Poli Sci 145E Rights of the Accused
Counterman v. Colorado (2023)
This matter arrived in the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari.
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The petitioner is Billy Raymond Counterman. The respondent is the State of Colorado.
Counterman claims that his First Amendment right to free speech was injured by his conviction for stalking based on messages he sent to a woman on Facebook. Counterman argues that he did not intend for his messages to be threatening, and that the Colorado Supreme Court's ruling that his subjective intent was irrelevant violated his First Amendment rights.
The State of Colorado responds that the Colorado Supreme Court's ruling was correct, and that Counterman’s messages constituted true threats that are not protected by the First Amendment. The state argues that the First Amendment does not protect true threats because of the need to protect individuals from fear of violence and the disruption that threats can cause.
The Supreme Court reversed the Colorado Supreme Court's judgment. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the First Amendment requires the state to prove that the defendant knowingly or recklessly made a true threat.
The decision was 7-2 with Justice Kagan writing for the majority. Justices Sotomayor and Jackson filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justices Thomas and Barrett filed dissenting opinions.
The decision rests on the First Amendment’s protection of free speech, and the need to balance this protection with the government's interest in protecting individuals from true threats. The court reasoned that a recklessness standard strikes the appropriate balance between these interests.
The decision announced a new rule requiring the state to prove that the defendant knowingly or recklessly made a true threat in order to secure a conviction.
The decision changes the reading of the First Amendment by requiring a subjective mental state for true-threats convictions. Previously, many courts applied an objective standard, which focused on how a reasonable person would perceive the statement, rather than the speaker's intent.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Barrett, dissented, arguing that an objective standard was sufficient for true-threat convictions. He argued that the Court should not have adopted a recklessness standard, which he believes provides more First Amendment protection to true threats than to other categories of unprotected speech. He also argued that recklessness is a difficult standard to apply and will make it harder to prosecute true-threat cases. Justice Sotomayor, while concurring with the judgment, argued that the Court did not need to decide whether recklessness was sufficient in all true-threat cases. She believes that the Court should have decided this case on narrower grounds.
Frank v. Mangum (1915)
This matter arrived in the Supreme Court by writ of error from the District Court.
When a party believes a judge made a mistake during a trial
When a party believes a lower court's judgment violated the law
When a party believes a lower court's judgment was based on new evidence that was not presented at trial
The petitioner is Leo Frank. The respondent is J. T. Mangum, Sheriff of Fulton County, Georgia.
Frank claimed his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was injured by the hostile mob environment that surrounded his trial. He argues that the mob outside the courtroom intimidated the judge and jury, thereby depriving him of a fair trial.
Sheriff Mangum responds that Frank received due process of law through his trial in Georgia’s courts, which included a review by the State Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court, finding that Frank's trial and subsequent appeals in the Georgia courts satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirements.
The decision was 7-2, with Justices Holmes and Hughes dissenting.
The decision rests on the principle of federalism and comity, respecting the State’s judicial processes while upholding the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that federal courts should not interfere with state court proceedings unless there are exceptional circumstances, such as a clear showing that the state has denied a defendant due process of law.
Comity: a principle or practice among political entities such as countries, states, or courts of different jurisdictions, whereby legislative, executive, and judicial acts are mutually recognized.
The decision does not announce any new rule for the future.
The decision does not overturn or change the reading of any statute or case law.
Justices Holmes and Hughes dissented, arguing that the trial court lost jurisdiction due to mob domination, and therefore Frank did not receive due process. They believe that Frank's allegations of mob domination were serious enough to warrant a hearing in federal court.
Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)
This matter arrived in the Supreme Court on appeal from the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
Court of errors refers to the right of a superior court to review the errors of another court.
The appellants are Griswold and Buxton. The appellee is the State of Connecticut.
Griswold and Buxton claimed the Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives injured the right of marital privacy of married couples (and that they have standing to assert that right because of their professional relationship with these couples). They argue that the law is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, although the right to privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution.
In 1879, Connecticut passed a law that banned the use of any drug, medical device, or other instrument in furthering contraception (fined no less than $50 or in jail for 60 days). A gynecologist at the Yale School of Medicine, C. Lee Buxton, opened a birth control clinic in New Haven in conjunction with Estelle Griswold, who was the head of Planned Parenthood in Connecticut. They were arrested and convicted of violating the law, and their convictions were affirmed by higher state courts. Their plan was to use the clinic to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment before the Supreme Court.
