratic openings in Argentina and Brazil; Byrnes endorsed multilateral intervention in support of democracies in Latin America (November 1945).
• The U.S. response varied by country and context:
  • Paraguay: Beaulac and later U.S. pressure from 1944–46 promoted press freedom, party legality, and elections; democratization occurred briefly in 1946 before a complex postwar trajectory.
  • Bolivia: The U.S. pressed for reform to help unite broad pro-Allied forces against nationalist regimes; the Frente Democrático Antifascista helped open a path to democracy in 1946.
  • Argentina: Spruille Braden led a vigorous pro-democracy campaign, pressuring for elections and a timetable toward democracy (1945–46). Berle, as ambassador to Brazil, and other U.S. officials similarly supported democratization.
  • Brazil: Berle’s pressure contributed to the successful December 1945 elections that ousted Vargas’s Estado Novo regime and brought Dutra to power, after Vargas faced a crisis of Queremismo (mass mobilization urging a Constituent Assembly). A second crisis in October 1945 helped derail attempts to postpone elections; Braden and Berle played key roles in pressuring for a timely democratic outcome.
  • Argentina (Perón era): Braden’s activity in Buenos Aires effectively supported a transition toward democratic politics; when Perón finally won the 1946 elections, Braden’s intervention had a mixed legacy but helped consolidate Peronism within a democratic framework.
  • A general trend emerged: as the war concluded, the U.S. began distancing itself from endorsing outright dictatorships and leaned toward recognizing the value of open political processes, while still prioritizing anti-Communist alignments in the emerging Cold War context.
• In 1945–1947, U.S. officials and policy statements increasingly argued for governments established through freely expressed consent of the governed. The shift was reinforced by the Chapultepec Conference and U.S. statements emphasizing democratic governance as a core regional norm, albeit with pragmatic caveats based on strategic interests.
• The broader context of economic expectations: the U.S. had supported wartime economic performance in Latin America but opposed a postwar “Marshall Plan” style program for the region; in 1950, Latin America received about $400\text{ million}$ in development aid, far less than Western Europe’s $19\text{ billion}$, prompting reliance on private capital and national development strategies (import-substitution industrialization).
• The postwar U.S. approach faced a key paradox: while it publicly endorsed democracy, it often supported or tolerated dictatorships if they were seen as more effective against Communism or more cooperative with U.S. economic interests. The same period also witnessed a tightening of anti-Communist measures, including labor union purges, anti-Communist legislation, and the expulsion of Communist or militant leftist influence from major labor organizations in several countries.

II.b. Key political and ideological developments in the immediate postwar period

• The wartime and immediate postwar era produced a reimagining of democracy as a central political symbol with broad appeal, especially among urban workers and middle classes seeking social reform and economic development.
• The Communist movement, which had been illegal in many countries, was legalized or tolerated in nearly all Latin American countries by 1945–1947, with notable gains in elections across the region (Costa Rica, Chile, Cuba, Brazil). By 1947, Communist party membership reached approximately $5\times 10^5$, and in several countries they secured significant vote shares (e.g., Chile’s PCCh received ~17% in municipal elections in 1947; Cuba’s PSP had ~$1.3\times 10^5$ in 1944 and ~$2\times 10^5$ in 1946).
• Labor militant expansion coincided with new political alignments; CTAL and later anticommunist unions formed. AFL leadership promoted anti-Communist union organization in Latin America, and by 1948–49, non-Communist labor federations left the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and aligned with international bodies like ICFTU.
• The political discourse about democracy and development broadened to merge economic policies (industrialization, development) with political participation; leftist and populist actors gained positions of influence, but internal divisions and regional differences undermined coherent democratic consolidation.

