Iraq's Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990

Introduction

The article discusses the decisions made by Saddam Husayn to engage in wars in 1980 and 1990.
Thesis: The decisions were influenced by Saddam's perception of threats to his regime from both domestic and international actors.

Saddam Husayn viewed his regime as facing serious pressures, making war a viable alternative to preserve his power.
Historical context highlights the lack of correlation between domestic politics and war decisions based on existing literature; case studies emphasize the need for specificity in how domestic factors inform war decisions.
The argument is based on the premise that safeguarding power is a fundamental goal for leaders, especially in regimes lacking strong electoral or constitutional support.

Domestic Security Considerations:
- Saddam's decision-making was less about gaining popularity and more about neutralizing external threats that he believed jeopardized his regime's stability.
- The attacks on Iran were motivated by concerns about Iranian influence on Iraqi Shi’i opposition, while the invasion of Kuwait was seen as a response to Kuwaiti economic actions that threatened Iraq's resource stability.

Comparison between the contexts of the 1980 Iran-Iraq War and the 1990 invasion of Kuwait:
- In both cases, Saddam perceived ongoing threats to his regime that necessitated a military response.
- Similar fears and perceptions that external events—whether regional adversaries or global powers—were orchestrating efforts to undermine his regime.

Offensive Realism:
- Often cited as a rationale for Saddam's decisions, emphasizing opportunities for territorial and economic gains.
- The argument suggests Saddam saw both Iran and Kuwait as vulnerable targets for military aggression due to their relative weakness at the time.
Saddam’s Personality Traits:
- Some interpretations link Saddam's aggressiveness to his personal characteristics and longstanding traditions among dictators to seek glory through military conflict.
Economic Crisis Argument:
- In 1990, Iraq faced an economic crisis, fueling arguments that the invasion of Kuwait was economically motivated.
- Critique: Economic troubles alone do not naturally lead to aggressive foreign policies, as seen in other nations during crises without resorting to war.

Differences in outcomes illustrate the enduring impact of perceived threats to domestic security over opportunities for gains:
- 1975 Algiers Accord: Saddam’s acceptance of border concessions was driven by commitments from Iran to cease supporting Iraqi dissidents, thus prioritizing regime survival over territorial integrity.
- 1991 Invasion Context: As international pressures escalated post-invasion, including coalition force build-up, Saddam believed withdrawal would not alleviate threats to his rule, leading ultimately to irrefutable consequences.

The decisions made by Saddam Husayn to engage in war in both 1980 and 1990 underline the critical role of perceived threats to regime stability over opportunistic calculations.
While victory was seen as possible, these decisions were primarily driven by an urgent need to address existential threats to his rule.