week 5

Page 1: Introduction

  • Lecture Title: Financial Regulation

  • Instructor: Dr. Orkun Saka

  • Institution: University of London, City

  • Course Code: EC2028

  • Year Established: 1894

Page 2: Reading Assignments

  • Relevant Book Chapter: Mishkin, 12th Edition, Chapter 10: Economic analysis of financial regulation

Page 3: Learning Objectives

  • Identify the reasons for and forms of a government safety net in financial markets.

  • Discuss how government actions may distort bank incentives to "play safe" in financial markets and create moral hazard.

  • List and summarize types of financial regulation and how each reduces asymmetric information problems.

Page 4: Bank Behavior

  • Banks often behave irresponsibly due to lack of accountability.

  • Notable cases of irresponsible behavior include:

    • Lending rate-fixing by global banks such as Barclays, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase, etc.

    • Cultural considerations in banking leading to moral hazards.

Page 5: Presentation Announcement

  • Interaction noted: live content display during presentations.

Page 6: Banking & Moral Hazard (1/5)

  • Bank Panics:

    • Can force healthy banks into bankruptcy.

    • Deposit insurance mitigates the risk of bank runs and contagion effects.

    • Methods of Deposit Insurance:

      • Payoff method

      • Purchase and assumption method

  • Government Safety Nets:

    • Lender of last resort (LOLR) - central bank support to troubled institutions.

    • Liquidity provision (e.g., Quantitative Easing).

    • Direct bailouts (government loans or equity injections).

Page 7: Banking & Moral Hazard (2/5)

  • Systemic Importance of Banks:

    • Banks as natural diversifiers but also systemically important.

    • A bank's failure can lead to wider financial system failures.

    • Total government cost of bailing banks often less than costs of bank failures.

  • Problems with Government Bailouts:

    • Knowing they can be bailed out, banks take excessive risks.

    • Adverse selection in the banking sector encourages riskier behaviors.

Page 8: Banking & Moral Hazard (3/5)

  • Moral Hazard from Insurance:

    • Deposit insurances and government bailouts can cause banks to act irresponsibly.

  • Example Investment Decision:

    • Project costing £70 million with uncertain outcomes ($90 million or $30 million).

    • Exploration on whether such risk would be considered by banks versus individuals.

Page 9: Banking & Moral Hazard (4/5)

  • Game Theory Dynamics:

    • A representation of interactions between banks, the economy, and the government.

    • Outcomes depend on decision overlapping between bank behaviors and government reactions.

Page 10: Interactive Content

  • Engagement noted: responses during presentations for insights on subgame perfect equilibrium paths.

Page 11: Banking & Moral Hazard (5/5)

  • Ensuring Credibility of No-Bailout Promises:

    • Ex-ante Actions:

      • Institutional reforms and punishments for banks.

    • Regulatory Actions: Regulating banks to encourage more responsible behaviors.

Page 12: Financial Regulation 1: Restrictions on Asset Holdings

  • Banks prefer riskier investments due to low capitalization.

    • This leads to risk being shifted onto creditors and depositors.

  • Regulations:

    • Promote diversification and restrict exposure to high-risk assets (e.g., common stock).

Page 13: Financial Regulation 2: Capital Requirements

  • Capital requirements minimize moral hazards in financial institutions.

    • Minimum leverage ratio set at ~5%.

    • Basel Accord introduced risk-weighted capital requirements across asset categories.

  • Regulatory arbitrage issues with preferences for risky assets despite capital risk categories defined.

Page 14: Financial Regulation 3: Prompt Corrective Action

  • Regulatory authorities intervene when bank capital falls below critical levels, requiring:

    • Capital restoration plans

    • Restrictions on asset growth

    • Approval for new business lines, etc.

Page 15: Financial Regulation 4: Chartering and Examination

  • Financial supervision through chartering and examinations aims to prevent adverse selection.

  • Monitoring Factors:

    • Capital adequacy, asset quality, management practices, earnings, liquidity, and market risk sensitivity.

    • Requires periodic reporting from banks.

Page 16: Financial Regulation 5: Assessment of Risk Management

  • Evaluating risk management may include:

    • Oversight quality from senior management.

    • Adequacy of risk activity policies.

    • Effectiveness of internal controls.

Page 17: Financial Regulation 6: Disclosure Requirements

  • Required adherence to accounting standards with transparency on various information.

  • Aims to reduce information asymmetries between banks and stakeholders, enhancing market discipline.

Page 18: Financial Regulation 7: Consumer Protection

  • Regulations guide banks to disclose vital information to consumers.

    • Protects against consumer abuse and risky loan practices, such as NINJA loans.

Page 19: Financial Regulation 8: Restrictions on Competition

  • Justification for restrictions due to increased competition leading to moral hazards.

    • Previous laws (Glass-Steagall Act) aimed to limit risk-taking.

  • Disadvantages:

    • May lead to higher costs for consumers and reduced efficiency.

Page 20: Lecture Summary

  • Recap of:

    • Government safety nets for banks

    • Moral hazards associated with banking

    • Types and implications of financial regulation.