interest groups
pluralism and its critiques
definitions (interest groups vs social movements)
interest group
any formal group which seeks to promote a particular policy or set of policies, and to organise to influence politics and policy-makers to achieve this policy and do not seek elected office
confederation of business
trade union congress
greenpeace
chemical industry association
social movement
a large informal grouping of individuals and/or organisations which aim to promote a particular political or social issue, or to promote or resist social change
a democracy movement → Arab Spring
mass demonstrations in democracies → Occupy Wall Street
student protests
pluralist theory of interest groups
Robert Dahl (1961) proposed a theory of interest group politics, called ‘pluralism’, which he developed from him study in New Haven, Connecticut (where Yale University is located)
Dahl argued that if there is open access to policy-makers and politicians, then any concerned group can influence policy outcomes
groups that have the most to gain/lose will organise and be able to access policy-makers, while groups that have no interests at stake will not have a say (⇒ better than elections?)
if one group organises on one side of an issue, another group will organise on the other side ⇒ there will be ‘countervailing power’
⇒ public officials should be ‘neutral referees’ of the battle between interest groups
⇒ policy outcome should be broadly reflective of the general will
critiques of pluralism
politicians are not ‘neutral referees’. if politicians seek votes, they will only listen to interest groups who share the policy preferences of their voters (or that help to win the next election) → ‘capture’ of policy-makers by particular interest groups
pluralism → ‘trades’ by groups, to increase public spending e.g. farmers and industry support for each other to promote subsides
why should people with more at stake (or have more time to lobby) have more say?
interest groups do not necessarily compete on an equal playing field → some groups are more able or likely to organise than others
the logic of collective action
public goods vs. private goods
public goods
a policy which is non-excludable and non-rivalrous
non-excludable ⇒ a person cannot be excluded from consuming a good whether or not they pay for the good (free-rider problem)
non-rivalrous ⇒ consumption by one person does not undermine the ability of another person to consume it → e.g. defence, clean air etc
private good
a policy which is excludable and rivalrous: some people can be excluded from consuming the good, and if one person consumes more, it reduces the amount remaining for others (e.g. parking lots etc)
example of public goods: light house
non excludable → once built, all ships passing through benefit from it, regardless if they contribute or not
non rivalrous → increase shipping in the area do not diminish benefit for each individual ships
we can conceptualise interest groups as seeking to provide public goods to its members
but the problem is, who will pay for such a project
Mancur Olson’s (1965): Logic of Collective Action
Olson explained why some groups are more able to mobilise than others and (as a result) why public goods are likely to be under-supplied while private goods are likely to be over-supplied
each individual has a ‘collective action function’:
R = (B x P) - C
where:
R = reward for participating in a group/social movement (protest)
B = benefit of the good provided by a group
P = probability that the action of the individual makes a difference
C = cost of participating
the free rider problem
probability of an individual making a difference (P) is very low, and people are likely to benefit (B) regardless of whether they show up
size of groups determine success in overcoming free rider problem
smaller groups are more able to organise because:
benefit for individual members are higher > increase B
individual contribution are more impactful > increase P
better able to sanction non-cooperation among members
example: US sugar program
sugar has sold for as high as 56 cents a pound domestically when the world market price was only 32 cents
costing consumers about USD 2.5 billion. why does the policy exist and persist?
such subside is a club goods from the societal perspective, but a form of public goods within the sector
there are 4570 sugar farms in the U.S.
if everyone consumes the same amount, the cost to each consumer is less than $10
each producer gets about $550,000 (assuming each farmer produces the same amount)
the argument becomes even more compelling when we consider the concentration of the sugar market
17 huge sugar cane plantations in Florida produce > 50% of the sugar
the total benefit of the sugar program is $2.5 billion. hence… (2.5bil* .5)/17 = $73.5 million
since this payoff is so large, big growers have strong incentives to lobby to keep the program going, even if the nation’s other 4553 sugar growers free-ride
disparity of intensity of interest within group reduce free rider problem
implications of the logic of collective action
implies that the voluntary contributes toward club goods will not occur unless individual costs relative to individual benefits are small
often true in smaller, concentrated interest since benefits are larger relative costs, monitoring costs are low and selective inducements are great (e.g., large financial firms).
large, diffuse interests often cannot overcome these costs, and are likely to be underrepresented in policymaking (e.g., consumers)
consumer groups are especially disadvantaged relative to concentrated interest groups because the costs of subsides are small and consumers face high coordination costs
success of interest groups depends on their size as well as the nature of the interest (concentrated v diffused, public v private goods) that they advocate
political voice and participation
success and failure of interest groups, NGOs and social movements is linked to who joins and who does not join
participation in interest organisations and hence political voice is usually not random: who is speaking when an organisation speaks?
