Revolutions Without Enemies: Key Transformations in Political Science (Dryzek, 2006)

In the Beginning Was the State

• American political science is described as a congenitally unsettled discipline prone to reform movements aimed at reorienting its fundamental character. Five movements are identified as revolutions in the discipline’s history:
  • late nineteenth-century statism (founding state-building science)
  • early twentieth-century pluralism
  • mid-twentieth-century behavioralism
  • the Caucus for a New Political Science (Caucus) in the late 1960s–early 1970s
  • the Perestroika movement in the early twenty-first century
• Kuhn’s paradigm-shift notion is generally not treated as the right frame for these changes; Dryzek emphasizes concrete programmatic shifts (new research programs) rather than Kuhnian paradigm shifts.
• A successful revolution is defined as a re-set of the discipline’s agenda validated by practitioners, even if they do not share the movement’s commitments. Crucially, the movement’s success hinges on its being recognized as such by the discipline.
• A striking pattern: the only two revolutions that clearly succeeded (statism and behavioralism) had no serious internal enemies within the discipline at the moment of their rise; enemies emerged only after success, which paradoxically helped validate the transformation.
• Consequence: over 150 years, the discipline has seen few reform attempts that actually reorient its core agenda in a durable way; many efforts fail because they meet internal resistance or fail to achieve widespread practitioner validation.
• The focus of this piece is developments in United States politics (with some integration of political theory); while comparative politics and international relations are mentioned, the American political science identity and normative purpose center the discussion.

The concept of the state and the founding moment

• The state concept becomes central to American political discourse in the late nineteenth century through key figures who would anchor the new discipline: Francis Lieber, Woodrow Wilson, and others.
• Wilson and contemporaries envisioned a political system with disciplined parties, informed policies, Congress, and expert administration—the “administrative state” that would “breathe free American air” (Wilson 1887).
• Empirical studies of American institutions exposed fragmentation, sectionalism, parochialism, and corruption, reinforcing the aim of a unified, strong state.
• The central practical task of early political science was seen as establishing a unitary national state accompanied by virtuous citizenship; this included normative advocacy for state-building as part of the discipline’s project.
• Frank Goodnow (1904) framed political science as assisting the realization of “State will.”
• The discipline’s founders sought to supplant amateur political analysis with a professional, reform-oriented program. This professionalization was not merely descriptive; it carried an agenda that could be seen as political activism.
• The American Social Science Association (ASSA, 1865) represented the older, reformist, activist, and public-welfare oriented tradition, which was not conducive to the serious, critical study of politics. APSA (1903) and the American Sociological Association (1905) helped establish the professional discipline and moved away from ASSA’s amateurism.
• The founding generation sought to establish a distinct professional identity centered on the state; the state’s primacy in the discipline’s early identity explains why resistance within the nascent field was minimal—the “enemy” lay outside the discipline at its outset.

The Pluralist Revolt

• The United States has always been more plural than the statists’ preferred narrative; pluralism is treated as fragmentation by statists, not as a valued condition.
• Arthur Bentley (1908) is treated as a precursor by behavioralists, but his later work Makers, Users and Masters criticized domination by groups, signaling early ambivalence toward pluralism’s descriptive versus normative implications.
• Charles Merriam and other statists still sought centralization and social control in the 1920s, signaling normative aspirations for consolidation.
• Normative pluralism emerges in the 1910s–1920s with Harold Laski and Mary Parker Follett. Laski’s pluralism is rooted in a Jamesian ethics emphasizing diverse experiences rather than top-down social engineering; Follett champions bottom-up group organization and asks, “What is to be done with this diversity?” (Follett, quoted in Gunnell 2004).
• George Catlin (1927) represents a key figure in empirical pluralism: he accepted plurality as a fact but grounded it in self-interest of groups rather than in experiential diversity. Catlin’s pluralism is thus less revolutionary than Laski/Follett’s normative pluralism.
• The behavioral-era pluralists regard plurality as rooted in interests rather than experience, a shift that, paradoxically, moved pluralism away from its original, more radical normative dimension.
• The claim that this period constituted a revolution hinges on whether normative pluralism became a disciplinary program that reoriented research; in practice, it did not, because disciplinary practitioners did not validate a normative shift from the statists’ project.
• Kuhn’s notion of invisibility is invoked to argue that revolutions may pass without immediate recognition; however, Dryzek argues that in political science, the 1920s–1940s did not display a cumulative redefinition that would be recognized as a revolution by the discipline. Key resistors to normative pluralism included Beard, Shepard, Coker, and Elliott; Laski was stigmatized as radical, and pluralism was sometimes linked to fascism by critics (Elliott, 1928; other debates cited by Gunnell).
• By the mid-century, normative statism faded from the discipline’s lexicon, except in international relations, where the state remained central.