III. The rollback and the limits of democracy, 1947–1954

• From 1947 to 1954, the postwar democratic wave suffered a sharp rollback in many countries: elections were curtailed, civil liberties restricted, and regimes reasserted control.
• In several countries dictator-ships and authoritarian regimes reemerged or stabilized, including: Argentina under Perón (an elected government with increasing autocratic control), Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador (overthrown by military coup in 1947, later elections), Venezuela (AD-led democracy dismantled in 1948; Marcos Pérez Jiménez dictatorship, 1948–1958), Peru (Bustamante’s government faced coup and instability), Bolivia (post-1947 oscillations toward repressive regimes), and Brazil (1945–1947 purge of Communist and independent leftists from unions; 1947–48 constitutional adjustments and labor repression under Dutra).
• The Latin American Communist Parties faced a major suppression wave: in Chile (1947, 1948), Brazil (1947–48), and Costa Rica (1948) the Communist parties were banned or marginalized; labor leadership was purged of Communist influence, and independent unions faced legal restrictions.
• In several countries, long-standing dictatorships persisted or reasserted control: Nicaragua (Somoza’s hold), Dominican Republic (Trujillo), Paraguay (Morínigo’s regime and the 1946–47 political maneuvering), and Cuba (an evolving authoritarian framework despite electoral openings in 1944–46).
• The postwar rollback was especially pronounced in Latin America’s more developed economies: Brazil (1945–49), Chile (1947–48), Costa Rica (1948), and others experienced political retrenchment and suppression of leftist labor and political activity.
• By 1954, Latin America’s democratic landscape had contracted to only a few states widely recognized as democratic (or with clear democratic traditions): Uruguay, Costa Rica, Chile, and Brazil. However, even these states faced ongoing democratic contestation: for example, Chile’s 1952–1953 leadership of Ibáñez del Campo and Brazil’s 1950s political oscillations under Vargas’s legacy and later political crises.
• The rollback was not purely domestic; the Cold War provided a powerful international frame for reasserting anti-Communist policies. The United States prioritized anti-communist security and economic concerns, sometimes endorsing or enabling dictatorships when they were seen as better defense against Communism or more reliable for U.S. capital and interests.
• Key factors contributing to the rollback:
  • The enduring strength and cohesion of dominant classes and the military, which resisted broad-based, inclusive democracy.
  • The weakness and fragility of reformist and leftist parties in many countries, along with internal divisions and a lack of durable social coalitions.
  • Labor movements, though militant, remained relatively weak and often bureaucratized; they faced state repression, antistrike laws, and delegitimization of independent unions.
  • The Cold War environment intensified anti-Communist campaigns, leading the United States to support anti-left policies, including purging Communist influence from unions and politics in several countries.
  • Economically, Latin American elites sought to attract private capital and maintain political stability, sometimes at the expense of democratic norms; they expected U.S. capital and development finance but faced limited postwar aid and a preference for private investment and internal stabilization over broad democratization.

IV. Explanations for the postwar failure of democracy (the domestic–international interplay)

• The core explanation emphasizes the resilience of dominant classes and the military, which did not experience the same disintegration as in some other regions after WWII. They used political and economic power to roll back democratic gains when popular mobilization threatened their hegemony.
• Domestic actors (parties and labor) often lacked deep social roots or coherent coalitions to sustain democratic reform in the face of countervailing forces and Cold War pressures.
• International context mattered: the United States, as the region’s dominant external power, used its leverage—economic aid, military security guarantees, and political pressure—to steer the region away from radical reforms and toward anti-Communist stability. This external pressure often reinforced the rightward turn and undermined left-leaning, reformist projects.
• The broader economic order in the postwar world—heavy U.S. dominance in global capital flows and the push for liberal, capitalist development—encouraged stability and private investment but at times compromised democratic participation and social reform.
• The Kennan line of thought (1950) warned that, in some cases, harsh measures against perceived communist influence might be necessary to preserve regional security and U.S. interests, even if it meant compromising democratic norms. This perspective foreshadowed later debates about whether democracy should be preserved at any cost or replaced by more authoritarian measures in the anti-Communist fight.
• The Guatemala 1954 invasion (CIA-backed) demonstrated that, in the most dramatic case, the United States was willing to intervene directly to overthrow a democratically elected government if it was perceived as a threat to U.S. interests or susceptible to Communist influence. This event encapsulated the paradox: the U.S. publicly promoted democracy, but it intervened militarily to destroy democratic governments when it believed that outcome served anti-Communist goals.
• The long-run takeaway: democracy in Latin America remained fragile and contingent on both internal class dynamics and external strategic pressures. While World War II catalyzed a democratizing impulse, the Cold War era subsequently multiplexed U.S. policy toward Latin America, producing alternating periods of repression and liberalization depending on how regional actors aligned with U.S. strategic priorities.

