global private
How did thief taking operate?
Thief-taking was a for-profit policing system in the 17th–18th centuries, used before modern state police forces existed.
It developed because the state lacked the capacity to enforce law consistently across society.
It operated as a private enterprise, not a salaried public service.
Motivation was mainly personal profit, not public duty.
Thief-takers were paid by piece-rate rewards, not wages.
They earned state rewards for capturing and securing convictions of certain offenders (e.g., burglars, highway robbers).
Rewards could be large (often £40 or more per conviction).
They collected private rewards and finder’s fees from victims for recovering stolen goods.
They received “blood money” — high state payments for capturing serious or notorious criminals.
Many thief-takers were former criminals or artisans with underworld connections.
They built networks of spies, informers, and thieves-for-hire.
They gathered intelligence in streets, taverns, and markets.
They identified who committed crimes and what goods were stolen.
They used early investigative and intelligence-gathering techniques.
They used stop-and-search, threats, and warrants to recover goods or force confessions.
They ran warehouses and storage networks for stolen goods.
They acted as middlemen between thieves and victims.
They often returned stolen property for a fee rather than pushing full prosecution.
Some thief-takers helped organize and control theft networks.
They sometimes profited from both sides — theft and recovery.
This created a system described as “crime-farming” (crime organized for profit).
They protected private property interests for paying clients.
Prosecution was treated as a private business responsibility.
The system encouraged false accusations and perjury (“fitting up”) to secure convictions and rewards.
Some thief-takers arranged crimes themselves and then “solved” them for payment.
These setups were known as blood money conspiracies.
Vulnerable people were often manipulated or trapped into committing crimes.
Some magistrates and justices were corrupt (“trading justices”) and took kickbacks.
There was little bureaucratic oversight or regulation.
Grew due to fragmented authority and weak formal policing.
Leadership and coordination gaps in law enforcement allowed private actors to step in.
Rivalries and disputes among authorities created opportunities for profit-driven enforcement.
Jonathan Wild built a large thief-taking empire.
He ran an integrated system of theft and recovery.
He paid thieves to steal, then charged victims to recover property.
He promoted himself through newspaper ads and public reputation.
He controlled criminal networks and betrayed non-cooperating criminals.
He was eventually executed in 1725, showing the dangers and corruption of the system.
Thief-taking operated as a commercial, intelligence-driven, and often corrupt private policing system that filled the gap before modern public police forces.
Explain what is meant by the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of violence
The state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence means only the government has the lawful authority to use force to maintain order and enforce law.
This idea is most associated with Max Weber and his definition of the modern state.
Force is considered legitimate when used by state-authorized actors (mainly police and military).
Police and the army are often described as the state’s “twin engines” of coercive power.
Under this model, private individuals are not supposed to use force, except in limited legal situations (e.g., self-defence).
The rise of professional public police helped the state claim control over lawful force.
State policing replaced earlier systems of self-help and private enforcement.
Police became the symbol of state authority and criminal justice power.
Some scholars argue the monopoly is partly an ideological claim, not a full reality.
Historically, policing and security were dispersed among many private and community actors.
Systems like thief-taking and private security show the state never fully controlled all enforcement.
Today, growth in private security and outsourcing challenges the monopoly again.
This suggests the monopoly may be a “historical blip,” not a permanent condition.
Even when security is privatized, the state still sets legal rules and boundaries for the use of force.
The state remains normatively responsible for protecting the public interest.
A key concern: if security becomes market-based, protection may become unequal and tied to ability to pay.
Core exam line: The concept means the state claims sole legitimate authority to use force, mainly through police and military, but in practice this control has always been contested and shared with private actors.
What kind of criminal justice innovations did Henry Fielding introduce?
Henry Fielding became a magistrate at Bow Street in 1748 and helped shift policing from freelance profit-seeking to a more organized public system.
Promoted the idea of a “monied police” — keeping financial incentives but placing thief-takers under formal oversight and direction.
Tried to reform, not eliminate, the reward-based system by supporting “useful” and supervised thief-takers.
Emphasized preventive justice — stopping crime before it happened rather than only reacting after.
Argued that crime prevention was more important than mass arrests after the fact.
Recruited thief-takers and private agents to work under magisterial control.
Organized these agents into public offices, reducing purely freelance operations.
Helped legitimize thief-catching as an honorable public function when serving the public interest.
Centralized operations at Bow Street to create a coordinated policing hub.
Built one of the first central criminal intelligence and surveillance centers.
Produced early crime reports and analysis about rising crime in London.
Helped establish the Bow Street Runners, often seen as a foundation of professional policing.
The Bow Street Runners were paid, trained, and more formalized officers.
They were funded partly by government grants and salaries, not only per-capture rewards.
Introduced a model of quicker response and coordinated pursuit (“quick notice and sudden pursuit”).
How does the metaphor of steering and rowing explain the operation of private security firms?
The “steering and rowing” metaphor explains how security is governed when the state no longer delivers all services directly.
It comes from neoliberal governance models based on “governing at a distance.”
“Rowing” means the hands-on delivery of security services.
Today, much rowing is done by private security firms, not public police.
Private firms provide guarding, patrolling, property protection, and commercial security.
They also perform specialized tasks (e.g., court security, prisoner transport, risk management).
Their focus is often prevention, loss reduction, and risk control, not prosecution.
“Steering” means the state sets rules and direction but does not do the work itself.
The state governs through laws, standards, and licensing systems.
The state creates regulatory bodies to oversee and monitor private security firms.
It uses vetting, accreditation, and compliance rules to control who can operate.