The State of Connecticut responds that the law is a valid exercise of its police power to regulate morality and protect public health.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of conviction, finding the Connecticut law unconstitutional.
The decision was 7-2 with a variety of concurrences. Justice Douglas wrote for the majority. Justices Goldberg, Warren, and Brennan joined in a concurrence. Justices Harlan and White each filed separate concurrences. Justices Black and Stewart filed dissenting opinions.
The decision rests on the implied right to privacy emanating from the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights, particularly the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments. The court reasoned that these amendments create a "zone of privacy" that protects certain personal decisions, including those related to marriage and procreation.
Emanations: certain rights flow from the structure of the Constitution. In Griswold, the Court argued that the right to privacy emanates from the protections offered by other constitutional provisions.
The decision established a new rule recognizing a right to marital privacy, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The decision changed the reading of the Constitution by recognizing an implied right to privacy that is not explicitly mentioned in the text.
Justice Black, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented, arguing that the Constitution does not explicitly protect a right to privacy. He argued that the Court's decision was an example of judicial activism, exceeding its authority by creating a right not found in the Constitution. Justice Stewart argued that while the Connecticut law was "uncommonly silly," it did not violate any specific provision of the Constitution. He believed that the Court should not have struck down the law, and that it should have been left to the people of Connecticut to repeal it through the democratic process.
No reference to English law and is an example of rejection of nrom for common law jurisprudence
Innocation
Right to privacy constituted out of the shadows of existing amendments
Free flowing judicial mind of J. Douglas
Marbury v. Madison (1803)
This matter arrived in the Supreme Court on an application for a writ of mandamus filed directly with the Supreme Court.
The plaintiff is William Marbury. The defendant is James Madison, Secretary of State.
Marbury claimed his right to his commission as Justice of the Peace was injured by Madison’s refusal to deliver it. He argues that the commission was complete upon President Adams’ signing, and the Secretary of State is obligated to deliver it.
Madison did not make an appearance in the case. The Court considered arguments on behalf of the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court denied Marbury’s petition for a writ of mandamus. However, the Court went on to find that the law authorizing the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus in this case was unconstitutional.
The decision was unanimous.
The decision rests on the principle of judicial review, the power of the Court to declare a law unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and any law that conflicts with it must be void.
The decision established the new rule of judicial review, granting the Supreme Court the power to declare a law unconstitutional.
The decision changed the reading of the Constitution by establishing the principle of judicial review.
There were no dissents.
McElrath v. Georgia (2024)
This matter arrived in the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of Georgia.
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The petitioner is Devonta McElrath. The respondent is the State of Georgia.
McElrath claims his Fifth Amendment right to protection from double jeopardy was injured by the State’s attempt to retry him for malice murder after the jury found him not guilty on that charge, but deadlocked on the charge of felony murder. He argues that the jury’s inability to reach a verdict on felony murder amounted to an acquittal of the predicate felony of aggravated assault, precluding retrial on malice murder.
The State of Georgia responds that under Georgia law, retrial on malice murder is permissible because the jury did not acquit McElrath of the predicate felony.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Court remanded the case holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the state from retrying McElrath on the malice murder charge.
The decision was unanimous, with Justice Alito filing a concurrence.
The decision rests on the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause, and the principle that the substance of a jury verdict, not its label, determines whether an acquittal has occurred. The Court reasoned that the jury’s inability to reach a verdict on felony murder meant that the State failed to prove the predicate felony, which is essential for a malice murder conviction.
The decision does not announce a new rule but clarifies the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause in cases where a jury acquits on one charge but deadlocks on another that includes the same element.
The decision does not overturn a rule, but emphasizes the importance of looking to the substance, rather than the form, of a jury’s verdict when determining whether an acquittal has occurred for double jeopardy purposes.
Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion to clarify that there was “indisputably an acquittal on the malice-murder charge”, and to emphasize that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents the state from retrying a defendant after an acquittal.
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017)
This matter arrived in the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of Colorado.
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The petitioner is Miguel Angel Pena-Rodriguez. The respondent is the State of Colorado.