Behavioralism

• Behavioralism is defined by three commitments: (1) a research focus on political behavior, (2) a methodological plea for science, and (3) a political message advocating liberal pluralism; Easton (1953) is a central reference point.
• The movement emphasizes the individual (though it can analyze individuals in groups pursuing collective interests) and aligns with a system-level view (the political system) as the organizing concept (Easton 1953).
• Two central figures of early behavioralism, Robert Dahl and David Truman, are themselves committed behavioralists; Truman chaired the SSRC’s Committee on Political Behavior in the 1950s.
• The 1950s–1960s witnessed a self-conscious celebration of behavioralism’s triumph (e.g., Dahl 1961).
• The core critique of traditional political science was its alleged hyperfactualism and lack of explanatory theory; Easton’s The Political System (1953, ch. 2–3) is the movement’s emblematic manifesto, though it is notable for lacking explicit names of contemporaries who were “guilty” of the alleged sins.
• Important nuance: Easton’s footnotes (Chapter 2) name a few figures as exceptions (Key, Simon, Merriam, Herring, Appleby, Lasswell, Gosnell, Eldersveld), but most are praised rather than condemned; the text highlights that the actual targeted opponents of traditionalism were not clearly identified (which complicates the claim of a clean break).
• The concept of the latent theory of traditionalists is discussed via Merle Fainsod’s “parallelogram of forces,” which explained policy decisions as the result of competing forces. Fainsod (1949) later becomes president of APSA (1968) and defends the discipline’s establishment against the Caucus by restricting access to the Annual Conference program.
• The critique of tradition did not come from formal institutional analysts opposing science; traditional formalism had a long-standing critical history (Bentley, Wilson).
• The APSA’s core objective, as stated in its 1903 constitution, was “the encouragement of the scientific study of politics,” signaling a long-standing emphasis on science as the discipline’s backbone.
• What behavioralism did oppose was not a single, unified set of opponents but a shift away from “hyperfactual” history toward behavior, science, and system. Yet the identity of the traditionalists remained somewhat diffuse; there was no single party-line opposition.
• Behavioralism contributed significantly to the discipline: more survey research, increased quantitative methods, more funding from NSF, and a shift away from policy-oriented work toward generalizable explanations of political behavior.
• Institutions remained part of the picture, but behavioralism foregrounded behavior and systems over institutional description alone. This period also saw the marginalization of political theory within the discipline as emigre critics (e.g., Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin) offered critiques of liberalism from outside the mainstream, leading to a divorce between political theory and mainstream political science. The liberal-democratic work of Dahl (1956) remained within the mainstream, illustrating possible boundaries for theory under a behavioral umbrella.
• A crucial, nuanced point: the most radical “novelty” of behavioralism was not a radical new theory of politics but rather an interest-based form of pluralism as normative theory; the state’s normative role waned in this era.
• By the 1950s, the old normative statism had few defenders; even Elliott moved beyond statism, and the state’s whose influence waned within discipline circles.
• Behavioralism faced resistance in the 1960s, but the principal opponents were not simply “traditionalists”: Straussian theory (Storing 1962) emerged as one strand, while left-leaning critics (e.g., Charlesworth 1962, Bay 1965) highlighted politicization concerns and sought alternatives to reconcile science with social commitment. These critics did not defend the old traditionalism but pursued different reformist routes.
• Overall, behavioralism reshaped the discipline’s research priorities and methods, but its lasting impact on a unified disciplinary agenda was complex and contested. It did not, by itself, remake the political science field as a unified alternative to the old paradigm; it reoriented but did not wholly replace previous modes of inquiry.