The state may rely on third parties (like insurers) to enforce standards.
This creates a division of labor: state steers, private firms row.
Security becomes a shared network (“nodal governance”) rather than state-only.
Critics argue profit-driven firms may prioritize market goals over public interest.
In practice, the “rowers” (private firms) may influence direction, limiting how much control the state truly has
What are Zedner’s three informal modes of governance?
Lucia Zedner identifies three informal modes of governance used to regulate private security outside direct state control: community, market, and architecture.
These are alternatives to formal state regulation but each has important weaknesses.
1️ Community (Self-Regulation)
Governance through industry self-regulation and professional norms.
Uses trade associations, voluntary bodies, and professional standards.
Relies on peer oversight and voluntary compliance.
Weak because firms can leave associations to avoid sanctions.
Can become “club government” — low transparency and weak accountability.
2️ Market (Competition)
Governance through market competition and consumer choice.
Assumes bad or dishonest firms will be driven out by better competitors.
Uses contracts and purchasing decisions as regulation tools.
Limited by information gaps — consumers often cannot judge quality.
Leads to unequal protection, since security goes to those who can pay.
3️Architecture (Design)
Governance through physical and technological design of spaces.
Uses built environments and security technology to control behavior.
Examples: gated properties, controlled entry, CCTV, patrol tracking systems.
Produces localized “bubbles of security” rather than broad protection.
Can be evaded or sabotaged and may displace crime elsewhere.
Core exam line: Zedner’s three informal governance modes are community (self-regulation), market (competition), and architecture (design control) — each helps regulate private security but all have significant limits, which is why formal state regulation often returns.
What is regulatory capture?
Regulatory capture occurs when a state regulator is meant to protect the public interest but instead serves the industry it regulates.
The regulator shifts from independent watchdog to industry ally/facilitator.
Regulation becomes shaped by industry interests rather than public protection.
How it happens
The industry itself pushes for regulation to shape rules in its favor.
Large firms support regulation to gain legitimacy and a “state-like” image.
Compliance costs help big firms squeeze out smaller competitors (market consolidation).
Firms can pass regulatory costs to consumers and increase prices.
Effects on regulators
Regulators begin to focus on “market health” instead of public good.
They justify regulation using business and economic benefits, not justice or safety.
Standards become minimal, avoiding strict rules that might hurt profits.
Regulators may act cautiously or “softly” to avoid damaging the industry.
Why capture occurs
The state becomes dependent on private firms to deliver security services.
Regulators rely on industry knowledge and cooperation.
Firms are treated as partners/stakeholders rather than subjects of control.
Collaboration turns into complicity, weakening enforcement.
Core exam line: Regulatory capture means a regulator serves the regulated industry’s interests over the public interest, leading to weak standards, industry-friendly rules, and reduced accountability.
Define private high policing. How do the authors define and characterize PHP?
Private high policing (PHP) = intelligence-led, risk-focused, often covert security work done by private actors to protect powerful private clients (especially corporations) rather than just the state.
It applies high-policing methods (intelligence, surveillance, infiltration, risk analysis) in the private sector.
Focus is on protecting private power, corporate assets, and elite interests.
Uses techniques similar to state intelligence agencies: informants, covert investigations, surveillance, and risk forecasting.
Emphasizes pre-emptive threat detection and risk management, not routine law enforcement.
Targets activities defined as threats to the client (e.g., fraud, activism, whistleblowing, reputational risk).
Often protects trade secrets, intellectual property, and corporate reputation.
Private high policing firms have global reach and expert intelligence networks.
Not subject to the same legal oversight and accountability as state high-policing agencies.
How O’Reilly & Ellison characterize PHP (Locus of Power view)
Conor O'Reilly and Graham Ellison argue high policing should be separated from the state.
Define PHP as protecting the “locus of power” in private/corporate structures.
Key distinction: public high policing protects the state; PHP protects the client.
Trace PHP historically to Pinkerton National Detective Agency and corporate intelligence work.
Identify transnational security consultancies as main modern PHP actors.
Stress secrecy, subversion control, and power preservation as core features.
How Jean-Paul Brodeur characterizes PHP (Hybrid critique)
Jean-Paul Brodeur sees PHP as a hybrid/partial privatization of high-policing functions.
Argues PHP shares some high-policing tools (informants, intelligence) but lacks full state powers.
Says PHP has weak symbolic authority compared to state agencies.
Notes conflicting private client interests make PHP less stable than state high policing.
Emphasizes that PHP firms hoard intelligence as proprietary rather than sharing it.
What are Brodeur's 4 characteristics of high policing?
Jean-Paul Brodeur distinguishes high policing from everyday (“low”) policing by four core features.
High policing focuses on intelligence and protection of state power, not routine crime control.
1️ Absorbent policing
High policing has an unlimited appetite for information.
Collects and absorbs data from many sources across society.
Intelligence is used for long-term threat assessment, not mainly for prosecutions.
Information is often not used in court unless necessary.
2️ Conflation of separate powers
High policing blurs or merges executive, judicial, and legislative powers.
Weakens normal checks and balances found in democratic systems.
May involve extra-legal or extra-judicial practices and executive overrides.
3️ Protection of national security (state-focused)
The main goal is protecting the state, regime, and political order.
Focus is on threats to government and dominant power structures, not individual crimes.
Citizen protection is indirect, through regime stability.
4️ Use of covert informants
Heavy reliance on informants and undercover operatives.
Uses human infiltration of suspect or dissident groups.
Seen as the most intrusive high-policing method.