classical critique of pluralism in this respect:
“[T] he flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent” - Schattschneider, E.E. (1960): The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America, p.35
what determines the inequality in political voice and socially biased membership in interest groups and organisations>
right to participate (historically)
motivation
knowledge and skills
money
time
location in social networks (beforehand)
all of these factors are linked to socio-demographic factors and socio-economic status
social inequality in political voice can therefore be a self-reinforcing process (Schlozman et al. 2013, chap. 1)
‘The Political Economy of Agriculture Protection’ Thies and Porche (2007)
look at what determines the level of agriculture subsides in 30 countries in East Asia, North America, Wester Europe, and Eastern Europe between 1986 and 2001
dependent variable → level of support in a country in a year (measured as the difference between the price a producer receives and the world price)
key determinants:
size of the agricultural sector → agricultural employment <= to test Olson’s logic
economic shocks → recession, fiscal crisis, terms of trade
comparative advantage of agricultural sector → labour productivity ratio, factor endowment ratio
political factors:
veto players (e.g. coalition govt.)
federalism
constituency (1=upper house territorially elected)
party fragmentation (no. of parties)
election year
impact of political institutions
interest group access and political institutions
access-seeking is one core strategy of inside lobbying by interest groups attempting to influence public policy (Bouwen 2004; Hansen 1991)
each political system has different entry points for interest groups. these are also called policy-making venues of simply “venues” in the public policy literature
hence, the institutional design is a key factor for effective interest group access and success
some doors are open in some countries but closed in other contexts
interest groups and lobbyists need to know which venues are most promising for realising their policy preferences in the political decision-making process
interest groups can target multiple venues to pursue their goals. this process is called “venue shopping” (Baumgartner and Jones 2009)
factors for interest group success
size of the groups
does interest group represent:
public vs private goods
concentrated vs diffuse interests
who is organised? and who isn’t? social bias in membership
insider or outsider status ⇒ linked to corporatism vs pluralism divide
institutional design and number of entry points or venues
two views of interest groups “Lobbying”
lobbying is bad for democracy
lobbying enables concentrated (private) interests to mobilise to influence policies, while diffuse (public) interests cannot access policy-makers too easily; lobbyists reinforce inequalities in access to politics
lobbying goes against the effects of the democratic electoral process
lobbying is good for democracy
gives more influence to those who has more at stake
opportunity to participate in policy making beyond voting
lobbying by interest groups provides vital information to policy-makers and politicians, who cannot be experts on all issues or accurately evaluate the impact of policies; lobbyists reduce information costs
alternatives to pluralism
alternative models to pluralism
corporatism (e.g. Schmitter, 1974)
the state grants privileged access to the ‘two sides of industry’: business and labour → e.g. German collective wage bargaining
neo-pluralism (e.g. Lindblom, 1977)
the state provides subsides and access to groups which represent diffuse (public) interests ⇒ artificially creating a ‘level playing field’ → e.g. EU funding of environmental and consumer groups
⇒ all these models involve a more active role of the state to support or promote groups which are less likely to be able to mobilise (to influence policy-makers) in an open pluralist model
⇒ disparity between insider v outsider groups
⇒ is this levelling the playing field? or simply introducing further bias/enabling state meddling the discourse?
corporatism vs pluralism (Schmitter 1974)
corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised:
compulsory
noncompetitive, hierarchally ordered
recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate
representational monopoly
pluralism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised:
voluntary
competitive, nonhierarchally ordered
not specially licensed, recognised, subsidised, or created by the state
do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories
institutional context and membership
Iceland and Sweden, together with Denmark, Finland and Belgium, apply the “Ghent-system”
you have to be member of a union to become member of the regular unemployment insurance (private goods increase incentive to join)
this explains the high membership shares in these countries (⇒ artefact)
it also reflects a state-granted privilege for unions
that state can (artificially) create privileges/monopoly for interest organisations
when does business lose?
Dür et al. (2015) investigation under which conditions business lobbying in the EU fails
data are interviews with commission officials who were asked to locate the policy-position of political actors on a scale 0-100
success defined as the extend these group are able to change the policy outcome from the initial proposal by the commission
in contrast to critiques of pluralism, business interests do not always have success in lobbying in the EU
citizen groups can under certain circumstances (i.e. when European Parliament was involved in the process) have more success (⇒ neo-pluralism in EU could have ‘levelled the playing field’)
in Sum
pluralistic model of interest group politics would lead to bias policy outcome in favour of smaller groups/concentrated interest
alternative model of interest group politics that tries to use state power to create a more levelled playing field for different groups, to different degrees of success
should the state become an active player? is it creating more problem than it solves?
politics matter! success of interest group is also dependent on political institutions as it determine opportunities and opening for lobbying