Pena-Rodriguez claims his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was injured by a juror’s racially biased statements during jury deliberations. He argued that the juror’s statements demonstrated racial bias against him, and the trial court's refusal to consider this evidence violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.
The State of Colorado responds that the trial court properly applied Colorado’s no-impeachment rule, which generally prohibits jurors from testifying about their deliberations.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado, remanding the case for further proceedings. The court held that there is a constitutional exception to the no-impeachment rule for evidence of racial bias during jury deliberations.
The decision was 5-3, with Justice Kennedy writing for the majority. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. Justice Alito filed a separate dissenting opinion, which was also joined by Chief Justice Roberts.
The decision rests on the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury, and the fundamental principle of racial equality in the justice system. The Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment requires juries to be free of racial bias, and this right outweighs the interests served by the no-impeachment rule in cases of racial bias.
The decision established a new rule recognizing a constitutional exception to the no-impeachment rule for evidence of racial bias.
The decision changed the reading of the Sixth Amendment by recognizing an exception to the longstanding no-impeachment rule for evidence of racial bias.
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, dissented, arguing that the no-impeachment rule is firmly established and should not be lightly overturned. He argued that the Court's decision would undermine the finality of jury verdicts and open the door to widespread challenges based on alleged juror misconduct. He also argued that the common-law understanding of the Sixth Amendment did not recognize any exception to the no-impeachment rule. Justice Alito, also joined by Chief Justice Roberts, wrote a separate dissent, emphasizing the history and importance of the no-impeachment rule. He argued that the rule is essential for protecting the integrity and finality of jury verdicts. He also argued that the Court's decision would have negative consequences for the jury system, such as discouraging jurors from speaking freely during deliberations and increasing the likelihood of post-trial harassment of jurors.
Powell v. Alabama (1932)
This matter arrived in the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama.
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A party who is dissatisfied with a lower court's decision can file a petition for a writ of certiorari
The higher court will order the lower court to send the case record for review
The higher court will then review the case and decide whether to grant the writ of certiorari
This is how most cases go to the Supreme Court
The petitioners are Ozie Powell, Willie Roberson, Andy Wright, Olen Montgomery, Haywood Patterson, Charley Weems, and Clarence Norris. The respondent is the State of Alabama.
From OYEZ: Nine Black youths -- described as, "young, ignorant, and illiterate" -- were accused of raping two white women. Alabama officials sprinted through the legal proceedings: a total of three trials took one day and all nine were sentenced to death. Alabama law required the appointment of counsel in capital cases, but the attorneys did not consult with their clients and had done little more than appear to represent them at the trial. This case was decided together with Patterson v. Alabama and Weems v. Alabama.
The petitioners, collectively known as the Scottsboro Boys, claimed their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was injured by the denial of counsel in their capital case. They argued that they were not given adequate time or opportunity to secure counsel, and the trial court’s appointment of all members of the bar to represent them did not constitute effective assistance of counsel.
The State of Alabama responded that the defendants were not denied due process of law because they were represented by counsel at trial.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the Alabama Supreme Court. The court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires that states provide effective assistance of counsel to defendants in capital cases.
The decision was 7-2, with Justices Butler and McReynolds dissenting.
The decision rests on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the fundamental right to a fair trial. The Court reasoned that the right to counsel is essential for a fair trial, particularly in capital cases where the consequences of a conviction are so severe.
The decision announced a new rule requiring states to provide effective assistance of counsel to defendants in capital cases.
The decision changed the reading of the Fourteenth Amendment by expanding the scope of the Due Process Clause to include the right to effective assistance of counsel in capital cases.
Justice Butler, joined by Justice McReynolds, dissented, arguing that the defendants were not denied due process of law because they were represented by counsel at trial. He argued that the Court's decision was an unwarranted interference with the state's criminal justice system.
Tennessee v. Garner (1985)
This matter arrived in the Supreme Court on appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
The petitioners are the State of Tennessee and the Memphis Police Department. The respondents are the Estate of Edward Garner and his father.
The respondents claimed that Edward Garner’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures was injured by the officer’s use of deadly force to prevent his escape. They argued that the shooting was unreasonable under the circumstances, as Garner was unarmed and posed no threat to the officer or others.