Core exam line: Brodeur says high policing is defined by absorbent intelligence gathering, merged powers, state security focus, and covert informant use, distinguishing it from routine law enforcement.
Explain differences between high & low policing with examples
High:
High Policing: Protects the state, national security, and dominant political/economic interests.
Focuses on preserving power structures rather than just enforcing laws.
Intelligence-led, preventive, and covert.
Uses absorbent policing to gather information from multiple sources.
Focus on steering threats, not immediate arrests.
Often blurs executive, judicial, and legislative powers.
Operates in secrecy; symbolic power comes from perceived ability to bypass rules for state protection.
High Policing (Public): MI5, MI6, CIA, FBI, CSIS
High Policing (Private): Pinkerton Agency, corporate security consultancies (Control Risks, Kroll).
Interrogation of suspects in countries with less regulated laws, secret operations, preventive custody (e.g., Guantanamo Bay)
Low:.
Low Policing: Reactive and evidence-based.
Intelligence is used to build criminal cases.
Primary tactics are interruption via arrests and prosecutions.
Legally accountable, bound by criminal law.
Visible, uniformed presence deters crime and reassures the public.
Maintains everyday community order, prevents and responds to ordinary crimes (the “policing of lampposts”)
Low Policing (Public): Uniformed patrols, homicide investigations, community policing.
Low Policing (Private): Security guards in malls, airport screening, event security.
Standard arrests, prosecutions, local crime enforcement (theft, burglary, disorder).
Relationship Between High and Low Policing
Often separated by a “wall” of secrecy; high policing agencies reluctant to share intelligence with low policing.
globalization and private security firms blur boundaries; private actors perform some high-policing functions (intelligence, risk management) for elite or corporate clients, creating a hybrid security landscape.
Core Exam Line: High policing = covert, intelligence-led, state-focused; Low policing = visible, reactive, community-focused. Boundaries exist but are increasingly blurred by private security and transnational risks.
How do private intelligence firms operate as agent provocateurs?
Private intelligence firms act as agent provocateurs to protect corporate or elite interests.
They infiltrate groups perceived as “subversive” to a client’s power, such as protest movements or labor organizations.
Human informants or investigators are embedded in these groups for intelligence gathering.
Incitement: Agents may actively encourage or exaggerate radical activity to make the group appear more threatening.
Threats are amplified to justify pre-emptive action or reputational damage against the group.
Example: McDonald’s case — private investigators infiltrated protest meetings, distributed exaggerated claims about the group, framing lawful dissent as subversive.
Defining subversion: Corporations decide arbitrarily what counts as “subversive” (e.g., labor activism, whistleblowing), and provocateurs generate evidence to support this narrative.
Modeled on Pinkerton Agency practices — 19th-century agent provocateurs monitored and disrupted trade unions under the guise of crime prevention.
Reflects high policing logic — the goal is long-term protection of power structures, not just immediate law enforcement.
Viewed as illegal or morally dubious from a low-policing perspective, since it manipulates consent and subverts democratic norms.
Distinctions between vagabonds and tourists
Vagabonds: Unwelcome travelers (asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers).
Mobility is constrained and often treated as a burden.
Often forced into containment in detention centers, ghettos, or controlled zones.
Monitored through a lens of suspicion, using biometric databases and state surveillance.
Pursuit, capture, and repatriation enforced by authorities.
Tourists: Globetrotting elites or transnationally mobile middle class (TMMC).
Mobility is facilitated and seen as essential to the global economy.
Voluntary containment within secure compounds, resorts, or protective bubbles.
Subject to supportive oversight, tracked by private security for safety and risk management.
Rescue and extraction, restoring mobility and protection.
Summary Table
Additional Notes
The transnational security industry acts as guardians of global mobility, facilitating tourists while the state enforces control over vagabonds.
Vagabonds are treated as threats, whereas tourists are treated as valuable assets for the global economy.
Distinction reflects social status, risk perception, and the differential application of security resources.
Core Exam Line: Vagabonds face constrained, suspicious, punitive mobility, whereas tourists enjoy facilitated, protected, and restorative mobility, illustrating how global security prioritizes elite movement.
Explain the two types of military contractor-identities that Eichler contrasts and explain the effects
1. White, Western "Expert"
Primarily from the US and UK, framed as professionals with elite military or special forces training.
Presented in marketing as mentors/managers who “professionalize” the workforce.
UK contractors often position themselves as disciplined professionals, distancing from the “cowboy” image of some US contractors.
Linked to hegemonic masculinity — authority, expertise, and elite status.
2. Third Country National (TCN)
Recruited from the Global South (e.g., Nepal, Fiji, Chile).
Characterized by subordinate masculinities and framed as “naturally suited” for dangerous work
(colonial “martial race” logic).
Often limited to low-status, high-risk work like static guarding or convoy protection.
Skills viewed as innate, not professionalized.
Effects of the Identity Hierarchy
Wage disparities: TCNs earn much less (e.g., Gurkhas ~$1,500/month) than Western experts ($8,000–$10,000/month).
Risk distribution: TCNs perform high-risk frontline work, Western experts are managers behind relative safety.
Some TCNs may have rights eroded
Confiscated passports, restricted movement, lack of social security or medical care.
Western “Expert” identity allows firms to shed a mercenary image, appearing ethical or humanitarian.
Gender and racial inequalities are treated as optional market issues rather than human rights concerns.
Ethnic bargain: Economic necessity forces men from the Global South into marginal, dangerous roles, reinforcing global inequalities.