The Alliance for Progress: The 1960s

The North American Goal and Kennedy’s Development Vision

• The Alliance for Progress emerged as a bold, integrated approach to address democracy and development in Latin America (1960s), framed by the idea that political freedom must accompany material progress.

• John F. Kennedy articulated a revolutionary vision for the Americas, emphasizing the need to mix political freedoms with substantial economic improvements to prevent conditions that might foster communist influence.

• The Alliance built on earlier proposals from prominent Latin Americans and policy initiatives that date to the late Eisenhower era (1957–1961), but Kennedy gave it a new, explicit mandate and organizational structure.

• Kennedy’s quote exemplifies the aspirational rhetoric: transforming the Americas into a crucible of revolutionary ideas and efforts, linking political freedom to living standards and dignity, and pursuing comprehensive reform across the hemisphere.

• Institutional shift: the Alliance for Progress created a distinct bureaucratic framework within the U.S. government to coordinate development assistance and democratization efforts separately from other policy areas; this was intended to coordinate a multi-dimensional strategy addressing poverty, inequality, and political oppression simultaneously (as opposed to earlier programs that focused mainly on political mediation or financial stabilization).

• The Alliance drew on a combination of top-down assistance (economic modernization, social reform) and political reforms (education, governance, anti-corruption measures) to promote sustainable development alongside political openness. It represented a deliberate pivot from the earlier “nonintervention” posture toward a more active, programmatic U.S. engagement with Latin American development and democratic governance.

• Context: the Alliance was part of a broader U.S. shift in the 1960s toward active development assistance as a tool of Cold War strategy, designed to strengthen pro-American regimes and prevent the spread of communism by addressing root causes of discontent (poverty, inequality, political exclusion).

• Overall implications for Latin America: the Alliance for Progress signaled a more integrated U.S. effort to promote development and democracy, creating an institutional mechanism for aid, technical assistance, and governance reform. It also reflected an ideological commitment to modernization and anti-Communism within a framework that blended political and economic objectives, setting the stage for later development programs and regional cooperation initiatives in the 1960s and beyond.

• Note: The content above draws on Bethell’s synthesis of the postwar period (1944–1954) and Tony Smith’s introduction to the Alliance for Progress era. It highlights the tension between democracy promotion and anti-Communist priorities in U.S. policy, as well as the shift from a purely noninterventionist Good Neighbor stance to a more interventionist but development-oriented approach in the 1960s.

• Key dates and figures to remember:

  • 1944–1946: Postwar democratization wave; multiple countries transition toward representative governance, some temporarily robust, others unstable.
  • 1945 Chapultepec Conference; Braden appointment (1945); Byrnes’ multilateralist push (1945).
  • 1946–1948: Rollback of democracy; Communist parties barred in several states; major labor crackdowns in Chile, Brazil, Costa Rica, and other countries.
  • 1948–1954: The anti-democratic consolidation period; coups in several states; Guatemala 1954 invasion.
  • 1960s: Alliance for Progress emerges under Kennedy; development and democracy linked within a coordinated U.S. program.

• Core numerical references (for quick recall):

  • Union density by end of WWII: roughly $3.5-4.0\times 10^6$ workers unionized across Latin America.
  • CTAL membership: about $3.3\times 10^6$ in sixteen countries.
  • Communist party membership in the late 1940s: about $5\times 10^5$ by 1947.
  • Share of lend-lease aid to Vargas’s Brazil: >$70\%$ of Latin American lend-lease aid.
  • Postwar aid levels (1950): Latin America received around $400\text{ million}$ vs $19\text{ billion}$ to Western Europe (1945–50).
  • The “two-fifths” share in UN votes: $rac{2}{5}$; in the U.N. General Assembly Latin America constituted a crucial bloc (about 20 of 51 votes historically).

• Connections to broader themes for exam prep:

  • How wartime and postwar geopolitics shaped domestic political trajectories in Latin America.
  • The paradox of promoting democracy while supporting dictatorships in the name of anti-Communism.
  • The role of labor movements in democratization, and how postwar suppression of labor leadership affected democratic consolidation.
  • The emergence of development as a central pillar of U.S. foreign policy in the 1960s and the birth of integrated political–economic strategies (Alliance for Progress).
  • The Guatemala 1954 coup as a watershed example of direct U.S. intervention in Latin American democratic processes, illustrating tensions between democratic rhetoric and strategic imperatives in the Cold War.