The State of Tennessee argues that the shooting was justified under Tennessee law and the Fourth Amendment. The state argued that the officer had probable cause to believe Garner had committed a felony, and the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent his escape.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, finding the Tennessee statute authorizing the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects unconstitutional. The Court held that the use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing suspect is a “seizure” subject to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement, and that such force may only be used when the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.
The decision was 6-3, with Justice White writing for the majority. Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist.
The decision rests on the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable seizures. The Court reasoned that the use of deadly force is a highly intrusive seizure, and must be justified by a compelling governmental interest. The Court also considered the historical context of the common-law rule permitting the use of deadly force to apprehend fleeing felons, noting that it was developed at a time when most felonies were capital offenses. The Court found that this historical justification was no longer applicable, and that the modern felony/misdemeanor distinction is too arbitrary to justify the use of deadly force against all fleeing felons.
The decision announced a new rule limiting the use of deadly force to apprehend fleeing suspects to those cases where the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.
The decision changed the reading of the Fourth Amendment by applying a more stringent reasonableness standard to the use of deadly force.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, dissented, arguing that the use of deadly force is justified when an officer has probable cause to arrest a fleeing felony suspect, particularly in the case of burglary. She argued that the Court's decision ignored the serious nature of burglary and the public interest in apprehending burglars. Justice O'Connor also criticized the majority's reasoning, finding it overly broad and likely to lead to second-guessing of police decisions in difficult circumstances.
Trump v. United States (2024)
This matter arrived in the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
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The petitioner is Donald J. Trump. The respondent is the United States.
Trump claimed his right to due process was injured by the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment against him. He argued that the indictment's allegations concern actions taken while he was President of the United States and should be categorized as official, not unofficial, actions. He argues that requiring him to stand trial for actions taken while he was president would distract him from his duties as a current presidential candidate.
The United States responded that the indictment’s allegations concerning unlawful efforts to overturn the results of the 2020 election are not official acts of the President.
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit, remanding the case for further proceedings. The Court held that the lower courts must carefully distinguish between official and unofficial actions when evaluating the indictment's allegations.
The decision appears to have been unanimous, though we don't have the full opinion.
The decision rests on the principle of separation of powers and the need to balance the interests of the Executive Branch with the need to ensure that no one is above the law. The Court recognized that the President enjoys certain immunities from prosecution for official actions, but emphasized that these immunities do not extend to unofficial acts.
The decision does not announce a new rule, but provides guidance for lower courts in determining whether Trump’s actions should be considered official or unofficial.
The decision does not overturn a rule or change the reading of any statute or case law, but clarifies the scope of presidential immunity from prosecution.
There are no dissents noted in the excerpt.
United States v. Rahimi (2024)
This matter arrived in the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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The petitioner is the United States. The respondent is Zackey Rahimi.
The United States claims that Rahimi’s conduct (possessing a gun while under a domestic violence restraining order) is not constitutionally protected by the Second Amendment.
Rahimi responded that the Second Amendment’s plain text covers his conduct and the government has not met its burden to justify its regulation.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit. The court held that Section 922(g)(8) of the Gun Control Act, which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic violence restraining orders, is consistent with the Second Amendment.
The decision was 8-1, with Chief Justice Roberts writing for the majority. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Kagan joined. Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson filed concurring opinions. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.
The decision rests on the Second Amendment’s text and history, interpreted through the lens of the Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen. The court held that while historical tradition is important in Second Amendment analysis, it is not the sole factor. The court reasoned that the government may regulate firearms in ways consistent with historical regulations.
The decision does not announce a new rule but reaffirms the framework set forth in Bruen for evaluating the constitutionality of gun regulations.
The decision does not overturn a rule or change the reading of any statute or case law, but demonstrates how Bruen’s historical analysis can be applied to a modern gun regulation.
Justice Thomas dissented, arguing that the Second Amendment protects Rahimi's right to possess a gun. He argued that the majority's decision was inconsistent with the original meaning of the Second Amendment and would allow the government to infringe on the right to keep and bear arms based on mere speculation about potential dangers. Justice Sotomayor, while concurring in the judgment, highlighted the flaws in the Bruen decision but recognized the need to apply it consistently. She emphasized that the Court's historical inquiry should be used to guide, rather than dictate, the outcome of Second Amendment cases.