Core Exam Line: The contrast between Western Experts and TCNs structures pay, risk, and status in private military contracting, legitimizing corporate authority while reproducing social and racial
Why might states choose to use mercenaries?
1. Political “Casualty Management”
Contractor deaths are excluded from official military casualty counts.
Media coverage of mercenary fatalities is limited, reducing public perception of the human cost of war (“body-bag effect”).
Allows governments to maintain wars with fewer political repercussions.
Example: In 2016, the U.S. deployed 9,800 official troops in Afghanistan but supplemented with 26,000 contractors.
2. Avoiding Conscription and Tax Pressure
Using contractors removes the historical link between mass conscription and higher taxes on the wealthy.
Governments avoid political pressure to redistribute wealth while still maintaining military force.
3. Tactical Flexibility and Expertise
Contractors provide speed, specialized skills, and niche capabilities that traditional military bureaucracies may lack.
Recruit highly trained veterans from Western militaries or special forces.
Can be deployed quickly for specialized or sensitive missions.
4. Legal “Gray Zones” and Deniability
Contractors occupy an ambiguous legal status, enabling sensitive operations without direct accountability.
Often granted immunity from local laws, especially in volatile regions (e.g., Iraq).
Provides plausible deniability for controversial actions.
5. Compensating for Weak State Capacity
Used by states or regimes that lack effective citizen armies or loyal domestic forces.
Helps maintain internal security and regime survival in oil-rich or fragile states (e.g., Saudi Arabia, UAE).
6. Economic and Political Incentives
Privatization of military services creates lucrative opportunities for politically connected firms.
Contractors often overbill, but governments justify them as “efficient” (neoliberal discourse), despite high costs.
Example: Blackwater received over $1 billion from the U.S. government.
7. Ideological and Strategic Factors
Links to the military-industrial complex and promotion of profit from political power.
Supports a shift toward “political capitalism”, where war and security generate economic gain for private actors and connected elites.
Why are mercenaries in positions of legal precarity?
Mercenaries, or Private Military and Security Contractors (PMSCs), exist in a state of legal precarity primarily because they occupy a "gray zone" of legal uncertainty between being private civilians and public combatants.
1. Lack of Combatant Immunity
Mercenaries/PMSCs are not official state soldiers.
Do not automatically enjoy protections under international law (e.g., combatant immunity).
Their use of force can be treated as criminal under civilian or local law.
2. Ambiguous and Temporary Legal Protections
States often grant temporary immunity to contractors in conflict zones to enable deployment.
Example: In Iraq, contractors were shielded by U.S. occupying forces.
Once immunity ends (e.g., after occupation), contractors face sudden exposure to local courts, prompting firms to withdraw.
3. Plausible Deniability for Hiring States
Contractors’ ambiguous status allows states to avoid legal responsibility for their actions.
If atrocities occur, states can claim it was a private act, leaving contractors in jurisdictional limbo.
4. Precarious Employment and Protections
Contractors are “virtual” employees, not state personnel.
Lack of benefits, pensions, medical coverage, or state-backed legal support.
Legal or injury disputes are handled privately by the employer, not the state.
5. Illegitimacy Perception
Mercenaries are seen as profit-driven rather than serving national interest.
This undermines their normative legal standing under international law, reinforcing precarity.
6. Strategic Advantage for States
Legal precarity makes mercenaries disposable, politically easier to deploy and manage than citizen-soldiers.
What do Russian PMSC’s provide?
Russian Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are part of a global industry that emerged in the 1990s and provide an extensive array of specialized services.
1. Core Services
Logistics Support: Supply, transport, and operational maintenance for military/security missions.
Training: Professional instruction for military, security forces, or client personnel.
Site & Personal Security: Protecting facilities, sensitive sites, or high-value individuals.
Intelligence: Gathering and analyzing information to inform client operations.
2. Combat Roles
Few explicitly advertise as combat forces, but many engage in activities indistinguishable from war fighting.
3. Operational Context
Russia is among the few states that initiate conflicts, providing domestic demand for private military expertise.
Russian PMSCs often operate in high-risk or conflict zones, performing roles aligned with national interests or foreign deployments.
4. Legal and Ethical Issues
Human Rights Abuses: Involvement in violations during operations.
Legal Precarity: Contractors face criminal liability and ambiguous legal status, like other PMSCs.
Criminalization Risks: Use of mercenaries can be illegal under domestic and international law.
Restrictions on Speech: PMCs may be prohibited from discussing operations abroad.
5. Operational Challenges
Corruption & Scandals: Linked to bribery, fraud, and mismanagement.
Financial Vulnerabilities: Sanctions or legal action can disrupt funding and operations.
Limited Effectiveness: Problems with preparation, local knowledge, and integration can reduce mission success.
What challenges did kings in the 14th to 16th centuries face in waging war?
During the 14th to 16th centuries, kings faced significant challenges in waging war primarily because they lacked centralized control over both military forces and the financial resources needed to sustain them.
Unlike modern states, medieval and early modern polities were not unified, and the "state" as a monopoly of force did not yet exist.
1. Lack of Command over Aristocrats
Kings could not directly control nobles; had to persuade or bribe them to join campaigns.
Divided loyalty: nobles maintained control over their own men.
Fragmented armies: lack of cohesion reduced battlefield effectiveness.
Desertion risk: nobles could withdraw their forces if unhappy or uninterested.
2. Part-Time Nature of Soldiers
Most fighters were farmers or townspeople, not professionals.
Limited availability: resisted long-distance or extended campaigns.
Difficult to sustain multi-year wars due to temporary service.