Children of the Revolution: The Caucus for a New Political Science

• The left’s criticisms of behavioralism coalesced into the Caucus for a New Political Science (formed around 1967 at the APSA meeting), with prominent members including Peter Bachrach, Christian Bay, Theodore Lowi, Michael Parenti, Alan Wolfe, Sheldon Wolin, and even Hans Morgenthau (who opposed the Vietnam War).
• The Caucus argued for:
  • a discipline oriented toward social problems and crises (Vietnam War, race, poverty, environmental and feminist concerns);
  • a discipline that would take collective political stands rather than remain politically neutral;
  • a broader commitment to political relevance and reform of the APSA itself.
• The Caucus sought to move away from the strict, technocratic focus of behavioralism and demanded a publicly engaged stance on contemporary political issues.
• Despite its strong agenda, the Caucus faced stiff resistance from the APSA hierarchy and internal power structures; panels proposed by the Caucus were often frozen out (1968 APSA Annual Conference).
• David Easton, in 1969, offered a conciliatory response in a presidential address, suggesting a “New Revolution in Political Science” that would put behavioral techniques at the service of social problems and integrate Easton’s system concepts; however, this did not heal the divide or fully reorient the discipline.
• The Caucus contributed to the emergence of policy-oriented subfields (e.g., public policy) in the 1970s but failed to re-set the discipline’s agenda in a way recognized by all practitioners.
• The Caucus gradually shifted toward professional organizational roles: it helped create the “New Political Science” journal and persisted as an APSA Organized Section, but its bloc influence remained limited within the broader discipline.
• A note on legacy: the Caucus’ energy did not fully realize the kind of reform it sought, and many of its members later entered mainstream leadership positions (e.g., Lowi, Katznelson) through the official channels of the discipline. Some members did eventually attain APSA presidencies, illustrating a partial assimilation into the established order.
• The Perestroika movement of the early 2000s shows that the Caucus’ lineage persisted in the broader reform tradition, but many younger scholars in Perestroika were unaware of the Caucus’ prior existence, indicating a disconnection from this earlier reform effort.

Proliferating Research Programs, but No Further Revolution

• After behavioralism, the discipline enters a phase of diversification, with multiple research programs coexisting rather than a single, unified revolution.
• The 1980s see the return of the state into analysis, but in a different guise: the state is treated as an independent variable (i.e., state actors have their own interests and operate within institutional constraints), diverging from the earlier comprehensive statism but not constituting a new revolution.
• This inquiry into the state aligns with a broader move toward more focused subfields and actor-centered approaches; it does not imply a wholesale reorientation of the discipline’s agenda.
• The rational choice revolution gains prominence in the 1990s, expanding the discipline’s methodological toolkit and emphasizing formal modeling, optimization, and assumptions about rational behavior (Arrow, Downs, Black, Riker, etc.).
• Rational choice enters the top journals and becomes a major program alongside behavioralism, new institutionalism (non-rationalist variants), cultural analysis, and empirical political psychology. It is presented by some as an advance over pure behavioralism, yet it does not erase the existence or value of prior programs.
• The author notes that this proliferation of programs reflects a broader disjunction: while the field has more research programs than ever, there is no single, unambiguous, discipline-wide agenda to re-set the discipline as a whole.
• The critic Eulau (1972) and others in the 1960s–1970s lament “disciplinary drift” and fragmentation; the discipline’s agenda is more diffuse, with numerous subfields and methodologies coexisting without a single dominant paradigm.
• The overall point is that revolutions in the Dryzek sense—clear, hinges-on-enemies, agenda-resetting shifts—are rare. The discipline tends to evolve through multiple reform programs that adapt to changing public concerns and theoretical developments rather than through sweeping, singular revolutions.