3. Dependency on Mercenaries
Kings hired mercenaries (e.g., Condottieri) to fill gaps.
Mercenary loyalty depended entirely on payment.
Often offered no decisive strategic advantage; victory favored the wealthiest employer.
4. Fiscal “Conundrum”
Circular problem: needed money to hire soldiers → needed soldiers to collect money → needed money again.
Lack of centralized tax bureaucracy.
Aristocrats and clergy often resisted sharing wealth.
Sometimes forced to extract funds by threat or tribute from own subjects.
5. Inconclusive Outcomes
Wars rarely changed borders permanently.
Campaigns often ended with ransoms or agreements to restore pre-war conditions.
Lasting solutions only emerged with nationalism and conscription in the 18th century.
Difference between policing and the police
The difference between the police and policing is the distinction between a specific institution of the state and the broader activity of maintaining order.
The Police: The Institution
"The police" refers to a specific body of publicly employed officers or constables.
• State Authority: They are synonymous with the modern criminal justice state and represent the state's claim to a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.
• Specific Task: Their primary task is to deliver criminals to the formal criminal justice system.
Policing: The Activity
"Policing" is defined as a set of organized activities intended to maintain order and social control.
• Broad Scope: It includes order-maintenance, peacekeeping, law enforcement, crime investigation, prevention, and information-brokering.
• Multiple Providers: Unlike "the police," which is a singular state entity, policing is carried out by an array of actors, including private security firms, communal "self-help" groups, individual citizens, and "monied" entrepreneurs like thief-takers.
• Historical Depth: The concept of policing (historically related to the German Polizei) long predates the formation of state police forces and was originally associated more broadly with the idea of "good government" and communal order
Max Weber’s definition of the state
the claim to a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence.
• The Engines of Power: This monopoly is traditionally realized through the "twin engines" of the police and the army.
The institution of the police is seen as synonymous with the modern state, and public policing is considered a defining characteristic of state power.
The sources question whether this monopoly was ever a practical reality or if it was instead a "highly effective, though illusory, ideological construction" designed to justify state sovereignty over crime control.
In the contemporary "neo-liberal" era, the state has largely relinquished its claim to dominance by fostering a market society where the state is now just "one node among many" in a cluster of public and private security providers.
Historically, the sources suggest that the state's total monopoly may be a "historical blip" in a longer pattern where responsibility for order was distributed among individuals, communities, and private for-profit entities
The Pinkertons
Pinkerton National Detective Agency was founded in Chicago in 1850 as a private police/detective force.
Initially focused on catching thieves and burglars, but quickly became known for strikebreaking and anti-union activities.
Built a strong historical reputation as a violent opponent of labor movements, often hired by large corporations to protect business interests during strikes.
Played major roles in labor conflicts and unrest:
Participated in the 1892 Homestead Strike, where armed conflict between Pinkertons and steelworkers led to multiple deaths.
Acted as infiltrators and operatives in other labor disputes, including railroad and mining strikes.
Linked by critics to episodes of industrial espionage, union infiltration, and suppression.
Accused historically of using undercover agents to infiltrate unions and worker organizations (e.g., the Molly Maguires case).
Investigated by a U.S. Senate civil liberties committee in the 1930s for anti-labor practices like strikebreaking and espionage.
Agency leadership later claimed to have ended formal anti-union work (1937), though the text questions how fully that shift occurred.
Also credited with some notable historical actions:
Intelligence work for the Union in the Civil War.
Supporting abolitionist causes.
Helping foil a plot against President Lincoln.
Pursuing famous outlaws.
In modern times, the agency has rebranded toward corporate security and risk management, emphasizing data, analytics, and corporate investigations.
Now owned by Securitas AB and reportedly hired by large corporations, including Amazon, for security and surveillance-related work — raising renewed concerns about worker monitoring and anti-union tactics.
Overall theme of the text: the Pinkertons are portrayed as a symbol of private force used on behalf of capital against organized labor, with a controversial legacy that continues into the present.
Jonathan Wild (The Regulator)
Jonathan Wild was an early 18th-century London crime controller known as “The Regulator” and is often described as the first to build a coordinated private policing system.
He combined crime control and organized crime, acting as both a leader within the underworld and a central figure in “policing” it.
Originally an apprentice buckle-maker, he fell into debtors’ prison, where he built key underworld connections that launched his later operations.
He became a receiver of stolen goods and brothel-keeper, learning how stolen property markets worked and how victims valued recovery.
He discovered a profitable model: victims would pay more to recover stolen goods than receivers earned reselling them, leading him to create a “lost property” recovery system.
He set up a lost property house where victims paid fees to retrieve items; he used an information network of thieves and informants to arrange returns rather than handling goods directly.
He styled himself “Thief-Taker General” and projected a respectable public image, claiming to fight crime while secretly controlling much of it.
He practiced selective enforcement: protected thieves who worked under his control and informed on rival criminals, using the courts to eliminate competitors.
His power depended on corrupt partnerships with magistrates and officials, showing how early private policing and state justice could overlap.
His career ended in 1725, when he was prosecuted and hanged for receiving stolen goods; his rise and fall are seen as either a precursor to modern policing systems or a warning about privatized, profit-driven crime control.
Fielding’s Bow Street Runners
Henry Fielding’s work at Bow Street (from 1748 onward) marked a key shift from informal thief-taking to a more organized, semi-public policing system in London.
After being appointed a magistrate in 1748, Fielding used his position to centralize and strengthen crime control operations in west London.
He recruited and organized private thief-takers into a structured group working out of Bow Street, creating an early prototype of a coordinated detective force.
Fielding brought together experienced private agents and organized them into public offices, making their work more systematic and visible.
The system followed a “monied police” model: agents were paid through rewards and private fees, similar to earlier mercenary-style thief-takers.
Fielding promoted a philosophy of crime prevention over prosecution, arguing it was better to stop crime early than simply arrest many offenders afterward.
He tried to improve the public image of thief-takers, arguing their dangerous work for society made the role honourable and necessary.
Despite reform efforts, Bow Street operations were affected by ongoing corruption within the magistracy and thief-taking system.
Some agents connected to the Bow Street group were involved in “blood-money” conspiracies — staging crimes or framing innocent people to claim government rewards.
Fielding himself is generally portrayed as personally reform-minded and not directly corrupt, and his Bow Street model is often seen as an important early step toward modern preventive policing, even though it was later overshadowed by more formal police reforms.
Post-regulatory State
A post-regulatory state describes a system where the state is no longer the only or central regulator, and control is exercised through multiple actors and methods, not just formal law.
Governance shifts from direct service delivery (“rowing”) to indirect coordination (“steering”), with the state guiding rather than fully operating systems like security and policing.
Regulation becomes decentralized, involving non-state actors such as private companies, industry bodies, and community organizations.
Scholars link this model to ideas like regulatory society and regulatory capitalism, where regulation is spread across markets and institutions instead of concentrated in government.
Security and crime control operate through hybrid governance, combining state authority with private security, community self-regulation, and market mechanisms.
Control is achieved through engineered compliance tools beyond criminal law, including contracts, licensing, audits, competition, insurance requirements, and environmental/architectural design.
Governance becomes networked, with the state acting as one node among many in a broader regulatory and security network.
The state still plays an “anchoring” role, setting frameworks and standards to keep diverse actors aligned with public interest goals.
Critics argue this is not state withdrawal but state “hyper-innovation” — the state is still active, but uses new, indirect regulatory techniques.
Non-state regulation often has limits and weaknesses (e.g., voluntary self-regulation can lack enforcement power) and ultimately still depends on formal law and the threat of legal sanctions (“the iron fist”) in the background.
Mass Private Property
Mass private property refers to large privately owned spaces that function like public places, where everyday social, commercial, and transit activities occur.
The concept was developed by Clifford Shearing and Philip Stenning in the early 1980s to explain changing urban security and governance patterns.
Typical examples include shopping malls, airports, sports stadiums, universities, transit hubs, and gated communities — all privately owned but widely used by the public.
These spaces have a dual nature: legally private, but socially public in how people use them for daily life and interaction.
Mass private property has been a major driver of growth in the private security industry, since owners are responsible for protecting and managing these spaces.
Property owners have legal authority to set entry rules and behaviour standards and can hire private security to enforce them.
This creates “latent demand” for private security, meaning owners can expand security measures whenever they feel public policing is insufficient or want tighter control.
These sites often become “security bubbles” — highly protected and ordered environments — sometimes increasing inequality by shifting risk and disorder to surrounding public areas.
Expansion of mass private property is seen as a challenge to traditional public space, because access and rights are controlled by owners rather than public law and democratic accountability.
The concept supports theories of nodal governance, where each private property “node” has its own rules, surveillance, and guards — meaning people increasingly move through multiple private security regimes in everyday life.
Industry Self-regulation
Industry self-regulation is a governance model where an industry sets and monitors its own standards through voluntary codes, trade associations, and professional guidelines instead of binding state law.
It is often described as community regulation, relying on cooperation and shared norms within the industry rather than formal legal enforcement.
It is based on responsive regulation theory, which argues that encouraging industries to regulate themselves can produce better compliance than strict top-down laws.
Governments historically supported self-regulation because they believed the industry’s interest in maintaining quality and reputation would motivate good behavior without heavy legislation.
Under neo-liberal market logic, policymakers assumed that competition would eliminate poor providers if voluntary standards failed.
In practice, self-regulation in the private security sector largely failed to ensure high standards or consistent accountability.
A major weakness was the “club government” problem: regulation was handled informally by insiders, limiting transparency and public oversight.
Participation in self-regulatory schemes was voluntary, and many firms (especially smaller ones) simply refused to join, leaving large parts of the industry unregulated.
Self-regulatory bodies had “no teeth” — they lacked legal enforcement power, and companies could avoid penalties by resigning membership.
Due to corruption, low standards, and criminal infiltration, governments shifted to mandatory state regulation and licensing, with even large firms supporting stricter laws to push out non-compliant competitors.
Nodal Governance Model
The nodal governance model explains modern security as produced by a network of multiple actors, where the state is only one node among many, not the sole provider of order.
It rejects a purely top-down, state-centered model of policing and instead sees security as created through plural public–private networks.
A “node” is a localized site of governance — such as a shopping mall, airport, gated community, or transit hub — with its own security regime.
The model is closely associated with scholars such as Clifford Shearing, Les Johnston, and Jennifer Wood.
Governance within nodes operates through horizontal power-sharing relationships, not just vertical command chains from government authorities.
Each node uses a distinct mix of tools and resources — such as private guards, surveillance systems, rules of entry, contracts, and environmental design — to produce compliance and order.
The model takes a “post-monopoly” perspective, arguing analysts should not assume public police are more important than private security without empirical evidence.
It treats the balance of state and non-state power as an empirical question, meaning each security setting must be studied case by case.
It is designed to move beyond state-centered (“Westphalian”) frameworks that assume the state monopolizes legitimate force.