Conclusion

• Dryzek concludes that the reorientation of American political science has been rare, with only two clear episodes that meet his criteria for a successful revolution (statism and behavioralism).
• A successful revolution requires mutual validation by practitioners and a resetting of the discipline’s agenda; revolutions that directly confront established practices without broad internal resistance tend not to succeed if resistance surfaces.
• The Caucus for a New Political Science is viewed as the “child” of the behavioral revolution, illustrating how reform movements can give rise to subsequent reformist currents without achieving a wholesale, lasting reorientation of the discipline.
• Over time, even successful revolutions can lose their agenda-setting power as new problems, technologies, and research programs emerge (e.g., rational choice and new institutionalism), leading to a more pluralistic, fragmented, and adaptive discipline rather than a single, unified paradigm.
• The article emphasizes that revolutions without enemies—movements that do not provoke explicit resistance within the discipline—tend to be the only kind that can succeed in reorienting American political science. The broader implication is that true reform requires a combination of persuasive internal alignment, acceptance by practitioners, and alignment with shifting public problems; outright opposition inside the discipline undermines transformative potential.

Key terms and figures to remember

• Statism: the early professionalization movement centered on building a unified state and a disciplined citizenry; foundational to the discipline’s identity.
• Pluralism: recognition of multiple centers of power and interest; normative (Laski, Follett) and empirical (Catlin) strands; contested as revolutionary at the time.
• Behavioralism: focus on political behavior, insistence on scientific method, and liberal pluralist messaging; system concept (Easton) and empirical turn; substantial methodological impact and realignment of research agendas.
• Caucus for a New Political Science: reform movement challenging behavioralism’s political quietism and advocating a politically engaged, problem-oriented, and activist stance; limited success in reorienting APSA.
• Perestroika: early twenty-first-century movement advocating methodological pluralism and qualitative inquiry to address pressing public problems; cited as a partial continuation of reform efforts but not deeply analyzed in this article.
• Easton’s political system and the inputs–outputs–feedback model: a framework for understanding how political systems process demands and supports; a core element of the behavioral program’s theoretical apparatus.
• Fainsod’s parallelogram of forces: a latent theory of traditionalists describing how policy decisions are the product of competing forces; used to critique the supposed simplicity of the behavioral critique.
• “Minerva’s owl” metaphor: Perestroika as a less visible evolution relative to earlier revolutions; used to indicate that some reform efforts receive less iconographic recognition.

Notable references cited (selected)

• Easton, David. 1953. The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science.
• Dahl, Robert A. 1956; 1961. A Preface to Democratic Theory; “The Behavioral Approach in Political Science” (PS).
• Catlin, George E. G. 1927. The Science and Method of Politics.
• Laski, Harold J. 1917; Follett, Mary Parker. 1918.
• Herring, Pendleton; Elliott, William Yandell. 1928.
• Fainsod, Merle. 1953 (parallelogram of forces work cited in Easton’s discussion).
• The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn. 1962.
• Gunnell, John G. (various works on the invention of political theory and the state’s decline in the traditional sense).
• Lowi, Theodore J. (The End of Liberalism, 1969; Politicization of Political Science, 1973).
• Ranney, Austin (interviews and reflections on the discipline’s history).
• Seidelman and Harpham (Disenchanted Realists, 1984).
• Farr, James (various works on the state, behavioralism, and history of political science).

Connections to broader themes

• The story of revolutions without enemies underscores how professional identity, methodological commitments, and perceived relevance shape reform—often more than explicit ideological opposition.
• The oscillation between statist, pluralist, behavioralist, and activist/committed strands reflects ongoing debates about the discipline’s purpose: to explain and to influence politics, to remain apolitical, or to engage directly with public problems.
• The persistence of multiple research programs today (rational choice, new institutionalism, cultural analysis, policy studies, political psychology) illustrates the long arc of evolution in political science: gradual diversification rather than wholesale reorganization.

ext{Inputs}
ightarrow ext{Outputs}
ightarrow ext{Feedback}
ightarrow ext{Inputs}
$ext{Policy change} = f( ext{forces A, B, C, …})$

• These LaTeX snippets summarize core structural ideas cited in the discussion of Easton’s political system and the latent theory of traditionalists (parallelogram of forces).