Key critiques: the model may overemphasize economic drivers (like mass private property) and underestimate political and cultural expectations that security should remain primarily a state responsibility, even within hybrid public–private systems.
Anchored Pluralism Model
The anchored pluralism model says that many groups (public and private) can provide security, but the state must stay in charge overall as the “anchor” to keep security fair and in the public interest.
The model is mainly linked to Ian Loader and Neil Walker, and is presented as an alternative to nodal governance theories.
It argues that security is a public good, not just a product you buy — everyone should have access, not only those who can pay.
The state’s role is to guide, oversee, and set rules for all security providers, even if it does not deliver all services itself.
The model is based on classic political ideas from thinkers like Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, who argued that society needs a strong public authority to prevent disorder.
Supporters say public police have special legitimacy and symbolic value — people see them as representing fairness, law, and shared protection.
Private security companies often lack this natural public trust, because they work for profit and serve paying clients first.
To look more legitimate, private security firms often copy state symbols and practices — for example, hiring former police officers, using police-style uniforms, and supporting state licensing laws.
The model warns that without strong state oversight, security could become unequal, where the wealthy get better protection than everyone else.
Main criticism: anchored pluralism may focus too much on ideals about state legitimacy and not enough on the real-world growth and economic power of private security markets.
New Political Economy Model
The new political economy model of private security explains how the private security industry is shaped by both money forces and political ideas at the same time.
The model was developed by Adam White to connect two older views: one that focuses on markets and one that focuses on state legitimacy.
It says private security companies are not just businesses — they are political and economic actors who must succeed in the market and gain public trust.
On the economic side, private security grows because of market demand — more fear of crime, more private property sites, and gaps where public police cannot cover everything.
Companies respond to supply and demand, offering new security services where customers are willing to pay.
On the political side, many people believe security should belong to the state, so private firms often face skepticism or distrust.
To gain acceptance, private firms use legitimacy strategies — for example, hiring former police officers, using police-style uniforms, and supporting government licensing rules.
The model says the economic and political sides affect each other: firms can only make money if people see them as legitimate, and market success helps them gain more political support.
To study private security, researchers should look at both local market conditions (crime, property, demand) and cultural signals (symbols, uniforms, language that copies the state).
Overall, the model argues that today’s system is mixed: security is provided by many private and public actors, but private companies still try to present themselves as working alongside the state for the public good, not just selling a product.
Transnational Security Consultancy Industry
The transnational security consultancy (TSC) industry is part of the private security market that provides knowledge-based, high-level risk protection rather than basic guard services.
Key firms include Control Risks, Kroll, ArmorGroup, Diligence, and The Risk Advisory Group.
The workforce is elite and experienced, often hiring retired personnel from intelligence and military agencies (e.g., CIA, FBI, SAS) to gain access to networks and “state-like” expertise.
TSCs use a “glocal” strategy, combining global presence with local knowledge to operate effectively in complex or dangerous regions.
Their main clients are the Transnationally Mobile Middle Class (TMMC) — professionals like bankers, lawyers, and engineers who travel and work across borders — providing “corridors of security” for global mobility.
The industry started in the 1970s with kidnap and ransom (K&R) services in Latin America and now works with insurers to manage hostage situations and corporate losses.
TSCs have expanded into emergency medical, concierge, and disaster response services, partnering with companies like International SOS to provide safety, healthcare, and business continuity in crises.
A recent trend is the “Neo-liberal (Re)turn”, moving these services from the Global South to the Global North, offering private rescue and elite protection for disasters in countries like the US and Europe.
The industry has a close relationship with governments, which can lead to blurred responsibility for controversial operations or foreign policy actions
Critics warn that TSCs increase inequality, protecting wealthy clients while leaving poorer populations vulnerable, and may redirect risks like kidnappings toward those without access to private security.
Elite Rescue Service
Elite rescue is a specialized part of the transnational security consultancy (TSC) industry that provides high-level extraction and protection for wealthy, mobile clients.
It is designed to locate, extract, and return individuals who face danger in unstable regions, keeping them safe and able to continue their work.
The main clients are the Transnationally Mobile Middle Class (TMMC) — bankers, lawyers, engineers, and corporate executives who travel through high-risk areas.
Clients are seen as valuable corporate assets, justifying the high cost of subscription-based protection.
Elite rescue uses a “toolkit” of services, often through strategic partnerships:
Kidnap and Ransom (K&R): Originally from 1970s Latin America, TSCs work with specialist insurers (e.g., Hiscox) to negotiate releases rather than use military-style rescues.
Emergency Medical & Concierge Services: Partnerships (like WorldShield between Clayton Consultants and WorldClinic) provide health and security oversight for travelers.
Disaster & Crisis Evacuation: Extraction during events like natural disasters, terrorist attacks (e.g., Mumbai 2008), or civil unrest (e.g., airport blockades in Thailand).
Elite rescue focuses on facilitating movement for elites (“Tourists”) rather than controlling people like traditional state security does for marginalized groups (“Vagabonds”).
The industry has expanded into the Global North following state failures, offering services to wealthy residents in areas at risk of disasters, like South Florida after Hurricane Katrina.
Critics describe this trend as “disaster apartheid” or the “privatization of fate”, where safety is available only to the rich.
Providing protection to elites can create negative effects for others, such as increasing risks for poorer local populations who cannot afford private security.
Overall, elite rescue combines high-end security, medical support, and evacuation services to maintain the mobility and safety of a privileged, globally mobile clientele.
Gendered Privatization
Gendered privatization is the idea that moving security and military services from the state to private companies is not neutral, but reinforces unequal relations between men and women.
Privatization often acts as a “remasculinization” of security, making it more male-dominated compared to increasingly inclusive public militaries.
Security shifts from citizenship-based logic (everyone’s safety) to market logic, where access and work are determined by money and contracts.
Private firms mostly hire from elite combat units and Special Forces, which historically exclude women, keeping high-level security roles male-dominated.
Women are often assigned support roles (administrative, clerical, or emotional work), while men dominate dangerous, low-paid, or managerial positions.
High-paying expert or managerial roles are usually reserved for white, Western men, emphasizing identity and past military experience.
Privatization weakens accountability, making it harder to hold companies responsible for sexual or gender-based violence (SGBV) against local populations.
Private firms can ignore gender equality rules, bypassing public-sector requirements, and many certified companies lack policies or reporting channels sensitive to women’s needs.
Two ways to analyze gender in private security:
Problem-solving approach: hiring more women to improve operations or reputation.
Critical approach: recognizes that the industry itself is built on gendered power structures that need deeper change.
Overall, the rise of private security depends on gendered labor “supply chains”, and understanding it requires looking at how gender shapes recruitment, roles, and accountability.
Problem Solving Approach vs. Gender Critical Approach
There are two main ways to think about gender in private security: the problem-solving approach and the gender-critical approach.
The problem-solving approach treats gender as a tool to improve efficiency or reputation.
It assumes that hiring more women will make the company look better or work better in certain tasks, like searches or customer-facing roles.
This approach does not challenge the industry’s male-dominated structure; it focuses on adding women into an existing system.
In contrast, the gender-critical approach looks at the deep power imbalances in the industry.
It argues that simply hiring women is not enough because the system itself favors men and reproduces inequality.
Gender-critical thinking examines how roles, authority, and labor are divided by gender, not just the number of women employed.
It also considers how privatized security weakens accountability for gender-based violence and discrimination.
The gender-critical approach aims to reform the foundations of the industry, not just make superficial adjustments.
Overall, the key difference is that problem-solving adds women to the system, while gender-critical seeks to change the system itself.
Body Bag Effect
The body bag effect refers to the public and political backlash that happens when national soldiers die in wars, which governments want to avoid.
Rich countries, like the United States, often hire private military contractors (mercenaries) to reduce this effect.
Reducing the perception of death: Contractor deaths are not counted in official casualty numbers and rarely reported in the media.
This creates an illusion that the human cost of war is low, making military interventions more acceptable to voters.
Western societies today are less tolerant of war deaths due to smaller populations and greater value placed on individual life.
Public soldiers’ deaths are heavily memorialized, increasing social pressure and making governments cautious about sending troops into danger.
Contractors are seen as employees rather than national heroes, so their deaths do not provoke the same public outrage.
Rarely, contractor deaths gain attention, such as the 2004 Blackwater incident in Fallujah, because of shocking visuals and media coverage.
Using contractors allows governments to practice “risk-transfer warfare”, attacking enemies while keeping official soldiers safer.
Overall, the body bag effect explains why privatizing military roles helps governments avoid political costs associated with visible battlefield deaths.
Mercenary
A mercenary is someone who fights primarily for money or for a foreign cause that is not linked to their own country.
The term is very old and has been applied to soldiers from Alexander the Great’s army to modern private military contractors (PMCs).
The definition is contested and often used as a political insult rather than a strict legal category.
Financial motivation alone doesn’t define a mercenary, because all professional soldiers are paid.
Fighting for foreign causes isn’t enough either, as national armies (like the French Foreign Legion) recruit foreigners without labeling them mercenaries.
The key feature of a mercenary is operating outside state authority and without collective, national purpose.
The label signals illegitimacy:
Soldiers are seen as fighting for the nation, while mercenaries are seen as fighting for personal profit.
Modern Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), like Academi (formerly Blackwater), emphasize professionalism to avoid being called mercenaries.
Historically, most pre-18th century European soldiers were essentially mercenaries, but citizen armies emerged after the American and French Revolutions to replace them.
Today, mercenaries differ from national soldiers because they serve paying clients instead of the nation, providing security for whoever hires them rather than for all citizens.
PMCS
Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are companies that provide military and security services, from training and logistics to armed combat and intelligence.
Unlike historic "soldiers of fortune," modern PMSCs operate as organized, corporate businesses within a global, billion-dollar industry.
PMSCs treat security as a “club good”, available only to paying clients, rather than a public good for everyone like national militaries.
They offer diverse services: frontline combat, site protection, personal security for diplomats, training for police, and running private prisons.
PMSCs have a large presence in war zones; during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, there were roughly 1.43 contractors for every American soldier by 2010.
Why governments use them:
Casualty management: Contractor deaths aren’t counted in official totals or widely reported, hiding the real human cost of war.
Cost and tax avoidance: Using contractors avoids pressure to raise taxes or provide social welfare.
Political connections: Many firms get no-bid contracts and huge profits, described as “political capitalism.”
PMSCs avoid being called mercenaries, emphasizing professionalism, ethics, and legal authorization to appear legitimate.
Critics say PMSCs lack national motivation and operate outside state control, sometimes undermining military goals by prioritizing client protection over civilian safety.
Globally, PMSCs are used in weak states by rich governments or corporations to protect resources or maintain power.
They are sometimes called “parasitic” because they hire trained veterans from public militaries, creating shortages in state forces and more demand for private contractors.
Overall, PMSCs show a return to private force from early modern history, but now structured as modern corporations within national and global politics.